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Executive Summary
1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML) / counter-terrorist financing 
(CTF) measures in place in Australia as at the date of the on-site visit (30 July – 12 August 2014). It analyses 
the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Australia’s AML/
CTF system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. 
A.  Key Findings
 Overall, Australian authorities have a good understanding of most of Australia’s main money 
laundering (ML) risks but need to develop their understanding further in certain areas. They 
coordinate very well activities to address key aspects of the ML / terrorist financing (TF) risks but some key risks remain unaddressed, and an underlying concern remains that the 
authorities are addressing predicate crime rather than ML.
 Authorities have a good understanding of TF risks, and are addressing them accordingly. 
They assess that TF is largely motivated by international tensions and conflicts.
 Operationally, national AML/CTF coordination is very comprehensive, but demonstrating its overall success is challenging, although results from national taskforces are showing positive 
trends. A stronger focus is required on monitoring and measuring success.
 Australia develops and disseminates good quality financial intelligence to a range of law 
enforcement bodies, customs and tax authorities. The amount of financial transaction data 
in the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) database, and the fact that that all relevant competent authorities have access to this database and can use 
its integrated analytical tool, are strengths of Australia’s AML/CTF system. However, the 
somewhat limited use of AUSTRAC information by law enforcement as a trigger to commence 
ML/TF investigations presents a weakness in the Australian AML/CTF system.
 Australia’s main criminal justice policy objective is to disrupt and deter predicate crime, 
including if necessary through ML investigations/prosecutions. Australia focuses on what it considers to be the main three proceeds generating predicate threats (drugs, fraud and 
tax evasion). However, Australia should expand its focus to ensure that a greater number of 
cases of ML are being identified and investigated adequately. 
 Confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value is 
being pursued as a policy objective; mainly in relation to drugs, and in relation to tax by 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Competent authorities have increased their efforts to 
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confiscate proceeds of crime, particularly since the establishment of the national Criminal 
Assets Confiscation Taskforce. But it is unclear how successful confiscation measures are 
across all jurisdictions, and total recoveries remain relatively low in the context of the nature 
and scale of Australia’s ML/TF risks and have only modestly increased over the past few 
years.
 Australia’s legal framework to combat TF is comprehensive. Australia has undertaken 
several TF investigations and prosecutions, and secured three convictions for the TF offence. 
Australia also successfully uses other criminal justice and administrative measures to disrupt 
terrorist and TF activities when a prosecution for TF is not practicable.
 Australia’s legal framework to implement targeted financial sanctions is a good example for 
other countries. The automatic, direct legal obligation to freeze assets as soon as an entity 
is listed by the UN and the numerous designations made under the domestic regime are 
to be commended as best practices for other countries. However, effective implementation 
of the legal framework is difficult to confirm in the absence of freezing statistics, financial supervision, or supervisory experience and feedback on practical implementation by the 
private sector.
 Australia has not implemented a targeted approach nor has it exercised oversight in dealing 
with non-profit organisations (NPOs) that are at risk from the threat of terrorist abuse. 
Authorities have not undertaken a review of the NPO sector to identify the features and types 
of NPOs that are particularly at risk of being misused for TF. 
 Most designated non-financial business and profession sectors are not subject to AML/CTF 
requirements, and did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of their ML/TF risks or 
have measures to mitigate them effectively. This includes real estate agents and lawyers, both 
of which have been identified to be of high ML risk in Australia’s National Threat Assessment. 
 The major reporting entities – including the big four domestic banks which dominate the 
financial sector – have a good understanding of their AML/CTF risks and obligations, but some AML/CTF controls, whilst compliant with Australian obligations, are not in line with 
FATF Standards1. 
 AUSTRAC has done a good job in promoting compliance with the AML/CTF standards by 
the vast amount of entities under its supervision. Australia has set up and developed a risk-
based approach to supervision, although further improvement is required relating to the 
risk picture of the supervised entities. In mitigating risks through supervision, Australia 
should focus more on effective supervision and enforcement of individual reporting entities’ 
compliance with AML/CTF obligations within the various sectors.
 Australia has not conducted a formal risk assessment on TF risks associated with legal persons 
and arrangements. The majority of legal persons are registered with the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (federal) while others with State or Territory authorities. While the information seems to be largely available to competent authorities and to the public, very 
limited verification is conducted on the information that is registered.  Information on the 
beneficial owner of legal persons and legal arrangements is not maintained and accessible to 
competent authorities in a timely manner.
 Australia cooperates well with other countries in MLA matters, including extradition. 
Informal cooperation is generally good across agencies.
1 The FATF Standards comprise the FATF Recommendations and their Interpretive Notes.
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B  Risk and General Situation
2. Australia has identified and assessed, and has a good understanding of most of, its main ML risks 
and has mechanisms in place to mitigate them. Domestic and foreign organised crime groups operate in 
Australia. The main sources of criminal proceeds are illicit drugs, frauds, and tax evasion. Australian drug 
markets are said to be some of the most profitable in the world, attracting interest from major syndicates 
in South East Asia and South America. Most laundering involves use of the banking sector, money remitters, 
and complex corporate structures, facilitated by gate-keepers. Australia is seen as an attractive destination 
for foreign proceeds, particularly corruption-related proceeds flowing into real estate, from the Asia-Pacific 
region. Outwards proceeds flows are directed mainly to major financial hubs in Asia and the Middle East, with 
tax proceeds also flowing to European havens.   
3. Australia has properly identified and assessed, and has a good understanding of, its TF risk, and 
is addressing it accordingly. Globally, the amounts of funds generated to finance terrorism vary between 
groups. Funds raised by groups that are part of an international network can be significant in the TF context. 
These groups have the financial infrastructure to undertake sizeable fundraising and money transfer 
operations. Small domestic groups and lone wolf terrorists are also a significant TF risk. While the amounts raised by these radicalised groups or individuals are much smaller, their intent to undertake violent acts 
in Australia can pose a direct threat to the Australian community.  The authorities have periodically and 
successfully disrupted domestic terrorism plots, and the associated funding. Recently, the emerging TF risk 
has involved some Australians funding travel from legitimate sources to fight in conflict zones. Some funds have also been raised through abusing registered and informal “pop-up” charities linked to humanitarian 
fund-raising. 
C  Overall level of compliance
4. Australia has a strong institutional framework for combatting ML, TF, and proliferation financing. 
Australia’s measures are particularly strong in legal, law enforcement, and operational areas, and targeted 
financial sanctions; some improvements are needed in the framework for preventive measures and 
supervision, in particular for designated non-financial businesses and professions. In terms of effectiveness, Australia has achieved high results in international cooperation, and substantial results in risk, policy and 
coordination, the use of financial intelligence and combating terrorist financing and proliferation financing. 
Only moderate or minor improvements are needed in these areas. Major improvements are needed in other 
areas, as noted below.
C.1 Assessment of risk, coordination, and policy setting
5. Australia has a good understanding of most of its main ML risks and coordinates comprehensively 
to address most of them. However, some key risks remain unaddressed and, inconsistently with the FATF 
Standards, the authorities are focussed more on predicate crime rather than ML. TF risk is well understood 
and actions are being taken to mitigate it, particularly by disrupting domestic terrorist activities. Australia 
has produced a national report on each of its ML (the National Threat Assessment—NTA) and TF risks (the 
National Risk Assessment—NRA), which are supplemented by ongoing risk analysis efforts. Australia has used the results of the assessments to help shape aspects of how it combats ML and TF and has a national 
strategy for combating organised crime which identifies ML as an intrinsic enabler of organised crime. 
6. Operational activities are coordinated using a mixture of standing committees and task forces that 
include federal and State and Territory agencies, which is salient as Australia is a federation. The objectives and activities of most of the competent authorities are generally consistent with the ML/TF risks, with the 
major exception being a lack of focus on addressing risks from abuse of complex corporate structures, real 
estate (including through regulating relevant designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)). 
7. Australia does not have a developed national policy setting out what the overall AML/CTF system is meant to achieve, or how its success should be monitored or measured, making it challenging to determine 
how well the ML/TF risks are being addressed. Accordingly, national metrics about how well the authorities’ efforts are addressing ML/TF risks are limited, and the authorities were challenged to present convincing 
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evidence about what outcomes their efforts are achieving. Exemptions from requirements for reporting 
entities and the application of enhanced or simplified measures are not based primarily on the results of the 
NTA, NRA or other efforts to assess ML/TF risks. The authorities coordinate and cooperate to a large extent 
to combat the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
C.2	 Financial	intelligence,	ML,	and	confiscation
8. Australia develops and disseminates good quality financial intelligence to a range of law enforcement 
bodies, customs and tax authorities. AUSTRAC is a well-functioning financial intelligence unit (FIU). The 
amount of financial transaction data in the AUSTRAC database, and the fact that all relevant competent 
authorities have access to this database, and can use its integrated analytical tool, is a strength of Australia’s 
AML/CTF system. AUSTRAC information is accessed by federal law enforcement as a routine in most cases but 
less so by State and Territory police who conduct most predicate crime investigations, and this information 
assists in the investigation of predicate offences. However, the somewhat limited use of AUSTRAC information by law enforcement as a trigger to commence ML/TF investigations, presents a weakness in the Australian 
AML/CTF system and should be addressed. Broader use of the sound institutional structure for combating 
ML would mitigate ML/TF risks more effectively.
9. Australia’s main policy objective is to disrupt and deter predicate crime, including, if necessary, 
through ML investigations/prosecutions. Australia focuses on what it considers to be the main three proceeds 
generating predicate risks (drugs, fraud, and tax evasion). At the federal level, the authorities charge stand-alone and third party ML offences, but legal issues have arisen in relation to the prosecution of self-laundering 
offences, and ML related to foreign predicates including corruption is not frequently prosecuted. At the State/Territory level, prosecutions for substantive ML offences, including third party laundering and stand-alone 
laundering charges, are less common. 
10. Since the last assessment, Australia has improved in terms of obtaining ML convictions, and is achieving reasonable results in relation to the key risk and those geographic areas where Australia is focusing 
on ML, but the overall results are lower than they could be relative to the nature and scale of the risks.  The authorities have applied a range of sanctions for ML offences to natural persons, but no corporations have 
been prosecuted for ML offences. The authorities apply other criminal justice measures to disrupt serious criminal activity, including ML offences, but in accordance with their policy of disruption of serious and 
organised crime such measures are applied whether or not it may be possible to secure a ML conviction.
11. Confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value is being 
actively pursued as a policy objective in Australia. The competent authorities have enhanced their efforts 
since the last assessment with the amounts being restrained and confiscated increasing at the federal level, 
although overall the figures remain relatively modest in the context of the nature and scale of Australia’s ML/
TF risks. The majority of assets recovered to date have flowed from the drugs trade and also from tax evasion 
(using ATO recovery powers). The Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce (CACT) takes non-conviction based 
asset recovery proceedings in most cases, allowing for a lower civil standard of proof; however, cases can 
become difficult to pursue when complicated company or overseas structures are used or when foreign 
predicate offending is involved. 
12. At the State and Territory level, the combined recoveries are about twice the value of recoveries 
made at the federal level due to the heavy emphasis on drug-related recoveries. Australia is taking some steps 
to target the cross-border movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). Australia remains 
at significant risk of an inflow of illicit funds from persons in foreign countries who find Australia a suitable 
place to hold and invest funds, including in real estate.
C.3	 Terrorist	financing	and	proliferation	financing
13. It is positive to note that Australia has undertaken several TF investigations and prosecutions, and 
secured three convictions for the TF offence. Australia also successfully uses other criminal justice and 
administrative measures to disrupt terrorist and TF activities when a prosecution for TF is not practicable. 
Australia had successfully disrupted two domestic terrorist plots (Pendennis and Neath) at the time of the on-
site visit. Australia also uses these other measures to address the most relevant emerging TF risk – individuals 
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travelling to conflict zones to participate in or advocate terrorist activity. Australian authorities identify and investigate different types of TF offences in each counter-terrorism investigation, and counter-terrorism strategies have successfully enabled Australia to identify and designate terrorists, terrorist organisations 
and terrorist support networks. Australian authorities have not prosecuted all the different types of TF 
offences, such as the collection of funds for TF, or the financing of terrorist acts or individual terrorists, and 
the dissuasiveness of sanctions applied has not been clearly demonstrated.
14. Despite the general risks identified by the authorities in the NRA, Australia has not undertaken a 
risk review of the NPO sector to identify the features and types of NPOs that are particularly at risk of being 
misused for TF. Subsequently, there is no TF-related outreach to, or TF-related monitoring of, this part of the 
sector that would be at risk and that account for a significant share of the sector’s activities. 
15. Australia has a sound legal framework for targeted financial sanctions relating to terrorism and 
proliferation, but it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of the system. Under the Australian legal 
framework, the legal obligation to freeze assets is automatic upon designation at the UN; no additional action by Australian authorities is needed to give legal effect to a designation (although email alerts are 
sent to subscribers). This is a best practice for other countries. The Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) has primary responsibility for compliance with sanction requirements. However, DFAT does 
not adequately monitor or supervise the financial sector for compliance with the requirements of the FATF 
Recommendations, as would be expected of a supervisory authority. In addition, no financial institutions 
are supervised or monitored for compliance with the targeted financial sanctions (TFS) requirements (as 
in financial supervision) by any other competent supervisory authority. The absence of freezing statistics, 
financial supervision, supervisory experience, and feedback on practical implementation by the private 
sector made it difficult to confirm the level of effectiveness of the system.
C.4 Preventive measures and supervision
16. Regulated entities generally have adopted preventive measures required under the Australian 
regime, but some controls are not yet in line with FATF Standards. 
17. Australia’s AML/CTF regime has changed significantly since the last mutual evaluation report in 
2005. The regime, introduced in 2006, significantly expanded the number of businesses subject to AML/
CTF obligations – known as reporting entities. Under the new AML/CTF regime, the preventive measures’ 
requirements have been brought more in line with FATF Standards, although deficiencies remain. Except for 
gaming and bullion, other DNFBP sectors are not subject to AML/CTF obligations. Understanding of ML/TF 
risks and implementation of preventive measures is better among larger players and in the regulated sectors. 
18. Within the remittance sector, effective implementation of AML/CTF controls varies, depending on 
the industry’s size and resources. The banks, particularly domestic ones, account for a large share of banking sector assets and international funds transfers in the system, but do not fully implement preventive measures 
to the extent envisaged by the FATF, especially where they meet Australian domestic requirements which 
do not meet the FATF standard. Most DNFBPs, including real estate agents and legal professionals, are also 
not subject to AML/CTF controls or suspicious transaction reporting obligations, even though they are 
highlighted as being high-risk for ML activities.  
19. To a large extent, licensing, registration and other controls implemented by Australia, adequately 
prevent criminals and their associates from entering the financial sector. An important factor AUSTRAC uses 
in identifying ML/TF risk at the Reporting Entity Group (REG) level is the volume and value of transaction 
reports (suspicious matter report (SMRs) and international fund transfer instructions (IFTIs)) as an indicator 
of the volume of funds flowing through an entity, the size of an entity as a proxy measure of the number of 
customers, products and distribution channels. It is not sufficiently clear that AUSTRAC, when risk profiling 
REGs or individual reporting entities, collects and uses sufficient information necessary to adequately 
determine the level of inherent risk of the REG and individual reporting entities, beyond the information 
from transaction reports.
20. AUSTRAC succeeds to a fair extent in promoting compliance with the AML/CTF requirements 
among the sectors it has engaged. The focus of supervision is targeting what AUSTRAC considers to be the 
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high-risk entities for enhanced supervisory activity, and to test the effectiveness of REG’s/reporting entities’ 
systems and controls in practice. However, the number of enforcement actions and the subjects of these 
actions do not convincingly demonstrate that reporting entities are subject to effective and proportionate 
sanctions.
C.5	 Transparency	and	beneficial	ownership
21. Australia has undertaken an assessment of the ML risks associated with legal persons and arrangements but did not comprehensively assess all forms of legal persons (including foreign companies 
operating in Australia). Legal persons and trusts were assessed as medium to high risk for ML but limited measures exist to mitigate risk associated with legal persons and very limited measures exist to mitigate the 
ML risk associated with legal arrangements. Authorities are nevertheless aware that legal persons can be, or 
are being, misused for ML. Australia has not conducted a formal assessment of the TF risks associated with 
legal persons and arrangements. 
22. Overall, there is good information on the creation and types of legal persons in Australia, but less 
information about legal arrangements. Federal and State/Territory registries are publically available for legal 
persons and what is recorded is available to competent authorities. However, measures need to be taken, including imposing AML/CTF obligations on those who create and register legal persons and arrangements, 
in order to strengthen the collection and availability of beneficial ownership information. 
23. The existing measures and mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure that accurate and up-do-date 
information on beneficial owners is available in a timely manner. It is also not clear that information held on 
legal persons and legal arrangements is accurate and up-to-date. The authorities did not provide evidence 
that they apply effective sanctions against persons who do not comply with their information requirements. 
Overall, legal persons and arrangements remain very attractive for criminals to misuse for ML and TF.
C.6 International Cooperation
24. Australia cooperates well with other countries in mutual legal assistance (MLA) matters. MLA 
requests are processed in a timely manner in accordance with a case prioritisation framework. Australia 
cooperates well in extradition. Both making and receiving requests in ML and TF related matters and informal 
cooperation is generally good across agencies. But the ability to provide beneficial ownership information for 
legal persons and trusts in relation to foreign requests is more limited. Nevertheless, Australia cooperates 
well in providing available beneficial ownership information for legal persons and trusts in relation to foreign 
requests.
25. Australia maintains comprehensive statistics in relation to MLA and extradition matters including in relation to ML and TF, although there are some limitations in relation to categorisation of ML offences 
within the case management framework. AUSTRAC cooperates well with its foreign counterparts. Informal 
cooperation is generally good across agencies.
D  Priority actions
26. The prioritised recommended actions for Australia, based on these findings, are: 
 Undertake a re-assessment of Australia’s ML risks in keeping with the requirements and guidance 
issued in relation to Recommendation 1, and formalise the ongoing processes for re-assessing risks. 
Australia should also identify metrics and processes for monitoring and measuring success.
 The authorities should place more emphasis on pursuing ML investigations and prosecutions at the 
federal as well at the State/Territory level. The authorities should increase efforts to address ML 
risks associated with: 
 x predicate crimes other than drugs and tax, including foreign predicates; 
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 x the abuse of legal persons and arrangements and the real estate sector; 
 x identity fraud; 
 x fraud; and 
 x cash intensive activities.
 CACT should continue its good early work and demonstrate its effectiveness over time to confiscate 
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.
 AUSTRAC should incorporate more (inherent) risk factors besides data analysis from filed reports 
into identifying and assessing the risk of reporting entities. AUSTRAC should consider opportunities to further utilise its formal enforcement powers to promote further compliance by reporting entities 
through judicious use of its enforcing authority.
 Australia should ensure financial institutions are actively supervised for implementation of DFAT lists, most likely through a legislative amendment to the statute identifying and authorising the 
agency responsible for supervision.  
 Australia should implement a targeted approach in relation to preventing NPOs from TF abuse. As 
a first step, Australia needs to undertake a thorough review of the TF risks that NPOs are facing 
(beyond the issues already covered in the NRA) and the potential vulnerabilities of the sector to 
terrorist activities.
 Ensure that lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, precious stones dealers, and trust and company 
service providers understand their ML/TF risks, and are required to effectively implement AML/
CTF obligations and risk mitigating measures in line with the FATF Standards. Ensure that reporting 
entities implement as early as possible the obligations on enhanced customer due diligence (CDD), 
beneficial owners, and politically exposed persons introduced on 1 June 2014.
 Australia should assess the risks of TF posed by all forms of legal persons and arrangements. 
Australia should also take measures to ensure that beneficial ownership information for legal 
persons is collected and available. Trustees should be required to hold and maintain information on 
the constituent elements of a trust including the settlor and beneficiary.
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Table 1. Effective Implementation of Immediate Outcomes
 
1. Risk, Policy and Coordination Substantial
Australia is achieving Immediate Outcome 1 to a large extent as demonstrated by its good 
understanding of most of its major ML risks and of its TF risks, as well as its very good coordination 
of activities to address key aspects of the ML/TF risks. Australia identified and assessed most of 
its major ML risks but more attention needs to be paid to understanding foreign predicate risks, 
and vulnerabilities that impact its AML/CTF system. AML/CTF policies need to better address ML risks associated with foreign predicate offending the abuse of legal persons and arrangements, 
and laundering in the real estate sector, particularly through bringing all DNFBPs within the 
AML/CTF regime. More current information about ML/TF risks also needs to be communicated to the private 
sector. The identification of low or high ML/TF risks by the authorities should drive exemptions 
from requirements and strongly influence the application of enhanced or simplified measures 
for reporting entities. While cooperation, particularly on operational matters, is very good across relevant competent authorities, including for proliferation matters, Australia could better articulate an AML/CTF policy and maintain more comprehensive national statistics to 
demonstrate how efficient and effective its AML/CTF system is, including by developing ways to 
show that its disruption strategy for predicate crime addresses ML risks.
2.   International Cooperation  High
The Immediate Outcome is achieved to a very large extent. Australia uses robust systems for mutual legal assistance, as demonstrated by their statistics, although there are some limitations 
in relation to the categorisation of ML offences within the case management framework. Informal 
cooperation is generally good across agencies.  Although diagonal cooperation does not appear to be permitted with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), this is not a significant issue. Australia cooperates well 
in providing available beneficial ownership information for legal persons and trusts in relation to 
foreign requests, keeping in mind that what is not (required to be) available in Australia cannot be shared.
3.   Supervision Moderate
In identifying ML/TF risk at the group level, an important factor on which AUSTRAC relies are 
the varying forms of reporting (i.e. SMRs, TTR s and IFTIs) and unverified self-reporting of 
compliance to determine reporting entity risks. Other risk factors should be considered and 
AUSTRAC supervisory practice should extend to more individual reporting entities. AUSTRAC’s 
approach does not seem sufficiently nuanced to adequately account for the risks of individual 
reporting entities in a REG. More generally, AUSTRAC’s graduated approach to supervision does 
not seem to be adequate to ensure compliance. 
The majority of deficiencies identified by AUSTRAC through its compliance activities are voluntarily 
remediated by REs based on recommendations and requirements issued by AUSTRAC after an 
assessment. No monetary penalties for violations of the AML/CTF preventive measure obligations 
have ever been pronounced. Rather, AUSTRAC had applied sanctions to a limited extent in the 
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form of enforceable undertaking, which amounts to – among other things – a formal agreement 
that the reporting entity will comply with AML/CTF requirements. The assessors concluded that the use of sanctions for non-compliance has had minimal impact on ensuring compliance among 
reporting entities not directly affected by the sanction. The private sector shared similar views 
about the depth, breadth, and effectiveness of the supervisory regime. In addition, there is no 
appropriate supervision or regulation of most higher-risk DNFBPs because they are not subject 
to AML/CTF requirements. Overall, the authorities were unable to demonstrate improving AML/CTF compliance by reporting entities or that they are successfully discouraging criminal abuse of 
the financial and DNFBP sectors.
4.   Preventive Measures Moderate
Australia exhibits some characteristics of an effective system for applying preventive measures in 
financial institutions and DNFBPs. The major reporting entities – including the big four domestic 
banks which dominate the financial sector – have a good understanding of their AML/CTF risks 
and obligations, as required by Australian obligations. These obligations  are not in line with 
FATF Standards. In general, the major reporting entities and other high risk reporting entities 
subject to more regular supervisory engagement appear to have a reasonable understanding 
of ML/TF risks and preventive measures that comply with the Australian AML/CTF regime. 
Reporting entities have demonstrated that they are aware of their requirement to have AML/
CTF programmes and reported having implemented the necessary internal AML/CTF controls. 
However, a number of aspects of the AML/CTF regime – including those that relate to internal 
controls, wire transfers, correspondent banking, etc. – do not meet FATF Standards. As a result, 
reporting entities’ implementation of AML/CTF measures will not meet the FATF Standards if its 
internal controls are developed solely to meet the Australian requirements. 
In addition, while the requirements have been revised with respect to CDD and politically exposed persons (PEPs), none of the reporting entities reported they were able to fully implement these 
requirements at the time of the on-site. As a result, at the time of the on-site visit, reporting 
entities were working to transition from the pre-June 1 AML/CTF Rules, which were not in line 
with the FATF Standards. At the same time, a lot of reliance is placed on the banking and financial 
sector as gatekeepers due to the absence of AML/CTF regulation and requirements on key high-
risk DNFBPs such as lawyers, accountants, real estate agents and trust and company service 
providers. As a result of these factors, the effectiveness of the preventive measures in the financial 
system as a whole, and DNFBPs, is hence called into question to some extent.
5.    Legal Persons and Arrangements Moderate
Legal persons and legal arrangements were identified as presenting medium to high risks for ML 
in the NTA of 2011 and the use of complex corporate structures in ML schemes was frequently 
cited by law enforcement spoken to by the assessment team. There is good information on the creation and types of legal persons in the country available publicly, but less information about 
legal arrangements. The ATO has made some improvements to the Australian Business Register 
(ABR) that involve collecting information on associates and trustees for new registrations from 
December 2013. The authorities seem to appreciate the extent to which legal persons can be, or are being misused, 
for ML and had some awareness in relation to TF. They could do more to identify, assess, and understand the vulnerabilities of both for ML and TF, as past assessment efforts seem to have 
Effectiveness
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focused more on underlying predicate crime. While Australia has implemented some measures to 
address the specific risk identified in the 2011 NTA to legal persons and legal arrangements, other measures need to be taken, including imposing AML/CTF obligations on those who create and 
register them to strengthen the collection and availability of beneficial ownership information.
Concerning beneficial owners of legal persons and legal arrangements, the existing measures and 
mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure that accurate and up-do-date information on beneficial 
owners is available in a timely manner. It is not clear that information held on legal persons 
and legal arrangements is accurate and up-to-date. The authorities did not provide evidence that they apply effective sanctions against persons who do not comply with their information 
requirements. Overall, legal persons and arrangements remain very attractive for criminals to 
misuse for ML and TF.
6.   Financial Intelligence Substantial
Australia’s use of financial intelligence and other information for ML/TF and associated predicate 
offence investigations demonstrates to a large extent characteristics of an effective system. 
AUSTRAC and partner agencies collect and use a wide variety of financial intelligence and other 
information in close cooperation. This information is generally reliable, accurate, and up-to-date. Partner agencies have the expertise to use this information effectively to conduct analysis and 
financial investigations, identify and trace assets, and develop operational and strategic analysis. 
This is demonstrated particularly well in joint investigative task forces, and when tracing and 
seizing assets.
A large part of AUSTRAC analysis use relates to predicate crime and not to ML/TF, thus resulting 
in a relatively low number of ML cases. Although AUSTRAC information is said to be checked in most Australian Federal Police (AFP) predicate crime investigations, that is not the case for the 
majority of predicate crime investigations which are conducted at the State/Territory level. Both 
AUSTRAC and law enforcement authorities could raise their focus on ML cases to achieve a larger 
number of criminal cases in this area.There are also some concerns with regard to the relatively low number of money laundering and 
terrorist financing investigations outside the framework of the task forces related to the abuse of tax or secrecy havens, use of alternative remittance/informal value transfer systems and asset 
seizure. 
Although AUSTRAC information is regularly referred to as a catalyst for ML/TF and related predicate investigations, the ability for law enforcement to maintain details of outcomes that are 
attributed to financial intelligence could be improved.
7.   ML Investigation and Prosecution Moderate
Overall, Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system for investigating, 
prosecuting, and sanctioning ML offences and activities. The focus remains on predicate offences, recovery of proceeds of crime, and disruption of criminal activity rather than the pursuit of convictions for ML offences or disruption of ML networks both at the Commonwealth and 
State/Territory levels. However, in the areas of identified risk, Australia is achieving reasonable 
results and the increase in the number of ML convictions over recent years is heartening. This 
demonstrates an increased focus on ML compared to the previous FATF/APG assessment. 
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It should be relatively easy to achieve a substantial or even high level of effectiveness by 
 expanding the existing ML approach to other (foreign) predicate offences including corruption, 
  focusing more on ML within task forces, 
 being able to demonstrate the extent to which potential ML cases are identified and investigated, 
 addressing investigative challenges associated with dealing with complex ML cases, including those using corporate structures, 
 pursuing ML charges against legal entities, and 
 ensuring that all States and Territories focus on substantive type ML.
8.   Confiscation Moderate
Overall, Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system for confiscating 
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. The framework for police powers and provisional 
and confiscation measures is comprehensive and is being put to good use by the CACT, which is 
showing early signs of promise as the lead agency to pursue confiscation of criminal proceeds as 
a policy objective in Australia. At the State/Territory level, the focus has remained primarily on 
recovery of proceeds of drugs offences. Relatively modest amounts are being confiscated, which 
suggests that criminals retain much of their profits.
9.   TF Investigation and Prosecution Substantial
Australia exhibits most characteristics of an effective system for investigating, prosecuting, and 
sanctioning those involved in TF. It is positive to note that Australia has undertaken several TF 
investigations and prosecutions, and also secured three convictions for the TF offence. Australia 
also successfully uses other criminal justice and administrative measures to disrupt terrorist and 
TF activities when a prosecution for TF is not practicable. Australia had successfully disrupted 
two domestic terrorist plots (Pendennis and Neath) at the time of the on-site visit.2 Australia also 
uses these other measures to address the most relevant emerging TF risk – individuals travelling 
to conflict zones to participate in or advocate terrorist activity. Australian authorities identify and investigate different types of TF offences in each counter-terrorism investigation, and counter-terrorism strategies have successfully enabled Australia 
to identify and designate terrorists, terrorist organisations, and terrorist support networks. Australian authorities have not prosecuted all the different types of TF offences, such as the 
collection of funds for TF, or the financing of terrorist acts or individual terrorists, and the 
dissuasiveness of sanctions applied has not been clearly demonstrated.
2 Another plot was disrupted soon after the on-site visit. AUSTRAC also took action in November 2014 to cancel the 
registration of remittance dealer (Bisotel Rieh Pty Ltd) concerned that its continued registration may involve a TF 
risk. This followed a period of engagement and notification of action by AUSTRAC.
Effectiveness
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10.   TF Preventive measures & financial sanctions  Moderate
Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system in this area. Terrorists and 
terrorist organisations are being identified in an effort to deprive them of the resources and 
means to finance terrorist activities. 
A strong area of technical compliance is in the legal framework for TFS against persons and entities 
designated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1267) and under Australia’s sanctions law (for UNSCR 1373). Australia 
has co-sponsored designation proposals to the UNSCR 1267/1989 Committee and adopted 
very effective measures to ensure the proper implementation of UN designations without delay. 
Australia has also domestically listed individuals and entities pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (including 
most recently two Australians fighting overseas for terrorist entities) and received, considered 
and given effect to third party requests. Australia actively works to publicly identify terrorists and 
terrorist organisations.
Furthermore, the TFS regime is administered robustly. Australia has procedures for: 
1. the identification of targets for listing, 
2. a regular review of listings, and 
3. the consideration of de-listing requests and sanctions permits. 
The authorities make a concerted effort to sensitize the public to Australian sanctions laws and to 
assist potential asset holders in the implementation of their obligations.
However, the private sector is not supervised for compliance with TFS requirements and 
was unable to demonstrate that the legal framework is effectively implemented. Effective 
implementation is difficult to confirm in the absence of freezing statistics, financial supervision, 
supervisory experience and feedback on practical implementation by the private sector. 
Designating Australians previously convicted for terrorism or terrorist financing, who openly join 
designated terrorist organisations could improve the system’s effectiveness.3
NPOs are an area for improved efforts and specific action. According to the NRA, charities and 
NPOs are a key channel used to raise funds for TF in or from Australia. However, the lack of a 
targeted TF review and subsequent targeted TF-related outreach and TF-related monitoring of 
NPOs leaves NPOs and Australia vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations. Since 2010 there 
has also been no effort directed at NPOs to sensitise them to the potential risk of misuse for TF. 
While the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC) actively works to improve 
transparency, it has no specific TF mandate and it has not conducted outreach to the NPO sector 
regarding TF risks.
3 At the time of the on-site, two of these individuals were under consideration by the government for designation. 
Designation of these two persons subsequently took place on 13 November 2014, after the on-site.
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11.   PF Financial sanctions  Substantial
Australia demonstrates to a large extent the characteristics of an effective system in this area. The 
issues listed under IO10 and that relate to UNSCR 1267 also apply to IO11.
Even though IO11 suffers from the same issues as IO10, IO10 has additional shortcomings in 
relation to NPOs that do not apply to IO11. In addition, the overall domestic cooperation in 
relation to country sanction programmes for Iran and DPRK seems sound, which may have a 
positive effect on the implementation of targeted financial sanctions that are related to these 
country programmes. This domestic cooperation benefit does not apply in the case of IO10 / 
UNSCR 1267, which is not a country programme.
Effectiveness
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Table 2: Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
1. Assessing risks & applying a 
risk-based approach 
PC • Mitigation policies have not been taken to 
mitigate high risks identified in the NTA 
related to certain entities and services.
• Most main, but not all, ML risks were identified 
and properly assessed.
• Reporting entities are not required to mitigate or carry out enhanced measures for high risks, 
identified by the authorities.
• Exemptions, and the application of simplified measures, are not based solely on low risk but include other variables such as regulatory burden and the desirability of promoting the 
risk-based approach.
• Scope issue - accountants, lawyers, trust and company service providers, most dealers in precious metals & stones, and real estate agents are not reporting entities and thus not 
subject to risk mitigation requirements.
2. National cooperation and 
coordination
LC • Australia does not have a formalised AML/CTF 
policy that draws on risks identified in the NTA 
and NRA.
3. Money laundering offence C The Recommendation is fully met.
4. Confiscation and provisional 
measures
C The Recommendation is fully met.
5. Terrorist financing offence LC • The Australian definition of ‘terrorist act’ is 
somewhat narrower than the definition in 
Articles 2(1)(a) and (b) of the TF Convention.
• The provision or collection of funds to be used by an individual terrorist for any purpose is not 
covered.
6. Targeted financial sanctions 
related to terrorism & TF
C The Recommendation is fully met.
7. Targeted financial sanctions 
related to proliferation
C The Recommendation is fully met.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
8. Non-profit organisations NC • No sectorial TF risk assessment.
• Subsequently, no relevant outreach to NPOs.
• Subsequently, no relevant measures applied 
to those NPOs that would be identified as high 
risk and that account for a significant portion 
of the financial resources and/or international 
activities.
9. Financial institution secrecy 
laws
C The Recommendation is fully met.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
10. Customer due diligence PC • Exemptions in operation within the AML/CTF 
Act and Rules may diminish the application 
of CDD in situations envisaged by the FATF 
Standard  (e.g. signatories associated with an Australian correspondent banking relationship, 
no CDD requirements on reloadable stored value cards below a certain threshold or occasional transactions below nominated 
thresholds which appear to be linked). 
• There are deficiencies in the verification 
requirements in relation to an agent of a 
customer, trustees and beneficiaries. 
• Exemptions and simplified due diligence measures in relation to trusts that are 
registered and subject to regulatory oversight, and companies which are licensed and supervised, are not permitted by the standard and do not appear to be based on proven low 
risk.  
• There are deficiencies in the breadth of the 
identification information required across all 
legal persons / arrangements.  Specifically, 
not all information specified in criterion 10.9 
is required in each entity type and not all 
information collected is required to be verified.
• There is no requirement to understand the control structure of non-individual customers, 
or understand the ownership structure.
• There is no requirement to identify the 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy until 
payout.
• Due to the wording of the requirements in relation to enhanced due diligence, a reporting 
entity may satisfy its enhanced CDD  by 
completing identification which is considered 
normal due diligence.
• There is no requirement in law to terminate the business relationship when the reporting entity 
is unable to comply with CDD requirements. The law does no t permit reporting entities to 
stop performing CDD even if there is a risk of 
tipping off.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
11. Record keeping LC • Certain customer-specific documents are 
exempt from record-keeping requirements.
• There is no clear obligation in the AML/CTF Act 
that transaction records should be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions, although this is partly addressed 
by requirements in other legislation.
• No formal requirement for reporting entities to ensure that the records be available swiftly to domestic competent authorities upon 
appropriate authority.
12. Politically exposed persons LC • The notions of close associate, which requires 
beneficial ownership of a legal person or arrangement, and of family members, which only apply to the spouse, parents and children, 
are too restrictive.
• Important officials of political parties are not 
covered.
• There is no specific requirement for life 
insurance.
13. Correspondent banking NC • The obligations to gather and verify information on the AML/CTF regulation 
applicable to the correspondent bank; the 
adequacy of its internal controls; information 
on the ownership, etc. only apply based on the 
risk evaluated by the reporting entity.
• There are no specific obligations for payable-
through accounts.
14. Money or value transfer 
services
LC • There is no obligation for MTVS providers to include their agents in their AML/CTF 
programme, though it is permissible.
• MVTS providers are not required to monitor 
their agents’ compliance with the AML/CTF 
programme.
15. New technologies LC • There is no obligation specific to the 
identification, mitigation and management of the ML/TF risks posed by new technologies to 
reporting entities.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
16. Wire transfers PC • The obligations in relation to the intermediary 
and the beneficiary financial institutions 
have not been updated to reflect FATF 
Recommendation 16.
• MVTS providers are not required to apply the 
requirements of Recommendation 16 in the 
countries in which they operate.
• No freezing action is undertaken in the context 
of Recommendation 16.
17. Reliance on third parties PC • It is not explicitly provided that the reporting entity relying on a third party remains 
ultimately responsible for CDD measures.
• There is no obligation to gather information in relation to the regulation and supervision of the third party located abroad or on the existence of measures in line with 
Recommendations 10 and 11 for the third parties located abroad and regulated by foreign 
laws.
• The geographic risk has not been taken into account when determining in which countries 
the third parties can be based.
18. Internal controls and foreign 
branches and subsidiaries
PC • There is no obligation beyond the nomination 
at management level of a compliance officer, the audit function is limited and there is no 
indication of the frequency of the audit or 
guarantee of its independence.
• These deficiencies also apply at the group level.
• With respect to branches and subsidiaries located abroad, there is no obligation for 
financial institutions to apply the higher standard or Australia regime to the extent 
possible. There is no obligation to apply measures to manage ML/TF risks and to 
inform AUSTRAC when the host country does not permit the proper implementation of AML/
CTF measures consistent with Australia’s AML/CTF regime
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
19. Higher-risk countries PC • Reporting entities are required to apply enhanced due diligence to their relationships 
and transactions with DPRK despite the FATF’s 
call to do so. 
• Among the measures for enhanced due 
diligence listed in the Rules, some address normal due diligence rather than enhanced due 
diligence. See Recommendation 10.
20. Reporting of suspicious 
transaction
C The Recommendation is fully met.
21. Tipping-off and confidentiality C The Recommendation is fully met.
22. DNFBPs: Customer due 
diligence
NC • Scope issue: DNFBPs other than casinos and 
bullion dealers are not subject to AML/CTF 
obligations.
• Casinos: The identification threshold exceeds 
that set forth in the Recommendation 22.
• See Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17.
23. DNFBPs: Other measures NC • Scope issue: DNFBPs other than casinos and 
bullion dealers are not subject to AML/CTF 
obligations.
• See Recommendations 18, 19, 20 and 21.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
24      Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015
Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
24. Transparency and beneficial 
ownership of legal persons
PC • There is no clear process for the obtaining or 
recording of companies’ beneficial ownership 
information. The processes for the creation and the public availability of information (including 
on beneficial ownership) relating to legal persons, other than companies and entities 
incorporated at State and Territory levels, vary 
throughout the country.
• There is no mechanism to ensure that information on the registers kept by companies 
is accurate.
• There is no requirement for companies or company registers to obtain and hold up-to-date information to determine the ultimate 
natural person who is the beneficial owner 
beyond the immediate shareholder. Companies 
are not required to take reasonable measures 
to obtain and hold this information.
• Bearer share warrants are not prohibited and 
may be permissible.
• There is not a general disclosure obligation 
regarding nominee shareholders.
• Australia does not monitor the quality of assistance received from other countries in 
response to requests for basic and beneficial 
ownership information or requests for 
assistance in locating beneficial owners 
residing abroad.
25. Transparency and beneficial 
ownership of legal 
arrangements
NC • There is no obligation for trustees to hold and 
maintain information on trusts.
• There is no obligation for trustees to keep this 
information up-to-date and accurate.
• There is no obligation for trustees to disclose 
their status to financial institutions and 
DNFBPs.
• There are no proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions available to enforce the requirement to exchange information with competent 
authorities in a timely manner.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
26. Regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions
PC • Absence of fit and proper obligations for 
currency exchange businesses.
• ML/TF risks of individual reporting entities are 
not adequately identified through AUSTRAC’s risk-based approach 
• The ML/TF risk profile relies too much on the 
amounts of the transactions reported.
27. Powers of supervisors PC • AUSTRAC’s powers (inspection and production of documents) are conditional upon the consent 
of the reporting entity. In absence of such 
consent, a court order is needed.
• Sanctions for the violation of AML/CTF obligations are civil and criminal penalties 
(fines and imprisonment). With the exception 
of remitters, AUSTRAC does not have the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend the reporting 
entity’s licence. This power resides with the prudential regulator, who can only revoke a 
license for breaches of the Banking Act, its 
regulations, or the Financial Sector (Collection 
of Data) Act.
• Sanctions do not extend to directors and senior 
management.
28. Regulation and supervision of 
DNFBPs
NC • Scope issue: Only casinos and bullion dealers 
are subject to AML/CTF obligations.
• Casinos: State and Territory licensing authorities do not have express AML/CTF 
responsibilities to qualify as competent 
authorities. In addition, not all legislation 
requires the licensing authority to consider the 
associates of the applicants.
• See Recommendation 26.
29. Financial intelligence units C The Recommendation is fully met.
30. Responsibilities of law 
enforcement and investigative 
authorities
LC • In Queensland, ML prosecutions need to be 
authorised by the Queensland Attorney-
General.
31. Powers of law enforcement 
and investigative authorities
LC • There is no mechanism in place to identify in a timely manner whether natural or legal 
persons own or control accounts.
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Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Recommendation Rating Factor(s) underlying the rating
32. Cash couriers LC • Lack of either dissuasive or proportionate sanctions for cash couriers, inconsistent with 
overall risk and context.
33. Statistics LC • Some statistics crucial to tracking the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system related to investigations, prosecutions, 
convictions, and property confiscated are not 
maintained nationally, reflective of the wide range of agencies involved at the federal and 
State and Territory levels.
34. Guidance and feedback LC • None of the guidance applies to most DNFBPs.
• Limited guidance available for identifying high 
risk customers or situations.
35. Sanctions PC • The only sanctions available for violation of AML/CTF obligations are civil and criminal 
penalties (fines and imprisonment) imposed by a court. The range of fines is sufficiently broad to be viewed as allowing proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions.
• Sanctions do not apply to most DNFBPs as they 
are not regulated by competent authorities. 
• Sanctions do not extend to directors and senior management if it is the reporting entities that 
breach the AML/CTF Act or rules.
36. International instruments LC • Deficiencies in the TF offence (i.e. the scope of terrorist acts covered in the TF Convention) 
affect the implementation of this convention.
37. Mutual legal assistance C The Recommendation is fully met.
38. Mutual legal assistance: 
freezing and confiscation
C The Recommendation is fully met.
39. Extradition C The Recommendation is fully met.
40. Other forms of international 
cooperation
C The Recommendation is fully met.
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Mutual Evaluation of Australia
PrefaceThis report summarises the AML/CTF measures in place in Australia as at the date of the on-site visit. It 
analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Australia’s AML/CTF system, and recommends how the system could be strengthened. 
This evaluation was based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and was prepared using the 2013 Methodology. The evaluation was based on information provided by Australia, and information obtained by the evaluation 
team during its on-site visit to Australia from 30 July to 12 August 2014 and during a face-to-face meeting 
with Australia from 7 to 9 January 2015. The evaluation was conducted by an assessment team consisting of: 
 Mr. Cheng Khai LIM, Monetary Authority of Singapore (financial expert) 
 Mr. Marijn RIDDERIKHOF, Dutch Central Bank, the Netherlands (financial expert) 
 Ms. Erin SCHENCK, Department of the Treasury, the United States (financial expert)
 Ms. Anne-Mette WADMAN, Økokrim (the FIU), Norway (law enforcement expert)
 Mr. Wayne WALSH, Department of Justice, Hong Kong, China (legal expert)
 Mr. Steve DAWE, International Monetary Fund
 Mr. Kevin VANDERGRIFT, senior policy analyst, Mr. Richard BERKHOUT and  Ms. Alexandra ECKERT, policy analysts, FATF Secretariat
 Mr. Gordon HOOK, Executive Secretary of Asia-Pacific Group
The report was reviewed by Mr. Nigel BARTLETT, World Bank; Mr. Ian MATTHEWS, Financial Conduct 
Authority, the United Kingdom; Ms. Josée NADEAU, Department of Finance, Canada; and Mr. Pieter SMIT, Financial Intelligence Centre, South Africa. 
Australia previously underwent a FATF Mutual Evaluation in 2005, conducted according to the 2004 FATF 
Methodology. The 2005 evaluation has been published and is available at www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer/MER%20Australia%20full.pdf. For the sake of brevity, on those topics where there has not been any material change in the situation of Australia or in the requirements of the FATF 
Recommendations, this evaluation does not repeat the analysis conducted in the previous evaluation, but includes a cross-reference to the detailed analysis in the previous report.
Australia’s 2005 Mutual Evaluation concluded that the country was compliant with 12 Recommendations; 
largely compliant with 14; partially compliant with 13; and non-compliant with 10. Australia was rated 
compliant or largely compliant with 13 of the 16 Core and Key Recommendations. Australia was placed under 
the regular follow-up process immediately after the adoption of its 3rd round Mutual Evaluation Report; 
however, due to the lack of progress, it was placed under the enhanced follow-up process in February 2012. 
Australia exited the follow-up process in June 2014 as it had achieved a satisfactory level of compliance with 
all Core and Key Recommendations.
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11. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT
1.1. The Commonwealth of Australia occupies a land area of about 7.7 million square kilometres, making 
it the 6th largest country in the world. Australia’s population is currently about 23.5 million. More than a 
quarter of Australians were born overseas. Australian territory cannot be reached by land. Neighbouring 
countries are Indonesia, East Timor and Papua New Guinea to the north; the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and 
France (French Caledonia) to the north-east; and New Zealand to the south-east. Papua New Guinea was a 
Territory of Australia between 1949 and 1975; close (economic) ties remain until today. The remaining (self-
governing) external territories of Australia are Norfolk Island, Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands. 
Other (mostly) uninhabited Australian territories are Ashmore and Cartier Islands, the Coral Sea Territory, 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands. Australia claims a piece of Antarctica.
1.2. Australia has a federal system of government that consists of the Federal government, six State 
governments, and two Territory governments. The main criminal law powers rest with the States and 
Territories. Federal legislation is generally restricted to criminal activity against federal interests. The 
Australian Parliament’s role in making legislation is limited to specific “heads of power” issues including, 
trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States; taxation; currency, banking, other than 
State banking; external affairs; and other matters referred to the Australian Parliament by the States. State and Territory legislation relates to criminal activity against any non-federal interests located within the 
geographical area of the particular State or Territory. Accordingly, the majority of criminal law proceedings in 
Australia are State or Territory proceedings. 
1.3. Australia’s federal Parliament consists of two houses, a Senate and a House of Representatives. The 
Australian Constitution also established a High Court of Australia, which can decide cases in first instance and 
on appeal from other federal courts or State or Territory courts. There is also a system of federal courts below 
the High Court, established by legislation. The establishment of a federal judiciary did not significantly affect 
the State judiciaries; each State continues to have its own Supreme Court and inferior courts.
1.4.  Australia is a wealthy G20 member with the world’s 12th largest economy (GDP was 
about USD 1.5 trillion in 2013) and 7th highest average income per capita (about USD 67 000). The national 
currency is the Australian dollar (AUD), which is also the currency used in Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu.
1.1 ML/TF Risks
1.5. This section of the report presents a summary of the assessment team’s understanding of the ML/TF 
risks in Australia. Australia’s assessment and understanding of the risk is set out in Chapter 2. The summary is based on material provided by Australia, open source material, as well as discussions with competent 
authorities and the private sector during the on-site visit. This includes consideration of Australia’s 2011 
National Threat Assessment on Money Laundering (NTA)1 and National Risk Assessment on Terrorist 
Financing 2014 (NRA)2. The NTA’s scope, inputs, and focus limits its value to assess ML risks whereas the 
NRA reliably assesses TF risks (see Chapter 2). 
1 Austrac (2011).
2 Austrac (2014).
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1  The NTA identified illicit narcotics, and tax frauds (and other frauds) as the major predicate crimes 
for ML. Drug trafficking and tax evasion generate the most significant amount of the illicit proceeds 
investigated by authorities. However, there is no current estimate of proceeds generating crime in 
Australia. The authorities utilize a conservative estimate, based on 2009 material, that organised 
crime costs the Australian economy 1.5% of GDP; however authorities do not have an estimated 
figure for the amount of criminal proceeds. For general context (but not for comparison) it is 
noted that Australia convicts around 135 000 offenders annually for predicate crimes (see chart 
at paragraph 2.28).3 The main predicate crimes where convictions are obtained are illicit drug 
offences, theft, and fraud or deception offences.
 The channels that were identified as highly vulnerable to ML activity were the banking sector, money remitters (both licensed and underground operators), gatekeepers, and the abuse of corporate 
vehicles. The risks are exacerbated by launderers often using false identity documents. 
 Australian drug markets are said to be some of the world’s most profitable and most drugs can 
be obtained. They are a serious and growing issue. In 2012-13, drug seizures and arrests were at 
record or decade highs for nearly all drug types.4 Cannabis dominates domestically, but the drugs 
of greatest concern are amphetamine-type stimulants. Drug trafficking in Australia is linked to 
transnational organised crime groups, particularly from South East Asia and South America.
 Authorities have found that organised criminal groups use complex corporate vehicles to conceal and launder proceeds, which are often sent out of Australia as part of the laundering process or to 
fund more drug-related activity. Trade-based ML may also be an emerging threat to Australia. 
 China; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Singapore and the United Arab Emirates were seen as major 
source, destination, and/or transit jurisdictions for proceeds of crime laundered into and out of 
Australia. Large amounts are suspected to be laundered out of China into the Australian real estate 
market. China and other countries within the Asia-Pacific region were also seen as likely sources of 
corruption proceeds that are laundered in Australia.
 Authorities consider that international laundering of tax crime proceeds is primarily outwards, 
involving havens in Europe as well as Vanuatu in the Pacific although many such proceeds eventually 
return to Australia. Overall the authorities’ view may downplay potential inwards laundering from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and other parts of Europe, and outwards laundering in New 
Zealand, Canada, and the United States as evidenced by recent ML and proceeds related mutual legal 
assistance requests. 
 TF risk is largely influenced by international tensions and conflicts, in particular Syria and Iraq. The main domestic risks involve small-scale collection and use of legitimate and illegitimate funds 
by domestic cells aligned with or sympathetic to radicalised Islamic jihadist groups abroad, for the 
purposes of committing domestic terrorist acts. 
 The authorities have periodically and successfully disrupted domestic terrorism plots and associated funding (albeit involving relatively low levels of funds) although this remains a constant 
risk. In addition, in recent years and on isolated occasions, ransoms have been paid by families and 
businesses to release Australians held hostage by terrorists. 
 The most significant emerging TF risk is the potential for groups as well as other individuals to send money, directly or indirectly, or raise money for, or otherwise support Australians travelling to 
conflicts zones abroad (especially Syria and Iraq) to support foreign terrorist groups and terrorist 
3 Some crimes committed within crime categories that are predicates for money laundering may not generate 
proceeds. Accordingly, this contextual data has not been used to compare results of ML efforts.
4 Australian Crime Commission ( 2014). 
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1acts, both abroad and domestically. In this context, the primary destinations for current TF flows from Australia were understood to be Syria and Iraq, with the funds often passing through other 
jurisdictions en route. Some Australians have funded travel for themselves from legitimate sources 
to fight in conflict zones, and some funds have also been raised through abusing registered and 
informal “pop-up” charities linked to humanitarian fund-raising.
 Charities and other NPOs are a channel of higher risk for use to raise funds for TF in or from 
Australia, although identified misuse of NPOs is low. However, the lack of a comprehensive sectorial 
risk assessment, the lack of subsequent outreach in relation to TF to the sector, and the lack of 
adequate preventive requirements or a supervisory framework that cover all relevant NPOs, leave 
them vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations.
1.2 Materiality
1.6. The Australian economy has performed well relative to many other advanced economies since the 
global financial crisis, with recent trend growth of around 3%. Australia has low unemployment, low inflation, 
and a highly skilled workforce. The services sector accounts for around 70% of the Australian economy and 
four out of five jobs, with the largest service-based industries being financial and insurance services. Of 
the non-services sector, the largest industry is mining. Australia’s exports are dominated by goods exports, 
in particular resources, rural commodities and manufactured goods (around 60%, 11%, and 13% of total 
exports respectively). Most trade is with Asia, particularly China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and 
ASEAN countries. Australia also has other strong links with Asia, being home to around two million people 
born in Asia. Similar numbers of Australians visit Asia yearly, and about three-quarters of international 
students in Australian higher education were born in Asia.
1.7. Australia’s financial sector is large and mature with assets totalling 340% of GDP (indicating that 
financial institutions provide substantial services to non-residents). The sector is dominated by four large 
banks. The IMF’s 2012 Financial Sector Assessment Program found Australia’s financial system to be sound 
and well managed, with the financial prudential regulatory and supervisory framework exhibiting a high 
degree of compliance with international standards.
1.3 Structural Elements 
1.8. The key structural elements for effective AML/CTF controls appear to be present in Australia. 
Political and institutional stability, accountability, and rule of law are all present. There is a professional 
and independent judicial system, both at State/Territory and federal level. Most States have Independent 
Corruption Commissions (ICC), some with far reaching powers, which also aim to counter corruption at the 
political level. In 2012, the review of Australia’s compliance with the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption commended Australia for its comprehensive and proactive anti-corruption arrangements. The 
federal government’s approach to combating corruption is based on a multi-agency model, which vests 
specialised functions and responsibilities in a number of agencies. There is no federal ICC. The institutional 
AML/CTF framework is centred around AUSTRAC, an independent agency within the federal Attorney-
General’s portfolio. For a full overview of the institutional framework see Section 2.1(b).
1.4  Other Contextual Factors
1.9. Australia has a mature and sophisticated AML/CTF regime, with a correspondingly well-developed 
legal and institutional framework. 
1.10. Combating corruption is a key priority for the public and the government, with corruption cases 
pursued by independent corruption commissions (at the State level), law enforcement (all levels), royal 
commissions, and the media. Close ties between business/labour unions and politicians and the absence 
of comprehensive party funding may be a specific vulnerability. Media and law enforcement attention for 
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1 corruption is widespread, public tolerance for corruption and corruption-related issues seems to be low, and 
there is no evidence that corruption is widespread in Australia. 
1.5 Scoping of Higher-Risk Issues
1.11. In deciding on issues to prioritise, the assessment team reviewed material submitted by Australia 
on national ML and TF risks, and from open sources. During the on-site, the assessment team gave increased 
focus to the areas below. The issues listed present not only areas of higher ML/TF risks (including threats and 
vulnerabilities), but also contain issues that were of significant interest or concern to the assessment team 
based on material provided before and during the on-site visit. 
Legal/operational issues 
1.12. Federal – State/Territory coverage, co-operation, and targeting ML and proceeds of crime, 
including confiscation: While the Commonwealth level has the lead on AML/CTF issues, many of the 
predicate offences are criminalised only at the State/Territory level. The information provided to the 
assessors by federal agencies almost exclusively focuses on the federal level, reflecting the federal system 
of government. The evaluation team explored with investigators and prosecutors at both federal and State/
Territory level to find out how those parts of the system are cooperating and performing, and the priority they give to pursuing ML rather than predicate offences as the data provided on ML convictions suggest these 
are low relative to predicate crime convictions.
1.13. Predicate offences: The magnitude of organised crime, narcotics, fraud, robbery/theft and, and 
foreign predicates, in particular corruption. Having reviewed other material that does not seem to have been 
factored into the NTA5 on the predicate crimes producing significant proceeds, the team explored the nature of the ML threat in Australia, and relative magnitude across crime types, and how authorities are pursuing 
ML cases related to these offences to consider whether sufficient priority is being given to the pursuit of ML 
investigations and prosecutions. 
1.14. Misuse of corporate vehicles, trusts, and NPOs: Measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons 
and legal arrangements may not be adequate, and Australia’s NTA identifies numerous ML schemes using 
corporate vehicles. However, it is not clear whether Australia has fully assessed the ML/TF risks posed by 
these vehicles. The team therefore explored the extent to which authorities can obtain accurate and up-
to-date information on beneficial ownership in a timely manner. Non-profit organisations have also been 
identified as a channel to raise and move terrorism funds in Australia6, and the team explored the adequacy 
of oversight of the NPO sector.
Financial and DNFBP sector vulnerabilities
1.15. Effectiveness of the AML/CTF regulatory and supervisory framework: AUSTRAC is Australia’s 
AML/CTF supervisor. Australia’s regulatory framework is very complex, and the team explored how well the 
various parts of the financial sector and DNFBPs (where they do have AML/CTF obligations) were aware of 
and understand their obligations and were adequately identifying, assessing, and mitigating ML/FT risk. The 
team further explored the adequacy of AUSTRAC’s risk analyses for the various sectors, including exemptions 
from AML/CTF obligations. The team also examined on-site and off-site supervisory programmes, feedback, and follow-up, including sanctions and other corrective measures to enhance AML/CTF compliance and 
mitigate ML/TF risk.  
5 E.g. Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) Counting the costs of crime in Australia a 2005 update, 2008 (which 
suggests substantial proceeds from cannabis and fraud); Australian Bureau of Statistics The Non-Observed 
Economy and Australia's GDP, 2012 (which also suggests substantial proceeds from cannabis).
6 AIC (2012), pp. 19-20.
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11.16. Gatekeepers and other DNFBPs (in particular lawyers, accountants, notaries, and real estate): Lawyers and accountants are identified in Australia’s NTA as facilitating the establishment of legal structures 
and advice to facilitate ML by organised crime groups. The NTA also particularly indicates that overseas-based crime groups buy real estate (as well as other high-value goods) in Australia to conceal their criminal 
proceeds. Most DNFBPs do not have comprehensive AML/CTF obligations, so the team explored the policy, 
legal, budgetary or other reasons for their non-coverage.
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2. NATIONAL AML/CTF POLICIES AND COORDINATION
Key Findings
Overall, Australian authorities have a good understanding of most of Australia’s main ML risks 
but need to develop their understanding further in certain areas. They coordinate very well activities to address key aspects of the ML/TF risks but there remain some key risks unaddressed, 
and an underlying concern that the authorities are addressing predicate crime rather than ML.Australia recognises the need to continue to update and take further measures to fully identify, understand, address, and communicate to the relevant sectors the full range of ML risks now occurring 
in Australia.
Australia needs to take further actions to address the risk of gatekeepers and corporate vehicles 
as channels to facilitate ML, as identified in the NTA , including by bringing all DNFBPs within the 
scope of the AML/CTF regime (and as required by the FATF Recommendations).
Authorities have a good understanding of their TF risks and are addressing them. They assess 
that TF is largely motivated by international tensions and conflicts.
National AML/CTF coordination at the operational level is very comprehensive, but 
demonstrating its overall success is challenging, although results from national task forces 
are showing positive trends. There is not enough focus on how to monitor and measure success, and there are limited national mechanisms or metrics actively in place to measure how effective or 
efficient the AML/CTF system is.
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2.1 Background and Context
(a)	 Overview	of	AML/CTF	strategy
2.1. Australia has no articulated AML/CTF policy or strategy but does have a national strategy for 
combating organised crime – the Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework – which identifies 
ML as an intrinsic enabler of organised crime. The key elements of that Framework are the Australia Crime 
Commission’s (ACC) biennial Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) that provides a picture of the most 
significant threats and harms arising from organised criminal activity; a National Organised Crime Response 
Plan (NOCRP) which includes strategies and priorities for national and multi-jurisdictional approaches 
to key risks within the organised crime environment; and multi-agency responses to develop and deliver 
operational, policy, regulatory and legislative responses to organised crime. Australia also has an AML/CTF 
interdepartmental committee (AML IDC) (see TC Annex) at the federal level that sets priorities through an 
annual work plan. The most recent work plan’s priorities include improving customer due diligence measures, reviewing the operation of AML/CTF legislation, enhancing data matching to improve the intelligence value 
of AUSTRAC information, and expanding the range of agencies that can access and use AUSTRAC information. More directly related to combating national ML/TF risks are the plans of individual agencies and task forces but these tend to focus on combating the underlying predicate crimes or terrorism rather than ML or TF, 
reflecting Australia’s focus on crime disruption (see below). TF risks are addressed as part of AML/CTF policy 
and national security and counter-terrorism strategies as appropriate. 
(b)	 The	institutional	framework
2.2. The following are the main ministries, agencies, and authorities responsible for formulating and 
implementing the federal government’s AML/CTF policies:
 Attorney General’s Department (AGD) — has policy responsibility for AML/CTF. It is also 
Australia’s central authority for extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
 Australian Crime Commission (ACC) — is Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency - 
focused on understanding and combating serious and organised crime of national significance. Its 
Board is chaired by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner and includes all State and 
Territory Police Commissioners, the Secretary of AGD, the Director-General of Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the CEO of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
(ACBPS), the Commissioner of Taxation and the Chair of the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC); AUSTRAC’s CEO is an observer.
 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) — monitors and detects the illegal 
movement of people, goods, and illicit cash across the border. It also administers border controls 
on UN sanctioned goods to prevent activities that may contribute to the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
 Australian Federal Police (AFP) — is responsible for investigating serious and complex crime 
against the federal government. It heads up the multi-agency Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce 
(CACT) and the Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit (TFIU). 
 Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) agencies1 — have intelligence and operational roles 
for aspects of ML/TF matters, as well as counter-proliferation. 
1 The Australian Intelligence Community, or AIC, is an informal term used to describe the six Australian security and 
intelligence agencies: The Office of National Assessments; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; Australian 
Secret Intelligence Service; Australian Signals Directorate; Defence Intelligence Organisation; and Australian 
Geospatial Intelligence Organisation.
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 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) — is Australia’s prudential supervisor for authorised deposit-taking institutions (banks, building societies and credit unions), life and general insurance and reinsurance companies, friendly societies  and superannuation funds (excluding self-
managed funds).
 Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) — is responsible for financial market 
integrity, business conduct and disclosure, and consumer protection in the financial system. It 
registers Australian companies and regulates financial markets, financial services organisations, and professionals who deal and advise in investments, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking 
and credit.
 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) — is the federal government’s principal revenue collection 
agency. It investigates tax crimes and provides information to law enforcement to assist with 
investigations into other crimes. 
 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) — Australia’s AML/CTF 
regulator and financial intelligence unit (FIU). 
 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) — prosecutes offences against federal 
law, which includes ML and TF offences. 
 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible for the implementation and 
administration of Australia’s targeted financial sanctions.
 Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC) seeks to maintain, protect and 
enhance public trust and confidence in the NPO sector.
 Each State and Territory also has its own police force and DPP. Most States and Territories also have 
specialist crime commissions and some have anti-corruption commissions.
(c) Coordination and cooperation arrangements 
2.3. Australia has a wide range of arrangements in place for AML/CTF coordination and cooperation 
at both the policy and operational levels. The main federal coordinating body is the AML IDC which meets to share information and inform the strategic direction and priority setting of federal agencies working on 
domestic AML/CTF initiatives.2 Coordination of AML/CTF-related activities also occurs through the NOCRP 
and other inter-departmental fora that coordinate law enforcement policy issues.3 
2.4. Operational activities are coordinated using a mixture of standing committees and task forces 
that include federal and State/Territory agencies. A key body is the ACC Board described above. The Board 
determines national criminal intelligence priorities and special operations and investigations. Task forces are 
used as a mechanism to coordinate operational activities. These task forces target specific areas of concern 
where laundering activity is involved such as the remittance sector (Eligo National Task Force), criminal 
gangs (Task Force Attero), tax crimes (Project Wickenby), serious and organised investment fraud (Task 
Force Galilee), and asset confiscation (CACT). The use of criminal intelligence is also coordinated via the ACC 
National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability and via AUSTRAC providing online access to its transaction 
reports database as well as posting liaison officers in some partner agencies. In addition, Joint Management 
Groups (JMGs) operate in each of Australia’s States/Territories to coordinate operational interaction between 
federal and State/Territory law enforcement and regulatory agencies.
2 The AML IDC is chaired by the AGD and also comprises representatives from AUSTRAC, the AFP, the ACC, DFAT, 
Customs, the Treasury, the ATO and the CDPP. It meets two to three times each year as needed.
3 E.g. the Heads of Operational Commonwealth Law Enforcement Agencies – meets twice-yearly and serves as the 
primary forum for 14 federal agencies to discuss law-enforcement policy issues.
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2.5.  CTF policy is coordinated by the AML IDC as well as broader counter-terrorism coordinating bodies, 
led by the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. CTF operational matters are coordinated 
through a multi-agency Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit.
2.6. DFAT chairs and services a number of counter-proliferation coordination groups. The main 
group comprises: DFAT (Chair), Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of Defence, AGD, 
ACBPS, the AIC agencies, and other agencies co-opted as necessary.
(d)  Country’s assessment of risk
2.7. Australia has produced two reports on its national ML/TF risks, which are supplemented 
by ongoing risk analysis efforts. Those  efforts include an Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) (produced by the ACC every two years) that focuses on aspects of the predicate crime environment, dynamic 
analysis processes stemming from strong inter-agency cooperation and joint-task forces, as well as studies 
into specific risk areas.
2.8. Australia conducted its first National Threat Assessment on Money Laundering (NTA) in 2011 
and published a summarised version. The NTA assesses ML threats and also assesses high-risk countries 
that influence Australia’s ML environment. It was produced prior to FATF adopting Recommendation1 
or publishing guidance on assessing ML/TF risk. The NTA tends to follow an approach similar to FATF’s 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Global Threat Assessment 2010, focusing mainly on the channels 
identified as vulnerable to laundering proceeds in the private sector. It is primarily a qualitative assessment 
using federal law enforcement cases and information in the AUSTRAC database to identify ML channels and 
typologies. While the NTA identifies and assesses most of the main risks, the assessors question whether the 
scope, inputs, and focus limit the analysis in relation to some other ML risk areas.
2.9. The NTA’s conclusions reasonably reflect most of Australia’s main risks (which likely still 
prevail), but the NTA is now three years old and assessors are not confident that it is current for 
all risks, including where subsequent assessments have superseded it in some areas (e.g. on crypto-
currencies, TBML and financial and investment sector fraud). The NTA, in particular, looked at some 
but not all potential AML/CTF regime vulnerabilities. It may not have identified or assessed new and 
emerging risks reflected in the latest FATF Standards, and potentially failed to identify some risks (e.g. foreign 
predicate risk). The NTA relied on the 2010 OCTA and other criminal intelligence for setting the broader 
crime environment. However, not all of the predicate crimes producing significant proceeds (such as the 
large domestic cannabis market) are assessed or examined as ML risks as fully as may have been expected. 
Nevertheless, Australia’s understanding of risk has since been supplemented by other mechanisms as set out 
in paragraph 2.1 above, for example the biennial OCTA. In addition, the ACC has produced many intelligence 
products which deal with either ML/TF specifically or are ML/TF related.
2.10. Australia has used the results of the NTA to help shape aspects of how it combats ML. The AML/CTF regime is calibrated around mitigating risks from organised and serious crimes with the regulatory focus 
on banks, the gaming sector, and remitters – seen in the NTA as the main channels for ML (and also TF for the 
latter). Specifically, the NTA appears to have been a substantial driver for the creation of a remittance task 
force in December 2012.
2.11. The NRA focuses on TF risks which impact on Australia’s domestic environment. It assesses 
the risk associated with the methods and financial channels used to raise or transfer funds for TF. High-risk 
countries which influence TF in Australia are also examined. It was coordinated by AUSTRAC, finalised in 
April 2014, and prepared with input from intelligence held across law enforcement and national security 
agencies. The methodology used, which drew on the NTA and modified it to take into account the FATF 
guidance on conducting ML/TF risk assessment, was superior to that used for the NTA such that the assessors 
are confident that it more likely identifies and assesses the TF risks in Australia. The NRA is being used to 
help guide agencies on how to combat TF in Australia.
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2.2 Technical Compliance (R.1, R.2, R.33)
2.12. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation 1 (assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach) is rated partially 
compliant.
 Recommendation 2 (national cooperation and coordination) is rated largely compliant.
 Recommendation 33 (statistics) is rated largely compliant.
2.3 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Coordination)
2.13. Australia exhibits many characteristics of an effective system but needs to implement moderate 
improvements in the way that it formulates and implements its AML/CTF policies and activities. This includes moving beyond the current primary focus on predicate crime to formulating and implementing policies more 
specifically aimed at mitigating the ML/TF risks.
Understanding risk
2.14. Overall, the authorities demonstrated a good understanding of most of Australia’s main ML 
risks but need to develop their understanding further in certain areas. Due to the dynamic ongoing risk 
analysis processes employed, the authorities’ understanding of Australia’s ML risks is not reliant solely on the 
NTA. They demonstrated very good understanding of aspects of the risks associated with the predicate crime 
environment, domestic geography, aspects of cross-border flows, the channels most vulnerable to laundering, and customer risks (including involving complex corporate structures), but somewhat less understanding 
of risks linked to system vulnerabilities. While having a comprehensive understanding of some aspects of 
nature and size of the proceeds of crime environment, the authorities acknowledged that they could improve 
the depth of their understanding particularly in State and Territory police agencies. Recent OCTAs have 
focused on improving the understanding of a wide range of “serious and organised” crime markets. The ACC 
was working on, and finalised after the on-site, a Financial Crime Risk Assessment, which should provide 
greater depth and detail about complex financial crimes and which can inform future ML risk assessments. 
Sydney and Melbourne were universally understood as the primary sources of domestic proceeds as well as 
the favoured geographic zones for domestic laundering. 
2.15. There seemed to be a fairly good and universal understanding in relation to specific aspects 
of cross-border illicit flows. Australian authorities have largely focused on outgoing high-risk funds but 
recognise, based on recent operational findings, among other things, that more attention needs to be paid to 
understanding potential incoming laundered flows. In addition, the authorities demonstrated differing views about the extent to which Australia is exposed to trade-based ML, although they have taken some steps to 
begin addressing the issue. 
2.16. There was also a very good and almost universal understanding of most channels that were 
identified as highly vulnerable to ML activity in the NTA. The authorities demonstrated a very good understanding of placement risk associated with mainly drug crime, as well as risks associated with more 
sophisticated aspects of laundering activity. However, while the gaming sector, high value goods, and real 
estate were identified as high threat in the NTA, the authorities did not convey that same understanding of 
their risk levels in their meetings with the assessment team – particularly at the federal level (but a number 
of case studies show they have successfully investigated ML involving these sectors).. 
2.17. There was insufficient understanding demonstrated of the extent to which Australia could 
be exposed to ML or TF risk through potential vulnerabilities such as gaps in the AML/CTF laws and 
regulations, weaknesses in the way that the authorities carried out their roles, or a lack of resources 
in AML/CTF agencies. 
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2.18. Australia could possibly forge a stronger consensus about the understanding of risks by 
formalising its ongoing efforts to analyse risk understanding. Understanding ML risks has been 
supplemented since the NTA through ongoing dialogue amongst Australian authorities but their views about 
some of those risks vary. While some variance is expected, there could be merit in having the AML IDC formally 
adopt future NTAs and findings that updated parts of Australia’s ML risk profile in between iterations of the 
NTA. Moreover, this would also help spread ownership of the NTA to assist AUSTRAC to engage more agencies 
nationally to contribute to the assessment.
2.19. The authorities demonstrated a deeper understanding of the TF risk than was contained 
in the public version of the NRA.4 They assessed that TF is largely motivated by international tensions 
and conflicts. The primary destinations for current TF flows from Australia were understood to be Syria 
and Iraq, with the funds often passing through other jurisdictions en route. The authorities did not see any 
evidence that TF funds were flowing into Australia to fund domestic terrorism or to be re-directed to other 
countries. “Lone-wolf” operators and small domestic groups (sympathetic with foreign Jihadist groups) were 
understood as the primary terrorism, and thus TF, risk both domestically and trans-nationally. Sydney and 
Melbourne were seen as the most likely fund-raising locations. Funds move out of Australia through banks or 
remitters or travel with those moving to conflict zones. There had also been a small number of incidents of 
Australian businesses paying ransoms to terrorist groups in Africa. 
Addressing risks
2.20. The authorities demonstrated areas where national policies and activities were addressing 
Australia’s main ML risks and that they are largely addressing TF risks (particularly by disrupting domestic 
terrorist activities, as discussed in Chapter 4 below), but there remain some key risks unaddressed, and 
an underlying concern that the authorities are addressing predicate crime rather than ML. The main 
criminal threats universally identified where national policies pursued ML, were drug trafficking and tax evasion, but the authorities did not demonstrate that their policies focused much attention on addressing 
laundering activity from other crimes (including foreign predicates). National policies to address drugs 
and tax crimes have led to the establishment of the ATO-led Project Wickenby in 2006, the Criminal Assets 
Confiscation Taskforce in 2011, and the Eligo National Task Force in 2012. Fraud was a high-risk predicate 
in the NTA and while national policies exist focusing on the predicate crime (e.g. the ACC-led Task Force 
Galilee was established in 2011 to address serious and organised investment fraud), the ML risk could be better addressed, including by having investigative agencies place more emphasis on pursuing criminal 
ML charges for large frauds and recovering the related proceeds using criminal processes. Present policies 
emphasise assisting some victims of large frauds to pursue stolen assets using civil processes (see IO7 and 
IO8). And while some laundering activity is being disrupted, investigators shared frustrations at being unable to effectively pierce complex corporate structures and suggested that this may be contributing to challenges 
in securing substantive ML or other convictions against senior members of major drug or ML networks, 
and the low level of proceeds confiscations relative to the estimated size of drug markets (see IO5, IO7, and 
IO8). Thus, Australia’s AML/CTF efforts could be enhanced by addressing risks associated with the abuse of 
companies and trusts, including by developing improved legal mechanisms to obtain beneficial ownership of 
companies and trusts. In particular, the authorities would probably benefit from a central register of trusts. Further areas where Australia could do more to calibrate its policies to address its risks are discussed below 
and in greater detail under each relevant IO).
2.21. The authorities claim that their policy of disrupting organised and serious crime addresses 
ML/TF risk but assessors were not presented with convincing evidence of how effective disruption 
was at combating ML. Australia considers that ML investigations form one component of a holistic strategy to prevent, deter and interrupt criminal activity and that predicate offending and money laundering are not 
mutually exclusive. Australia argues that following the money results in the investigation of money laundering 
offences also provides a benefit for investigating predicate offences. Thus, due to the transnational nature of most predicate crimes generating substantial proceeds in Australia, Australia has responded by prioritising 
4 A sanitised version of the NRA was published on 11 September 2014, too late after the on-site visit to be taken into 
account for the purposes of determining ratings.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 41
NATIONAL AML/CTF POLICIES AND COORDINATION
2
an international disruption strategy that involves arrest and prosecution of those involved in serious and organised crime (often for the predicate offence) but also international collaboration to target criminal 
syndicates and their senior controllers as key parts of responding to crime. This strategy is presented as 
partly explaining why domestic ML convictions might be lower than could be expected, relative to Australia’s 
ML risk profile. Challenges remain in demonstrating how successful the strategy is. In addition, the assessors 
note that while this policy of disruption does not fit within the “alternative measures” approach contemplated 
in Core Issue 7.5 of the Methodology (see IO.7), but disruption strategies can fit under IO.1 if assessors are 
convinced that it contributes to combating ML.  
2.22. Authorities pointed to areas where disruption had hardened the environment and forced 
criminals to move offshore and change ML methodologies, as illustrating that the disruption strategy 
was addressing the ML risks. However, the assessors were not convinced that changing rather than 
reducing behaviour amounts to addressing or mitigating ML risks. Examples of criminals changing their 
modus operandi include some organised criminal syndicate principles moving offshore to avoid detection 
and arrest, and their use of “clean-skin” non-resident mules who quickly carry out structured deposits. These 
make it difficult for law enforcement to take action before the mules have left the country and the funds 
have moved offshore, into untraceable corporate structures, or both. While the authorities cited intelligence that pointed to launderers changing to other methods due to disruption activity, some law enforcement and 
the private sector said that financial crime, including money laundering, was not decreasing, instead, the 
criminals were just changing their behaviours. This is a major challenge in an area of criminal activity where 
perpetrators adapt, regroup, and shift their methodologies. 
2.23. The authorities have addressed some vulnerabilities in the regulatory framework by 
introducing new CDD requirements and regulation and supervision focuses on addressing risks in 
banks, the gaming sector, and remitters consistent with the NTA, but need to take further measures 
to address the ML risks associated with gatekeepers and corporate vehicles, as identified in the NTA 
(and as required by the FATF Recommendations). Australia’s AML/CTF regime was strengthened in 2014 
by the introduction of new CDD and PEP requirements for reporting entities. In 2011, amendments to the 
AML/CTF Act introduced new obligations to address the ML/TF risk associated with remitters. As discussed 
in IO3, AUSTRAC’s risk-based supervision policy focuses on the higher risk reporting entities currently within 
the AML/CTF regime. Robust enforcement of the new CDD requirements, coupled with other predicate crime policies5 should also enhance efforts to combat the use of fraudulent identities in ML/TF, which discussions 
with law enforcement and the private sector suggested occurred frequently. Identity fraud was identified 
as a high-risk issue in the NTA, which indicated identity crime/fraud as both a crime risk and an enabler to 
ML. However, there are limited measures in place to mitigate high ML/TF risks identified by the authorities 
associated with the abuse of legal persons and arrangements or the real estate sector. Professional facilitators 
(lawyers, accountants, TCSPs – especially from lower tier firms) were almost universally understood as a 
major ML risk - but the authorities have not addressed that risk by including them within the scope of the 
AML regime. Obligations to record details about beneficial ownership of customers, companies, and trusts by 
professional facilitators as well as report suspicions to AUSTRAC may enhance detection of ML/TF activity 
as well as facilitate the timely tracing of criminal assets. This is particularly relevant for the latter where the authorities indicated that tracing proceeds is often frustrated through the use of complex corporate 
structures (see IO4, IO5, and IO8). 
2.24. The authorities could also do more to pro-actively address the ML risk from foreign proceeds, 
including by regulating real estate agents, one of the DNFBPs most exposed to the activity, and by 
law enforcement more actively pursuing foreign predicates crime. The laundering of foreign proceeds of crime in Australia (particularly in the real estate sector) was acknowledged by some of the authorities 
and much of the private sector as a high ML risk, but assessors’ attention was not drawn to any national 
policies explicitly targeting or prioritising this risk. Of great concern is that Australia has not brought real 
estate agents within the AML/CTF regime. Furthermore, while authorities have taken some proceeds of crime action in relation to foreign proceeds, they do not always pursue such cases, nor receive good cooperation from other countries to get admissible supporting evidence to demonstrate foreign offending or that money 
5   See the National Identity Security Strategy, at www.ag.gov.au/identitysecurity.
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in Australia is the proceeds of crime, which therefore limits Australia’s ability to take action. The AFP works 
closely with AGD and foreign law enforcement agencies to help ensure that foreign orders can be registered 
in Australia. Nevertheless, authorities indicated that the receipt of a foreign restraining order was not usually a trigger to commence an Australian investigation to pursue criminal charges against those carrying out the 
laundering activity in Australia. Overall, the assessors were left with the impression that law enforcement efforts to pursue the laundering of foreign proceeds might be given a higher priority if there was an explicit 
national policy to address this risk (See IO4 and IO7).
2.25. The authorities could do more to address ML/TF in cash-intensive businesses. Cash is clearly 
understood as a major risk - but cash intensive businesses do not seem to be a focus for the authorities 
and, other than being mentioned in the NTA, it is not clear that the authorities have policies that proactively 
address the risks associated with them.
2.26. Australian authorities’ understanding of its TF risk has also informed the development of 
its national CTF policies and activities. The introduction of remittance registration obligations in 2011 
has assisted in addressing the TF risks posed by the remittance sector, a key channel for TF in Australia. The 
authorities’ ability to investigate TF and disrupt terrorism plots has been greatly enhanced by the creation of 
a specific Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit in the AFP in 2010. More generally, Australia does not 
have a developed national policy setting out what the overall AML/CTF system is meant to achieve, 
or how its success should be monitored or measured, making it challenging to determine how well 
the ML/TF risks are being addressed. Most AML/CTF agencies have key performance indicators (KPIs) 
but few relate to AML/CTF, and those are too micro to help determine what the system overall is achieving. 
Thus, there are very limited mechanisms or metrics actively in place to measure how efficient or effective 
the AML/CTF system is, including how well it addresses ML/TF risks. Related to this, there are challenges 
producing some key national level AML/CTF related statistics for the system’s criminal justice outcomes (see 
TC Annex).6
2.27. Accordingly, metrics about how well the authorities’ efforts are addressing ML/TF risks are 
limited, and the authorities were challenged to present convincing evidence about what outcomes 
their efforts are achieving.7 While law enforcement’s strategic focus is on disrupting predicate crime, 
including through confiscating criminal assets, rather than pursuing ML offences, there was not sufficient evidence that this strategy was reducing the level of offending or taking enough proceeds away from criminals 
to make crime unprofitable (see IO.7 and IO.8). Official crime statistics and other reports indicate that, while 
predicate crimes may be decreasing in some areas (e.g. some frauds), the overall incidence, particularly for 
drug trafficking (the main threat), is not (see chart below). Consistent with this, drug seizures and arrests are substantially higher than since the last assessment and at record highs8. Some law enforcement indicated that the value of property taken from criminals each year was small compared to what the criminals generated 
(see IO.8 for more on what is confiscated annually). Moreover, the authorities only take action to freeze or 
seize proceeds of crime in a small number of predicate crime cases, suggesting that more could be done to 
address ML risks.9
6 A contributing factor may be that criminal justice statistics are maintained according to the highest ranked offence 
that an offender is charged with or convicted for. The ML offence ranks 79th, behind many predicate offences (and 
below all major profit generating offences identified in the NTA). This limits an ability to accurately track how 
many offenders are convicted for ML or what sanctions were imposed on them for ML.
7 See IO.6, IO.7, and IO.8 for more information about outputs of various operational task forces.
8 Australian Crime Commission (2014).
9 The ratio is around 2%. Note, however, that it is unrealistic to expect any country to prosecute 100% of it predicate 
crime offenders for money laundering or recover 100% of proceeds generated. 
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Objectives	and	activities	of	competent	authorities
2.28. The objectives and activities of most of the competent authorities are generally consistent 
with the ML/TF risks, with the major exception being a lack of focus on addressing risks from abuse 
of complex corporate structures and real estate (including through regulating relevant DNFBPs). And, while there may be alignment, as discussed above, moderate improvement is needed in some areas to 
address the ML risks. On the preventive front, regulation of financial institutions but not DNFBPs matches the 
main risks and AUSTRAC’s stated areas of supervisory focus are fairly well aligned with the high risk channels 
identified in the NTA, and guided by sector and entity-type risk analysis. But AUSTRAC’s actual supervisory 
practice does not adequately align with the risks in the regulated sectors and is not sufficiently nuanced to 
account for variance and risk between the RE s within a single Reporting Entity Group (REG). As mentioned, 
there is no specific national AML/CTF policy or strategy for the authorities to align their objectives and 
activities with.
Exemptions,	enhanced,	and	simplified	measures
2.29. Exemptions from requirements, and the application of enhanced or simplified measures, 
are not based primarily on the results of the NTA, NRA or other efforts to assess ML/TF risks. The 
regulatory framework does not require reporting entities to apply enhanced measures based on the findings 
of the NTA or NRA, and exemptions are often driven by a combination of parameters such as regulatory burden imposed on regulated entities relative to their risks and other matters, rather than primarily on a 
proven low risk of ML and TF.
National coordination and cooperation
2.30. National coordination across the operational chain is very comprehensive, but demonstrating 
that it is focused on combating ML and TF rather than predicate crimes and terrorism is challenging. As mentioned, Australia has many arrangements in place for AML/CTF coordination and cooperation, 
underpinned by OCTA, NOCRP, NTA and NRA (see IO6, IO7, and IO8 for more information about the results 
being produced by various operational task forces). These result in regular dialogue between relevant 
agencies, particularly on operational matters. Overall, however, none of the material cited by the authorities 
flowing from these arrangements set out any policy or strategy for combating laundering per se or going after 
those that facilitate it – the target of most of the material is organised crime rather than money launderers. 
However, the authorities said much of their effort focuses on following the money trail overseas to identify the 
key ML syndicate organisers - the ‘super controllers’ or ‘super facilitators’ - and to engage foreign authorities 
to take joint action against these targets. As previously mentioned and elaborated below in Chapters 3 and 
4, the authorities’ focus is on disrupting predicate crime and terrorism rather than ML/TF. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, AUSTRAC, as AML/CTF supervisor, seems to coordinate well with law enforcement, but could 
make more effort to coordinate with prudential supervisors.   
44      Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015
NATIONAL AML/CTF POLICIES AND COORDINATION
2
2.31. The authorities coordinate and cooperate to a large extent to combat the financing of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Communicating ML/TF risks
2.32. Australia has been proactive in directly communicating some aspects of ML risk outcomes, 
particularly to major reporting groups, but could enhance communication of customer and country 
risks to all reporting entities, and improve overall communication to the lower-tier reporting entities. 
A sanitised version of the NTA on ML was published that contains only cursory material about the predicate 
crime threat, cross-border or country risks, and very little about customer risks. Very general information about predicate crime threats and sometimes their links with ML are also communicated through the 
ACC’s sanitised OCTA and other publications, but more focus on the size and nature of the predicate crime 
environment in future sanitised NTAs would help the private sector to better understand the broader ML risk 
environment. The NRA on TF had not been shared with the private sector at the time of the on-site. A sanitised version shared with the assessors, while identifying high-risk countries and the main areas exposed to risk, seems high level and would be improved if it provided more practical information to the private sector about 
Australia’s TF risks.10 The authorities have also shared more details on ML/TF risks in AUSTRAC’s major 
reporters and industry forums. Many in the private sector indicated that the extent of their knowledge about 
the authorities’ views of ML/TF risks was limited, and that they would benefit from having more information 
than what is available in the published material, including more current information on areas of concern.
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 1
2.33. Australia is achieving Immediate Outcome 1 to a large extent as demonstrated by its good 
understanding of most of its major ML risks and of its TF risks, as well as its very good coordination 
of activities to address key aspects of the ML/TF risks. Australia identified and assessed most of its major ML risks, but needs to pay more attention to understanding foreign predicate risks, and vulnerabilities that 
impact its AML/CTF system. The system has started to achieve some mitigation of ML risks (e.g. for some 
fraud and tax crime), but the major drug crime threat is highly resilient to the authorities’ efforts. AML/CTF policies need to better address ML risks associated with foreign predicate offending, the abuse of legal 
persons and arrangements, and laundering in the real estate sector, particularly through bringing all DNFBPs 
within the AML/CTF regime. More current information about ML/TF risks also needs to be communicated to 
the private sector. The identification of low or high ML/TF risks by the authorities should drive exemptions 
from requirements and strongly influence the application of enhanced or simplified measures for reporting 
entities. While cooperation, particularly on operational matters, is very good across relevant competent authorities, including for proliferation matters, Australia could better articulate an AML/CTF policy and 
maintain more comprehensive national statistics to demonstrate how efficient and effective its AML/CTF system is, including by developing ways to show that its disruption strategy for predicate crime addresses ML 
risks. The rating for Immediate Outcome 1 is substantially effective.
2.4 Recommendations on National AML/CTF Policies and Coordination
2.34. The authorities are recommended to:
 Develop and implement more aggressive policies to combat ML, particularly drug related, but also other ML beyond the current primary focus on the predicate crime, including aimed at pursuing 
sophisticated and complex ML schemes in order to disrupt major ML networks and facilitators.
10 A sanitised version of the NRA was published on September 11, 2014, too late after the onsite visit to be taken into 
account for the purposes of determining ratings.
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 Better address ML risks associated with: 
 x predicate crimes other than drugs and tax, including foreign predicates; 
 x the abuse of legal persons and arrangements and the real estate sector; 
 x identity fraud; 
 x fraud; and 
 x cash intensive activities, including by extending AML/CTF requirements to lawyers, accountants, 
trust and company service providers, and real estate agents. 
 Articulate and then implement clear and more granular strategies  for combating ML and TF, 
including identifying metrics and processes for monitoring and measuring success.
 Establish processes to collect and maintain the main national level statistics needed to measure success in implementing a national AML/CTF strategy, particularly those related to investigations, 
prosecutions, convictions, and property confiscated.
 Undertake a re-assessment of Australia’s ML risks in keeping with the requirements and guidance 
issued in relation to Recommendation 1, and formalise the ongoing processes for re-assessing risks.
 Share more information with the private sector about ML/TF risks and consider having private 
sector input into the assessment of those risks. 
 Amend the AML/CTF Act and Rules to ensure that exemptions and the application of simplified 
preventive measures must be based primarily on low ML and TF risk.
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3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Key Findings
Australia develops and disseminates good quality financial intelligence to a range of law 
enforcement bodies, customs, and tax authorities. AUSTRAC is a well-functioning FIU. The amount 
of financial transaction data in the AUSTRAC database, and the fact that all relevant competent authorities have access to this database and can use its integrated analytical tool, are strengths of 
Australia’s AML/CTF system. AUSTRAC information is accessed by federal law enforcement as a 
routine in most cases but less so by State and Territory police who conduct most predicate crime 
investigations, and this information assists in the investigation of predicate offences.
However, the overall limited use of AUSTRAC information by law enforcement as a trigger to 
commence ML/TF investigations presents a weakness in the Australian AML/CTF system and 
should be addressed as a priority. Broader use of the sound institutional structure for combating ML 
would more effectively mitigate ML/TF risks.
Australia’s main criminal justice policy objective is to disrupt and deter predicate crime, 
including if necessary through ML investigations/prosecutions. Australia focuses on what it 
considers to be the main three proceeds-generating predicate threats (drugs, fraud and tax evasion). 
Australia should expand its focus to ensure that a greater number of cases of ML are being identified 
and investigated adequately. 
Stand-alone and third party ML offences are regularly prosecuted. However, legal issues have 
arisen in relation to the prosecution of self-laundering offences and ML of foreign predicates 
is not frequently prosecuted. The level of convictions for ML at the federal level and in Victoria 
is encouraging, but the level in the other States and Territories is lower than is warranted by 
their size and risks. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions have been applied to natural 
persons. However, no corporations have been prosecuted for ML offences and it appears that this 
option is not seriously considered or pursued – which is inconsistent with the risk profile. 
The Australian authorities apply a range of criminal justice measures to disrupt serious 
criminal activity, including ML offences, as an alternative to pursuing the ML offence, but such 
measures are applied whether or not it may be possible to secure a ML conviction.
Confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value is 
being pursued as a policy objective; mainly in relation to drugs and in relation to tax by the 
ATO. Competent authorities have increased their efforts to confiscate proceeds of crime, particularly 
since the establishment of the federal Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce. But it is unclear how 
successful confiscation measures are across all jurisdictions and total recoveries remain relatively 
modest.
The movement of undeclared currency (“cash smuggling”) is identified as an increasing high 
risk in Australia and some steps have been taken to target cross-border movement of cash and 
bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). 
The focus of Australia’s confiscation efforts are consistent with the primary risk identified in 
the NTA to the extent that the majority of assets recovered to date have flowed from the drugs 
trade and also from tax evasion. Australia is also at significant risk of an inflow of illicit funds from 
persons in foreign countries who find Australia a suitable place to hold and invest funds, including in 
real estate.
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3.1 Background and Context 
Legal System and Offences
3.1. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (CC) contains Division 400, which contains the federal ML offences. 
Australia follows an all-crime approach for predicates, including State, Territory and foreign predicates. 
States have also criminalised ML. Federal seizure and confiscation provisions, both for ML and TF, are in the 
Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (POCA). States and Territories have corresponding, but different, sets of laws.
3.2. AUSTRAC is the financial intelligence unit (FIU) for Australia. It is an administrative FIU in the AGD 
portfolio. The FIU branch in AUSTRAC is responsible for monitoring and analysing financial transactions report data, producing intelligence products and working with domestic agencies and international counterpart 
FIUs. AUSTRAC has been a member of the EGMONT Group since 1995. 
3.3. The AFP is the federal police force. It works in coordination with the State and Territory police forces. 
AFP is responsible for federal crimes, which cover about half of the predicate offences and ML, as well as TF. 
The State and Territory police forces are responsible for non-federal predicates, which cover the majority of 
predicates, and ML. There is overlap in predicate-coverage between the federal and state/territory level, but 
together, both levels cover all predicates.
3.2 Technical Compliance (R.3, R.4, R.29-32)
3.4. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex: 
 Recommendation 3 (money laundering offence) is rated compliant.
 Recommendation 4 (confiscation and provisional measures) is rated compliant.
 Recommendation 29 (financial intelligence unit) is rated compliant.
 Recommendation 30 (responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities) is 
rated largely compliant. 
 Recommendation 31 (powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities) is rated 
largely compliant.
 Recommendation 32 (cash couriers) is rated largely compliant.
3.3 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial intelligence) 
a)		 Types	of	reports	received	and	requested	(information	to	the	FIU)
3.5. AUSTRAC receives a wide range of financial transactions reports. The following table summarises 
the report types AUSTRAC has received and subsequently analysed in recent years (see Table 3.1).
3.6. The number of reports that AUSTRAC receives is high because of the requirement to report all 
international fund transfers instructions (IFTIs). AUSTRAC also receives suspicious matter reports (SMRs) 
and considers that these reports are of a relatively high quality when it comes to the description of the 
suspicion that caused the reporting. The vastly larger volume and immediate filing of IFTIs and TTR s can make them more useful for intelligence and longer running operations, allowing larger money trails to be 
followed and wider networks to be identified. However, law enforcement found that SMRs can at times take 
longer to be submitted to AUSTRAC (up to 10 days). 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 49
LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
3
3.7. AUSTRAC stores all transactions in a highly advanced and sophisticated database for receiving, 
storing and analysing financial transactions and related information: the Transaction Reports Analysis 
and Query (TRAQ) database. AUSTRAC can also request additional information from financial institutions 
(making two such requests in 2013-14). AUSTRAC has direct access to a wide range of information. AUSTRAC 
also has indirect access to information held by the AFP. This information may be entered manually into TRAQ 
as an external source of information and thereby serve the purposes of analysis. AUSTRAC may benefit by 
increasing the sources for its analysis; such databases could be information related to criminal convictions.
Table 3.1.  Report types received and analysed by AUSTRCAC
Reports received by Austrac 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
IFTI (international funds transfer instruction reports) 18 095 756 35 666 743 53 770 266 79 334 421
SMR/SUSTR (suspicious transaction reports) 47 386 44 775 48 155 44 062
TTR/SCTR (threshold and significant cash transaction 
reports)
3 375 447 8 325 621 5 395 630 5 224 751
CBM/PC (cross-border movement of cash 
declarations)
35 527 30 342 29 525 30 725
CBM/BNI (cross-border movement of BNIs 
disclosures)
918 850 659 655
Total 21 555 034 44 068 331 59 244 235 84 634 614
SMR/SUSTR per FIU FTE staff member * 615 533 573 595
Total reports per FIU FTE staff member 279 936 524 623 705 289 1 143 711
* AUSTRAC staff dedicated to the FIU function. 
Customs (ACBPS)
3.8. AUSTRAC also receives and inputs into its database the cross-border currency declarations and 
cross-border BNI disclosures that ACBPS collects from travellers. 
b)		 Use	 and	 dissemination	 of	 financial	 information	 (Information	 from	 the	 FIU	 to	 law	
enforcement)
3.9. The Australian approach to the use and dissemination of financial intelligence and information is 
by 1) allowing direct access to the AUSTRAC database by partner agencies, thus giving them direct access to 
the raw data that it contains and specific reports from the database; and also by 2) disseminating analysis 
conducted by AUSTRAC.
i)		 Direct	use	of	financial	information	and	other	relevant	information
3.10. A large number of Australian authorities access and use a broad range of financial and other 
relevant information in the FIU database to develop evidence and trace criminal proceeds, especially 
in relation to predicate offences. Main sources used to identify predicate offences and potential ML and TF 
offences are intelligence, financial flows, human sources and use of coercive powers.
3.11. Authorised partner agencies access the AUSTRAC database directly online through the TRAQ 
Enquiry System (TES) – based on MOUs concluded with each partner agency. The MOUs govern the number 
of personnel from each agency permitted to use TES and the level of access granted to each user. The 41 
agencies include all major federal, State and Territory law enforcement bodies. In 2012/13, these agencies 
had a total of approximately 3 200 personnel with access to TES. All use of the AUSTRAC information can 
be audited for security reasons. In each of the previous five years, over 2 million manual searches (more 
than 7000 each day of the year) have been conducted in the AUSTRAC database. Other access is role-based 
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(different agency staff with different levels of security or operational responsibility have differing levels of 
access to the AUSTRAC system). Some agencies, such as the AFP, have full online access to all data held by 
AUSTRAC. Other agencies, such as ATO, automatically receive copies of all SMRs.
3.12. AUSTRAC also forwards potential high risk reports, such as some SMRs, automatically to certain 
partner agencies within one hour of receipt, based on dynamic red flags that are set in coordination with each 
partner agency. Other flagged reports are made available within 24 hours. AUSTRAC refers and sends these 
SMRs to partner agencies based on the nature of the alleged offence, risk or other material fact. 
3.13. The amount of financial transaction data in the AUSTRAC database, and the fact that all 
relevant competent authorities have access to this database and can use its integrated analytical tool, 
are strengths of Australia’s AML/CTF system.
3.14. Access to information is also achieved through a network of AUSTRAC senior liaison officers (ASLOs). 
The network promotes the use of AUSTRAC financial intelligence by partner agencies. AUSTRAC data is also 
used as input for the ACC Fusion database that generates law enforcement intelligence.
3.15. Much of the use of financial information in investigations takes place through joint task forces, such 
as the ATO-led Project Wickenby and the AUSTRAC/ACC-led Eligo National Task Force (see also IO7). 
Box 3.1.  Joint task forces
Project Wickenby is consistently cited by all authorities as the best example of successful use of 
AUSTRAC information. Wickenby has existed since 2006. It aims to prevent people from promoting or 
participating in the abuse of tax or secrecy havens and to improve taxpayers’ willingness to comply with 
their taxation obligations. The success of Wickenby is regularly communicated to the general public, 
and publicly measured by the amount of AUD that have been discovered and the number of successful 
prosecutions. Since 2006, 44 persons have been convicted for serious offences as a result of Wickenby, 
3 of these were ML convictions. The total amount of money recouped under Project Wickenby since 
2006 is over AUD 851 million. This includes over AUD 500 million in cash collections (payments of 
tax liabilities). This equates to about 5-6 convictions and the recovery of about over AUD 100 million 
annually. AUSTRAC information is said to be key to the success of Wickenby. In 2012 – 2013 AUSTRAC 
provided 55 intelligence reports to Wickenby (including international funds transfer pattern reports).
Eligo National Task Force is an ACC-led special investigation into the use of alternative remittance 
and informal value transfer systems by serious and organised crime. Eligo’s aim is to put in place long-term prevention strategies, using criminal intelligence insights to disrupt ML, drive greater sector 
professionalism and make it harder for organised crime to exploit this sector. AUSTRAC is an active 
participant, as the FIU and as the financial regulator. Eligo is actively cited as an example of the use of 
financial intelligence to prevent and disrupt criminal activity. Despite efforts, law enforcement officials expressed frustration with the continued operation of apparently criminal, although registered, 
remittance businesses. Moreover, abuse of remittance businesses was cited as one of the most common 
methods used to launder, particularly, drug proceeds, Australia’s largest ML threat.
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Customs (ACBPS)
3.16. Because all international wire transfers are reported to AUSTRAC, smuggling cash and BNIs is considered an attractive alternative to bring illicit funds in and out of Australia without the certainty of being 
reported. AUSTRAC and all law enforcement agencies indicated that illicit cash coming from abroad (for 
example to buy real estate) - is a major typology in Australia despite the fact that, for example, buying real 
estate with cash would trigger a significant cash transaction report. Cash flowing out of Australia, mainly 
drugs proceeds that are used for the next transport of drugs, is also a high risk according to authorities. 
3.17. Since 2011, ACBPS detected an average of AUD 10.5 million of undeclared cash per year. In 2012-
2013, ACBPS detected 308 cases of undeclared currency at the border, amounting to AUD 7.6 million. Of these 
detections, 230 were incoming and 78 were outgoing. 107 fines were issued and two convictions obtained for 
offences relating to failing to declare cash. An additional 14 convictions were obtained in 2013-2014.
Table 3.2.  Convictions for failing to report movement of cash over the threshold and BNIs when 
requested into and out of Australia
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total
Failure to report movement of cash over threshold into 
Australia 
0 1 4 5
Failure to report movement of cash over threshold out of 
Australia 
7 1 10 18
Receives cash moved into Australia without report 0 0 0 0
Failure to report BNI when requested 0 0 0 0
Total 7 2 14 23
3.18. AFP does not have figures on how many seizures have followed from these detections. Considering the risk of cash in Australia following the number and amounts of foreign-linked cash cases reported by the 
authorities, this suggests a low detection rate. Australian authorities also reported that an amount of AUD 
1.1 billion is declared annually from an average of 30 000 travellers (that is an average of AUD 31 000 per 
traveller). Travellers who declare are generally not stopped by ACBPS, as there are no restrictions on the amounts of cash that can be moved across the border and as intelligence information would be needed to 
alert ACBPS to question a traveller. From the data and the on-site discussions it seems that custom officials 
would generally not pro-actively question a traveller who declares such large sums of cash.
ii)  FIU analysis and dissemination
3.19. Because many federal partner agencies have direct access to AUSTRACs database and/or receive a 
copy of some reports that are submitted to AUSTRAC, dissemination (forwarding) of information (as received 
from reporting agencies) is less of an issue than it may be in other countries that have “closed buffer” FIUs. 
Nevertheless, AUSTRAC also pro-actively and reactively disseminates intelligence products. AUSTRAC ASLOs 
also produce intelligence reports for partner agencies, both reactively and proactively.
3.20. Reactive dissemination takes place when partner agencies request AUSTRAC to conduct specific 
analyses. This could be related to a case or to strategic intelligence needs (for example money flows to tax 
havens for ATO). Since other agencies have access to the AUSTRAC database, they could do this directly 
themselves; however, AUSTRAC’s analytical experience adds value. AUSTRAC intelligence reports are 
also produced and disseminated proactively (i.e. on AUSTRAC’s own initiative). For 2013-2014, AUSTRAC 
disseminated 752 reports and made 1314 disseminations to partner agencies1.
1   Some reports go to more than one agency.
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3.21. AUSTRACs intelligence reports tend to be based mainly on the reporting information that is available 
in the AUSTRAC database, and the intelligence reports that AUSTRAC staff shared with the assessment team 
were all based solely on reported information. These reports seemed to be of a good quality. Examples of 
the types of intelligence reports that AUSTRAC produces are network analysis reports, transaction trends 
and patterns reports, and typologies reports. For this, AUSTRAC has two intelligence teams that produce 
tactical and operational intelligence reports principally from analysing incoming reports (flagging based on 
red flags), and two other teams: a specialist financial revenue / tax data mining team and a research and 
development team applying advanced analysis across the entire database. 
3.22. The information flow described applies both to ML and TF. AUSTRAC information is generally used 
for intelligence, but in limited circumstances has been used as evidence (with the exception of SMRs).
3.23. The ’federal authorities underlined the fact that the use of information from the FIU was a routine in almost all investigations with an economic crime component and that they found the information to be both 
high quality and useful. The ATO uses AUSTRAC information in direct support of their administrative powers, 
for example to raise assessments. 
3.24. FIU analysis and dissemination supports the operational needs of competent authorities, 
particularly at the federal level and in relation to predicate offence investigations. AUSTRAC analysis 
indicates that around 60% of this use relates to predicate crime and the rest to ML/TF investigations. 
According to the statistics, AUSTRAC information (including from the 699 intelligence reports and regular 
database access) was used in 280 investigations in 2013.
Table 3.3.  Use of Financial Intelligence and outcomes 2012-2013
Partner Agency Direct 
agency 
access 
searches
AUSTRAC Intelligence 
assessments disseminated
SMRs 
dissemi-
nated
Significant 
Investigation 
Outcomes
Nature of 
usage and 
Outcomes
Total Pro-
active
Requested
USE (PARTIALLY) RELEVANT FOR ML/TF
Federal Law 
Enforcement and 
Border Security 
agencies
1 008 851 814 58% 42% 9 717 212
(all 
cases)
114
(ML 
cases)
41% Money 
Laundering, 
33% drug, 5% 
fraud – remaining 
matters include 
people smug-
gling, weapons 
offences, coun-
terfeit goods and 
other predicates
State Law 
Enforcement
174 431 282 47% 53% 2 830 65 
(all 
cases)
National Security 29 514 18 90% 10% 325 N/A Terrorism / ter-
rorism financing 
matters 
TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY RELATED USE
Australian 
Taxation Office
510 115 169 58% 42% 44 044 1 428 Tax administra-
tion matters 
leading to AUD 
572 million in ad-
ditional assess-
ments
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Table 3.3. Use of Financial Intelligence and outcomes 2012-2013 (continued)
Partner Agency Direct 
agency 
access 
searches
AUSTRAC Intelligence 
assessments disseminated
SMRs 
dissemi-
nated
Significant 
Investigation 
Outcomes
Nature of 
usage and 
Outcomes
Total Pro-
active
Requested
Department of 
Human Services - 
Centrelink & Child 
Support
302 328 7 29% 71% 1 283 298 Frauds upon the 
Commonwealth 
resulting in annu-
alised savings of 
AUD 4.4 million
OTHER USE
Regulatory 
agencies
27 363 34 76% 24% 605 0 Market 
manipulation / 
consumer fraud. 
Federal and 
State Corruption 
agencies
11 327 12 67% 33% 127 2 Corruption
Other agencies 204 5 67% 33% 0 1 State based 
evasion of tax 
TOTAL  
(all use of 
AUSTRAC data)
2 063 686 1 341 58 931 2 006
Note – Some agencies to which financial intelligence is disseminated are not investigative agencies, for example 
National Security can conduct inquiries and receive financial intelligence from AUSTRAC to enhance the security 
intelligence picture. Outcomes for National Security investigations are not published on security grounds. 
Box 3.2.  Use of financial intelligence
An example of the use of financial intelligence is Operation Tricord where financial intelligence 
assisted in building a comprehensive picture of a sophisticated, transnational ML scheme.  The 
scheme involved multiple companies in Western Australia and Victoria believed to have been set up 
to launder funds generated through the exploitation of foreign nationals working on farms. By using 
financial intelligence produced by AUSTRAC, law enforcement strategies were developed to disrupt 
the alleged organised crime syndicate that had operated over many years. An AUSTRAC Senior Liaison 
Officer (ASLO) participated in both the investigative and financial teams, providing on-site support 
to investigators through ongoing searching and analysis of AUSTRAC holdings, and identifying entity 
linkages and funds flows offshore. The AFP CACT (see IO.8) utilised the intelligence to progress 
a mutual assistance request to Vietnam to identify syndicate assets held overseas. Following the 
18-month investigation, over 45 search warrants were executed in Perth and Melbourne in early May 
2014. At least AUD 15.7 million was moved through the accounts of the two ML syndicates, 22 people 
were charged with 38 offences, with 12 persons arrested for ML offences under subsection 400.3(1) of 
the CC, laundering in excess of AUD 1 million, detection of numerous firearms and the identification of 
at least 162 unlawful non-citizens, resulting in charges for harbouring of unlawful non-citizens under the Migration Act 1958. Prosecutions and sentencing is pending. This example demonstrates the entire 
cycle of the effectiveness of Australia’s regime, including: suspect reporting by reporting entities; the 
value of the collection of IFTI reports to track funds movements out of Australia; the proactive and 
reactive use of financial intelligence; extensive law enforcement coordination and investigation; major 
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ML arrests; and the use of mutual legal assistance. The ML activity was complex, involving the use of 
companies, cash money and international wires.
Another example of the use of financial intelligence for TF investigations is Operation Neath (this 
is also described in IO.9, see below) where a group in Australia sent funds destined for use by the 
Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab. AUSTRAC financial intelligence included several intelligence 
reports, online requests and alerts, ASLO engagement and analysis, and the dissemination of related 
assessment to ASIO and AFP. Three suspects were found guilty of conspiring to plan an Australian-
based terrorist attack and sentenced to 18 years in jail.
c)		 Cooperation	and	exchange	of	information
3.25. AUSTRAC and other competent authorities cooperate and exchange information to a large 
extent. This is evident both in the use of cross-agency task forces and ASLOs. Another positive aspect is the 
degree to which AUSTRAC is able to exchange information and cooperate with foreign partner FIUs, often 
through the Egmont Secure Web (ESW). 
3.26. The FIU and its partner agencies use secure channels for exchanging information, and protect 
the confidentiality of information exchanged or used. This is in accordance with the MOU between 
AUSTRAC and the partner agencies. International information exchange with FIUs is done by using the ESW, 
thus also protecting confidentiality in this regard.
d)		 Resources	-	AUSTRAC	and	law	enforcement
3.27. AUSTRACs staff numbers have been reduced, from a peak of 370 in 2009 to 327 for the current 
budget year, and a projected 319 for 2014-2015. AUSTRAC indicated that the peak of staff related to additional 
resources needed in relation to the recent roll-out of the AML/CTF Act and Rules and its related awareness raising and training, as well as in anticipation of a second tranche of AML/CTF legislation (which was in the 
end not implemented). The subsequent reduction of resources has not prohibited AUSTRAC from handling an 
increasing number of reports and creating more output.2
3.28. As far as law enforcement bodies are concerned, the use of the overall budgets is within the authority 
of the commissioners of police. Long term resources are dedicated to combating ML/TF and financial crime 
through the ACC’s Targeting	Criminal	Wealth	No.	2	Special	Investigation, task forces (such as the Eligo National 
Task Force and Project Wickenby) and the multi-agency Terrorist Financing Investigations Unit. The AFP 
had three permanent Money Laundering Short Term Teams. First established in January 2012, these teams 
focused solely on ML investigations. One team was merged into the AFP’s general organised crime squad, one 
team was merged with a joint task force on alternative remittance services (Eligo), and the third team is still 
in place (7 staff in Melbourne). The New South Wales (NSW) Police and NSW Crime Commission also have 
specialist ML teams.
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 6
3.29. Australia’s use of financial intelligence and other information for ML/TF and associated 
predicate offence investigations demonstrates to a large extent characteristics of an effective system. 
2 After the on-site, the federal government made AUD 650 million available to fight terrorism. AUD 20 million was said 
to be earmarked for AUSTRAC, to enhance its TF analysis and tracking capabilities. Although this took place after the 
cut-off date for the assessment, this should have a positive effect on AUSTRAC’s resources.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 55
LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
3
AUSTRAC and partner agencies collect and use a wide variety of financial intelligence and other information 
in close cooperation. This information is generally reliable, accurate, and up-to-date. Partner agencies have 
the expertise to use this information effectively to conduct analysis and financial investigations, identify and 
trace assets, and develop operational and strategic analysis. This is demonstrated particularly well in joint 
investigate task forces, and when tracing and seizing assets.
3.30. A large part of AUSTRAC analysis use relates to predicate crime and not to ML/TF, thus 
resulting in a relatively low number of ML cases. Although AUSTRAC information is said to be checked in 
most AFP predicate crime investigations, that is not the case for the majority of predicate crime investigations 
which are conducted at the State/Territory level. Both AUSTRAC and law enforcement authorities could raise 
their focus on ML cases to achieve a larger number of criminal cases in this area.
3.31. There are also some concerns with regard to the relative low number of money laundering and 
terrorist financing investigations outside the framework of the task forces related to the abuse of tax 
or secrecy havens, use of alternative remittance/informal value transfer systems and asset seizure. 
3.32. Although AUSTRAC information is regularly referred to as a catalyst for ML/TF and related predicate 
investigations, the ability for law enforcement to maintain details of outcomes that are attributed to financial 
intelligence could be improved. 
3.33. Overall, Australia has achieved a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.6.
3.4 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 7 (ML investigation and prosecution) 
3.34. Australia’s main policy objective is to disrupt and deter predicate crime, including if necessary 
through ML investigations/prosecutions. Australia focuses on what it considers to be the main three 
proceeds-generating predicate risks (drugs, fraud and tax evasion). However, Australia should 
expand its focus, to ensure that a greater number of cases of ML are being identified and investigated 
adequately.
3.35. The assessors recognised that Australian law enforcement agencies are performing well, domestically and internationally, to combat serious and organised crime, including through their disruption and deterrence 
approach. At the federal level, all matters under investigation by the AFP with an economic crime component 
are said to be examined from a ML perspective and assessed as to whether a concurrent financial investigation 
is warranted. It is unclear, however, what such an examination entails in practice (e.g. AUSTRAC data check, 
or formal decision), and in what proportion of cases financial investigations do commence, as the authorities 
do not maintain such statistics. In the last three years, for example, the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (CDPP) received on average 1 700 briefs for narcotics and fraud per year from the AFP, as well 
as other Federal, State and Territory law enforcement agencies and an average of approximately 90 briefs for 
ML cases. The high number of briefs for drugs and fraud is consistent with their status as Australia’s largest 
proceeds-generating predicate offences. However, the lower number of ML briefs suggests that more cases of 
ML from major proceeds-generating offences could be followed through. 
3.36. Australian law enforcement agencies view ML investigations as one component, albeit an important 
component, in a holistic strategy to disrupt organised crime in Australia. Agencies therefore target incidents of crime and suspected offenders in a manner that is designed not to boost arrest and prosecution statistics, 
but to best disrupt organised criminal activity. In practice, this means that the authorities aim to disrupt ML 
activity but will not necessarily pursue a ML investigation/prosecution. 
3.37. Primary sources to identify ML activity are intelligence, financial flows, human sources  and use of 
coercive powers. AFP works in conjunction with agencies including ACC, AUSTRAC and ATO, as well as State/
Territory agencies to investigate predicate and other serious offences. The ACC has significant intelligence gathering capabilities and some investigative capacity, and the results of these activities are passed to AFP for 
appropriate action. According to ACC records for the year 2013–14, 46% of ACC operational and intelligence 
resources were dedicated to combating ML and other financial crimes. The information on financial flows 
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held by AUSTRAC are an asset for AFP in investigating cases, if not for initially identifying criminal activity, 
then for allowing investigators to build investigations with recourse to the financial information held by 
AUSTRAC. They cited the IFTI information as particularly useful. According to AFP, recourse to AUSTRAC 
information is made in most financial cases. ATO also profiles and shares its information with AFP to enhance 
investigative capacity. 
3.38. When ML activity is identified, the authorities look to their suite of available measures. This may result in a ML prosecution and/or one or more other appropriate measures, such as the case being handed 
to ATO to pursue tax remedies; to AFP to pursue criminal action on a predicate offence; or to CACT to pursue 
confiscation action under POCA. Authorities may also let the activity run to see what further intelligence can be obtained, including by developing human sources . 
3.39. Task forces have been established to tackle key enablers of criminal activity, and have begun to 
have some success in detecting and disrupting key ML risks. Since 2012, the Eligo National Task Force that 
investigates the use of alternative remittance services by serious and organised crime had led to: 
i. seizure of more than AUD 29 million cash; 
ii. seizure of illicit drugs with a combined estimated street value of more than AUD 614 million; 
iii. restraint of more than AUD 30 million worth of assets; 
iv. disruption of 23 serious and organised criminal groups/networks and the identification of 
more than 166 targets, operating in more than 20 countries, previously unknown to law 
enforcement; 
v. arrests of 123 people on 232 charges; and 
vi. 26 convictions, including 7 for ML and 19 for predicate offences. 
3.40. Since 2006, Project Wickenby, which investigates arrangements of an international character to 
avoid or evade taxation and similar offences, has led to 44 convictions, including 3 ML convictions. See IO.6 
for more on these task forces. 
3.41. At the State/Territory level, police focus is on the investigation of predicate offences, particularly 
drug offences and outlaw motor cycle gang activity. This is consistent with the risk identified in the NTA. 
However, most State cases follow through to a ML prosecution only in simple cases where offenders may 
be caught in possession of cash. Victoria obtains a reasonable level of substantive ML prosecutions and 
convictions and NSW (which together with Victoria accounts for half the population) generates a relatively 
large number of cash-possession ML cases. Information available through AUSTRAC and other financial 
information are used to support investigations into the predicate offence and for asset recovery action. In 
States and Territories where the number of ML investigations is low, this is mainly due to the complexities 
involved and the resource-intense nature of the investigations. However, Queensland and other States and 
Territories should focus much more on ML to achieve the generally satisfactory results that Victoria and to 
some extent NSW are achieving.
3.42. The NTA of 2011 identified drugs (particularly methamphetamine or ‘ice’), fraud and 
tax evasion as high-risk areas from a threat perspective. Consistent with this risk assessment, the 
authorities focus on these predicates, and to a lesser extent on related ML. However, the ML focus on 
these risks could be reinforced, and the overall ML focus could be broadened to cover other predicate 
offences such as all forms of corruption (including foreign corruption). ACC identifies ice and ML as being key risks in the serious and organised crime environment and is currently dedicating most of its resources 
to these areas, including through Eligo National Task Force and its focus on the remittance sector. Despite the generally good results, several law enforcement entities indicated that actions to date had limited impact 
on the drugs market and major networks laundering drug proceeds. They also suggested that investigating 
major drug-related laundering was often frustrated through organised groups using complex corporate 
structures. Project Wickenby has focused on the tax avoidance/evasion risk. Task Force Galilee focuses on investment fraud, including boiler room activity located off-shore to defraud unsuspecting investors, which 
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is seen as a serious problem. Whilst this type of criminal activity is being disrupted, the prospect of detection, conviction, and punishment is not dissuading criminals from carrying out these proceeds-generating crimes 
and ML. Project Wickenby interventions are nevertheless improving taxpayers’ willingness to comply with 
their taxation obligations. See also the boxes with information on task forces in IO.6.
3.43. Legal issues have arisen in relation to the prosecution of self-laundering offences and ML of 
foreign predicates is not frequently prosecuted. In Nahlous	v	R [2010] NSWCCA 58 and Thorn	v	R [2009] 
NSWCCA 294, the courts have criticised the practice of charging both predicate and ML offences as “double 
charging” when the criminality of the ML offence is completely encompassed in the predicate offence. 
Subsequently, the CDPP issued a litigation direction to prosecutors stating that the charging of the predicate offence and a ML offence will not be an abuse of process where it is necessary to charge both offences to 
reflect the overall criminality in the case. As indicated by the authorities, this issue presents a challenge for 
prosecutors in Australia in ML cases involving self-laundering.
3.44. Foreign predicate offences, including corruption offences, are not frequently prosecuted from the 
ML perspective – because Australia does not consider that foreign predicate offences are major predicates 
for ML in Australia. Authorities have referred to the difficulties of obtaining off-shore evidence and have generally found the most successful way to obtain restraint or forfeiture orders is to seek registration of 
foreign orders. However, federal and State action is not effectively coordinated. For example, while ML of 
foreign illicit proceeds through real estate is perceived to be a risk for Queensland (Gold Coast), Queensland 
has no ML convictions for this activity. AFP indicated that it does not focus on this risk, believing this ML 
activity relates to State level predicates, whereas the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission stated 
it does not focus on this risk as it relates to foreign money and is thus a matter for AFP. At the same time, assessors took note of two examples of successful prosecution for foreign predicates (fraud and corruption) 
by AFP and the registration of two restraint orders from Papua New Guinea in Queensland.
3.45. CDPP charges stand-alone and third party ML offences and the majority of CDPP’s ML prosecutions 
now involve these offences. However, it is more challenging to get convictions when ML is prosecuted with 
the predicate offence, according to CDPP. CDPP data indicates that about 95% of defendants are convicted for 
the ML offence when they are prosecuted for a stand-alone ML offence, whereas the figure is about 70% when 
defendants are prosecuted for ML jointly with the predicate offence. The authorities indicated that in many 
cases the ML offence may be withdrawn by the prosecutor as part of a plea bargain. 
3.46. The number of prosecutions and convictions of ML offences is difficult to compile due to differences 
in criminalisation between the federal and State/Territory level, and between States and Territories, and the 
differences in keeping statistics. Overall, the assessment team considers that Australia has improved in terms of obtaining ML convictions since the last assessment and is achieving reasonable results in the risk and those 
geographic areas where Australia is focusing on ML. However, the overall results are lower than they could be. 
The increasing number of ML convictions being obtained is also encouraging (see below).
3.47. At the federal level, Australia criminalises ML under Division 400.3 to 400.8 of the CC consistent with 
the FATF Standards under offence categories based on the value of the property dealt with and the requisite 
mental elements of knowledge or recklessness. There are also offence provisions based on negligence within 
these categories, and an offence under 400.9 of dealing with property which is reasonably suspected to 
be proceeds of crime, which requires a less onerous mental standard than under the Vienna and Palermo 
Conventions. It is positive that Australia has criminalised certain behaviours beyond what is required in those conventions, but the availability of these lower mental element offences should not distract from pursuing 
serious level ML. 
3.48. Consolidated statistics at the federal level for prosecution of ML offences under the offence provisions 
of Division 400 of the CC are set out in the table below.
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Table 3.4.  Federal prosecution of ML under Division 400 of the CC
Offence 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Average %
400.3 19 11 4 7 10 11%
400.4 18 20 13 15 17 17%
400.5 7 3 4 6 5 5%
400.6 19 8 25 26 20 20%
400.7 15 2 8 5 8 8%
400.8 2 4 2 1 2 2%
400.9 16 39 30  52 34 36%
Total 96 87 86 112 95
3.49. At the State/Territory level prosecutions for foreign predicate ML offences, third party laundering and 
stand-alone laundering charges are less common than at the federal level. ML charges may also be withdrawn 
at the prosecution stage in order to obtain a plea and conviction for the predicate offence. The absence of 
deeming provisions in State/Territory legislation equivalent to the Commonwealth legislation can also make 
it more difficult for State/Territory authorities to prosecute cases under these provisions.  Apart from NSW 
and especially Victoria, the number of prosecutions for the ML offence equivalent to the Vienna and Palermo 
standard is very low, and in the case of NSW many of the ML prosecutions are withdrawn to be considered as 
part of the predicate offence prosecution (however, this will not influence the conviction or total sentence). In 
Queensland, the Queensland Attorney General’s (a Minister) consent is required for a prosecution to proceed 
and this may also act as an impediment for law enforcement AML action. As with the federal ML offences, 
the State/Territory offences contain differing mental elements of knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and 
suspicion.
3.50. An analysis of data on all convictions treated as ML offences or similar at both the federal and State/
Territory level is set out in the table below. 
Table 3.5.  Convictions equivalent to Vienna/Palermo conventions (“knowledge”, “recklessness”)*
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Average
Federal (CDPP) 40 28 38 35
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 0 1 1 1
New South Wales (NSW) 27 25 23 25
South Australia (SA) 5 5 5 5
Tasmania (TAS) 1 2 0 1
Victoria (VIC) 63 77 100 80
Western Australia (WA) 0 2 0 1
Queensland (QLD) 0 0 0 0
Total – All potential Vienna/Palermo 
convictions
136 140 167 148
Other convictions (possession of suspected 
proceeds or negligent dealing in proceeds or 
receiving of stolen goods offences)
Federal (CDPP) 14 31 29 25
* The data may slightly overstate the level of convictions equivalent to the Vienna and Palermo standard because 
they include a few cases where the mental element of the offence is unknown.
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Table 3.5. Convictions equivalent to Vienna/Palermo conventions (“knowledge”, recklessness”)*  
(continued)
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Average
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 0 1 5 2
New South Wales (NSW) 108 112 106 109
South Australia (SA) (no suspicion offence) 0 0 0 0
Queensland (QLD) (receiving offences only) 1 415 1 294 1 444 1 384
Tasmania (TAS) 1 1 0 1
Victoria (VIC) 1 680 1 934 2 242 1 985
Western Australia (WA) (no suspicion offence) 0 0 0 0
Total – Other Convictions 3 218 3 373 3 926 3 506
Grand Total 3 360 3 514 4 099 3 658
* The data may slightly overstate the level of convictions equivalent to the Vienna and Palermo standard because 
they include a few cases where the mental element of the offence is unknown.
3.51. As shown above, the bulk of convictions that the authorities consider as ML are for the possession 
type. The following chart shows the increase over the last three years in total number of convictions for ML 
offences potentially equivalent to the Vienna and Palermo standards.
3.52. The authorities have applied a range of sanctions for ML offences to natural persons. However 
corporations have not been prosecuted for ML offences and it appears that this option is not seriously 
considered or pursued. A unique issue arises in relation to prosecution of corporations that are reporting 
entities due to section 51 of the AML/CTF Act, which has the effect of making it difficult to prosecute them for the ML offence so long as they report the transaction (although they may continue to carry out the transaction 
– there is no consent mechanism). As far as natural persons are concerned, because at the federal level, 35% 
of ML cases are prosecuted under 400.9 of the CC or under the negligence provision of the other offences, the 
sanctions imposed may be at the less severe end of the range, including suspended jail sentences and fines. 
Overall, data provided indicates that persons are jailed in 58% of the cases involving a ML conviction, with 
one person receiving a sentence of 14 years (which seems dissuasive). The graded nature of the Division 400 
offences with differing mental elements also enables for proportionate sanctions to be applied. Overall, however, many sentences may have been combined with sentences for predicate offences in a number of 
cases, making it difficult to determine what sanctions are imposed in practical terms for the ML offence.
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3.53. Consolidated statistics for sanctions imposed under Division 400 of the CC are set out in the table 
below.
Table 3.6.  Sanctions imposed under Division 400 of the CC
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total %
Jail 40 36 31 42 149 58%
Jail (suspended sentence) 9 16 18 15 58 23%
Fine 1 6 4 6 17 7%
Community service 2 0 8 5 15 6%
Recognisance order 2 0 4 7 13 5%
Other 0 0 1 2 3 1%
3.54. At the State/Territory level, penalties are relatively light, often resulting in fines for possession or 
handling type charges. Alternatively, the offences may be combined with the overall sanction for the predicate 
offence.
3.55. The Australian authorities apply a range of criminal justice measures to disrupt serious 
criminal activity, including ML offences. Such measures are applied whether or not it may be possible to 
secure a ML conviction. As the stated strategy of the authorities is to consider at an early stage how best to 
disrupt the criminal activity identified, using any measure available from their ‘tool kit’ or suite of measures, 
a ML investigation and prosecution will not necessarily be the chosen remedy, even when possible. The focus 
may instead be action on the predicate offence, asset recovery proceedings and/or other disruptive action. 
The assessors recognised that Australia’s focus on disruption to combat serious and organised crime was 
having some effect on these issues. However, they were unable to give it much weight in relation to IO7 as the disruption measures are applied whether or not it may be possible to secure a ML prosecution, and a 
demonstrable effect on reducing ML activities was also not clear. 
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 7
3.56. Overall, Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system for investigating, 
prosecuting, and sanctioning ML offences and activities. The focus remains on predicate offences, recovery of proceeds of crime, and disruption of criminal activity rather than on the pursuit of convictions for ML offences 
or the disruption of ML networks, both at the federal and State/Territory levels. However, in the areas of 
identified risk, Australia is achieving reasonable results and the increase in the number of ML convictions 
over recent years is heartening. This demonstrates an increased focus on ML compared to the previous FATF/
APG assessment. It should be relatively easy to achieve a substantial or even high level of effectiveness by:
 expanding the existing ML approach to other (foreign) predicate offences including corruption,
  focussing more on ML within task forces, 
 being able to demonstrate the extent to which potential ML cases are identified and investigated,
 addressing investigative challenges associated with dealing with complex ML cases, including those using corporate structures, 
 pursuing ML charges against legal entities, and 
 by ensuring that all States and Territories focus on substantive type ML. 
3.57. Australia has achieved a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.7.
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3.5 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 8 (Confiscation)
3.58. Confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value is being 
pursued as a policy objective in Australia. Following a general policy review on criminal asset recovery 
work, the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce (CACT) was established in 2011 and became operational 
under POCA in January 2012. It has assumed primary responsibility from the CDPP at the federal level for 
restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime, except in cases where a conviction is required and no prior 
restraint order has been obtained. The primary policy objective of CACT is to draw on agency skills to target 
the criminal economy and take the profit out of crime. 
3.59. CACT has been operational under POCA for only two years and aims to take a more proactive 
approach to litigating proceeds of crime matters and testing the POCA. While it is too early to say whether its 
efforts are having a marked impact on recovery of proceeds of crime, restraint figures have surged, which is a 
positive sign. CACT is led by the AFP with around 100 personnel, consisting of forensic accountants, financial 
investigators, investigators, secondees, and support staff, and supported by over 30 in-house litigation lawyers 
and litigation assistants in conjunction with the ACC and ATO and the intelligence resources they  have at 
their disposal. As it is not necessary to prove a predicate offence for the purposes of sustaining proceeds of crime action based on ML offences, AFP statistics do not show whether ML cases are based on suspected drug 
crime or other types of offending. However, based on discussions, most of the focus of the work seems to have 
been on dealing in proceeds related to drug cases and some fraud activity. Focus on recovery of proceeds of crime arising from, and in connection with, other predicate offences has not been clearly demonstrated, 
although some recovery action in relation to other predicate offences has taken place. ATO, through Project 
Wickenby, has targeted recovery of monies from tax crimes. As these recoveries relate to tax administration, 
they are made in most cases through ATO’s taxation powers rather than under POCA 
3.60. All States and Territories have conviction and non-conviction based confiscation schemes. The 
NSW Crime Commission and the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission in particular, pursue non-
conviction based recovery of criminal proceeds as a policy objective. The authorities in Victoria have also 
been successful in pursuing significant recoveries as a policy objective, but in other States the policy steer 
and priority is inconsistent. 
3.61. The competent authorities have increased their efforts to confiscate proceeds of crime since 
the last FATF assessment, with the amounts being restrained and confiscated increasing at the federal 
level. Overall, however, the figures remain relatively low in the context of the nature and scale of 
Australia’s ML/TF risks and have only modestly increased since the last assessment. The total value of 
amounts recovered at the federal level since 2006-2007 has increased from AUD 12.65 million in 2006-2007 
to AUD 65.74 million in 2013-2014. The CACT figures are also showing an upward trend in restraint actions, 
even though few cases have yet progressed to final confiscation or forfeiture orders. 
3.62. CACT takes non-conviction based asset recovery proceedings in most cases allowing for a lower civil 
standard of proof; however cases can become difficult to pursue when complicated company or overseas 
structures are used. In addition, under POCA the CACT must provide an undertaking to pay damages to the 
property holder in all actions it commences to restrain and forfeit property. As such, the CACT is required 
to consider the potential risk and liability prior to commencing proceedings. This requirement can act as a disincentive to take immediate action in complex matters, especially when successful outcomes may be 
reliant on overseas evidence not to hand or not forthcoming.
3.63. In line with the authorities’ overall objective of disruption, a decision may be made by CACT at the outset to refer the case to ATO to consider whether there has been an avoidance of tax and to use its civil tax 
recovery powers. The authorities advise that currently around 25 - 30% of cases are referred to the ATO by 
CACT. ATO has made significant recoveries under Project Wickenby on unpaid tax liabilities, including those 
related to tax crimes, using its tax recovery powers. While this has been an effective means of recovery, the 
ATO recoveries are not made under proceeds of crime legislation (POCA). AUD 2.7 million has been recovered 
under POCA powers in connection with Project Wickenby.
3.64. Unexplained wealth orders are available to target the kingpins of serious and organised crime when they cannot necessarily be linked to criminal offences on available evidence, but to date CACT has not used the 
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powers due to difficulties with the current legislation and no such orders have been obtained. The procedures 
allow for a reversal of the onus of proof and require defendants to explain how their wealth was accumulated 
once it is established the defendant has links to general criminal activity. Amendments to the unexplained wealth regime to improve the investigation and litigation of unexplained wealth matters are currently before 
the federal Parliament.
3.65. CACT has faced challenges in pursuing domestic restraint and confiscation action based on ML 
involving complex corporate structures and foreign predicate offences where assets are located in Australia. For the latter, the authorities indicated that the challenge is due to the need to obtain foreign evidence and 
the requirement to give the undertaking as to damages to the property holder if proceedings are commenced. 
CACT has now begun to work with foreign jurisdictions to register orders obtained abroad under mutual legal 
assistance procedures against assets identified locally and it has been successful in a few cases to date. CACT 
aims to continue to process other cases, including cases involving foreign jurisdictional differences, which 
will require testing before the Australian courts.
3.66. CACT has taken some action to recover proceeds which have been moved outside Australia through 
requests made under the mutual legal assistance channels. Difficulties have been encountered when 
funds are located outside Australia, including in investment and boiler room frauds investigated by ASIC. 
In addition, the authorities do not generally take action under POCA to recover proceeds of crime in fraud 
cases when there are identified victims, because under POCA, funds recovered are paid into the Confiscated 
Assets Account and shared with the Australian community to fund anti-crime initiatives. As a result, the authorities do not, as a matter of policy, actively pursue POCA action with a view to restitution of victims, although victims are able to apply to the court during proceeds of crime proceedings to have their interest 
in property recognised, e.g. through applying for an exclusion or compensation order. Australia does share funds under its sharing program to countries that have provided assistance to Australia in response to mutual 
legal assistance requests or domestic investigations, and in cases involving restitution of victims abroad. 
3.67. As a result of the transfer of the bulk of asset recovery responsibilities, including litigation, to the 
CACT, the CDPP no longer has specialist litigation resources and personnel for asset recovery work. This is 
in line with the drop in POCA work now undertaken by the CDPP. As would be expected, CDPP restraint and 
confiscation figures have declined. CDPP continues with its designated role in cases where a conviction is 
necessary and no prior restraint order has been obtained.
3.68. At the State and Territory level, comparison of figures for recovery of proceeds of crime is difficult 
because different jurisdictions take different approaches to data collection. Between 2010-2011 and 
2012-2013, Victoria authorities confiscated AUD 54 million in criminal assets (some of which was returned 
to victims under compensation orders). In the same period, the NSW authorities confiscated assets with a 
realisable estimated value of around AUD 60.8 million. In NSW and Queensland, the State Crime Commissions 
pursue non-conviction based confiscation, whilst in other States the DPP  takes either criminal or non-
conviction based confiscation action. Non-conviction based proceedings are generally not pursued in fraud 
cases when there is an identified victim, as there is no mechanism to provide restitution to victims and funds 
are paid into consolidated revenue. The combined recoveries at State/Territory level are about twice the value 
of recoveries made at the federal level under POCA due to the heavy emphasis on drug related recoveries. 
Settlement of these cases tends to be more straightforward and less complex than cases undertaken at the 
federal level by CACT.
3.69. Overall statistics for actual recovery of proceeds, tax liabilities, and instrumentalities of crime are set 
out in the tables below. A large number of recoveries have been made through ATO but these are recoveries 
linked to tax evasion under ATO taxation powers, not via POCA recovery powers.  
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Table 3.7.  Confiscation of proceeds of crime (in AUD millions)
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Average
Confiscated Proceeds 
CACT/CDPP 25.8 13.9 43.1 20.0 25.7
States1 56.5 56.7 48.3 61.4 55.7
Cross-border cash confiscations2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Victim restitution3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total Confiscated Proceeds 82.3 70.6 91.4 81.4 81.4
Notes
1. Some States report value of orders obtained rather than assets confiscated
2. Australia was unable to provide information on the value of cross-border related confiscations
3. Australia was unable to provide information on the value of compensation orders issued to victims
3.70. Separate from the confiscation of proceeds of crime collections, ATO made the following tax 
collections (in AUD million) in respect to serious non-compliance audits. These figures include results from 
Project Wickenby and non-Wickenby activities which relate to the tax implications of organised crime work.
Table 3.8.  Total tax collections: ATO’s Serious Non Compliance Audits
Year Tax liabilities collected (in AUD millions)
2012-13 91.24
2011-12 119.83
2010-11 109.50
2009-10 81.90
3.71. The Australian authorities regularly make large seizures of drugs due to the size of the domestic drug 
market and the prevalence of drug offending. The table below sets out the quantum of drugs seized annually: 
Table 3.9.  Quantum of drugs seized*
Year Amount (in kilograms)
2012-2013 19 628
2011-2012 23 802
2010-2011 9 358
2009-2010 7 851
* The estimated whole sale value of the seized drugs would have been AUD 438 million (2009-
2010); 782 million (2010-2011); 1.01 billion (2011-2012); and 2.67 billion (2012-2013).
3.72. The following table provides information on the values of money recovered as provided to the AFP 
by the Australian Financial Securities Agency, which operates the Confiscated Assets Account in its capacity 
as the Official Trustee for the purposes of the POCA. Amounts recovered relate to orders made by the AFP 
and CDPP3.
3 The payments into the Confiscated Assets Account are less costs and fees incurred by the Official Trustee in 
realising the property.
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Table 3.10.  POCA: Amounts recovered into the Confiscated Assets 
Account from Forfeiture Orders and PPOs*  
for the period 2006-07 to 2013-14
Financial Year Total amount (in AUD)
2013-14 65 759 185.26
2012-13 20 033 263.34
2011-12 43 095 166.75
2010-11 13 948 991.37
2009-10 25 843 496.07
2008-09 16 669 702.61
2007-08 19 014 501.93
2006-07 12 657 119.95
* Sections 47, 48, 49, 92, 116 & 134 of the POCA
3.73. No comprehensive information was available to assess the whole system involved in restraint and 
confiscation of assets, except in relation to the CDPP and CACT. These statistics on applications for restraint 
and forfeiture orders, together with a comparison against property actually confiscated (i.e. recovered), are 
set out in the table below.
Table 3.11.  Restraint and confiscation of assets in relation to the CDPP and CACT
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Average
Number of freezes, seizures, & 
other restraints
44 48 191 228 128
Value of assets frozen, seized, or 
restrained (AUD millions)
21.1 42.9 116.7 62.5 60.8
Average value (AUD) 480 680 894 717 611 060 274 123 476 142
Number of forfeiture, pecuniary 
penalty, etc., orders
142 126 144 86 125
Value of forfeiture, pecuniary 
penalty, etc., orders (AUD millions)
25.4 24.2 75.6 25.3 37.6
Average value (AUD) 179 186 191 912 524 706 293 659 302 084
Value of confiscations (AUD 
millions)
25.8 13.9 43.1 20.0 25.7
Relative to restraint 122% 32% 37% 32% 42%
Relative to orders 102% 58% 57% 79% 68%
3.74. Funds paid from the Confiscated Assets Account for sharing with foreign governments and entities 
under sharing arrangements are set out in the table below. The significantly higher figure for 2013-14 relates 
to a case involving the repatriation of funds to a trustee in bankruptcy overseas for compensation of victims.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 65
LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
3
Table 3.12.  Funds paid from the Confiscated Assets Account for 
sharing with foreign governments and entities under 
sharing arrangements
Year Sharing with foreign governments and 
entities (in AUD)
2013-14 44 600 000
2012-13 0.00
2011-12 0.00
2010-11 0.00
2009-10 4 653 907
2008-9 280 446
2007-8 3 860 000
2006-7  4 015 348
3.75. Australia is taking some steps to target the cross-border movement of cash and BNIs.  However 
the authorities were unable to provide information about how much of the detected cash is seized 
or confiscated, and insufficient action is taken to investigate significant declarations. All persons 
entering or leaving the country are required to declare whether they are carrying more than AUD 10 000 in 
currency. In 2012-13, ACBPS detected 308 cases of undeclared cash amounting to about AUD 7.6 million and 
subsequent seizures are continuing to grow in overall size and value. In 2013-14, there were 430 detections 
totalling AUD 16 710 909. Around two thirds of these cases involve incoming movements. Fines are issued in cases of undeclared movements over the limit and in serious cases the matters are referred to AFP for further 
investigation and prosecution. In 2013-14, 167 fines were imposed and 14 individuals were convicted of 
offences relating to failing to declare cash. Cases of airlines employees transporting significant sums of money 
have been prosecuted and imprisoned for ML offences and the proceeds seized and confiscated.
3.76. All declarations made at border points and collected by ACBPS are filed with AUSTRAC. If significant 
sums are declared and an ACBPS officer develops a reasonable suspicion, such as where there is targeted 
intelligence indicating laundering, they would actively question the traveller. However, it is not clear whether 
travellers declaring significant sums are questioned in all circumstances. Nor are declarations of significant 
sums actively reviewed, investigated, or profiled by AUSTRAC when automatically passed on from ACBPS. 
3.77. Statistics on border cash detections by ACBPS are set out in the table 3.13 below and demonstrate a 
recent improvement in the number of detections of undeclared cash.
3.78. Australia’s confiscation efforts are consistent with primary risk identified in the NTA to 
the extent the majority of assets recovered to date have flowed from the drugs trade and also from 
tax evasion. Australia is also at significant risk of an inflow of illicit funds from persons in foreign 
countries who find Australia a suitable place to hold and invest funds, including in real estate. Cash 
non-declarations/seizures at border points also indicate illicit funds are entering Australia. The authorities do not appear to be investing serious effort in mitigating this risk, including when foreign predicate offences 
may be involved.
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Table 3.13.  border cash detections by ACBPS
Border Cash Detections 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Average
Number of cash 
detections
- incoming 225 230 300 251
- outgoing 54 78 130 87
Total Cash Detections 279 308 430 339
Number of fines imposed 82 107 167 119
Fines as percentage of 
detections
29% 35% 39% 35%
Total value AUD 5 478 165 AUD 7 656 212 AUD 16 710 909 AUD 9 948 428
Average Value  AUD 19 635  AUD 24 858  AUD 38 862  AUD 28 397 
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 8
3.79. Overall, Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system for confiscating the 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. The framework for police powers and provisional and confiscation measures is comprehensive and is being put to good use by the CACT, which is showing early signs of promise 
as the lead agency to pursue confiscation of criminal proceeds as a policy objective in Australia. At the State/
Territory level, the focus has remained primarily on recovery of proceeds of drugs offences. The quantum of 
proceeds confiscated is relatively low in the context of Australia’s ML/TF risk and has only increased modestly 
since the last FATF assessment, which suggests that criminals retain much of their profits.
3.80. Australia has achieved a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.8. 
3.6 Recommendations on legal system and operational issues 
3.81. The following recommendations are made in relation to the legal system and operational issues:
Financial intelligence (IO.6)
 The authorities should develop a comprehensive long-term plan for law enforcement to improve 
the use of AUSTRAC information to increase the number of ML/TF and financial investigations, and 
to increase the commitment to fight these crimes. In the short term, this should include setting 
performance indicators.
 The authorities should earmark funds to establish financial crime/ML/TF operational teams within AFP and state police forces, and be committed to keep these funds / operational teams in place for 
a longer time.
 AUSTRAC should better tailor its information to the needs of its users (outside the context of joint 
task forces).
 AUSTRAC should (be enabled to) increase the number of sources of information available in its 
database, for example (but not limited to) criminal conviction records.
ML investigations and prosecutions (IO.7)
 More emphasis should be placed on the detection, prosecution and punishment of ML offences (not 
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only the disruption of predicate criminal activity) to dissuade potential criminals from carrying out 
proceeds generating crimes and ML, both at the federal and even more so at the State/Territory 
level.
 Authorities should pro-actively monitor the extent to which potential ML cases are identified and investigated and should address investigative challenges associated with dealing with complex ML 
cases, including those using corporate structures.
 ML cases involving other predicate offences where there is risk, should be proactively pursued, 
alongside the existing emphasis on drugs and fraud cases, and all States and Territories should focus 
on substantive type ML offences.
 Self-laundering offences should continue to be charged where appropriate, and more investigations and prosecutions for foreign predicate ML offences, including proceeds of foreign corruption, should 
be pursued.
 Consideration should be given to imposing ML sanctions on corporations in suitable cases.
 Authorities should consider harmonising State and Territory level ML offence provisions with the 
federal provisions to improve effectiveness of the State and Territory offences e.g. by inclusion of 
deeming provisions similar to those in the federal legislation.
Confiscation	(IO.8)
   More emphasis should be placed on the confiscation of proceeds of crime reflecting the identified 
risks from all major revenue generating offences (including fraud and corruption) to increase the 
volume of confiscation cases to make crime unprofitable, at both the federal and State/Territory 
level.
 CACT is encouraged to continue its positive action to date to pursue restraint and forfeiture orders, 
including in difficult cases.
 The authorities should enhance their capabilities to pursue restraint and confiscation action based on ML involving complex corporate structures, foreign predicate offences, and investment frauds 
where assets are located in and outside Australia.
 State and Territory law enforcement should expand their primary focus beyond recoveries relating 
to drug offending.
 The authorities should give consideration to allowing restitution of victims of crime under POCA.
 The authorities should take proactive steps to investigate declarations of cross-border movements 
of significant amounts of cash, which may be an indicator of proceeds of foreign predicate offences 
being laundered in Australia.
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4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF 
PROLIFERATION
Key Findings
Australia has undertaken several TF investigations and prosecutions and secured three 
convictions for the TF offence. Australia also successfully uses other criminal justice and 
administrative measures to disrupt terrorist and TF activities when a prosecution for TF is 
not practicable. Australia has successfully disrupted two domestic terrorist plots at the time of the 
on-site visit.1 Australia also uses these other measures to address the most relevant emerging TF risk 
– individuals travelling to conflict zones to participate in, or advocate, terrorist activity. Australian authorities identify and investigate different types of TF in each counter-terrorism investigation, and counter-terrorism strategies have successfully enabled Australia to identify and designate terrorists, 
terrorist organisations, and terrorist support networks. On the other hand, Australian authorities 
have not prosecuted all the different types of TF offences, such as the collection of funds for TF, 
or the financing of terrorist acts or individual terrorists, and the dissuasiveness of sanctions 
for TF has not been clearly demonstrated.
Australia demonstrates a number of characteristics of an effective system for targeted financial 
sanctions (TFS) both for TF and PF. A key area of demonstrative effectiveness is in the direct 
implementation of TFS against persons and entities designated by the UNSC and under Australia’s 
autonomous sanctions regimes. Australia has also domestically listed individuals and entities 
pursuant to UNSCR 1373 and received, considered, and given effect to third party requests. Australia’s 
legal system and processes for implementing targeted financial sanction provisions related to UNSCRs 
represent a best practice for other countries, especially the direct legal obligation regarding UN 
designations.
However, the effectiveness of the overall framework for targeted financial sanctions both 
for TF and PF is heavily impacted by the lack of financial supervision of the financial and 
DNFBP sectors, to ensure compliance with the domestic framework. Due to the lack of financial 
supervision or monitoring, the lack of practical examples of implementation issues from the financial 
sector, and the lack of frozen assets, assessors were unable to establish that the framework is effectively 
implemented by the financial sector and DNFBPs. A related shortcoming is that AUSTRAC and ASIC do 
not check their own databases for designated entities. 
NPOs are an area for improved efforts and additional action. According to the NRA, charities 
and NPOs are a key channel used to raise funds for TF in or from Australia. However, the lack of a 
comprehensive sectorial risk assessment (as required by R8), the lack of subsequent outreach 
in relation to  TF to the sector, and the lack of adequate preventive requirements or a supervisory 
framework that cover all relevant NPOs, leave them vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations.
1   Another plot was disrupted soon after the on-site visit.
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4.1 Background and Context 
Terrorist	financing	(criminal	justice	measures)
4.1. Terrorist and terrorist financing offences are contained in sections 103.1 (financing of terrorist acts), 
102.6 (financing of a terrorist organisation) and 103.2 (financing of an individual terrorist) (all Criminal 
Code). 
Targeted	financial	sanctions	for	terrorist	financing	and	proliferation	financing
4.2. Targeted financial sanctions for terrorist financing and proliferation financing are contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (CotUNA) and its implementing regulations. The programmes are 
administered by DFAT, in coordination with other relevant agencies.
Not	for	profit	organisations
4.3. Australia has a general charity regulator, but its focus is on voluntary registration (mainly for tax 
purposes) and not on TF. About 40 000 of the estimated 140 000 NPOs with legal personality, and 20 000 
without legal personality, have registered. No TF-related risk assessment has been conducted, no TF-related 
monitoring and limited TFS-related outreach has taken place. 
4.2 Technical Compliance (R.5-8)
4.4. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation 5 (terrorist financing offence) is rated largely compliant. 
 Recommendation 6 (targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing) 
is rated compliant.
 Recommendation 7 (targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation) is rated compliant.
 Recommendation 8 (non-profit organisations) is rated non-compliant.
4.3 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 9 (TF investigation and prosecution)
Prosecution/conviction	for	TF	activity	consistent	with	Australia’s	risk	profile	
4.5. Australian authorities demonstrated a generally broad understanding of TF risk (see IO1 above). Risks 
are largely influenced by international tensions and conflicts, particularly Iraq and Syria. The main domestic risks involve small-scale collection and use of legitimate and illegitimate funds by domestic cells aligned 
with, or sympathetic to, radicalised Islamic jihadist groups abroad, for the purposes of committing domestic 
terrorist acts. The most significant emerging risk is the potential for groups as well as other individuals to 
send money, directly or indirectly, or raise money for, or otherwise support Australians travelling to conflict 
zones abroad (especially Syria and Iraq) to support foreign terrorist groups and terrorist acts. An on-going 
risk relates to how these foreign factors continue to pose risks for terrorist activities within Australia.
4.6. Prosecutions are handled by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), following 
referral from an investigative agency. The CDPP has designated combat terrorism (CT) prosecutors in each 
office, and dedicated CT branches in the Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra Offices to assess briefs of evidence 
alleging terrorism related offences and to prepare and carry on matters for prosecution. The CDPP designated 
CT prosecutors in each of its other offices (Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide, Hobart, and Darwin).
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4.7. The CDPP also briefs external counsel to provide advice in CT prosecutions, including provision of 
qualified advice during the investigation stage, and to conduct prosecutions. The CDPP works closely with the 
AFP to bring the strongest case possible. Cooperation involves the provision of legal advice, the provision of 
training to AFP CT investigators as required, and joint scenario-based exercises with AFP investigators. 
4.8. Australian authorities have not prosecuted all different types of TF offences. Australia has 
prosecuted nine individuals for TF and convicted three. All nine of these prosecutions were for section 
102.6(1) CC —making funds available to a terrorist organisation.
4.9. Authorities have prosecuted 41 individuals under Australia’s counter-terrorism framework. Twenty-three have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code (such as conspiracy to commit 
or preparation of a terrorist act, or membership of a terrorist organisation); three have been convicted of 
making an asset available to a proscribed entity under the CotUNA, one has been convicted of an offence under the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976, and one has been convicted under the Crimes 
(Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978.
4.10. Most of these terrorism prosecutions have resulted from three counter-terrorism investigations. 
Operation Pendennis (which included TF charges) and Operation	 Neath both involved domestic, “home-grown” cells, sympathetic to radicalised terrorist groups, which aimed to commit terrorist acts on Australian 
soil in response to Australia’s involvement in counter-terrorism efforts abroad. Operation Halophyte involved domestic individuals sending funds to support a foreign terrorist organisation (Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE)). The cases can be summarised as follows:
 Operation Pendennis (2005-2009): involved the prosecution of 13 individuals based in Melbourne, 
and 9 based in Sydney. The Melbourne cases included charges against six individuals for TF (section 
106(1) of the CC—attempting to intentionally make funds available to a terrorist organisation), 
which resulted in three convictions, as well as convictions for other terrorist offences. The specific 
terrorist acts the group aimed to commit were not identified. The funding involved was raised from 
legitimate and illegitimate sources (mainly theft and fraud). Three of the defendants charged with 
TF were acquitted.
 Operation	Neath (2009-2010): involved the prosecution of five individuals for terrorism charges, 
and conviction of three, who plotted to attack the Holsworthy Army barracks. TF charges were not 
laid in this case.
 Operation	Halophyte	(2007-2009): involved the prosecution of three individuals who were alleged 
members of, and provided support and/or funds to, LTTE. Charges included section 106(1) of the 
CC—attempting to intentionally make funds available to a terrorist organisation, i.e. LTTE. These 
charges were later dropped, given the difficulty to gain evidence relevant to their defence from 
northern Sri Lanka. However, the individuals were convicted of other terrorist-related offences 
(i.e., making an asset available to a proscribed entity under Australia’s targeted financial sanctions 
regime).
4.11. As noted above, the Pendennis case involved convictions for the provision of funds to be used 
by a terrorist organisation—authorities have not prosecuted other types of TF offences (i.e., collection 
of funds for TF, the financing of terrorist acts or individual terrorists).
4.12. Prosecutors have identified potential difficulties in demonstrating a connection with a terrorist act 
when pursuing an individual, as well as difficulties in proving that an organisation is a terrorist organisation 
when it is not formally designated under the Criminal Code (which was the case in Operation Halophyte). 
It is also difficult to pursue TF charges that relate to money supporting terrorists in other countries. The 
money trail becomes difficult to follow as funds are first transferred to conduit countries -generally countries 
neighbouring conflict zones  making it difficult to prove the final destination of the funds. Prosecutors also face challenges in complex, large-scale investigations involving a large number of people, and indicated that 
pursuing specific TF charges would add to the burden of prosecutors, without adding much value to the case 
or sentences (since terrorism offences carry sentences of up to life imprisonment). Australia also focuses on disrupting potential terrorist activity, given the potential high impact of terrorism, before a TF case would have 
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time to be developed. For these reasons, specific TF charges are not often pursued. The technical deficiencies 
identified in R.5 have not negatively impacted Australia’s investigation and prosecution of TF offences.
TF	identification	and	investigation	
4.13. Australian authorities identify and investigate different types of TF offences in each counter-
terrorism investigation. TF is an avenue of enquiry in all terrorism investigations that are conducted. 
Where evidence supports other more specific offences, TF will be examined as an adjunct to the broader 
investigation. 
4.14. In 2010, the AFP established a Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit (TFIU) dedicated to addressing 
the TF aspects of all matters identified for consideration of criminal investigation. The TFIU is a multi-agency, 
multi-jurisdictional team with representation from the AFP and State police, AUSTRAC, and input from the 
Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). It is based on similar successful groups operating in the UK (NTFIU) 
and the United States (TFOS). The TFIU provides expertise, specialised support, and focused engagement 
on an Australia-wide basis with internal and external stakeholders on all aspects of TF. The TFIU, based in 
the AFP’s Sydney office, consists of six AFP employees as well as seconded staff from other agencies. All CT 
investigations which TFIU supports, are done through an investigator nominated as a financial coordinator to 
the investigation. Seconded members included one staff member from AUSTRAC, one staff member from an 
AIC agency, and, 2 New South Wales Police officers. Non-seconded staff members also contribute on a regular 
basis by attending TFIU coordination meetings, and by being available as a direct agency contact point for the 
TFIU. Both seconded and non-seconded membership fluctuates over time and as needed. The TFIU also has 
contact points in all Australian capitals to help facilitate a national counter-terrorism approach. The broader 
CT staffing for the AFP includes approximately 129 (full-time-equivalent) AFP employees complemented by 
staff from State police and other organisations. 
4.15. The AFP has investigated 36 matters which were either TF matters or had a substantive TF component 
as part of the investigation. The cases included the mentioned prosecutions above and focussed, wholly or 
in part, on TF aspects which could have led or did lead to charges for TF offences. The investigations were preventative, as proactive steps were taken to ensure that a terrorist act did not occur or that a terrorist, 
terrorist act or terrorist organisation would not be funded. In the two cases where TF offences were 
prosecuted, the investigations identified the financiers.
4.16. The identification of terrorism cases occurs through a variety of means including: 
  information provided by human sources; 
  community reporting, including anonymously; 
  information coming to the attention during the course of an existing investigation; and 
  referral by AIC agencies or by foreign law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
4.17. Once a matter is identified, the full range of investigative powers (see Recommendation 31) supports 
the investigation process. These powers have been used in Australia’s successful terrorism investigations. 
Investigators can also access relevant analytical software tools through AUSTRAC, or through the authorised 
disclosure of information which can be analysed using AFP analytical software, to support joint operational 
and task force investigations. More generally, spreadsheet software and analytical software linked to 
operational databases provide important means to address the TF components of terrorism investigations.
TF	investigation	integrated	with	and	supporting	national	counter-terrorism	strategies	and	
investigations 
4.18. Counter-terrorism strategies have successfully enabled Australia to identify and designate terrorists, 
terrorist organisations, and terrorist support networks, and TF investigation has contributed to this. TF 
investigation is integrated with, and used to support, national counter-terrorism strategies, and 
investigations. Financial intelligence, in particular AUSTRAC information, has contributed to broader 
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investigations by identifying other persons of interest and the existence of networks. There is also an 
AUSTRAC Senior Liaison Officer embedded in the TFIU. This has assisted in opening new lines of enquiry or 
options for disruption. The TFIU has assisted in identifying: 
  the financial activities of a suspected terrorist or terrorist supporter; 
 evidence of the means by which a terrorist may conduct his or her financial activity;
 evidence of financial transactions conducted; 
 evidence about the time, date and place where financial activity occurs; and 
  financial evidence which can be correlated against evidence from other sources, such as surveillance, 
travel movements or telephone interception, as a means of corroboration. 
Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions 
4.19. The sanctions applied against natural persons convicted of TF offences have been effective and 
proportionate; however, their dissuasiveness is unclear. Three convictions have taken place—all as part of 
the Pendennis case. The total effective sentences imposed on the accused in relation to all offences were: 
 Ahmed Raad: 8 years with a non-parole period of 6 years’ imprisonment (including 5 years for TF)
 Aimen Joud: 8 years with a non-parole period of 6 years’ imprisonment (including 5 years for TF), and
 Ezzit Raad: 6 years with a non-parole period of 4.5 years’ imprisonment (including 4 years for TF)
4.20. One person convicted of terrorism (not TF) charges in the Pendennis case has returned to a conflict 
zone in the Middle East to support designated terrorist groups (including the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)) and advocate terrorist activity (mainly through social media). On the other hand, the ideological nature of these individuals and their associations may explain such recidivism, rather than the sanctions 
previously imposed on them. 
Other	criminal	justice	and	other	measures	to	disrupt	TF	activities	
4.21. Australia primarily and successfully uses other criminal justice and administrative measures to 
disrupt TF activities when a prosecution for TF is not practicable. Australia places a strong focus on disrupting 
terrorist organisations, and terrorist acts before they occur. Thus, investigations may not advance to the stage 
where a TF charge is practicable. As noted above, there are also practical difficulties in pursuing TF offences. 
4.22. The CDPP examines the briefs of evidence provided by the AFP and decides, in line with the 
Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth, on the available and appropriate charges to bring. The assessment 
of the evidence by the CDPP may result in other terrorism offences in the Criminal Code, (e.g. doing an act in preparation for, or planning, terrorist acts or providing support to a terrorist organisation), offences under 
the CotUNA (e.g. making an asset available to a designated person or entity), or offences under the Crimes 
(Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (e.g. preparations for incursions into foreign states for purpose 
of engaging in hostile activities) being brought. Administrative action includes ASIO  issuing adverse security 
assessments to DFAT, which can lead to a revocation of a passport. 
4.23. These measures are being used to identify and disrupt domestic terrorist activity and the provision 
of financial support from Australia to offshore extremist groups. This confronts the risk posed by individuals 
travelling to conflict areas abroad (in particular Syria and Iraq) to become directly involved in designated terrorist groups, and so called “lone-wolves”, who may be sympathetic to but are only indirectly aligned with 
such groups. The authorities have already convicted one individual under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and 
Recruitment) Act 1978, and had begun prosecutions of three more at the time of the on-site visit. Since 1 July 
2013, the federal government has also cancelled more than 70 passports on national security grounds. 
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Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 9:
4.24. Australia exhibits most characteristics of an effective system for investigating, prosecuting, and 
sanctioning those involved in terrorist financing. It is positive to note that Australia has undertaken several 
TF investigations and prosecutions, and also secured three convictions for the TF offence. Australia also 
successfully uses other criminal justice and administrative measures to disrupt terrorist and TF activities 
when a prosecution for TF is not practicable. Australia had successfully disrupted two domestic terrorist 
plots (Pendennis and Neath) at the time of the on-site visit.2 Australia also uses these other measures to 
address the most relevant emerging TF risk – individuals travelling to conflict zones to participate in or 
advocate terrorist activity. Australian authorities identify and investigate different types of TF offences in each counter-terrorism investigation, and counter-terrorism strategies have successfully enabled Australia 
to identify and designate terrorists, terrorist organisations, and terrorist support networks. Australian authorities have not prosecuted all the different types of TF offences, such as the collection of funds for TF, 
or the financing of terrorist acts or individual terrorists, and the dissuasiveness of sanctions applied has not 
been clearly demonstrated.  
4.25. Australia is therefore rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.9.
4.4 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 10 (TF preventive measures and financial 
sanctions)
	Targeted	financial	sanctions	for	TF
4.26. Australia is actively using the TFS framework and demonstrates some characteristics of 
an effective system for TFS. With UNSCR 1267/1989 and UNSCR 1988 designations, the legal obligation 
to freeze assets is automatic upon designation at the UN; no additional action by Australian authorities is 
needed to give legal effect to a designation. Nevertheless, when there is a change in the listing at the UN, the 
next business day DFAT amends its Consolidated List to reflect changes in the UNSCR 1267 designations and 
the updated Consolidated List is published on the DFAT website and circulated for information to subscribers 
via email. The automatic asset freeze obligation is a best practice for other countries on how UN 
designations can be implemented without delay.
4.27. Australia had co-sponsored or acted as co-designator for a number of designations at the UN. 
Australia’s decision to co-sponsor proposals or co-designate, includes consideration of whether the proposed 
designation has links to Australia or is otherwise in Australia’s national interest. At the time of the on-site visit, 
Australia also took into account the necessity of ensuring its impartiality as chair of the UNSCR 1267/1989 
and 1988 Committees when considering possible co-sponsorship or co-designation.
4.28. Australia is also using its framework to domestically list individuals and entities pursuant to UNSCR 
1373 and has listed 89 persons and entities (at the time of the on-site). At the domestic level, targets for 
listing can be proposed to DFAT by any agency, including AFP, AGD, ASIO and other intelligence agencies. DFAT then works with intelligence agencies and law enforcement to determine if the proposed designee meets the 
legal test for designation. Authorities can use both open source and classified information in the creation 
of a statement of reasons (SOR), but the preference is to rely as little as possible on classified information 
in composing the SOR. After consideration by the Ambassador for Counterterrorism (a DFAT official), the 
SOR and a recommendation for listing, is submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who makes a final 
determination. After listing, a designee may contact DFAT for a copy of the unclassified SOR. 
2 Another plot was disrupted soon after the on-site visit. AUSTRAC also took action in November 2014 to cancel the 
registration of remittance dealer (Bisotel Rieh Pty Ltd) due to concerns that its continued registration may involve 
a TF risk. This followed a period of engagement and notification of action by AUSTRAC.
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4.29. Third party requests from foreign jurisdictions are considered under the same process. Australia 
receives requests either directly through DFAT or via its embassies or High Commissions abroad. DFAT 
begins consideration of such requests within one business day. Australia has received numerous requests 
from foreign jurisdictions since the establishment of the regime and has given effect to both formal and 
informal requests. DFAT noted that most of its domestic designations were a result of either formal requests 
or informal discussions with like-minded countries. Where Australia does not believe that the information provided meets the legal threshold for designation (for example due to differences in designation criteria 
or because the request is politically motivated), authorities still continue to monitor the individuals and 
entities for information to substantiate a designation. Australia has never formally rejected a request. From 
November 2013 to June 2014, Australia received only 3 formal third party requests. At the time of the on-site 
visit, authorities were advancing one for domestic designation.
4.30. Australia has made no unilateral requests to other countries for consideration of the names it has 
designated. 3 Australia explained that many of the designees it believes would have warranted a third-party 
request were subsequently designated at the UN or were subject to a third-party request by a like-minded 
country with Australia’s active or in-principle support, often after informal discussions between Australia 
and a group of like-minded countries.
4.31. All designations made pursuant to Australia’s implementation of UNSCR 1373 must be reviewed 
every three years. The review process is similar to the process for the initial listing and is to determine that 
the designee continues to satisfy the criteria for listing. DFAT also invites, via a media release and posting 
on its website, public submissions for the review regarding listees and anyone can make a submission. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs must make a formal determination to renew the listing or the listing expires. As a 
result of the review process, four listings were permitted to expire in 2013. 
4.32. Listees may apply to the Minister for revocation of the designation. Since 2002, DFAT has received 
three de-listing requests related to TF TFS. Two requests were filed by the same entity and were rejected in 
2003 and 2004; the third request, which was filed in January 2014, was still pending at the time of the onsite 
visit.
4.33. As part of its outreach efforts, DFAT administers an Online Sanctions Administration System (OSAS) 
through which members of the public can enquire if an activity is subject to prohibitions under the sanctions 
regime and can apply for a sanctions permit (license). Across the TFS regimes, the average time to consider 
a request for a sanctions permit is approximately 15 days. DFAT also offers LinkMatchLite software to assist asset holders to consider the probability that a provided name is a match with a name on the Consolidated 
List. Under section 41 of the Charter	of	the	United	Nations	(Dealing	with	Assets)	Regulation	2008,	asset holders may contact the AFP for assistance to determine whether or not an asset is owned or controlled by a listee 
(the process has been agreed by DFAT, the AFP, the Australian Bankers Association and major banks, and as 
set out on the website of DFAT). Based on the information available to the AFP, it provides an indication as 
to whether a name match to the Consolidated List is ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’ or ‘unknown’. Under its TF sanctions 
regime Australia has frozen property related to only one entity listed pursuant to 1373; in 2002 AUD 2 000 
was frozen in multiple bank accounts for the listed entity. There was also a false positive in 2002, where 
funds were initially frozen and then released. DFAT also conducts sanctions-related outreach to businesses, universities, and individuals and holds national outreach tours twice a year and speaks at relevant seminars 
and conferences. The March 2014 DFAT outreach events had over 100 attendees from across ten sectors, 
including banks, law firms, mining and dual use industries. 
4.34. DFAT has primary responsibility for compliance with sanction requirements and it does issue 
production orders to enforce the sanctions framework. However, this is a reactive process, as DFAT’s production 
orders are usually in response to a suspected violation. DFAT also undertakes outreach to educate society on 
the requirements. However, DFAT does not monitor or supervise the financial sector for compliance with the 
requirements of the FATF Recommendations (which would be difficult given that DFAT is not a supervisory 
3  After the on-site, Australia made requests to other jurisdictions following designations in Australia under 
UNSCR 1373.
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entity) and as expected of a supervisory authority. In addition, no financial institutions are supervised or 
monitored for compliance with the TFS requirements (as in financial supervision) by any other competent 
supervisory authority. This is a major shortcoming in the supervisory regime, as reflected under IO.3, but is 
relevant for IO.10 to measure effective implementation. The assessment team also confirmed that AUSTRAC 
does not check its own databases for matches with DFATs lists on an ongoing basis. AUSTRAC staff indicated 
that the vast number of false positives this would generate, would make this a challenging or impossible task. 
However, there is an internal SMR analysis rule that allows for checking with possible list hits, and reporting 
agencies can indicate on an SMR that there is a possible list hit. In addition, when discussing company 
registration with ASIC, ASIC stated that it does not automatically check the DFAT lists when registering a 
company, its directors or its shareholders. Not checking government databases against government issued 
lists effectively limits the same government ability to detect compliance breaches.
4.35. Assessors also sought to establish effective implementation of the requirements during interviews 
with the private sector, or through the statistics. All financial institutions were aware of their obligations to 
freeze (often referred to as the “UN, OFAC and DFAT lists”) and confirmed that they were not supervised for 
compliance with their sanctions obligations. A few were aware that they should contact AFP if there was a 
question about whether they had a match with the Consolidated List, but most were unable to share feedback 
on the remaining practical issues that inevitably would have to come up during implementation (e.g. how to 
deal with similar names i.e. false positives issues; what assets needed to be frozen) and that would establish 
that the private sector effectively implements the requirements. Moreover, as indicated above, despite the large number of domestic designations (89 at the time of the on-site visit), only in one case were assets 
detected (approximately AUD 2 000 in 2002), and one false positive in 2002. The list of designated entities 
contains names that are common in Australia. As a result, it could be reasonably expected that similar names 
would have caused false positives, which would have allowed financial institutions to gather experience with 
dealing with false positives, demonstrating that the system was being effectively implemented.  
4.36. A possible explanation for this lack of evidence of implementation may be that it seems that 
the sanctions framework to implement UNSCR 1373 is not used to target entities in Australia or against 
Australian citizens (at the time of the on-site), which indeed limits the likelihood of detecting funds and other 
assets of designated entities in Australia. This is in line with another related shortcoming, which is that the 
legal provisions are not applied systematically by the authorities. Specifically, some of the persons that had 
previously been convicted in Australia for terrorism or terrorist financing completed their sentences and 
then left Australia to openly take part in terrorist acts abroad. At the time of their travel, the groups that 
these Australians joined (Jabhat al-Nusra or JN and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL) were already 
designated by the federal government under UNSCR 1373 (JN) and under UNSCR 1267 (ISIL and JN) in 2013. 
Nevertheless, at the time of the on-site, these persons (especially those that had previously been convicted) 
had not been referred to the UN (under UNSCR 1267) for designation, or designated domestically (under 
UNSCR 1373). It should, however, be noted that two of these individuals were considered by the federal 
government for designation. Designation of these two persons took place on 13 November 2014, which was 
only after the on-site. The Australian authorities believe that their regular interaction with financial entities regarding possible designated entities before an institution entered into a customer relationship also limits 
the number of possible false positives.
4.37. The Australian legal framework for the implementation of TFS is a good example for other 
countries, especially the immediate legal obligation to freeze assets as soon as an entity is listed by 
the UN, and the numerous designations made under the domestic regime are to be commended as 
best practices for other countries. However, effective implementation of the framework is difficult 
to confirm in the absence of freezing statistics, financial supervision, supervisory experience, and 
feedback on practical implementation by the private sector.
Non-Profit	Organisations	(NPOs)
4.38. The NRA cites charities and NPOs as one of the key channels that can be used to raise funds for TF 
in or from Australia. It notes that organisations can be exploited in a number of ways, including disguising 
international funds transfers to high-risk regions, co-mingling of humanitarian aid and funds raised to finance terrorism, and diversion or siphoning of legitimate funds by or to terrorist groups after the funds arrive in the 
destination country. 
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4.39. Despite the general risks identified by the authorities in the NRA, Australia has not undertaken 
a risk review of the NPO sector to identify the features and types of NPOs that are particularly at risk 
of being misused for TF. Subsequently, there is no TF-related outreach to, or TF-related monitoring 
of, the part of the sector that would be at risk and that account for a significant share of the sector’s 
activities.
4.40. Australia’s general NPO regulator, the Australia Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) 
was established in 2012 to administer the framework for the voluntary registration and regulation of 
charities. Only charities are permitted to register with the ACNC. About 40 000 of the 140 000 NPOs with 
legal personality and 20 000 without legal personality have registered, and mainly to take advantage of tax 
incentives. The ACNC has the ability to conduct reviews of registered charities, which focus on whether the 
organisation has a charitable purpose and the funds are used solely for that purpose. While the ACNC actively 
works to improve transparency, it has no specific TF mandate and it has not conducted outreach to the NPO 
sector regarding TF risks. 
4.41. Outreach efforts to the NPO sector are minimal, and not targeted. In 2009 the AGD issued a 
brochure “Safeguarding Your Organisation against Terrorism: A Guidance for Non-profit Organisations”. This 
non-binding guidance sets out best practice principles for NPOs, including on undertaking risk assessments, 
applying due diligence procedures to beneficiaries and third parties, being aware of legal obligations, and 
ensuring internal processes of transparency and accountability. In 2013 the AGD issued a fact sheet about the 
ongoing violence in Syria; the document focuses primarily on the Australian sanctions obligations and the best 
way to donate funds for humanitarian support. Both documents focused mainly on DFAT-lists requirements.
Terrorist	asset	seizure	and	confiscation	(criminal	justice	measures)
4.42. Two TF cases have been referred to CACT since its establishment to recover TF related assets. No 
seizures or confiscations resulted from these referrals. These outcomes do not seem commensurate with the 
overall TF risk. 
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 10
4.43. Australia demonstrates some characteristics of an effective system in this area. Terrorists and 
terrorist organisations are being identified in an effort to deprive them of the resources and means to finance 
terrorist activities. 
4.44. An area of strong technical compliance is the legal framework for TFS against persons and entities 
designated by the UNSC (UNSCR 1267) and under Australia’s sanctions law (for UNSCR 1373). Australia has co-
sponsored designation proposals to the UNSCR 1267/1989 Committee and adopted very effective measures 
to ensure the proper implementation of UN designations without delay. Australia has also domestically listed 
individuals and entities pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (including most recently two Australians fighting overseas 
for terrorist entities) and received, considered and given effect to third party requests. Australia actively 
works to publicly identify terrorists and terrorist organisations.
4.45. Furthermore, the TFS regime is administered robustly. Australia has procedures for:
i. identifying targets for listing, 
ii. a regular review of listings, and 
iii. the consideration of de-listing requests and sanctions permits. 
iv. The authorities make a concerted effort to sensitize the public to Australian sanctions laws 
and to assist potential asset holders in the implementation of their obligations.
4.46. However, the private sector is not supervised for compliance with TFS requirements and was unable 
to demonstrate that the legal framework is effectively implemented. Effective implementation is difficult to 
establish in the absence of freezing statistics, financial supervision, supervisory experience, and feedback on 
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practical implementation by the private sector. Designating Australians previously convicted for terrorism 
or terrorist financing, who openly join designated terrorist organisations, could improve the system’s 
effectiveness.4 
4.47. NPOs are an area for improved efforts and specific action. According to the NRA, charities and NPOs 
are a key channel used to raise funds for TF in or from Australia. However, the lack of a targeted TF review 
and subsequent targeted TF-related outreach and TF-related monitoring of NPOs leaves NPOs and Australia 
vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations. Since 2010, no effort has been directed at NPOs to sensitise 
them to the potential risk of misuse for TF. While the ACNC actively works to improve transparency, it has no 
specific TF mandate and it has not conducted outreach to the NPO sector regarding TF risks. 
4.48. Australia has been rated for a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.10.
4.5 Effectiveness: Immediate Outcome 11 (PF financial sanctions)
Targeted	financial	sanctions	related	to	proliferation	financing
4.49. Australia’s legal system and processes for implementing UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 (as required by 
Recommendation 7 and assessed in this IO) are identical to those for implementing UNSCR 1267 (as required 
by Recommendation 6 and assessed in IO.10). The same key findings apply: a sound legal system and process 
exist. However, the assessors were unable to ascertain effective implementation of the requirements due to the absence of a supervisory or other compliance testing framework, the absence of implementation feedback 
from the financial sector, and the absence of freezing actions (including for false positives).
4.50. In addition, Australia has a proliferation-related autonomous sanctions regime, as described in the 
paragraphs below. This capability, and the process Australia undergoes to identify proliferation-financing targets, contributes to the overall effectiveness in preventing persons and entities involved in the proliferation 
of WMDs from raising, moving, and using funds.
Domestic	cooperation	to	implement	obligations	to	combat	the	financing	of	proliferation
4.51. DFAT takes the lead on domestic coordination regarding operational threats, cases, and international 
cooperation in relation to proliferation financing. DFAT discusses operational issues with domestic partners, 
and reaches out to the businesses that are involved. Part of this work relates to the authority of DFAT to grant 
licences that relate to UNSCR 1718 and 1737.
4.52. With respect to UNSCR 1718 and 1737, DFAT considers applications for sanctions permits for trade in 
goods and services as well as for financial transactions, and has implemented a unified system that facilitates 
a holistic approach to any proposed activity. Consideration of applications for sanctions permits for trade in 
goods and services includes seeking information about related financial transactions to ensure DFAT bases 
decisions about proposed activities on full information.
4.53. In considering sanctions permit applications, DFAT coordinates principally with Defence (including 
the Defence Export Control Office, DECO), the Australian Customs and Border Protection Agency (ACBPS) 
and the Australian Intelligence Community, and other agencies as appropriate. DFAT’s Sanctions Section’s 
contacts with relevant agencies appear well developed, which facilitates early identification of possible cases 
of proliferation financing concern and a coordinated whole -of-government response. The monthly inter-
agency Non-Proliferation Coordination Group, co-chaired by DFAT’s Arms Control and Counter- Proliferation 
Branch and attended by the Sanctions Section, is the primary mechanism for raising and discussing issues 
of concern, whether these are individual cases or emerging trends. All relevant agencies, including ACBPS, 
4 At the time of the on-site, two of these individuals were under consideration by the government for designation. 
Designation of these two persons subsequently took place on 13 November 2014, after the onsite.
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DECO, and AUSTRAC attend these meetings. The Sanctions Section is also in direct daily contact with ACBPS 
and DECO, and has established standard operating procedures in agreement with these agencies to facilitate 
coordination of sanctions permit applications. 
4.54. As reflected under IO. 10, all financial institutions were aware of their obligations to freeze (often 
referred to as the “UN, OFAC and DFAT lists”) and confirmed that they were not supervised for compliance 
with their sanctions obligations. However, there was strong evidence that the financial institutions were 
actively seeking to comply with TFS obligations due to the possible reputational risks and legal penalties 
flowing from contravening Australian sanction laws as well as concerns connected to supervisory action that 
had taken place in other jurisdictions for non-compliance with IO.11 / PF-related TFS obligations. DFAT is the 
competent authority for processing informal inquiries and formal applications relating to sanctions permits. 
Since 2010, DFAT has received only one application in relation to targeted financial sanctions under UNSC 
Iran or DPRK sanctions, which was refused. DFAT has received 276 inquiries and 873 applications in relation 
to trade in goods and services under UNSC and Australian autonomous DPRK and Iran sanctions. Of the 873 
applications, 404 were granted, 36 denied, 326 withdrawn, and 107 never required a permit. In considering 
inquiries and applications, DFAT checks its own sanctions lists and the AUSTRAC database, and may also 
reach out to the intelligence services and – as required – to the UN. DFAT also coordinates with universities to 
ensure that export controlled knowledge is not acquired by sanctioned countries. 
Overall conclusions on Immediate Outcome 11
4.55. Australia demonstrates to a large extent the characteristics of an effective system in this area. The 
issues listed under IO.10 and that relate to UNSCR 1267 also apply to IO.11.
4.56. Even though IO.11 suffers from the same issues as IO.10, IO.10 has additional shortcomings in 
relation to NPOs that do not apply to IO.11. In addition, the overall domestic cooperation in relation to country 
sanction programmes for Iran and DPRK seems sound, which may have a positive effect on the targeted 
financial sanctions implementation that are related to these country programmes. This domestic cooperation 
benefit does not apply in the case of IO.10 / UNSCR 1267, as it is not a country programme. 
4.57. Australia has been rated for a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.11.  
4.6 Recommendations on Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation 
Investigating	and	prosecuting	terrorist	financing	(IO.9)
 Australia should give consideration, where appropriate, to actively prosecuting different types of 
TF offences. 
Targeted	financial	sanctions	on	TF	(IO.10)	and	financing	of	proliferation	(IO.11)
 Australia should ensure financial institutions are actively supervised for implementation of DFAT lists, ideally through a legislative amendment to the statute identifying and authorising the agency 
responsible for supervision. Specifically, supervision should include a focus on those issues that 
other countries’ supervisors have detected in relation to non-compliance with targeted financial 
sanctions requirements by global financial institutions, such as the facilitation of sanctions evasion 
by financial institutions (IO.10 and IO.11) (see also IO.3). 
 Australia should ensure that government entities implement and/or supervise the targeted financial 
sanctions requirements of DFAT. This includes monitoring AUSTRAC’s and ASIC’s databases for 
possible matches (IO.10 and IO.11).
 Australia should take comprehensive measures to ensure that DNFBPs can also be supervised or 
monitored for compliance with targeted financial sanctions requirements (IO.10 and IO.11).
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 Australia should continue using its preventive designation powers against identified (self-declared) members of designated terrorists groups, or propose the names of these persons for designation to 
the UN (IO.10). 
 Australia should implement a targeted approach in relation to preventing NPOs from TF abuse. As 
a first step, Australia needs to undertake a thorough review of the TF risks that NPOs are facing 
(beyond the issues already covered in the NRA) and the potential vulnerabilities of the sector to 
terrorist activities. Australia should then apply the required measures to those NPOs that are at risk 
and that account for a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the NPO sector, 
and a significant share of the sector’s international activities (IO.10).
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5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Key	Findings
Reporting	entities’	understanding	of	 their	ML/TF	 risks	and	 the	effective	 implementation	of	
preventive	measures	varies	across	and	within	sectors. The major reporting entities – including 
the big four domestic banks which dominate the financial sector – have a good understanding of their 
Australian AML/CTF risks and obligations, which do not all comply with FATF Standards. 
Australia’s	requirements	on	CDD,	beneficial	ownership,	and	the	requirements	for	PEPs	were	
enhanced	on	1	June	2014. Most of the reporting entities interviewed by the assessment team advised 
that they are not yet able to apply the improved requirements; they have a transition period until 31 
December 2015. Therefore, those reporting entities that are applying the pre-June 1 measures are not 
adequately identifying beneficial owners or applying CDD to PEPs. 
DNFBP	sectors,	other	than	casinos	and	bullion	dealers,	including	those	assessed	as	high	risk	in	
the	NTA,	are	not	subject	to	AML/CTF	regulation,	and	have	demonstrated	a	poor	understanding	
of	their	ML/TF	risks. Australia should establish comprehensive AML/CTF obligations for all DNFBPs 
as a matter of priority.
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5.1	 Background	and	Context	
(a) Financial Sector and DNFBPs
5.1. Australia’s financial sector is the 12th largest in the world, and is dominated by banks. Total banking 
sector assets amount to over 200% of GDP (over AUD 321.1 billion). Australia’s banking sector is the third 
largest in the Asia-Pacific region, following Japan and China, and is highly concentrated, with the four largest 
banks accounting for 78% of the total banking assets. The Australian banking system comprises a mix of 
domestic and foreign players, with 48 of the 68 licensed banks being subsidiaries or branches of foreign 
banks.
Table	5.1.		Type	of	Financial	Institutions	Authorised	to	Conduct	Financial	Activities	and	
Operations
Type of financial institution No. of entities
Banks
Australian owned banks
Foreign Subsidiary Banks
Branches of Foreign Banks
68
20
8
40
Building Societies 9
Credit Unions 85
Specialised credit card institutions 2
Other authorised deposit-taking institutions 4
Finance companies – Australian Credit Licensees 5 856
Authorised Credit Representatives 28 201
Lease Finance Companies – Credit Licensees Providing 
Consumer Leases
4 102
With 19 330 authorised representatives
Money Remittance Companies 6 230
Australia Financial Securities Licensees 5 093 
Financial Markets 18 
Clearing and Settlement Facilities 6
Market Dealers 136 market participants
Securities Dealers 800
Friendly Societies 12
Superannuation Funds and Trustees 200 superannuation fund trustees
53 Pooled Superannuation trusts
2 979 small APRA funds
62 Single-member authorised deposit funds 
528 701 self-managed superannuation funds
Funds Managers
Managed Investment Schemes (trustees) 784
494 responsible entities for MIS 
Registered Managed Investment Schemes 4 152
Foreign Financial Service Providers 614
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Table	5.1.	Type	of	Financial	Institutions	Authorised	to	Conduct	Financial	Activities	and	
Operations	(continued)
Type of financial institution No. of entities
Custodial Service Providers 718
Investment Banks 26
Hedge Fund Managers 250
Retail Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivative Providers 43
Life insurers / Life Insurance Brokers/ Life Insurance 
Agents 
28
Foreign exchange contracts – Australian Financial 
Services License holders
1 079
AFS Authorised Representatives 7 853
Money and currency exchange providers – bureaux de 
change
108
5.2. Australia is one of the major centres of capital market activity in the Asia Pacific region. Annual 
turnover across Australia’s financial markets was AUD 135 trillion in the year to June 2013. Australia’s total 
stock market capitalisation is more than USD 1.3 trillion, making it the 10th largest market in the world and 
the 4th largest in the Asia Pacific region. Australia’s foreign exchange market is ranked 8th in the world by 
turnover, with the AUD/USD the fourth most actively traded currency pair in the world by turnover.
5.3. Australia has a large number of remittance providers which provide an important service to 
Australia’s significant multicultural society. MVTS are offered by remitters, which fall into three types: 
remittance network providers (RNPs); agents or affiliates of the RNP; and independent remittance providers. 
Over 6 000 reporting entities registered with AUSTRAC operate in the remittance sector in one of these three 
categories. More than 5 500 of these entities are agents or affiliates of RNPs and the value of transactions 
flowing through the remittance sector is relatively concentrated. The top five networks account for 90% of all 
MVTS. The top 14 remitters account for 83% of the value of funds transferred in and out of Australia through 
the remittance channel. Outside of these networks, there are approximately 650 independent remitters 
registered with AUSTRAC. In terms of value, international funds transfers through remitters accounted for 
1.7% or AUD 66 billion of over AUD 3.9 trillion aggregate international funds transfers in 2013. The banking 
sector accounts for more than 95% of the total cross-border funds transfers.   
5.4. The NTA highlights banks, the gaming sector, and remitters as the main channels for ML (and also for 
TF through the remitters). Specifically, the NTA appears to have been a substantial driver for the creation of 
the Eligo National Task Force in December 2012. As noted earlier, the four largest banks are domestic banks 
and account for 78% of total banking assets and 66% of the international funds transfers by value. AUSTRAC 
has a dedicated team called Major Reporters, which regulates the 19 most significant reporting entity groups 
(REGs) comprising mainly the major Australian and foreign banks. In considering the risk and context of the 
financial sector, assessors gave greater material importance to the domestic banks and remitters. 
5.5. Most of the DNFBPs operate in Australia. As highlighted under IO.1, the real estate sector has been 
identified by authorities as a high ML/TF risk, and professional facilitators (lawyers, accountants, trust and 
company service providers – especially from lower tier firms) were almost universally considered  a major 
risk for ML. The real estate sector in Australia was also identified as an attractive avenue for investments, 
including by organised crime groups looking to launder illicit monies. As a result, the assessors viewed these 
sectors as materially important in determining effectiveness.
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Table	5.2.		DNFBPs:	Type	and	number	of	entities
Type of Entity Number of entities
Casinos 12
Lawyers The Law Council acts on behalf of approx. 56 000 legal practitioners
Notaries Approx. 260
Accountants Institute of Public Accountants – over 25 000 members in 50 countries
Certified Practicing Accountants Australia – over 150 000 in 121 countries
Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia – over 73  000 members 
globally
Precious Metals & Stones 
Dealers
82 Bullion Dealers
Jewellers Association of Australia - 1 100 outlets
Trust and Company Service 
Providers
Approx. 300 company formation agents.
 
Real Estate Agents 35 019
(b) Preventive Measures
5.6. Australia’s AML/CTF regime has undergone significant reform since the last assessment in 2005. 
The most important reform was the enactment of the AML/CTF Act in 2006, which expanded the scope and 
coverage of Australia’s AML/CTF regime. Businesses with AML/CTF obligations increased from approximately 
3 000 under the previous AML/CTF regime to about 15 000 under the AML/CTF Act. The AML/CTF Act 
focuses on the services to be regulated – called “designated services” in the Act – rather than the nature 
of the entity that provides the service. In broad terms, the AML/CTF Act applies to the services provided 
by financial institutions, gambling service providers, bullion dealers and remittance dealers. Entities that 
provide these designated services are known as reporting entities and are supervised by AUSTRAC for 
compliance with the Act. Beyond bullion dealers and gambling services, including casinos, other DNFBPs (i.e. 
real estate agents, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals and accountants, 
and trust and company service providers) are only covered when they provide one of the designated services 
– i.e. essentially acting in the capacity of a financial institution under the FATF Recommendations. None of 
the services designated relates to real estate agents, dealers in precious stones or trust and company service 
providers activities. 
5.7. The AML/CTF Act requires REs to establish an AML/CTF programme, which is divided into two parts 
– Part A and Part B. The primary purpose of Part A of the standard AML/CTF programme is to identify, mitigate 
and manage ML/TF risks that a reporting entity faces and includes AML/CTF risk awareness training for 
employees, employee due diligence program, oversight by boards and senior management, and procedures 
for independent review of programme. The primary purpose of Part B is to set out the reporting entity’s 
applicable customer identification procedures (ACIP), including beneficial ownership, ongoing customer due 
diligence and enhanced due diligence. A standard programme applies to a particular RE; joint programmes 
apply to each reporting entity that belongs to a particular DBG .
5.8. The AML/CTF Act is supplemented by the AML/CTF Rules Instrument 2007 (AML/CTF Rules), 
issued by AUSTRAC’s CEO pursuant to section 229 of the AML/CTF Act. The AML/CTF Rules expand on the 
requirements and provide greater specificity with respect to some of the obligations in the AML/CTF Act. For 
example, the AML/CTF Rules set out the requirements on reporting entities’ risk assessments, and include 
provisions on their adoption of a risk-based approach.
5.9. The AML/CTF Rules were updated on 15 May 2014 via the AML/CTF Rules Amendment Instrument 
2014 (No.3) (Rules Amendment). The Rules Amendment updated a number of the preventive measure 
requirements, including those related to customer identification, beneficial ownership, and the provisions 
of Part A of the AML/CTF program. The Rules Amendment commenced on 1 June 2014 but REs have until 
1 January 2016 to fully implement the requirements before certain sanctions will be applied.
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(c)	 Risk-Based	Exemptions	or	extensions	of	preventive	measures
5.10. Casinos and bullion dealers are the only categories of DNFBPs subjected to AML/CTF requirements, 
including the requirement to establish AML/CTF programmes to mitigate ML/TF risks. Other DNFBP sectors 
such as lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, and trust and company service providers are not subject 
to such obligations, which is in direct contrast to their assessment as a high threat in the NTA and the risk-
based approach. On the regulated sectors, Australia sets the threshold for CDD requirements to be applied to 
customers of casinos at AUD 10 000 (USD 9 300 / EUR 6 900), which exceeds the USD / EUR 3 000 threshold 
in the FATF Recommendations. Persons licensed to operate gaming machines are also not subject to most 
of the AML/CTF obligations under the Australian regime if they operate no more than 15 such machines, 
although there are State and Territory-level restrictions on winnings paid in cash. 
5.11. AUSTRAC has the powers to grant exemptions to specified persons from all or parts of the AML/
CTF Act. In practice, it has granted full or unconditional exemptions to various applicants, including those 
operating in private banking, prepaid cards or investment funds. According to the AUSTRAC Exemption Policy, 
exemptions are considered based on a number of factors, including – but not limited to – the risk profile of 
the applicant, the designated service, issues of competitive neutrality, and the level of regulatory burden to 
which the applicant is being subjected. While AUSTRAC considers these exemptions on a case-by-case basis, 
the assessment team was not convinced that the exemptions were sufficiently justified as low risk.
5.2	 Technical	Compliance	(R.9-23)
5.12. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation	9	(financial	institution	secrecy	laws)	is	rated	compliant.
 Recommendation	10	(customer	due	diligence)	is	rated	partially	compliant.
 Recommendation	11	(record-keeping)	is	rated	largely	compliant.
 Recommendation	12	(politically	exposed	persons)	is	rated	largely	compliant.
 Recommendation	13	(correspondent	banking)	is	rated	non-compliant.
 Recommendation	14	(money	or	value	transfer	services)	is	rated	largely	compliant.
 Recommendation	15	(new	technologies)	is	rated	largely	compliant.
 Recommendation	16	(wire	transfers)	is	rated	partially	compliant.
 Recommendation	17	(reliance	on	third	parties)	is	rated	partially	compliant.
 Recommendation	 18	 (internal	 controls	 and	 foreign	 branches	 and	 subsidiaries)	 is	 rated	
partially	compliant.
 Recommendation	19	(higher	risk	countries)	is	rated	partially	compliant.
 Recommendation	20	(reporting	of	suspicious	transactions)	is	rated	compliant.	
 Recommendation	21	(tipping-off	and	confidentiality)	is	rated	compliant.
 Recommendation	22	(DNFBPs	–	customer	due	diligence)	is	rated	non-compliant.
 Recommendation	23	(DNFBPs	–	other	measures)	is	rated	non-compliant.
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5.3	 Effectiveness:	Immediate	Outcome	4	(Preventive	Measures)
5.13. The AML/CTF Act requires reporting entities to perform regular risk assessments. This entails 
assessing the risk of the reporting entity being involved in or facilitating ML or TF, and determining what the 
reporting entity will need to do to identify, mitigate, and manage those risks. The AML/CTF Rules specify that 
in its risk assessment a reporting entity must consider its customer types, the types of designated services 
it provides, the methods by which it delivers designated services and the foreign jurisdictions with which it 
deals.
5.14. Financial	institutions’	and	DNFBPs’	understanding	of	ML/TF	risks	and	measures	to	mitigate	
them	 varies	 across	 sectors.	 Financial sector representatives demonstrated a better understanding of 
their ML/TF risks and were better at identifying steps to mitigate and manage those risks. Most DNFBPs 
that are not subject to prudential or AML/CTF regulation or supervision did not demonstrate an adequate 
understanding of their ML/TF risks.
5.15. The	 understanding	 of	 risks	 and	 measures	 also	 vary	 across	 reporting	 entities	 within	 the	
respective	sectors,	depending	on	the	scale	and	complexity	of	their	operations. Across the board, larger 
reporting entities demonstrated a better understanding and ability to mitigate their identified ML/TF risks. 
5.16. Across	sectors	it	was	reported	to	the	assessment	team	that	smaller	reporting	entities	found	
it	challenging	to	understand	and	meet	all	the	AML/CTF	requirements.	AUSTRAC has undertaken a large 
number of outreach strategies to communicate with small to medium reporting entities, including compliance 
guides for small bookmakers, independent remitters and clubs and hotels and outreach to industry 
associations. Nevertheless, the small to medium reporting entities have a lower level of understanding 
of their obligations and risks. To a large extent this is as a result of the inherent characteristics of smaller 
entities that do not have the capacity to maintain the wide range of compliance resources and capabilities 
employed by larger entities. Both large and small reporting entities interviewed suggested that insufficient 
regulatory and enforcement presence was a contributing factor. The larger reporting entities enjoy close 
working relationships with AUSTRAC and the law enforcement agencies, which enhances their ability to 
understand the authorities’ views on risk. The same opportunity is not as available to the smaller reporting 
entities, which rely on the NTA and the published AUSTRAC guidance and typologies for insight into how the 
authorities assess risk. While reporting entities indicated that the guidance and typologies were generally 
useful, they all noted that these materials could be clearer and more up-to-date.
5.17. DNFBP	 sectors	 that	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 the	AML/CTF	 regime	 generally	 demonstrate	 a	 poor	
understanding	of	ML/TF	risks. Most were unaware of the NTA or its findings that many of the unregulated 
DNFBPs are a high risk for ML. Those that were aware of the NTA disagreed with its conclusions, citing the 
lack of clear evidence in typologies reports or criminal prosecutions to justify the assessment. Nearly all of 
these sectors asserted that the ML/TF risks in their respective sectors are low, as they handle no or minimal 
cash transactions. They also claimed that the current professional standards for their sectors sufficiently 
protect the sector from abuse by criminals. 
5.18. Banks – Banks	operating	 in	Australia	 generally	have	a	 sufficient	understanding	of	 the	ML/
FT	 risks	 of	 their	 clients,	 and	 have	 a	 framework	 in	 place	 to	mitigate	 them. In addition, large banks 
demonstrated a better understanding of their AML/CTF obligations and had the resources to effectively 
implement them. This was significantly more challenging for small to medium sized banks due to more 
limited resources and capacity, as well as the complexity of the requirements laid out in the AML/CTF Act and 
the AML/CTF Rules.  
5.19. Domestic	banks	did	not	have	measures	 that	 fully	meet	 FATF	Standards	on	CDD,	beneficial	
owners	and	politically-exposed	persons. This appeared to be due to Australian-based banks limiting the 
scope of their ML/TF assessment to the scope of the requirements as outlined in AML/CTF Act and Rules. 
International banks whose home jurisdictions comply with these relevant Standards generally considered a 
wider array of factors when reviewing the ML/TF risks of their bank and its business lines.
5.20. Money and Value Transfer Services – Within	 the	 remittance	 sector,	 the	 ability	 to	 adequately	
assess	risk	varies	widely. Large RNPs with global operations seem to adequately identify and mitigate the 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 87
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
5
risk associated with their product lines and their customers (the five largest RNPs in Australia account for 
90% of affiliates). For example, large RNPs will have varying thresholds for enhanced due diligence based on 
transaction corridor, or customer type based on internally determined risk profiles. Such approaches are less 
likely in smaller RNPs and independent remitters, but they make up only a limited part of the sector. 
5.21. In 2011, regulatory changes were implemented to strengthen the remittance registration process. 
The criteria applied to registration changed and the AUSTRAC CEO was given the capacity to refuse, cancel, 
suspend or impose conditions on registration. RNPs were included in the registration process and the 
compliance obligations of agents/affiliates shifted to the RNP. This included requiring RNPs to undertake due 
diligence on their affiliate (including requiring RNPs to obtain criminal records checks of all key personnel 
within their affiliates), providing the agent/affiliate with a compliance program, monitoring agent compliance, 
training agents, and conducting transaction monitoring of their entire network. 
5.22. The 2011 regulatory changes improved the ability of AUSTRAC to monitor the remittance sector 
and improved implementation of obligations. However, representatives from the sector reported to the 
assessment team that implementation	of	obligations	in	line	with	the	FATF	Standards	continues	to	vary	
greatly	within	the	sector. A number of larger remitters and RNPs implement obligations in line with the 
FATF Standards. Smaller remitters – which account for a small part of the sector – lack capacity to implement 
Australia’s complex regulatory requirements and do not implement preventive measures in line with the 
FATF Standards.
5.23. In line with Australia’s AML/CTF Rules, money remitters are implementing the Australian obligations 
for wire transfers and the filing of IFTIs, but the existing Rules are not in line with the requirements of 
Recommendation 16. Smaller remitters were universally identified by the authorities and the private sector 
as less compliant with Australian AML/CTF obligations and highly vulnerable to ML. 
5.24. To improve compliance throughout the remittance sector, sector participants are considering the 
creation of a professional association of remitters. In addition to furthering compliance, an association would 
further establish professional standards and would act as an advocate for the sector.1
5.25. Casinos – The casino sector has been identified by the NTA and AUSTRAC as high risk and is therefore 
supervised more intensively, especially over the last two years. One of the larger	 casinos	 in	 Australia	
demonstrated	a	good	understanding	of	 its	AML/CTF	obligations and reported having more stringent 
AML/CTF measures than what the law required in some aspects. For instance, they set lower cash thresholds 
for CDD triggers, or have wider scope of due diligence. This is driven in part by their desire to better manage 
business and reputation risks in their activities, and/or to ensure the chances of success in renewing or 
holding on to their licences. Given the relatively small number of casino operators and AUSTRAC’s supervisory 
focus on this sector, the discrepancy among casino operators in implementing AML/CTF measures that are 
commensurate with their scale and ML/TF risks is unlikely to be as large as in some other sectors. 
5.26. Bullion dealers – Bullion dealers are regulated by AUSTRAC and are required to comply with AML/
CTF obligations. Consistent with feedback from most private sector representatives, the larger bullion dealers 
attract regular scrutiny from AUSTRAC, and are likely to demonstrate better understanding of their AML/CTF 
obligations and have adequate AML/CTF safeguards as a result. Insufficient information was provided for the 
assessors to establish whether smaller bullion dealers implement AML/CTF measures commensurate with 
their activities and ML/TF risks. The characteristics of small bullion dealers are consistent with other small 
reporting entities – the understanding of obligations and compliance levels are expected to be lower than it 
is for the larger players.  
5.27. Other	 DNFBPs (lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, trust and company service providers, 
dealers in precious stones) – These DNFBPs are not subject to AML/CTF requirements or supervision and, 
with limited exceptions, demonstrated a low understanding of their respective ML/TF risks. 
1 In October 2014, the Australian Remittance and Currency Providers Association Limited was established with 50 
members from RNPs and independent remitters.
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5.28. Some sectors, such as the legal and accounting profession, are of the view that they are subject to 
stringent professional standards that are sufficient to manage any potential ML/TF risks and/or allow them 
to adequately know their customers. However, the sector representatives were unable to demonstrate to or 
convince the assessors how existing professional standards were sufficient to mitigate ML/TF risks over and 
above their personal business interests, or had enabled them to be an effective contributor in combating 
system-wide ML/TF risks. These sectors do not see themselves as having a gatekeeping role to prevent ML/
TF, and felt this is the responsibility of the financial sector, on the basis that most funds are expected to flow 
through the financial system. 
5.29. Other sectors like the business incorporators (i.e. trust and company service providers) reported 
having a fairly good understanding of their customers, given the nature and simplicity of the services that 
they provide. 
5.30. On the whole, however, there is no conclusive evidence that these non-regulated DNFBPs are rejecting 
customers due to suspected ML/TF activities. They also do not have obligations to report suspicious matters 
to AUSTRAC, and do not do so in practice.
Requirements on CDD and PEPs
5.31. Financial	 institutions’	 and	 DNFBPs’	 existing	 measures	 on	 customer	 due	 diligence	 and	
identification	of	beneficial	owners	and	PEPs	are	not	in	line	with	FATF	Standards. As mentioned above, 
the Rules Amendment commenced on 1 June 2014. The implementation period is outlined on the AUSTRAC 
website and is accompanied by policy principles issued by the Minister for Justice. The policy principles 
indicate that certain enforcement action – being an application for a civil penalty order or an injunction, the 
issuing of a remedial direction, or the imposition of a requirement to undertake an external compliance audit – 
will not be taken by the AUSTRAC CEO during the period of the policy principles for breaches of the additional 
CDD requirements, provided the reporting entities demonstrate that they have taken “reasonable steps” to 
comply by 1 January 2016. What constitutes “reasonable steps” is also set out in the policy principles and 
includes requiring reporting entities to have adopted a board approved transition plan to comply setting out 
how it will reach compliance with the new obligations. The transition plan was required to have been adopted 
by 1 November 2014. Also, where reporting entities are able to comply with the provisions through their 
existing operations, they must do so to demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps. In addition, high-
risk customers on-boarded by a reporting entity after 1 June 2014, but prior to the full implementation of 
the new obligations, are required to be retrospectively identified at the level required by the new obligations.
5.32. Based on interviews with reporting entities, assessors determined that at the time of the onsite a 
majority of reporting entities were not able to fully implement the requirements in the Rules Amendment; 
most continue to operate under the pre-June 1, 2014 requirements. While all the reporting entities endeavour 
to be in compliance as soon as possible, Australia-based reporting entities generally responded that they were 
unlikely to be able to comply with the new requirements ahead of 1 January 2016. Most sector representatives 
indicated that enforcement action would be taken against them if they took until that time to implement 
them. See also the preamble to Section 5 of the TC Annex. A number of international reporting entities noted 
that they were already implementing a number of the requirements based on their foreign obligations, and 
expected to be in compliance with the Rules relatively quickly.
5.33. The Rules Amendment expands on the CDD requirements with respect to the identification 
of the beneficial owner and the PEPs requirements, which are more in line with the FATF standard on 
Recommendations 10 and 12. However, even under the updated rules, several deficiencies remain as outlined 
in Recommendation 10.
Record Keeping
5.34. The	 larger	 reporting	 entities	 appear	 to	 have	 adequate	 record	 keeping	measures	 in	 place,	
while	some	smaller	entities	have	weaker	record	keeping	procedures. In demonstrating that reporting 
entities in general had effective record keeping measures in place, AUSTRAC provided information on a 
range of sectors. Of 68 on-site and off-site assessments conducted on major reporters since 2009, record-
keeping deficiencies did not seem to be a key weakness across the major reporters. Only 16 requirements 
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were issued relating to record keeping requirements. The number of recommendations issued by AUSTRAC 
to reporting entities to remediate record-keeping requirements in 2013/14 is also relatively low compared 
to other obligations, such as identification procedures and reporting obligations. These suggest that the 
major reporters do not have major difficulties with meeting record keeping requirements. Private sector 
representatives reported anecdotal feedback on limited capacity of smaller players to cope with obligations 
in the AML/CTF Act in general. Law enforcement’s experience was that, with the exception of many smaller 
remitters, most reporting entities kept fairly good records. 
5.35. On average across all industry sectors, 90% of reporting entities that lodged compliance reports to 
AUSTRAC to report their compliance with AML/CTF obligations in 2012 reported that they retain records 
of all customer identification information. While this proportion has improved over time, this suggests that 
some reporting entities (most likely the smaller ones) may not be meeting basic record keeping obligations 
fully.  
Other	Measures
Correspondent banking
5.36. Financial institution representatives did not highlight any major challenges or difficulties in instituting 
measures for correspondent banking under the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules. AUSTRAC identified very 
few breaches of correspondent banking obligations in 2013/14. Based on AUSTRAC’s understanding, financial 
institutions would adopt a risk-based approach to determine the extent of due diligence that is required with 
respect to correspondent banking. Interviews with the sector indicate that Australian rules on correspondent 
banking are being implemented. It should however be noted that the AML/CTF Act correspondent banking 
requirements are not in line with the FATF Standard; as a result the measures implemented by reporting 
entities may  not meet the FATF standard, even if they meet Australia’s requirements.
New	technologies
5.37. Sector representatives whom the assessors interviewed did not report particular difficulties in 
applying AML/CTF measures for new technologies. Before introducing a new designated service, delivery 
method or technology, larger reporting entities would typically conduct a product risk assessment that 
included ML/TF risk, and determine the controls needed to mitigate these risks. 
Wire transfer rules 
5.38. Sector representatives indicated that the information accompanying cross-border wire transfers 
seems to comply with Australian requirements. However, the Australian requirements are not in line with 
the FATF Standard. In some cases, especially with respect to large, international financial institutions, the 
information accompanying a wire transfer exceeds the Australian requirements and may be in line with 
the FATF Standards. Representatives for banks and remitters were aware of the Australian requirements 
regarding the filing of international funds transfer instructions (IFTI) reports with AUSTRAC.
Targeted	financial	sanctions	(TFS)
5.39. As noted under IO.10, reporting entities were generally aware of their obligations with respect to the 
DFAT sanctions lists. Under section 41 of the Charter	of	the	United	Nations	(Dealing	with	Assets)	Regulation	
2008 using a process agreed to by DFAT, the AFP, the Australian Bankers’ Association and major banks, 
reporting entities should contact AFP if there was a question about whether they had a match with the 
Consolidated List. Only a few reporting entities were aware that the AFP is the point of contact. However, it 
was universally reported by both the public and private sector that DFAT is responsible for enforcement of 
TFS and that reporting entities were not being monitored for compliance with TFS obligations. 
5.40. AUSTRAC’s role in relation to TFS is limited to its FIU activities – DFAT is a partner agency of 
AUSTRAC for these purposes. From a regulatory perspective, AUSTRAC would only have a role in monitoring 
the compliance with TFS obligations to the extent that an entity failed to lodge an SMR where it has formed 
a suspicion relevant to a breach of the laws related to TFS. In some limited instances during its regulatory 
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engagements, AUSTRAC has identified possible breaches of sanctions during its compliance assessments. In 
two instances, reporting entities were involved in sending transactions to sanctioned Iranian banks. Warning 
letters were issued by AUSTRAC in relation to these matters. Of the two instances, one entity ceased trading 
and closed accounts, and the second entity ceased the relationship with the Iranian bank. No further action 
was taken (by AUSTRAC). AUSTRAC has also taken sanctions matters into account in determining registration 
decisions related to particular remitters. 
Higher	risk	countries
5.41. Larger reporting entities that employ risk models usually use multiple data sources to assess 
jurisdiction risks, to a large extent based on their experience with foreign regulators. Based on AUSTRAC’s 
understanding, the FATF International Cooperation Review Group list of jurisdictions carries a significant 
weighting in such assessments. The outcomes of these risk assessments are used to guide their business and 
customer on-boarding decisions. Smaller entities with less sophisticated measures are likely to rely only on 
DFAT’s list and guidance to identify higher risk countries. 
Suspicious Transaction Reporting Obligations and Tipping Off
5.42. Reporting	obligations	are	generally	well	understood	by	FIs	and	DNFBPs	and	they	are	filing	
SMRs. As AUSTRAC is both the FIU and the AML/CTF regulator, reporting of SMRs and other reporting 
obligations such as IFTIs and TTRs (i.e. quality of the reporting) is often the focus of its engagement with 
financial institutions and DNFBPs. In this regard, the quality and volume appears to meet AUSTRAC’s 
expectations. Overall, the assessors felt that reporting entities were effectively implementing the SMR 
requirements.
5.43. On	the	other	hand,	the	number	of	recommendations	that	AUSTRAC	issued	to	reporting	entities	
to	remediate	reporting	obligations	is	the	second	highest	among	all	obligations	in	2013-14. This may 
be a result of AUSTRAC’s focus on reporting obligations and the IFTI obligation. Based on feedback gathered, 
the timeliness of SMR reporting varies according to reporting entities. It is also influenced by the complexity 
of the transactions and when a suspicion is formed. Some reporting entities, particularly the major financial 
institutions, will contact AUSTRAC and provide notice of an impending SMR that they consider a priority. 
Some financial institutions and remitters will reportedly contact law enforcement agencies before submitting 
an SMR to ensure that they are capturing and reporting adequate information. Private sector representatives 
also reported having good communication channels with AUSTRAC and other law enforcement agencies, and 
sharing of transaction details or records on an ad hoc basis to facilitate their investigations.
5.44. Universally, the private sector highlighted the need for information and more timely feedback from 
AUSTRAC and law enforcement agencies to improve their transaction monitoring systems for detecting ML 
and TF. Reporting entities specifically noted challenges in detecting TF in the absence of specific information, 
and putting in place effective measures to prevent them.  
5.45. With respect to the quality of reporting, AUSTRAC considers that most medium to large reporting 
entities provide sufficient information and context for the SMRs submitted. Missing information usually 
relates to insufficient detail on the subject of the report, but does not appear to have significant adverse 
impact on the relevance or value of the SMRs. Overall, the reports received by AUSTRAC – including SMRs, 
TTRs and IFTIs – form a fundamental pillar of financial intelligence (see also IO.6).
5.46. Reporting entities are aware of the prohibitions against tipping off and have included the provisions 
in their internal policies, controls and trainings. A number of the large, international REs noted that the scope 
of the tipping off provisions have required them to have exemptions from the global AML/CTF programmes, 
as notifying the parent or home office of the institutions about SMRs would violate the provisions. 
Internal AML/CTF Controls 
5.47. Reporting entities are aware of their requirement to have AML/CTF programmes – as outlined 
earlier under this IO – to ensure compliance with their obligations under the AML/CTF Act. They are also 
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aware of their obligation to submit compliance reports to AUSTRAC annually. REs reported having screening 
procedures when hiring new employees, ongoing training programmes and independent audit functions.  
5.48. Reporting entities that are headquartered outside Australia and subject to AML/CTF regulation and 
supervision elsewhere generally reported having benefitted from comparing and contrasting guidance and 
requirements imposed by their home or other host jurisdictions, and adapting sound or best practices and 
applying them to their Australian operations. As a result, a number of these entities are implementing internal 
controls in line with FATF Standards, even when the Australian requirements do not meet the standard. 
5.49. Reporting entities headquartered in Australia with cross-border operations include their overseas 
branches in their AML/CTF programmes. However, they reported that they have not extended their internal 
controls to their foreign subsidiaries, on the basis that they are separate legal entities from the Australian 
parent and because it is not a requirement under the Australian regulatory regime. It also appears that they 
have not adopted the more stringent of Australian or host jurisdiction rules in their group-wide AML/CTF 
framework on areas where host country requirements are stricter or more in line with FATF Standards. 
5.50. Due to confidentiality provisions in Australia laws, reporting entities are not permitted to share 
their SMR information and details with their overseas operations unless they are branch operations. This 
relates to both Australian headquartered as well as foreign entities operating in Australia. Private sector 
representatives reported to the assessors that this restriction has impeded the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their group-wide AML/CTF controls. However, assessors noted that Australia’s tipping off provision is in line 
with the FATF Standard. Authorities also note that reporting entities often share information with other parts 
of the REG about matters triggering alerts without sharing specific information that an SMR has been filed.
Overall	conclusions	on	Immediate	Outcome	4	
5.51. Australia exhibits some characteristics of an effective system for applying preventive measures in 
financial institutions and DNFBPs. In general, the major reporting entities and other high risk reporting 
entities subject to more regular supervisory engagement appear to have a reasonable understanding of ML/
TF risks and preventive measures that comply with the Australian AML/CTF regime. Reporting entities have 
demonstrated that they are aware of their requirement to have AML/CTF programmes and reported having 
implemented the necessary internal AML/CTF controls. However, a number of aspects of the AML/CTF regime 
– including those that relate to internal controls, wire transfers, correspondent banking, etc. – do not meet 
FATF Standards. As a result, reporting entities’ implementation of AML/CTF measures will not meet the FATF 
Standards if its internal controls are developed solely to meet the Australian requirements. In addition, while 
the requirements have been revised with respect to CDD and PEPs, none of the reporting entities reported 
they were able to fully implement these requirements at the time of the onsite. As a result, at the time of the 
onsite visit, reporting entities were working to transition from the pre-June 1 AML/CTF Rules, which were 
not in line with the FATF Standards. At the same time, a lot of reliance is placed on the banking and financial 
sector as gatekeepers due to the absence of AML/CTF regulation and requirement on key high-risk DNFBPs 
such as lawyers, accountants, real estate agents and trust and company service providers. As a result of these 
factors, the effectiveness of the preventive measures in the financial system as a whole and DNFBPs is called 
into question to some extent.
5.52. The	overall	rating	is	therefore	a	moderate	level	of	effectiveness	for	Immediate	Outcome	4.
5.4	 Recommendations	on	Preventive	Measures
5.53. The following recommendations are made on preventive measures (IO.4):
 Ensure that lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, precious stones dealers, and trust and company 
service providers understand their ML/TF risks, and implement effective AML/CTF obligations and 
risk mitigating measures in line with the FATF Standards. Among others, persons and entities in 
these sectors should be able to demonstrate that they are effectively refusing businesses on ML/TF 
grounds or when CDD is incomplete, in addition to their own business or reputation considerations. 
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In addition, they should be required to report suspected proceeds of crime and funds in support 
of terrorism to competent authorities in a swift manner. Last but not least, the effectiveness of 
the controls and measures that they put in place should be subject to sufficient monitoring and 
supervision to ensure compliance.
 Ensure that reporting entities implement preventive measures in line with the FATF Standards.
 Ensure that reporting entities implement as early as possible before 1 January 2016 the obligations 
on enhanced CDD, beneficial owner, and politically exposed persons introduced on 1 June 2014.
 Monitor and ensure that reporting entities headquartered in Australia with cross-border operations 
to ensure that their overseas branches and subsidiaries have effective AML/CTF programs and risk 
mitigation measures in place as required under the AML/CTF Act. 
  Improve the feedback and guidance to reporting entities on reporting quality and volumes of SMRs 
and reinforce this feedback loop into their ML/TF risk identification and the effectiveness of their 
AML/CTF programmes.
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6. SUPERVISION
Key	Findings
Licensing,	registration	and	other	controls	implemented	by	Australia	to	a	large	extent	adequately	
prevent	criminals	and	 their	associates	 from	entering	 the	 financial	 sector.	However, there are 
some questions about the effectiveness of these measures for remitters.
AUSTRAC has an insufficient understanding of the ML/TF risks of the individual reporting entities 
within reporting entity groups, which raises questions on the adequacy of how it selects individual 
reporting entities for compliance assessments.
AUSTRAC	 is	 good	 at	 promoting	 compliance,	 but	 does	 not	 focus	 sufficiently	 on	 effective	
supervision	 and	 enforcement	 of	 individual	 reporting	 entities’	 compliance	 with	 AML/CTF	
obligations	within	the	various	sectors. AUSTRAC allocates its limited supervisory resources to the 
reporting groups and/or entities it considers higher risk.
The	 majority	 of	 deficiencies	 identified	 by	 AUSTRAC	 through	 its	 compliance	 activities	 are	
voluntarily	 remediated	by	 reporting	 entities	based	on	 recommendations	 and	 requirements	
issued	by	AUSTRAC	after	an	assessment.	AUSTRAC	does	not	take	sufficient	enforcement	action	
to	ensure	compliance	by	industry.	
AUSTRAC	does	not	supervise	subsidiaries	of	Australian	reporting	entities	located	abroad nor 
maintain relationships with supervisory authorities where those subsidiaries operate, besides New 
Zealand.
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6.1	 Background	and	Context
6.1. Financial institutions are required to be licensed or registered with the APRA and/or the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). Casinos are licensed through State or Territory legislation and 
are supervised by the relevant State or Territory casino control authorities or gaming departments. Pubs and 
clubs are licensed at the State and Territory level. Remittance service providers, currency exchange businesses 
(bureaux	de	 change), licenced gaming operators and bullion dealers are required to register (enrol) with 
AUSTRAC. Other DNFBPs, like lawyers, precious stones dealers, real estate agents, accountants and trust 
and company service providers are not subject to AML/CTF requirements and are therefore not regulated or 
supervised for AML/CTF purposes.
6.2. AUSTRAC is responsible for monitoring the AML/CTF compliance of financial institutions and those 
DNFBPs that provide a ‘designated service’ under the AML/CTF Act. All providers of a designated service must 
enrol with AUSTRAC, and be entered on the Reporting Entities Role. This requirement provides AUSTRAC 
with visibility over the scope of the regulated population and assists AUSTRAC in exercising its supervisory 
function. The Compliance Branch of AUSTRAC is responsible for supervision. There are approximately 
40 employees directly contributing to supervision in the branch. AUSTRAC has 13 657 reporting entities 
under supervision. Staff are located in AUSTRAC’s offices in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. While the 
Brisbane office is about to be closed, the positions in this office have been maintained and moved to other 
offices. 
6.2	 Technical	Compliance	(R.26-28,	R.34,	R.35)
6.3. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation	26	(regulation	and	supervision	of	financial	institutions)	is	rated	partially	
compliant.
 Recommendation	27	(powers	of	supervisors)	is	rated	partially	compliant.	
 Recommendation	28	(regulation	and	supervision	of	DNFBPs)	is	rated	non-compliant.
 Recommendation	34	(guidance	and	feedback)	is	rated	largely	compliant.	
 Recommendation	35	(sanctions)	is	rated	partially	compliant.
6.3	 Effectiveness:	Immediate	Outcome	3	(Supervision)
Licensing, registration and enrolment
6.4. Licensing,	 registration	 and	 other	 controls	 implemented	 by	 Australia	 to	 a	 large	 extent	
adequately	prevent	criminals	and	their	associates	from	entering	the	financial	sector.	However,	there	
are	 some	questions	about	 the	effectiveness	of	 these	measures	 for	 remitters. Australia has a system 
of self-certification for fitness and propriety by financial institutions. This process may not be in line with 
the standards. Regarding their respective regulated financial sectors, APRA and ASIC perform a certain level 
of supervision of the adequacy of the assessment by the financial institutions of the fitness and propriety 
of all ‘responsible persons’ or ‘responsible managers’. Full background verifications are conducted on 
owners and controllers before issuing a licence. This assessment must be done prior to initial appointment 
and afterwards repeated on an annual basis. ASIC conducts probity checks with its overseas counterparts 
whereas the prudential regulator APRA does not have a direct role in such checks. APRA seeks comments 
and information on a basis of need where it is relevant rather than as a matter of course. Both APRA and ASIC 
are designated agencies under the AML/CTF Act and can directly access AUSTRAC’s systems for information 
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relevant to their supervisory and enforcement responsibilities. APRA and ASIC also engage with AUSTRAC 
Compliance Branch on matters of mutual interest. 
6.5. AUSTRAC’s approval process for registering as a RNP, affiliate or agent, or independent remittance 
dealer, provides AUSTRAC with the capacity to remove entities that pose an unacceptable risk of ML or TF 
from the system. AUSTRAC does not systematically sample criminal records checks at the time of registration. 
Applicants provide AUSTRAC with information relevant to the suitability of ‘key personnel’ such as criminal 
history and beneficial owner arrangements. Typically, AUSTRAC only reviews whether the criminal history 
check has been performed when an entity is known to be of concern to partner agencies. AUSTRAC may 
also conduct sample testing of criminal history checks performed by the remitter during examination. In 
addition, from time to time, AUSTRAC compares the key personnel of remitters on its register against criminal 
targeting lists of its partner agencies. An increasing number of actions have been undertaken by AUSTRAC 
including giving an infringement notice to a large multi-national remittance provider for providing services 
to unregistered affiliates. Given that remitters are considered to present high ML/TF risks, this process could 
be enhanced through more systematic validation of criminal history and beneficial owner arrangements. 
6.6. Licensing and due diligence checks on casino operators, key persons, and employees are governed 
and performed by State and Territory laws and regulators. The two major casinos are in New South Wales 
and Victoria. The Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority (ILGA), the casino regulator in New South Wales, 
conducts extensive due diligence to assess the suitability of the applicant and their associates to own and 
run a casino. These checks are also performed once every five years during the licence renewal process. 
The ILGA conducts police checks on many key personnel who work in casinos as required under the Casino 
Control Act 1992. In Victoria, similar periodic licence renewal due diligence is performed by the state casino 
regulator. The assessors understand that not all States and Territories have similarly strict laws for licensing, 
regular licence renewals and probity checks. This is a concern given the ML risk profile of casinos and the 
involvement of some in high profile ML cases.
	Risk	identification
6.7. AUSTRAC regulates entities at a group level as DBGs or REGs. Those reporting entities that are owned 
and controlled by a parent reporting entity within normal corporate group structures form a REG, e.g. one 
major bank has over 120 individual REs within its corporate structure. This includes every subsidiary in the 
group. As previously noted, the four largest banks in Australia are domestic and they dominate the financial 
sector; therefore they have been identified to be of high ML/TF risk and impact. In addition, given their 
heightened risk, remitters are also considered to be of greater materiality than other aspects of the financial 
sector. Under its risk-based approach1 AUSTRAC identifies and maintains an understanding of the ML and TF 
risks of these REGs and the individual reporting entities stemming from the results of the NTA regarding ML/
TF channels and risks, compliance assessment outcomes; engagement with peak industry associations and 
bodies; specific interest by and engagement with partner agencies; analysis of reported transactions; and 
strategic research and analysis of different crime types, including methods and vulnerabilities.  
6.8. AUSTRAC focuses on those corporate groups in sectors identified in the NTA as having a higher 
exposure and vulnerability to ML/TF. As mentioned before, these sectors are: domestic banks, foreign and 
investment banks, cash in transit operators (armoured car and cash delivery services), remitters, currency 
exchange businesses (bureaux de change) and casinos. While the authorities recognize the need to update the 
NTA, these sectors continue to remain particularly vulnerable. More recently, AUSTRAC has used information 
from its internal intelligence function and from partner agencies to focus to a large extent on the remittance 
sector, identified as high risk based on recent high profile examples of criminal exploitation and infiltration 
of the sector.
6.9. Important factors in identifying ML/TF risk at the REG and reporting entity level are volume and 
value of transaction reports (SMRs and IFTIs) as an indicator of the volume of funds flowing through an entity, 
and the size of an entity as a proxy measure of the number and type of customers, products, distribution 
1   Based on AUSTRAC’s Compliance	&	Enforcement	Tactical	Plan	2013-2014.
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channels and geographic reach. However,	it	has	not	been	made	sufficiently	clear	that	AUSTRAC,	when	
risk	profiling	REGs	or	individual	 reporting entities,	collects	and	uses	sufficient	information	necessary	
to	 adequately	 determine	 the	 level	 of	 inherent	 risk	 of	 the	 REG	 and	 individual	 	 reporting	 entities,	
beyond	the	information	from	transaction	reports. International standards on the risk-based approach 
require, for example, an insight into the level of inherent risk of entities under supervision, including the 
nature and complexity of products and services, business model, financial and accounting information, 
delivering channels, customer profiles, geographic location, countries of operation, etc. The assessors were 
of the view that AUSTRAC’s approach was not sufficiently nuanced to account for variance and risk between 
the reporting entities within a single REG and within and between sectors.
6.10. After selecting a REG and/or reporting entity for review, when AUSTRAC is planning for (on-site) 
assessments, it does take into account the detailed characteristics of the REG and/or reporting entity under 
review. AUSTRAC also has regard to its considerable data holdings and any information held by the FIU 
to inform the scope of the assessment. At this stage AUSTRAC requests and receives documentation from 
the entity or group of entities for detailed consideration prior to the review. Where particular issues are 
identified through a review of these materials, the scope of the assessment may be changed or expanded. 
Where customer identification records are to be sampled as part of the assessment, AUSTRAC focusses on 
assessing higher risk customer types as part of the assessment.  
Table	6.1.		Reporting	entities	in	high-risk	corporate	groups
Alternative remittance dealers (including affiliates) 4 960
Betting agencies 4
Bookmakers 4
Cash in transit operators 6
Casinos 12
Credit unions & building societies 3
Custodians 93
Domestic banks 44
Financial services intermediaries 58
Foreign & investment banks 54
Foreign exchange providers 15
Insurance product issuers 19
Non-AML regulated entities 6
Non-bank lenders & financiers 229
Non-bank wealth creation groups 3
Provider of purchased payment facilities 1
Precious metal trader 1
Pubs & clubs 38
Stock brokers 106
Superannuation fund trustees 45
Trustees of managed investment schemes 123
Grand Total 5 837
6.11. In 2013/14, AUSTRAC identified 230 high risk REGs, representing 5 837 Res or 43% of the total 
population of 13 657 reporting entities in Australia – including all affiliates of registered remittance network 
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providers. There are high-risk REGs in low-risk sectors because of relative risk factors. An incident relating to 
ML/TF may result in a reporting entity or REG that is not currently in the high-risk category for supervisory 
engagement being elevated into the high-risk group where, for example, an entity is identified by law 
enforcement. While REs from low-risk sectors that are large in comparison to their specific industry peers 
targeted for engagement by AUSTRAC, smaller reporting entities from these sectors which pose a higher ML/
TF risk due to other factors (like high-risk activities, geographical presence, concentration of high-risk clients, 
risks resulting from company culture and behaviour etc.) may see limited direct compliance engagement.
6.12. After determining ML/TF risk, AUSTRAC determines the level and type of engagement with a REG 
based on its compliance risk. This is based on the knowledge that most corporate groups have a centralised 
AML/CTF compliance function. Compliance risk is defined as the risk that an REG is non-compliant with its 
obligations under the AML/CTF Act. It is used to determine the level and type of engagement with an REG.
6.13. At the time of the on-site AUSTRAC advised the assessors that it had developed, but not implemented, 
a	comprehensive	 tool	 to	 identify	and	 track	compliance	risk	as	 the	residual	risk2. A compliance risk 
score sheet was being used that produces an indicator of compliance (which is the score) of the reporting 
entity or REG, based on a self-assessment by each reporting entity or REG’s compliance officer. Previous 
direct compliance engagements, information from the enrolment / remitter registration processes, and 
behaviour monitoring relative to industry peers are taken into account in determining compliance risk at the 
REG level. In addition, AUSTRAC has developed data mining techniques that scan its reporting database to 
identify reporting entities that display outlier behaviours compared to their industry peers. For example, this 
can be in the form of material change in reporting patterns or unusual reporting patterns.
6.14. To a certain extent, further threats and vulnerabilities are also considered through campaign-based 
activities, which are based largely on reports filed with AUSTRAC. Occasionally, campaign-based work can 
involve follow up on information received from partner agencies and/or through the media. Examples 
provided include the remittance sector, which is a known high risk sector, and the gaming sector.
Mitigating	risks	through	supervision	or	monitoring	compliance
6.15. With a view to mitigating the risks, AUSTRAC and other Australian regulators adopt a graduated 
approach to supervision. In AUSTRAC’s case this extends from low intensity (media articles, guidance, forums 
and presentations); through to moderate intensity (behavioural reviews, letter campaigns, desk reviews) and 
high intensity (onsite inspection, enforcement consideration, remedial direction, enforceable undertakings 
and civil penalties). This wide range of measures should allow AUSTRAC to implement tailored responses 
depending on the type of reporting entities and their inherent factors, such as their relative importance, their 
size, and the ML/TF risk they face, etc. In addition, AUSTRAC’s supervisory approach has been modified over 
time to take into account the stage of development of the Australian AML/CTF regime. Immediately after 
the implementation of AML/CTF regulation in Australia, AUSTRAC was primarily focused on engaging large 
proportions of the reporting population to educate them on their obligations and nurturing a compliance 
attitude following the implementation of the AML/CTF Act. Over time, this has developed into a more detailed 
assessment of reporting entities’ compliance with the substantive obligations of the AML/CTF Act. From 
July 2007 to June 2010 AUSTRAC undertook a combined total of 944 onsite inspections and desk reviews. 
As a result, over 3 362 requirements have been issued to reporting entities to remedy breaches of AML/
CTF obligations and 2 149 recommendations to improve systems, processes and practices. From July 2010 
to June 2014, AUSTRAC has since continued to escalate monitoring activities and, through campaigns aimed 
at different sectors, has issued a further 3 163 remediation requirements for breaches of obligations and 
1 605 recommendations to seek best practices from 1 152 on-site inspections and desk reviews. AUSTRAC 
succeeds	to	a	fair	extent	in	promoting	compliance	with	the	AML/CTF	requirements	among	the	sectors	
it	has	engaged. 
6.16. The	focus	of	supervision	is	targeting	high	risk	entities	for	enhanced	supervisory	activity	and	
to	test	the	effectiveness	of	REGs	/ reporting	entities’ systems	and	controls	in	practice. AUSTRAC focuses 
2   As of the face-to-face meeting, the tool had been fully implemented. 
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its supervisory resources on the 230 high risk REGs and reporting entities within these groups are subject 
to periodic on-site reviews under AUSTRAC’s risk-based supervision approach. Transactions through high-
risk REGs represent over 99% of the reported monetary value flowing in and out of Australia. A combined 
total of 317 reviews (59 on-site assessments or 258 desk reviews) to verify reporting entities’ AML/CTF 
effectiveness were conducted by AUSTRAC in 2012-13, of which fewer than 20% (in total 60; 32 on-site 
and 28 desk) were high-risk REGs / reporting entities. In 2013-14, the total number of reviews decreased 
to 165 reviews (62 on-site inspections and 103 desk-reviews) – but 99% were in high risk REGs/ reporting 
entities - following a shift in AUSTRAC’s compliance approach to better calibrate ML risks. Between 2010 
and 2014, 118 on-site inspections were conducted in high-risk groups as well as 163 desk-reviews. These 
numbers include thematic assessments. AUSTRAC periodically reviews multiple REGs against a particular 
AML/CTF obligation, for example, KYC, ongoing CDD and enhanced CDD. AUSTRAC may commence a thematic 
assessment based on the results of any compliance activity with a view to identifying and remedying any 
systemic breach of the AML/CTF Act or Rules. 
6.17. As shown in the table below (Detailed	Supervisory	actions	and	outcomes	for	2012	-14), 34 assessments 
have been performed in 2012/2013 on the banking sector, aimed at 12 groups, consisting of 303 individual 
REs and a further 20 individual reporting entities outside of a DBG. AUSTRAC considers that it assessed 
compliance in all 303 reporting entities on the basis of 15 onsite audits and 19 desk reviews.  AUSTRAC’s 
Standard Operating Procedures relating to the assessment of reporting entities’ AML/CTF program require 
supervisors to, in respect of each designated service, identify the risk reasonably faced by the reporting entity 
that provision of the service might (inadvertently or otherwise) involve or facilitate ML or TF (ML/TF risk) 
by reference to customer types, the type of designated service that is being provided, the methods by which 
the designated service is being delivered, and the foreign jurisdictions being dealt with. If the reporting entity 
forms part of a DBG, the supervisors should separately identify the ML/TF risk reasonably faced by each 
reporting entity in the group by reference to the designated services that each provides. Assessors question 
whether the way such assessment work is being done is sufficiently robust to assess compliance by the 303 
individual reporting entities.  
6.18. AUSTRAC is clearly able to assess the effectiveness of mitigation for those individual reporting 
entities of the group directly engaged during the assessment. However, assessors are not convinced that 
AUSTRAC holds sufficient information about the ML/TF risk profile of all reporting entities within REGs to 
be able to design each REG’s assessment work-plan such that the targeting and sampling used produces 
reliable results about compliance across the group. The assessors also consider that AUSTRAC’s recent focus 
on assessing compliance by remitters means that the number of banks targeted for the assessments is too 
low relative to that sector’s risk profile. This	makes	 it	 insufficiently	clear	 for	 the	assessment	team	to	
conclude	that	AUSTRAC’s	supervisory	response	is	adequately	adapted	to	the	ML/TF	risks. During the 
interviews with the private sector, representatives from the sector mentioned several times that they were 
under the impression that assessments undertaken since 2010 are still aimed primarily at assisting AUSTRAC 
in understanding the activities, entities, and REGs.  
Table	6.2.		AUSTRAC	AML/CTF	compliance	assessments	of	entities	in	High-Risk	Groups	 
between	2010-11	and	2014-15
On-site inspections –  
High-risk Groups / High-risk 
entities 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total
Hotels or clubs (gaming) 2 4 17 23
Domestic banks 5 5 6 6 22
Foreign and investment banks 2 1 6 9 1 19
Remittance service providers 3 6 4 1 14
Currency exchange dealers 1 3 5 9
Casinos 2 3 3 8
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Table	6.2.		AUSTRAC	AML/CTF	compliance	assessments	of	entities	in	High-Risk	Groups	 
between	2010-11	and	2014-15	(continued)
On-site inspections - 
High-risk Groups / High-risk 
entities
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total
Stockbrokers 2 4 6
Corporate bookmakers 1 4 5
Specialist credit providers 1 2 1 4
Bookmakers 2 2
Funds managers 2 2
Bullion dealers 1 1
Superannuation funds 1 1
Cash in transit operators 1 1
Precious metal traders 1 1
Insurers 1 1
Credit unions / building societies 1 1
Grand total 11 14 32 61 2 118
Desk reviews –  
High-risk Groups / High-risk 
entities 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total
Foreign and investment banks 5 8 12 25
Specialist credit providers 1 3 16 1 21
Domestic banks 11 5 3 1 20
Funds managers 2 4 11 17
Financial planners 1 13 14
Stockbrokers 2 1 10 13
Hotels or clubs (gaming) 1 12 13
Superannuation funds 3 1 7 11
Credit unions / building societies 1 4 2 7
Currency exchange dealers 2 3 5
Remittance service providers 1 4 5
Custodians 5 5
Cash in transit operators 3 1 4
Small bookmakers 2 2
Insurers 1 1 2
Casinos 1 1
Bullion dealers 1 1
Precious metal traders 1 1
Grand total 2 31 28 102 4 163
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Table	6.3.		Detailed	Supervisory	actions	and	outcomes	for	2012–14
Year Industry 
sector
N° of   
Assessments
Breakdown of reporting entities assessed
N° of DBGs 
(entities 
within DBG)
N° of 
individual 
entities
Desk review Onsite audit
2012-13
Banks 34 12 (303) 20 19 15
Gambling 194 3 (17) 191 176 18
Remitters 13 0 13 2 11
NBFS 76 10 (42) 66 61 15
TOTALS 317 25 (632) 290 258 59
2013-14
Banks 32 14 (159) 17 17 15
Gambling 41 8 (47) 48 15 26
Remitters 8 1 (3) 2 4 4
NBFS 87 19 (88) 55 70 17
TOTALS 168 42 (297) 122 106 62
NBFS:	Non-bank	financial	services	(securities,	life	insurance,	etc.)
6.19. AUSTRAC uses the annual compliance reports (ACR) tool, which reporting entities are required to 
submit under the AML/CTF Act, as an important tool for providing information on potential compliance or 
implementation issues and thematic assessments. It is comprised of an online questionnaire with fixed choice 
responses across 22 key question areas. Following the results of this exercise, further thematic analysis may 
be conducted in relation to the entities to assess the need for further escalation. AUSTRAC identified several 
problems regarding the current ACR; the usefulness has decreased over time as the ACR was designed in a 
time when AUSTRAC was more focused on implementing AML/CTF programs rather than ML/TF risk and 
ongoing compliance. As a result, the ACR now provide limited visibility over the maturity and effectiveness 
of reporting entities’ AML/CTF programs. AUSTRAC is in the process of reviewing the format of the reports.
6.20. The duration of the overall reporting entity’s on-site assessment process (from pre on-site preparation 
to post on-site follow-up) lasts from several weeks to several months. The actual on-site components are 
short (in general 1-2 days at most for nearly all financial institutions, which follows a much longer off-site 
preparation). In line with the risk-based approach, medium and low risk  reporting entities are not part of the 
aforementioned cycle, but can be involved in assessments through campaign based work (for example, the 
clubs and pubs in 2013-14 and through ACRs based on self-assessment disclosure) or can be targeted for an 
assessment based on other factors.
6.21. As noted under IO.10, there is no systematic monitoring of compliance with the international and 
autonomous sanctions regimes. During its reviews, AUSTRAC periodically uncovers issues of non-compliance, 
and primarily refer the matters to DFAT which has responsibility for the sanctions regimes. 
Remedial actions and sanctions
6.22. AUSTRAC’s enforcement strategy is based on its Compliance	 &	 Enforcement	 Tactical	 Plan	 2013-
14 and focusses on ‘fixing the problem’ before sanctioning. In	 most	 cases,	 deficiencies	 identified	 by	
AUSTRAC	 through	 its	 compliance	 activities	 are	 remediated	 by	 reporting	 entities	 according	 to	 the	
recommendations	and	requirements	issued	by	AUSTRAC	after	an	assessment.	
6.23. When	AUSTRAC	determines	that	it	is	necessary	to	use	its	formal	enforcement	powers	under	
the	AML/CTF	Act, the sanctioning instrument used most often is the Enforceable Undertaking (EU). An EU is 
a written undertaking that is enforceable in a court and is used where there has been a contravention of the 
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AML/CTF Act, the regulations or the AML/CTF Rules. The EU is mutually agreed by the reporting entity and 
the AUSTRAC CEO. The AUSTRAC CEO may accept an undertaking that a person will comply with the AML/
CTF requirements, take specified action, refrain from taking specified action, and/or take specified action 
towards not contravening, or being likely to contravene the requirements in the future. Copies of each EU are 
published on AUSTRAC’s website.
6.24. AUSTRAC	issues	around	five	enforcement	actions	each	year	which	is	assessed	as	low	compared	
to	 the	 total	number	of reporting	entities	and	not	 commensurate	with	 the	 severity	of	 findings	and	
control	deficiencies	that	it	found	in	the	reporting	entities	through	its	supervisory	processes. EUs have 
been used 14 times since 2008. Eleven cases were based on AUSTRAC’s own compliance assessment, one on 
a voluntary breach reporting, one on referral from APRA, and one on referral from AUSTRAC’s intelligence 
function. Sectors involved were the banking sector (two EUs), remitters (five EUs) and hotels with gaming 
activities (seven within one REG). AUSTRAC has only applied financial sanctions in one case, related to the 
failure of a remittance provider to register its affiliates. No financial sanctions have ever been applied for 
non-compliance with AML/CTF obligations relating to preventive measures. The number of enforcement 
actions and the subjects of these actions do not convincingly demonstrate that reporting entities are subject 
to effective and proportionate sanctions. Reporting entities met by the team confirmed the absence of a 
deterrent effect of measures taken by AUSTRAC. Remediation work for large entities is dissuasive to the 
concerned reporting entity (considering the volume and cost of remediation work, as remediation actions 
are reviewed by external third parties, such as consultancy firms). Remediation actions are not made public 
by AUSTRAC.
Table	6.4.		Summary	of	AUSTRAC	enforcement	actions	from	2008-09	-	2013-14
Enforcement action 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Infringement notices (section 184) - - - - - 1
Enforceable undertakings (section 197) 1 3 7 (one RE 
Group)
1 1 1
Remedial direction (section 191) - 1 1 1 - -
Notices to appoint an authorised 
external auditor (section 162)
- 7 (one RE 
Group)
- 1 - -
Total 1 11 8 3 1 2
6.25. Within the remittance sector, AUSTRAC has refused, cancelled, suspended or placed conditions 
on the registration of a number of remitters as a means of reducing the ML/TF risk posed by the sector. 
The AUSTRAC CEO has refused the registration of 7 applicants; imposed conditions on 17 registrations; 
suspended the registration of 2 persons; and cancelled the registration of 8 persons.  In addition, as a result 
of AUSTRAC’s enquiries, 9 persons have voluntarily removed themselves from the register and 5 persons 
have withdrawn their applications to be registered.
Demonstrating effect on compliance 
6.26. AUSTRAC	was	unable	to	convince	assessors	that	its	supervisory	activities	had	a	demonstrable	
effect	on	compliance	by	individual reporting entities that	were	not	subject	to	onsite	or	offsite	engagement. 
While AUSTRAC’s outreach activities promote an awareness of AML/CTF obligations, assessors were not 
satisfied that its approach to on- and off-site supervision and enforcement action had a demonstrable effect 
on compliance by reporting entities. This was particularly notable among REs that AUSTRAC had limited 
direct engagement with or had not inspected. Since the compliance risk tool (as a tracking mechanism) was 
not yet implemented at the time of the onsite, AUSTRAC has advised the team that it does	not	have	 full	
insight	into	the	effect	of	its	supervisory	activities	on	compliance	by	sectors,	 reporting entities or	REGs. 
At this stage, effectiveness can be shown based on the results of EUs; the cover ratio regarding reviews of 
high risk groups (approximately 40% per year); the outcome of ACRs (self-assessment disclosure) regarding 
individual REGs and/or individual  reporting entities; and the volume of SMR reports and other types of 
reporting provided by the REGs to AUSTRAC. The ACRs through self-disclosure are however – as mentioned 
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before - past their expiry date and AUSTRAC is reviewing their use and content with the aim of gaining a 
better insight in risk identification and classification by reporting entities. The assessors were of the view 
that the majority of these metrics on the adequacy of  reporting entities’ controls and AML/CTF compliance 
are based on attestations from the  reporting entities, with insufficient work done to independently verify 
these assertions. 
Promoting a clear understanding of AML/CTF obligations and ML/TF risks
6.27. Promoting awareness of AML/CTF obligations is a key priority for AUSTRAC. This is reflected 
by the fact that one of the statutory functions of the AUSTRAC CEO is ‘to advise and assist the reporting 
entities in relation to their obligations under this Act, the AML/CTF Rules and regulations’. In	its	function	
as	regulator	and	supervisor,	AUSTRAC	engages	with	the	sector	through	consultation	and	explanation	
of	 the	 AML/CTF	 obligations	 through	 several	 mechanisms,	 including through the development and 
dissemination of information and guidance materials (including e-learning), regular industry forums and 
consultation processes, and the AUSTRAC Help Desk. The main guidance issued is the AUSTRAC Compliance 
Guide. Remittance	businesses	have	been	provided	with	broad	information	on	AML/CTF	obligations,	
including	registration	requirements.	Their	application	in	practice	seems	however	to	be	challenging,	
especially as it relates to smaller, unaffiliated remitters. This challenge is not unique to Australia. 
6.28. Materials	 and	other	 information	 on	ML/TF	 risks	 are	 limited	 and	 somewhat	 outdated. The 
private sector indicated that there’s a need for AUSTRAC to further develop its understanding of ML/TF risks 
regarding several sectors (including the banking sector) and regarding activities of individual  reporting 
entities in order to better promote a clear understanding of ML/TF risks, not only of AML/CTF obligations. 
Reporting entities unanimously desire to obtain more feedback on reported SMRs to guide them in their 
further work in identifying relevant ML/TF risks in Australia, and stated that the feedback provided was too 
general and outdated to be useful.
6.29. At the time of the onsite, reporting entities had mixed views about the usefulness of AUSTRAC’s 
guidance. While many found it helpful, they expressed reservations about its complexity and timeliness of 
its updates. AUSTRAC addressed these issues shortly after the onsite by redesigning its website and issuing 
the Compliance Guide which provides comprehensive guidance on reporting entities’ AML/CTF obligations.
Overall	conclusion	on	Immediate	Outcome	3
6.30. AUSTRAC relies heavily on varying forms of reporting (i.e. SMRs and IFTIs) and unverified self-
reporting of compliance to determine reporting entity risks; other risk factors should be considered and 
AUSTRAC supervisory practice should extend to more individual reporting entities. AUSTRAC’s approach 
does not seem sufficiently nuanced to adequately account for the risks of individual reporting entities in a 
REG. More generally, AUSTRAC’s graduated approach to supervision does not seem to be adequate to ensure 
compliance. No monetary penalties for violations of the AML/CTF preventive measure obligations have ever 
been pronounced. Rather, AUSTRAC had applied sanctions to a limited extent in the form of enforceable 
undertaking, which amounts to – among other things – a formal agreement that the reporting entities will 
comply with AML/CTF requirements. The assessors concluded that the use of sanctions for non-compliance 
has had minimal impact on ensuring compliance among reporting entities not directly affected by the sanction. 
The private sector shared similar views about the depth, breadth, and effectiveness of the supervisory regime. 
In addition, there is no appropriate supervision or regulation of most higher-risk DNFBPs because they are 
not subject to AML/CTF requirements. Overall, the authorities were unable to demonstrate improving AML/
CTF compliance by REs or that they are successfully discouraging criminal abuse of the financial and DNFBP 
sectors. 
6.31. The	overall	rating	is	therefore	a	moderate	level	of	effectiveness	for	Immediate	Outcome	3.
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6.4	 Recommendations	on	Supervision
6.32. The following recommendations are made to Australia on supervision (IO.3):
 Keep the inherent risk picture of domestic markets and sector(s) up to date.  
  Incorporate more (inherent) risk factors besides data analysis from filed reports into identifying 
and assessing the risk of reporting entities.
 Focus more on the assessment of the effectiveness of the application of the controls at the individual 
reporting entity level, instead of on the assessment of the design of (parts of) the AML/CTF 
programmes on a group level.
 Australia should take comprehensive measures to ensure financial institutions are actively 
supervised for implementation of DFAT lists. As the AML/CTF regulator, this supervision may 
appropriately align with responsibilities of AUSTRAC, although additional compliance staff would be 
required. DFAT and AUSTRAC should work closely together in promoting compliance with sanctions 
regimes (both obligations and risks).
 AUSTRAC should consider opportunities to further utilise its formal enforcement powers to promote 
further compliance by reporting entities through judicious use of its enforcing authority. Australia 
should make the corresponding changes to its legal framework for AUSTRAC, where necessary, to 
enable this. In relation to remitters, the regulatory oversight of self-certification should be reinforced 
or enhanced. 
 Enhance the utility and timeliness of feedback provided to  reporting entities on the SMR reporting 
to enable them to better understand the real ML/TF risks of their activities;
 AUSTRAC’s supervision should extend to subsidiaries of Australian reporting entities located 
abroad and establish supervisor relationships with the supervisory authorities in the countries 
where these entities operate.
 Extend the supervision of the DNFBPs for AML/CTF compliance beyond casinos and bullion dealers 
to include services offered by other DNFBPs – real estate agents, other precious metals and stones 
dealers, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants, and trust and 
company service providers.
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7. LEGAL	PERSONS	AND	ARRANGEMENTS
Key	Findings
Australia	has	not	conducted	a	formal	risk	assessment	on	TF	risks	associated	with	legal	persons	
and	arrangements. The majority of legal persons are registered with ASIC (federal) while others 
with State or Territory authorities. While the information seems to be largely available to competent 
authorities and to the public, very limited verification is conducted on the registration information. 
Hence,	there	is	no	certainty	that	information	maintained	on	legal	persons	is	accurate	or	up-to-
date. The same conclusion applies to the Australian Business Register maintained by the ATO.
In	most	cases,	registration	is	carried	out	by	a	third	party	(i.e.	lawyers,	accountants	or	trust	and	
company	service	providers)	not	subject	to	AML/CTF	obligations.	
Trustees	 are	 not	 required	 to	 maintain	 adequate,	 accurate	 and	 current	 information	 on	 the	
settlor,	trustee,	protector,	beneficiaries,	etc.	of	a	trust. Nor are they explicitly required to disclose 
their status. 
Information	on	the	beneficial	owner	of	legal	persons	and	legal	arrangements	is	not	maintained	
and	accessible	to	competent	authorities	in	a	timely	manner.
Some	information	on	shareholders	is	available	(on first rank shareholders only, but does not extend 
to the beneficial owner as defined by the FATF), which may themselves be other legal persons. Public 
company share registries are required to collect information on whether shares are held beneficially 
or not. Information on proprietary companies is collected through the Australian Business Register. 
Law enforcement agencies advised that access to companies’ registers was not timely due to obstacles 
posed by lawyers. 
Some	measures	have	been	 taken	 to	mitigate	 the	 risks	 posed	by	nominee	 shareholders	 and	
directors	but	they	are	insufficient	to	address	other	risks. 
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7.1	 Background	and	Context
(a)	 Overview	of	legal	persons
7.1. The types of legal persons that can be established or created in Australia are: proprietary companies; 
public non-listed companies; public listed companies; incorporated and limited partnerships; incorporated 
associations; and cooperatives.
7.2. Australia reports that in 2012-13 there were more than 2 million registrations with ASIC, including 
1 990 551 proprietary companies; 21 690 public companies; and 3 324 foreign companies. Incorporated and 
limited partnerships, incorporated associations and cooperatives are registered at State or Territory level. 
The number of registrations by jurisdiction are listed below.
Table	7.1.		Number	of	legal	person	registrations	by	jurisdiction
State /  
Territory
Incorporated 
Associations 
– New
Incorporated 
Associations – 
Total
Registered 
Cooperatives 
– New
Registered 
Cooperatives 
- Total
Limited 
Partnerships – 
New
Limited 
Partnerships – 
Total
New South 
Wales
Data not 
available
36 037
(as at 30 June 
2013)
121 (as at 30 
June 2013)
617
(as at 30 June 
2013)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Victoria 1 695
(2013-14)
39 883 
(2013-14)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
29
(2013-14)
271
(2013-14)
Queensland 1 081
(2012-13)
23 631 
(as at 30 June 
2013)
4
(2012-13)
182
(as at 30 June 
2013)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Australian 
Capital 
Territory
93
(2013-14)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Tasmania 165
(2012-13)
3 591
(as at 30 June 
2013)
Data not 
available
27
(as at 30 June 
2013)
Data not 
available
122
(as at 30 June 
2013)
South 
Australia
380
(2012-13)
19 770
(as at 30 June 
2013)
0
(2012-13)
56
(as at 30 June 
2013)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Northern 
Territory
20
(2012-13; 
includes 
unincorporated 
associations)
535
(2012-13; 
includes 
unincorporated 
associations)
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Western 
Australia
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
Data not 
available
7.3. The New South Wales (NSW) Department of Fair Trading registers incorporated and limited 
partnerships, incorporated associations and cooperatives. There are approximately 36 037 associations; 
149 limited partnerships, 121 incorporated partnerships and 617 cooperatives registered in NSW. Some 
information on the number of entities registered in other States and Territories was also provided. NSW is 
expected to have the largest number of entities registered in each category of legal persons registered
7.4. As described below and in the TC Annex, proprietary companies, public non-listed companies, public 
listed companies, incorporated limited partnerships, and incorporated associations must register with ASIC. 
Incorporated and limited partnerships, incorporated associations and cooperatives are at State or Territory 
level. ASIC and the relevant State or Territory authorities maintain a number of registers that relate to legal 
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persons. They are available to competent authorities and to the public (possibly subject to the payment of a 
fee) and allow for several types of searches. 
7.5. In addition to these registers, the ATO maintains a register of the businesses (i.e. any type of legal 
persons and arrangements) holding an Australian Business Number (ABN). Holding an ABN is compulsory for 
businesses that are required to register for the goods and services tax (GST). Australia also advised that there 
is a significant incentive for businesses which are not required to have an ABN to register for one, as other 
businesses are required to withhold 46.5% of the value of the invoice when paying charges to businesses 
without an ABN. 
7.6. Some specific sectors, such as the non-profit and alternative remittance sectors, are subject to 
additional regulation which applies to all entities operating within these sectors, regardless of the type of 
legal persons and arrangements.
(b)	 Overview	of	legal	arrangements
7.7. Trust law in Australia is governed primarily by common law at the State and Territory level. States 
and Territories also have statutes which impose additional obligations on trustees and a trust’s constituent 
elements. The federal Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) applies in addition to trust law when a trustee 
is a corporate entity; and if the trust receives income, it is subject to federal tax laws and must lodge an annual 
tax return with the ATO. In doing so, information about trustees and in some cases beneficiaries is disclosed 
and recorded by the ATO.
7.8. Australia does not have a central registry of trusts although the Australian Business Register (ABR), 
hosted by the ATO, records information for a significant number of trusts. Some information on trusts holding 
a tax file number is recorded by the ATO but is limited to trusts registered with the ATO. As of 30 September 
2014, approximately 802 700 trusts lodged a tax return for the 2011–12 income year and over 768 000 trusts 
lodged tax returns for the 2012/13 income year. The ABR indicated that the number of trusts registered as of 
30 June 2013 was over 991 000 trusts. There is no estimate of the total number of trusts existing in Australia.
(c) International context for legal persons and arrangements
7.9. Australia’s political and economic stability is attractive to foreign investment. Australia requires that 
at least one corporate director resides in Australia. 
7.10. In 2009, Project Mercury investigated risks or vulnerabilities arising from the lack of transparency 
in the ownership of Australian securities. The primary focus was offshore ownership and Custodial Service 
Provider (CSP) and nominee company arrangements. It found that:
 Approximately 40% of the ASX (Australia Securities Exchange) market was owned by foreign 
entities, and
 Approximately 47% of the ASX market was held by CSPs and nominee companies.
7.11. These characteristics of the ownership of ASX securities were not in themselves cause for concern, 
provided effective controls and measures for accessing information are in place. Indeed, foreign investment 
is essential to the Australian economy. Further, CSPs and nominee companies play an important role for 
investors in helping them to maintain a level of public anonymity, as well as providing flexibility in their 
investment options.
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7.2	 Technical	Compliance	(R.24,	R.25)
7.12. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation	 24	 (transparency	 and	 beneficial	 ownership	 of	 legal	 persons)	 is	 rated	
partially	compliant.	
 Recommendation	25	(transparency	and	beneficial	ownership	of	legal	arrangements)	is	rated	
non-compliant. 
7.3	 Effectiveness:	Immediate	Outcome	5	(Legal	Persons	and	Arrangements)
Risk and transparency of legal persons and legal arrangements
7.13. Australia has assessed the threat of ML through corporate vehicles and other legal persons in the NTA 
and, in the context of organised crime, in the sanitised version of the ACC’s biennial OCTA (Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment in Australia). The NTA made a distinction between corporate entities that can be used to 
conceal crime wealth and ownership, and public companies where shares can be purchased using proceeds 
of crime. The first scenario was given a high threat rating; the second a medium threat rating. The two threat/
risk levels over the next three years was assessed as being stable, although there will be an increasing use of 
legal persons and arrangements by organised crime and an increased use of foreign legal entity structures. 
During the on-site visit to Australia, the different stakeholders advised that they shared the conclusions of the 
NTA with respect to legal persons and arrangements. The sanitised version of the NRA on TF risk does not 
formally assess the risk of TF through legal persons. Nevertheless, Australia does have some understanding 
of TF risks associated with legal persons as a result of the NTA in which TF, as a predicate crime to ML, 
was examined. This understanding flows into the NRA where TF through legal persons is referenced by case 
examples and red flag indicators, although not formally rated with a risk rating.    
7.14. Prior to the NTA, in 2009 Project Mercury (a sub-project of Project Wickenby) investigated the 
risks and vulnerabilities arising from the lack of transparency in the ownership of Australian securities. The 
primary focus was on the following: (1) offshore ownership, (2) custodial service providers and (3) nominee 
company arrangements. However, no specific assessment of the ML and TF risks associated with numbered 
companies, shelf companies, foreign owned domestic companies and companies incorporated in high risk 
jurisdictions subsequently registered in Australia has been undertaken.
7.15. Following the assessment of ML risks associated with legal persons and legal arrangements in the 
NTA, some improvements to the ABR were made to address the general identified risk requiring the collection 
of information on associates and trustees for new registrations from December 2013. In addition, as a result 
of Project Mercury, some typologies and case studies following on from that project supported general CDD 
enhancements in recent 2014 measures.
7.16. Apart from the general information in the NTA, no other risks specific to the trusts were raised by the 
Australian authorities. However, it was acknowledged that the authorities have encountered difficulties, in 
particular, to access information on foreign trusts established in jurisdictions such as the Cook Islands, Jersey, 
and Panama, and other off-shore trust jurisdictions. They further advised that the difficulties encountered 
with certain jurisdictions are limited thanks to a good cooperation with key partners. It is however planned 
to improve the ABN register held by the ATO and to computerise the register held by the NSW Department 
of Fair Trading.
Nominee	shareholders	and	nominee	directors
7.17. As described in the TC Annex, nominee shareholders may hold shares for the benefit of another 
natural or legal person. Under the Corporations Act, nominee shareholders are required to advise the company 
that shares are held “non-beneficially” which must be recorded in the company register. Failure to comply 
with this requirement is an offence under the Corporations Act (section 1311(1); and Schedule 3) (i.e. a fine 
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of 5 penalty units or AUD 850). If the offence is committed by a body corporate, the fine may be increased 
by up to 5 times the maximum amount. Further sanctions apply if the shareholder fails to comply with their 
obligations in relation to any beneficial tracing notice issued to it. Australia has partially addressed issues 
with nominee shareholders using ASIC powers to trace beneficial owners of shares, but only for publicly 
listed entities. 
7.18. The appointment of nominee directors (“alternate directors”) must be notified to ASIC within 28 
days. Failure to notify such a nomination is sanctioned by a fine (approx. AUD 10 000) and/or one year 
imprisonment. While the sanction is appropriate to the risk of nominee directors being appointed to conceal 
control of corporate entities, no fines under this provision have ever been applied. 
Basic information 
7.19. ASIC holds a number of on-line registers, including: 
1.	 the company register, containing approximately 2 million registrations at the time of the 
on-site visit; 
2.	 the national business register; 
3. the register for AFSL holders; and 
4. the register for liquidators and company auditors. 
7.20. When registering, companies are required to provide certain information, including the company 
details (name, type, address of the registered office, etc.), the names and addresses of the directors and 
secretaries and the share structure. Although rarely seen, bearer share warrants may nevertheless be issued 
by Australian companies incorporated under the Corporations Act, but there are no measures in place to 
identify the holder of the beneficial owner of those instruments.
7.21. The company register contains the following information: 
 name of the company; 
 unique identification number (ABN,  Australian Company Number [ACN], Australian Registered 
Business Number [ARBN], or Australian Registered Scheme Number (ARSN)); 
  type of company; 
 date of registration; 
 date of the next annual review; 
 address of registered office, and 
  the list of documents lodged with ASIC. 
7.22. This information is available to competent authorities. Basic information is accessible to the public 
online. Other information, such as current or historical extracts, roles and relationship extracts or copies of 
certain documents lodged with ASIC, is available to competent authorities as well as to the public for a small 
fee.
7.23. While ASIC does checks to ensure substantial compliance with lodgement obligations, it conducts 
only limited accuracy of information checks. Examples are (1) checks against Australia Post Files to ensure 
addresses are valid physical addresses if required, and (2) checks of new officeholder names against 
bankruptcy records held by the Australian Financial Security Authority. No key information verification, 
including checks on criminal records or terrorist lists, is conducted. ASIC advised that if the registration 
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contains suspicious elements or raises suspicion, more verification would be undertaken but that such a 
situation is very rare.
7.24. Companies are required to notify ASIC within specified timeframes (generally 28 days or less) about 
a change of registered office, principal place of business, its member register, its share structure, directors 
or secretaries, including in their personal details. Failure to notify is sanctioned by a fine of 60 penalty units 
(AUD 10 200) and/or one year imprisonment.
7.25. ASIC also conducts an annual review of each of the companies registered. The review occurs at 
the anniversary date of the registration. Companies are required to review and as necessary update their 
information and to provide a solvency declaration. Along with the annual review, companies also have to pay 
the annual review fee, which helps to identify companies that have changed address or that have ceased their 
activities. However, ASIC advised that it does not have the resources for proactive searches and verifications. 
ASIC may also require a company at any time to respond to a return of particulars (section 348A of the 
Corporations Act) if there is a suspicion that recorded information is incorrect.
7.26. ASIC advised that 80 to 95% of the companies registered were registered online by a third party. 
These third parties can be lawyers or accountants, but a large majority of the companies are registered by 
trust and company service providers specialising in companies’ registration. In addition to registration, trust 
and company service providers also set up trust and self-managed funds. They justified the high level of 
reliance on third parties for companies’ registration by the fact that they are specialised in this activity and are 
aware of any obstacle in the registration process. Moreover, most trust and company service providers have 
direct access to ASIC and ASIC’s registers, which ensures a timely registration. Trust and company service 
providers met during the onsite also advised that the large majority of their clients are not the companies 
themselves, but lawyers and accountants acting on the behalf of their clients. Once registered, companies 
can still rely on trust and company service providers to fulfil the companies’ obligations vis-à-vis ASIC. This 
includes the notification of any changes affecting the company or the response to the annual review and the 
payment of the annual fee. These elements (the fact that companies’ registration businesses do not know who 
their clients are and provide services after the registration) raise concerns as to the veracity and accuracy of 
the information recorded in ASIC registers and potential misuse of companies for ML/TF purposes. Neither 
trust and company service providers nor lawyers or accountants are subject to AML/CTF obligations. 
7.27. Registers are maintained by State and Territory authorities in relation to the creation of incorporated 
and limited partnerships, incorporated associations and cooperatives. From discussions that the assessment 
team had with the New South Wales (NSW) Department of Fair Trading, it appears that the obligations on 
partnerships, associations and cooperatives are similar to those of companies registered by ASIC, including 
with respect to the notification of changes affecting them. Certain basic information is available to competent 
authorities and to the public for a small fee. It should be noted that access to the registries is currently being 
improved through a computerisation project. As with ASIC, the NSW Department of Fair Trading takes the 
registration information it receives on face value and does not conduct any specific accuracy verification. 
Accordingly information in State and Territory registers may not be accurate or up-to-date. 
7.28. Apart from the registers held for the different types of legal persons, the ATO also maintains the ABR, 
which gathers information on the natural persons, legal persons and arrangements that have an ABN. In total 
there are over 7.5 million ABN holders registered in the ABR. 
7.29. The ABR contains information on individuals, companies, government agencies, partnerships, 
trusts and superannuation funds. The ABR contains information on the ABN holder; however in case of 
companies, there is no comparison / cross-verification with the data held by ASIC on a specific company. 
There is, however, verification of company number and company name, but no cross-referencing of director 
or secretary information. ABN holders are required to notify the ATO of any relevant change; in case of failure 
to notify changes within the set period, sanctions similar to those mentioned above for failure to notify ASIC 
apply. In 2013-14, 3.8 million updates were made to the ABR. The ATO advised that only a few companies are 
picked up every year for a review of their information. The ABR is available to competent authorities and to 
the public. Numerous searches are made every year; however only limited information on the ABN, state of 
operation, legal name and business name, and date of registration, is available to the public. The ATO advised 
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that it has a project to improve the ABR and implement expanded automated processes, including for the 
verification of the information provided.
7.30. With respect to legal arrangements, there is no obligation for trustees to maintain basic information 
on the trust. Australia relies on the obligation to identify customers that are legal arrangements, which apply 
to reporting entities to get basic information on legal arrangements. As described under IO.4 and in the TC 
Annex, this obligation is overall in line with the FATF Standards. While the measures were introduced on 
1 June 2014, entities have a transition period until 31 December 2015. Moreover, this mechanism will only 
be available for trusts with relationships with financial institutions, because trust and company service 
providers, lawyers, and accountants who create the trusts do not have AML/CTF obligations.
Beneficial	ownership	information
7.31. Under section 169 of the Corporations Act, companies are required to hold a register of members 
(shareholders) containing each member’s name and address, date on which the member was issued shares, 
the number and class of shares held, and date of issuance. This information relates to legal, not beneficial, 
ownership. However, for publicly listed entities, the register must also include information disclosed in the 
context of the ASIC’s power to trace beneficial ownership of shares (Corporations Act, Part 6C.2). Under this 
article, ASIC may direct a member of a publicly listed company, a person having a relevant interest or having 
given instructions about voting shares, to disclose the detail of his/her interest in the shares, information 
about the acquisition or disposal of the shares, the exercise of the voting rights or any other matters relating 
to the shares. Any information received by the company in this context must be recorded. There are no 
equivalent powers in relation to non-list companies. Law enforcement agencies met in Australia recognised 
that companies’ registers are a good source of information on beneficial ownership, but also expressed 
frustration about how long it can take to trace such information, exacerbated if structures are complex and 
involve foreign shareholders, the use of front persons or trusts that mask the ultimate beneficial owner, or 
both. 
7.32. For listed companies, section 672DA of the Corporations Act provides that “relevant interests” in 
shares (securities) must be disclosed; “relevant interest” is defined in section 608 as meaning, amongst other 
things, an interest “however remote” and can include beneficial interests as contemplated by the meaning of 
beneficial owner in the Glossary to the FATF Methodology.
7.33. ASIC registers contain information on the share structure, including for companies limited by shares 
the number and class of shares each member and for unlimited companies, information on the issue of shares, 
as well as membership details. The ATO registers also contain information on 20 key shareholders (regardless 
of whether they are natural or legal persons) as well as on the trustee, the settlor and the beneficiaries of a 
trust. The ABR holds information on the 20 key shareholders of private companies, registered from December 
2013 and trustees and beneficiaries for closely held trusts registered from December 2013. The ABR is 
governed by the A	New	Tax	System	(Australian	Business	Number)	Act 1999. These measures mitigate to some 
extent the ML and TF risks identified in the NTA. 
7.34. With respect to beneficial ownership, law enforcement advised that the best source of information is 
reporting entities. This entails that law enforcement knows which reporting entity has a business relationship 
with the legal person or arrangement at stake, and that the legal person or arrangement has established a 
business relationship with a reporting entity. As mentioned above, reporting entities are since 1 June 2014 
required to identify the beneficial owner of their clients and to take reasonable measures to verify their 
identity consistent with Recommendation 10. However, entities have a transition period until 31 December. 
The quality of the information held by reporting entities is therefore questionable. Furthermore, reporting 
entities met during the onsite visit to Australia advised that they currently fulfil their obligation with respect 
to beneficial owners through the consultation of public registers, such as ASIC registers. In addition, as 
mentioned, TCSPs, lawyers, and accountants are not reporting entities. 
7.35. Special measures for listed companies: ASIC or a listed company may issue a tracing notice in relation 
to holdings in the listed company (section 672A of Corporations Act). In practice, there are a number of 
businesses that issue beneficial tracing notices on behalf of listed companies and it is common for this to 
occur. In most instances, ASIC will not be involved as the listed company will do this work and the responses 
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from these notices must be publicly available (section 672DA of Corporations Act). Third parties can also 
request ASIC to issue a tracing notice. Disclosure in response to a tracing notice must be made within two 
days, and failing to respond to a tracing notice is a strict liability offence with penalty up to 25 penalty units 
(AUD 4 250) and/or six months imprisonment. ASIC is infrequently approached by companies seeking ASIC 
involvement where there has been a failure to comply with a beneficial tracing notice sent by a listed company 
or responsible entity of a listed management investment scheme. There are also obligations under tax law for 
declaring trustee status in tax returns. 
Information	exchange	and	international	cooperation
7.36. The numerous registers held by the different authorities involved in the registration of legal persons 
and the tax authorities are accessible to law enforcement authorities. At national level, ASIC can share 
information pursuant to MOUs or via information forums or committees with a large number of federal 
law enforcement agencies and competent authorities, including the AGD, the ACC, the AFP, the two financial 
supervisory bodies, and AUSTRAC. At the State and Territory level, ASIC can exchange information to assist 
the federal, State or Territory governments to perform a function or exercise a power (section 127 of the ASIC 
Act). In 2012/2013, over 60 million searches were made, as well as more than 4 million paid searches. 
7.37. ASIC can exchange information with 102 foreign counterparts under the International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Multilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MMOU)  Concerning 
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (enforcement). ASIC can exchange information 
with 64 foreign counterparts under an additional 80 bilateral MOUs covering supervision and enforcement. 
ASIC’s MOUs and the MMOU allow for the exchange of information recorded in ASIC’s registers. ASIC can 
exchange information recorded in ASIC registers with foreign counterparts and other agencies, including law 
enforcement agencies, whether or not there is an MOU. This includes publicly available information. If the 
information is not publicly available on ASIC’s registers but is held by ASIC in relation to its registry function, 
ASIC can release the information pursuant to section 127(4) of the ASIC Act and, if an MOU exists, pursuant 
to the terms of the MOU. 
7.38. The ABR is widely accessible to federal agencies and State and Territory Governments. Over 
370 million searches were made in the ABR in 2012-2013. In addition, ASIC has provided information on 
the number of additional requests made by law enforcement authorities for information not in the public 
registers. Also in 2013-2014, the ATO received 2 610 requests from a range of law enforcement agencies, 
including 10 requests for ABR information.
Overall	conclusions	on	Immediate	Outcome	5
7.39. Legal persons and legal arrangements were identified as presenting medium to high risks for ML in 
the NTA, and the use of complex corporate structures in ML schemes was frequently cited by law enforcement 
spoken to by the assessment team. There is good information on the creation and types of legal persons 
in the country available publicly, but less information about legal arrangements. The ATO has made some 
improvements to the ABR that involve collecting information on associates and trustees for new registrations 
from December 2013. The authorities seem to appreciate the extent to which legal persons can be, or are 
being misused for ML, and had some awareness in relation to TF. However, they could do more to identify, 
assess and understand the vulnerabilities both for ML and TF, as past assessment efforts seem to have 
focused more on underlying predicate crime. While Australia has implemented some measures to address the 
specific risk identified in the NTA to legal persons and legal arrangements, other measures need to be taken, 
including imposing AML/CTF obligations on those who create and register them to strengthen the collection 
and availability of beneficial ownership information. Concerning beneficial owners of legal persons and legal 
arrangements, the existing measures and mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure that accurate and up-do-
date information on beneficial owners is available in a timely manner. It is not clear that information held on 
legal persons and legal arrangements is accurate and up-to-date. The authorities did not provide evidence 
that they apply effective sanctions against persons who do not comply with their information requirements. 
Overall, legal persons and arrangements remain very attractive for criminals to misuse for ML and TF. 
7.40. Australia	has	a	moderate	level	of	effectiveness	for	IO.5
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures  in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 113
LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
7
7.4	 Recommendations	on	Legal	Persons	and	Arrangements	
7.41. In relation to IO.5, Australia should:
 Conduct a formal assessment of the TF risks to which legal persons are exposed, and subsequently 
take adequate mitigating measures.
 Conduct ML and TF risk assessments for differing legal persons (numbered companies, public 
companies, foreign companies, etc.) to identify where the risks are, to address those specific issues.
 Ensure that minimal information on the creation of legal arrangements, including those that are not 
registered with ATO, is publicly available.
 Ensure that information on legal persons recorded in ASIC, State or Territory, and ATO registers is 
accurate and up-to-date. 
 Take measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk posed by bearer share warrants.
 Ensure that competent authorities have timely access to a company’s register.
 Ensure that information on the beneficial owner of legal persons and legal arrangements is 
maintained and accessible to competent authorities in a timely manner.
 Require reporting entities to implement as early as possible before 1 January 2016 their obligations 
on beneficial ownership, introduced on 1 June 2014. 
 Apply proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for failure to advise a company that shares are held 
non-beneficially and take further measures against nominee directors.
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8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Key	Findings
Australia	 cooperates	 well	 with	 other	 countries	 in	 mutual	 legal	 assistance	 (MLA)	 matters, 
receiving an average of 300-400 MLA requests per annum which are processed in a timely manner in 
accordance with the case prioritisation framework.
Some	 problems	 have	 been	 identified	 by	 Australia	 concerning	 other	 countries	 meeting	 the	
requirements	of	the	Foreign Evidence Act 1994. These problems translate into delays encountered 
in receiving information on requests made, but these issues are mitigated to some extent by direct 
cooperation with the ACA and AFP for assistance. Nevertheless, delays can exist as a result of the 
stringent requirements of the Act. 
Australia	 cooperates	well	 in	 extradition,	 both	making	 and	 receiving	 requests	 in	ML	 and	TF	
related	matters,	and	informal	cooperation	is	generally	good	across	agencies. Australia cooperates 
well in providing available beneficial ownership information for legal persons and trusts in relation 
to foreign requests, keeping in mind that what is not (required to be) available in Australia cannot 
be shared. But the ability to provide beneficial ownership information for legal persons and trusts in 
relation to foreign requests is limited.
Australia	 maintains	 comprehensive	 statistics	 in	 relation	 to	 MLA	 and	 extradition	 matters, 
including in relation to ML and TF, although there are some limitations in relation to categorisation of 
ML offences within the case management framework.
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8.1	 Background	and	Context
8.1. Proceeds of crime in Australia are generated by a range of criminality. Internationally, Australia is 
prone to receive proceeds of crime generated from abroad, particularly from countries in the region and 
sometimes involving foreign corrupt persons, who send funds to Australia which has a safer banking sector 
and is attractive for foreign investment. The real estate sector in particular may be attractive for foreign 
investment.
8.2. Australia has ratified the Vienna, Palermo, CTF, and Merida Conventions and has a strong framework 
for international cooperation. The main instruments used are bilateral treaties for MLA and extradition, the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987, the Extradition Act 1988, and corresponding regulations. The 
Australian Central Authority in the federal Attorney-General Department is Australia’s central authority for 
MLA and extradition.
8.2	 Technical	Compliance	(R.36-40)
8.3. See for the full narrative the technical compliance annex:
 Recommendation	36	(international	instruments)	is	rated	largely	compliant.	
 Recommendation	37	(mutual	legal	assistance)	is	rated	compliant.	
 Recommendation	38	(mutual	legal	assistance:	freezing	and	confiscation)	is	rated	compliant.	
 Recommendation	39	(extradition)	is	rated	compliant.	
 Recommendation	40	(other	forms	of	international	cooperation)	is	rated	compliant.	
8.3	 Effectiveness:	Immediate	Outcome	2	(International	Cooperation)	
8.4. Australia observed in its NTA for money laundering that there is almost always an international 
dimension to ML offences in Australia. Similar comments were made in the NRA for TF. Highest risk countries 
are not listed in the de-classified versions of those risk assessments, but authorities indicated during the 
mutual evaluation that some countries in the Middle East, south-east Asia and north Asia are of primary 
concern. 
MLA and Extradition
8.5. The Australian Central Authority (ACA) for MLA and extradition is within the federal Attorney 
General’s Department (AGD). The ACA currently has 19 full time officers (11 in MLA and 8 in Extradition) 
who work within a case management and prioritisation framework for incoming and outgoing requests. Case 
prioritisation for MLA is based on factors such as court dates, crime type, national security issues, whether 
organised crime is an issue, and the overall seriousness of the offence involved in the request. Requests from 
high risk countries are managed within this set of factors but not given a higher level of priority.
8.6. Australia can provide MLA to another country on the basis of reciprocity; membership in a multi-
lateral convention/treaty to which Australia is also a member; or a bilateral treaty (29 currently exist). 
Bilateral treaties are negotiated where the other state to the treaty requires such an instrument or where 
the volume of requests exchanged between Australia and the other state calls for a framework instrument to 
guide the processing of mutual requests (e.g. with the US). 
8.7. In the 10 years between 2004-05 and 2013-14, Australia received 3 370 MLA requests; 163  related 
to ML and 1 477 (1/3 of all requests) related to ML predicate crimes.
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Table	8.1.		MLA	Requests:	ML	and	Associated	Predicate	Offences
FY New Requests Made ML ML 
Predicates
Finalised Refused
2004-05 205 8 41 191 0
2005-06 228 9 52 159 0
2006-07 239 5 106 242 0
2007-08 290 9 163 385 0
2008-09 340 12 173 338 0
2009-10 380 13 205 373 1
2010-11 427 15 200 438 0
2011-12 387 28 179 391 1
2012-13 398 38 198 385 1
2013-14 321 26 160 345 0
TOTAL 3 370 163 1 477 3 011 3
8.8. Australia is unable, due to the case management system, to break down these statistics further, 
to show how many of the ML-related requests involved self-laundering, third party laundering, or foreign 
predicate crimes. None of the three refusals in this time period were in relation to ML cases. Over the same 
period, Australia received 28 terrorism-related MLA requests and 10 TF-related requests, none of which were 
refused.
Table	8.2.		MLA	Requests:	Terrorism	and	Terrorist	Financing
FY New Requests Made Terrorism Terrorist 
Financing
Finalised Refused
2004-05 151 0 1 126 0
2005-06 167 0 1 94 0
2006-07 220 2 0 176 0
2007-08 225 6 3 298 0
2008-09 184 4 0 186 0
2009-10 182 2 1 192 0
2010-11 203 11 2 175 0
2011-12 263 1 0 225 0
2012-13 292 0 2 259 0
2013-14 353 2 0 303 0
TOTAL 2 240 28 10 2 034 0
8.9. Over the same 10-year period, Australia received 281 requests to obtain or enforce proceeds orders, 
but is only able to provide information in relation to those requests made between 2010 and 2014. During 
that period, Australia received 46 MLA requests for restraint or forfeiture action, all of which involved ML and 
associated predicate crimes. Of the 46 requests, nine restraint actions were taken and one forfeiture action, 
totalling approximately AUD 34.6 million in assets for both types of actions. At the time of the on-site visit, a 
further restraint request totalling AUD 3.7 million was under consideration. Bearing in mind that Australia is 
at some risk of receiving proceeds of crime from foreign predicate offences, including corruption offences, the 
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authorities should continue to enhance efforts on effective restraint and forfeiture action pursuant to foreign 
requests received. 
8.10. For expediency, MLA requests may be made directly to the ACA via email, post and fax, and not 
strictly through diplomatic channels. The time necessary to complete MLA requests is dependent on a 
number of factors, including whether the request involves coercive or non-coercive measures; whether 
the request is detailed or accurate enough to comply with the request; and whether witnesses from whom 
statements are requested can be located. The AFP’s International Liaison Officers Network assists countries 
in making requests to Australia where required in order to ensure that requests to the ACA are not delayed. 
Authorities indicated that requests requiring a search warrant (bank records) may take two to three months, 
whereas non-coercive assistance (voluntary witness statements) may take one to two months. Feedback 
from 20 countries prior to the mutual evaluation shows that Australia’s cooperation is good both in terms of 
the time taken to process incoming requests and the quality of the information provided by authorities.
8.11. Likewise, Australia pursues assistance from other countries in order to enforce criminal law 
in Australia. Since 2004 Australia has sought MLA in 201 instances from other countries relating to ML; 
1 074 instances in relation to associated ML predicate crimes; and 90 MLA requests in relation to terrorism, 
including nine requests (one investigation) in relation to TF. In one case (Project Hyssop) involving an 
Australian-based narcotics syndicate, assistance was sought from other countries involving MLA and 
information exchanges through Egmont. This resulted in restraint action overseas totalling AUD 15 million in 
relation to narcotics trafficking and ML. 
8.12. Australia has not always received the information sought in a form admissible within Australian 
courts in accordance with the Foreign Evidence Act 1994. The requirements of that Act are onerous for other 
countries to meet (agreed by Australia) and there will likely be delays in providing the information requested 
when meeting them. While these issues are mitigated to some extent by direct cooperation and assistance 
from ACA and AFP, delays can exist as a result of stringent requirements of the Act. Serious consideration 
should be given to easing the admissibility requirements.1
8.13. With respect to extradition, Australia cooperates bilaterally on the basis of several regimes including 
bilateral treaties; the London Scheme for Commonwealth countries; multilateral conventions/treaties; and 
whether a country has been designated as an extradition country under Australian regulations. A simplified 
and speedy system of “backed warrants” exists with New Zealand. Requests under this scheme are managed 
on a police to police basis. The CDPP appears in extradition proceedings on behalf of New Zealand, including 
reviews and appeals. According to the CDPP, challenges to surrender do not happen often. The CDPP is also 
involved in outgoing requests where extradition is sought of persons charged with federal offences. 
8.14. Between 2004 and 2014, 228 extradition requests were received. In that ten-year period, 95 requests 
were granted, six of which related to ML and TF. In the same period Australia made 171 extradition requests. 
113 requests were granted in that period. 
Table	8.3.		Extradition	Requests	Received	from	Other	Countries
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Requests 
received
15 21 22 12 17 30 23 22 23 43
Requests 
granted
12 11 8 9 10 6 5 10 11 13
Requests 
refused
1 2 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 2
1 The FEA was amended following the on-site visit to address these issues including  more streamlined procedures 
to admit in evidence material obtained through MLA or agency-to-agency channels
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8.15. As with MLA, Australia’s cooperation in extradition has been good with positive feedback from other 
countries. In one instance, a country complained of delays by Australia in an extradition matter indicating 
Australia’s bureaucratic requirements, but this is not reflective of the general feedback received from the 19 
other countries that provided feedback. 
Other	Forms	of	International	Cooperation
8.16. AUSTRAC: There are no legal barriers for AUSTRAC to cooperate with other supervisory bodies. 
However, AUSTRAC indicated that it had never received a request from any foreign AML/CTF regulator/
supervisor, neither directly or indirectly (through APRA). AUSTRAC has never submitted a request to a foreign 
AML/CTF regulator/supervisor. AUSTRAC stressed that the absence of international cooperation in the 
regulatory area may be caused by the fact that AUSTRAC is the FIU and the AML/CTF regulator/supervisor, 
something which is unique according to AUSTRAC. It is noteworthy that AUSTRAC has taken the initiative to 
set up regulatory overseas contacts with the FIUs of Canada and New Zealand.
8.17. ASIC:  Under the ASIC Act, ASIC can share any information that is in its possession and can exchange 
information directly with foreign law enforcement agencies, including Interpol. ASIC may seek further 
information from regulated entities based on a foreign request when the request is in support of a civil or 
administrative regulatory matter. If a request is solely related to criminal matters, it needs to come to ASIC 
via AGD and the MLA channel. To date, almost all information exchanges resulting from foreign requests 
have related only to direct or basic beneficial ownership in addition to other readily available information 
such as information on directors and senior managers, corporate status or licensing information of entities 
registered with ASIC. ASIC has been able to respond to these requests quickly.  When requests are made 
for more extensive beneficial information beyond what is readily available to ASIC (i.e. basic information), 
law enforcement authorities use their powers to secure that information if it relates to information held 
in Australia. However, if foreign requests relate to public companies, beneficial ownership tracing notices 
may be issued by ASIC. ASIC can share and exchange ML/TF-related information. While an MOU is not 
necessary for ASIC to share information, ASIC nevertheless has 76 bilateral and multilateral MOUs with 
foreign counterparts. ASIC has no AML/CTF-related responsibilities and exchanges of information with 
foreign FIUs are made via AUSTRAC. When ASIC’s enforcement branch becomes aware of AUSTRAC-related 
information that might be of interest to a foreign counterpart, the enforcement branch refers the matter to 
ASIC’s international cooperation branch, who works with AUSTRAC to determine the best way to convey that 
information to the foreign agency; this may involve telling a foreign counterpart to request information from 
Australia via the FIU.
8.18. APRA: APRA’s international cooperation is limited to the exchange of information related to 
prudential supervision. While MOUs are not required to exchange information with foreign counterparts, 
APRA has approximately 25 MOUs with counterparts with whom they are likely to share information on a 
regular basis. APRA reported that they have not had many requests to exchange information. APRA noted that 
it would reject requests that were not related to prudential supervision. APRA did not have a formal policy 
for how to respond to AML/CTF requests; authorities stated that if it received a request related to AML/
CTF it would either refer the matter directly to AUSTRAC or it would deny the request and recommend the 
counterpart contact AUSTRAC.
8.19. AFP: The AFP’s International Liaison Officer Network consists of 99 liaison officers in 29 countries 
attached to Australian embassies and high commissions often supported by a number of MOUs – which are 
not necessarily required for police-to-police cooperation. The Network is the first point of contact for law 
enforcement enquiries to be raised with Australian law enforcement domestically. It operates with foreign 
counterparts to exchange information on asset recovery matters, often having knowledge of assets in 
jurisdictions where they are located well before an MLA request is made. The AFP is also the designated 
INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) for Australia and facilitates international enquiries to and from 
relevant Australian and foreign law enforcement, government, and regulatory agencies. Australia has 
provided case material to illustrate the effectiveness of the Network. 
8.20. ACBPS: The ACBPS has a network of 50 MOUs with relevant foreign counterparts. As with the AFP, 
MOUs are not required to cooperate and exchange information with other customs and border protection 
services. ACBPS can share information with other law enforcement agencies, such as the AFP, but not with 
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intelligence agencies, except through the relevant agency in Australia (e.g. AUSTRAC). Recently, the ACBPS 
established a Trade Enforcement Unit to target trade-based ML in Australia and is in the process of establishing 
international connections to exchange information relevant to trade-based ML. Currently, this new unit is 
involved in a major trade-based ML investigation with the United States.
8.21. ATO: The ATO has a number of instruments which permit international cooperation in the exchange 
of information with foreign counterparts, including double tax agreements, multi-lateral tax conventions 
and MOUs. The ATO belongs to the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre, which is designed 
to facilitate the sharing of information amongst partner agencies, including intelligence and individuals of 
interest (in particular financial intermediaries). However, the ATO can only share information with other tax 
administrations, including information held relating to trusts that are meeting the strict legal requirements of 
confidentiality obligations. The ATO is not able to share information with other non-revenue agencies, unless 
other agencies are involved in investigating a criminal offence.
Overall	conclusions	on	Immediate	Outcome	2
8.22. The Immediate Outcome is achieved to a very large extent. Australia uses robust systems for MLA, as 
demonstrated by their statistics, although there are some limitations in relation to the categorisation of ML 
offences within the case management framework. Informal cooperation is generally good across agencies. 
Although diagonal cooperation does not appear to be permitted with ASIC and APRA, this is not a significant 
issue. Australia cooperates well in providing available beneficial ownership information for legal persons and 
trusts in relation to foreign requests, keeping in mind that what is not (required to be) available in Australia 
cannot be shared. 
8.23. Australia	has	achieved	a	high	level	of	effectiveness	for	IO.2.
8.4	 Recommendations	on	International	Cooperation	
8.24.  In relation to IO.2, Australia should (noting that the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 was amended post 
on-site): 
 Establish mechanisms to ensure that if a foreign request is made for beneficial ownership 
information beyond basic information in relation to legal persons and arrangements, it can provide 
that information.
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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX
1.	 INTRODUCTION
This annex provides detailed analysis of the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations of 
Australia. It does not include descriptive text on the country situation or risks, and is limited to the analysis 
of technical criteria for each Recommendation. It should be read in conjunction with the Mutual Evaluation 
Report.
Where both the FATF requirements and national laws or regulations remain the same, this report refers to 
analysis conducted as part of the previous Mutual Evaluation in 2005. This report is available at:  
www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/a-c/australia/documents/mutualevaluationofaustralia.html.
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2.	 NATIONAL	AML/CFT	POLICIES	AND	COORDINATION	
Recommendation	1	-	Assessing	Risks	and	applying	a	Risk-Based	Approach
a2.1. This is a new Recommendation and assessing against it requires full analysis against all of the 
criteria.
Risk assessment
a2.2. Criterion	1.1	– Australia uses many processes to identify and assesses it ML/TF risks that generally 
result in a reasonable portrayal of most of those risks. The written ML risk assessment conducted focuses 
on most major risks but likely fails to identify all potential ML risks, or provide a sufficient basis for proper 
analysis to assess the risks due to its somewhat limited scope and information base (elaborated below), but 
this is supplemented by other ongoing risk analysis. Australia has generally identified and assessed its TF risks. 
Australia has produced two national reports on its ML/TF risks, which are supplemented by an Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) (produced by the ACC every two years) that contains information about 
aspects of the predicate crime environment arising from organised criminal activity, but not other forms 
of criminal activity1. In addition, Australian authorities use dynamic processes for ongoing analysis of risk 
built around strong inter-agency cooperation and joint task forces. These processes include informal regular 
discussions as well as intelligence assessments and other studies into specific areas of risk. The two national 
reports, produced by AUSTRAC, in collaboration with law enforcement and national security agencies, were:
 The 2011 NTA assesses ML threats by examining measures, the intelligence picture, drivers and 
enablers, and gaps.2 It also assesses high-risk countries that influence Australia’s ML environment. 
While providing a baseline upon which future assessments can build, its scope is somewhat limited 
as it focuses primarily on the channels identified as vulnerable to laundering proceeds in the private 
sector (akin to the approach in the FATF Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Global Threat 
Assessment 2010) rather than broader AML/CTF regime vulnerabilities, thus potentially failing 
to identify some risks (e.g. customer risk, foreign predicate risk, risks due to weaknesses in the 
authorities’ AML/CTF efforts). Some of these vulnerabilities may have been examined through a 
threat matrix that assessed deterrence and detection elements of the framework, related mainly 
to the AML/CTF preventive measures but not to other measures. It is primarily a qualitative 
assessment based on law enforcement and financial intelligence experts’ input3, taking into account 
mainly classified information that was not made available to the assessors. The NTA draws links 
between crime types, criminal groups, ML channels and dominant typologies, informed by the 
OCTA and other strategic criminal intelligence. There is a modest discussion on the predicate 
crime threat environment concentrating on organised and serious crime which may not assess or 
examine all of the predicate crimes for their ML risk as fully as may have been expected4. The NTA 
1 The OCTA focuses on offences that involve two or more offenders, substantial planning and organisation and the use 
of sophisticated methods and techniques, which is committed in conjunction with other serious offences punishable 
by imprisonment for a period of three years or more.
2 Note that it was produced prior to FATF adopting R.1 or publishing any guidance on assessing ML/TF risk.
3 The main agencies making input were: AUSTRAC, AGD, ACC, AFP, ACBPS, ATO and the New South Wales Crime 
Commission. Other federal, State and Territory agencies were consulted, provided information, or both (e.g. ASIC, 
the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission, and the Victoria Police). Information from international law 
enforcement partners and FIUs was also used.
4 For example, it downplays the ML risk posed by domestic cannabis markets identified in: Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC) Counting the costs of crime in Australia a 2005 update (published 2008); Australian Bureau of 
Statistics The Non-Observed Economy and Australia's GDP, 2012. This is due to the OCTA assessment of the predicate 
124      Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015
NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION
A2
also relied on analysis of information reported to AUSTRAC, which may not be representative of 
actual ML behaviour in Australia. To address an absence of data on the number or value of ML 
cases, the assessment drew on a sample of 174 sanitised predicate crime and ML cases contained 
in AUSTRAC’s annual typologies report. The authorities involved in the NTA considered that these 
cases broadly represented the main areas of ML activity, although they recognised the limitations of 
this approach and that it does not reflect levels of activity across the breadth of sectors exploited for 
ML. These cases contain some information about the value being laundered but other intelligence 
and analysis of AUSTRAC data was used to fill this gap. The NTA also does not address the harm or 
consequences of the identified risks; the NTA notes that, apart from fuelling criminal enterprises, 
reliable evidence of ML consequences is limited in Australia. Thus, overall, while the NTA identifies 
and assesses most of the main risks, the assessors question whether the scope, inputs, and focus 
limit the analysis in relation to some other ML risk areas. 
 The 2014 NRA focuses on TF risks (within Australia and from foreign countries) which impact on 
Australia’s domestic environment. It assesses the risk associated with the methods and financial 
channels used to raise or transfer funds for TF. High-risk countries which influence TF in Australia 
are also examined. It was coordinated by AUSTRAC, finalised in April 2014, and prepared with input 
from intelligence held across law enforcement and national security agencies.5 In addition, AUSTRAC 
developed a ‘forensic’ profile of financial activity from the reports in AUSTRAC’s data holdings since 
2006 related to TF matters. The methodology used, which drew on the NTA and modified it to take 
into account the FATF guidance on conducting ML/TF risk assessment was superior to that used for 
the NTA such that it more likely identifies and assesses the TF risks in Australia. 
a2.3. Criterion	1.2	– Australia’s 2010/11 National Organised Crime Response Plan (NOCRP) identified 
that ML risks would be assessed and that AUSTRAC, as lead agency for AML/CTF, would be responsible. 
AUSTRAC, in consultation with the AFP and ASIO, was also chosen to take the lead for coordinating actions 
to assess TF risks.
a2.4. Criterion	1.3	– While the NRA is new and therefore up to date, the NTA is less so. For example, 
it did not identify or assess new and emerging risks that have been reflected in the latest FATF standard, 
and contains some outdated information about Australia’s predicate crime environment. The authorities 
have indicated that they plan to update the NTA and NRA at five yearly intervals. In between these updates 
AUSTRAC has been producing thematic criminal and financial intelligence assessments to respond to the 
areas identified as requiring further work in the NTA (e.g. on: PEPs, corruption and foreign bribery; digital 
and virtual currencies; legal practitioners, and real estate agents). These reports have been provided to 
partner agencies to help them understand evolving risks (e.g. TBML is now seen as a greater risk than it 
was assessed in the NTA). However, while useful, these reports do not normally assess the level of risk or re-
assess existing levels of risk, nor do they derive from a methodology like those in the NTA or NRA. In addition, 
the authorities maintain that other reports, such as the two-yearly OCTAs, intelligence analysis produced by 
national criminal task forces, and national security statements also provide regular information about ML/
TF risks. However, these other reports do not focus primarily on ML/TF and most do not formally identify 
and assess ML/TF risks.6 
crime environment, on which the NTA was based, including an assessment of the harms posed by the different 
crimes, meaning that the large volume of domestic proceeds generated from cannabis was given less attention. 
Australia may want to reconsider this approach given that the assessment is meant to focus on ML not predicate 
crime.   
5  Input came from: the AFP-led Terrorism Financing Investigations Unit (TFIU), AGD, ACNC, ACC, ACBPS, Australian 
Intelligence Community agencies, DFAT and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet . The TFIU coordinated input 
on the assessment from State and Territory law enforcement agencies through Australia’s network of joint counter-
terrorism teams.
6 Recent OCTAs have included some assessment of certain emerging ML risks.
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a2.5. Criterion	 1.4	 – The authorities shared the classified NTA with all partner agencies and have 
published a summary version for use by self-regulatory bodies, financial institutions, and DNFBPs. However, 
the summary version of the NTA reads in many parts like a generic ML typologies report and it does not share 
information on a key result of the risk assessment - high risk countries, nor does it draw attention to the 
relative importance of transnational ML risks. The classified version of the NRA has been shared with partner 
agencies but no mechanism had been used to provide information on the NRA results to the private sector at 
the time of the onsite.7 
Risk mitigation
a2.6. Criterion	 1.5	 – The AML/CTF regime is calibrated around mitigating risks from organised and 
serious crimes with the regulatory focus on banks, the gaming sector, and remitters – seen as the main 
channels for ML (and also TF for the latter). The AML IDC agrees and sets annual risk-based priorities to 
guide the work and resource allocation of its member agencies on AML/CTF matters. Each agency must 
initiate changes to its resource allocation through its Minister and ultimately Parliament. Most AML/CTF 
agency budgets have been reduced recently as part of broader government-wide budget reductions since 
the Global Financial Crisis despite the NTA identifying high risk areas requiring attention and the OCTA 
identifying ML as a key risk enabling organised and serious crime. Despite this tighter budgetary backdrop, 
additional funding has been given to agencies (e.g. AUSTRAC received additional funding for new intelligence 
systems in 2010 and AUSTRAC for a remitter register in 2011) on the basis of understanding risks.8 There 
are also some examples of reallocating existing resource to address risks (the ACC established a remittance 
task force in December 2012 that participating agencies funded by reallocating resources, and the NSW 
Police and NSW Crime Commission established dedicated ML teams). While these examples of moving 
resources to address identified risks involve interagency consultation, there does not appear to be any whole 
of government approach to resource allocation to AML/CTF matters on the basis of risk. A large concern is 
that no legislative or regulatory measures have been promulgated to mitigate the high risks identified with 
certain DNFBPs (accountants, lawyers, trust and company service providers and real estate agents), other 
businesses (e.g. high-value goods and cash intensive businesses) all of which are outside of the scope of the 
AML/CTF regime or related to preventing the abuse of legal entity structures. This indicates that the AML/
CTF legal and regulatory framework could be better harmonised with the identified risks.
a2.7. Criterion	1.6	– The regulatory framework does not require reporting entities to fully implement 
all requirements of the relevant FATF Recommendations (see section of report on preventive measures). 
However, the basis for these exemptions is not solely on the basis of low risk. The legislative requirements 
(sections 248 and 212 of the AML/CTF Act) and published policy provide that the basis is also concerned 
with avoiding excessive regulatory burden and other considerations. While the authorities have rejected 
some exemption applications because risks were too high, they have not provided convincing evidence 
that those granted were on the basis of demonstrated low ML and TF risk and some exemptions appear to 
be granted solely on the basis of excessive regulatory burden.9 Moreover there are other examples where 
the FATF Recommendations are not fully applied that are not clearly based on low ML/TF risk. There is an 
exemption for the gaming industry in relation to transactions under AUD 10 000 and the exemption from 
most of the AML/CTF obligations applicable to any person licensed to operate no more than 15 gaming 
machines (Chapter 52 of the AML/CTF Rules) run counter to the NTA assessment that the gaming sector 
7 A sanitised version of the NRA was published on 11 September 2014, following the on-site.
8 After the on-site, the federal government also made AUD 650 million available to fight terrorism, including AUD 20 
million for AUSTRAC to enhance its TF analysis and tracking capabilities.
9 AUSTRAC states that it will consider exemptions where “the	burden	imposed	on	business	is	likely	to	be	
greater	than	is	warranted	by	the	risk” (see www.austrac.gov.au/exemption_policy.html). Moreover, the AML/
CTF Act section 212(3)(c), requires that the AUSTRAC CEO must have regard to, amongst other things, 
“the	desirability	of	ensuring	that	regulatory	considerations	are	addressed	in	a	way	that	does	not	impose	
unnecessary	financial	and	administrative	burdens	on	reporting	entities”. Collectively these demonstrate 
that considerations other than demonstrated low risk are taken into account when granting exemptions.
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presents a high threat (including potentially in relation to transactions below AUD 2 000), and the exemption 
applies regardless of the number of transactions or amounts gambled. Similarly, the thresholds set for stored 
value cards, which are based on a risk assessment, combined with the absence of an explicit requirement 
in relation to structuring, do not seem in line with the NTA assessment, which identified these means of 
payment as providing criminal opportunities to move funds, including cross-border, and do not seem to factor 
in TF risk. Casinos and bullion dealers are the only two categories of DNFBPs subject to AML/CTF obligations 
under the current Australian regulation despite the high level of ML threat that professionals such as lawyers, 
accountants, trust and company service providers, etc. represent.10 The NTA assessment also identified high 
value goods as high risk; only bullion dealers are covered by the AML/CTF Act. Moreover, there are no review 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the circumstances justifying the exemptions are still met.
a2.8. Criterion	1.7	– Australia identified in its NTA seven areas as presenting high ML risks (the banking 
system, money transfer businesses and alternative remittance services, the gaming sector, high-value 
goods, professionals, legal entity structures, cash intensive businesses) and one presenting potentially 
high ML risks (electronic payment systems and new payment methods).Yet, while the AML/CTF regime is 
reasonably well calibrated to focus on the risks in banking, remittance, and gaming sectors, the authorities 
have not demonstrated that it addresses all of the remaining identified high risks. More specifically, there 
is no requirement on reporting entities to take enhanced measures in respect of transactions or customers 
associated with higher risks identified by the authorities, nor any requirement that those higher risks be 
incorporated into the risk assessments conducted by FIs and DNFBPs. Chapter 15 of the AML/CTF Rules only 
requires regulated entities to apply enhanced due diligence measures to risks that they identify themselves 
and not those identified by the country – e.g. in the NTA or NRA. Also, the wording of the rules leaves open 
the possibility that reporting entities may not apply enhanced or specific measures for higher risk activities 
identified in the FATF Recommendations. Some of the measures prescribed are not enhanced measures, but 
instead regular due diligence measures (see criterion 10.17). 
a2.9. Criterion	 1.8	 – The authorisation for reporting entities to take explicit simplified measures 
in the AML/CTF Act is limited to certain CDD measures under the AML/CTF program requirements, and 
requires the existence of appropriate risk-based systems and controls based on a proper assessment of risk 
in accordance with the AML/CTF program requirements (e.g. see Paragraphs 4.3.8 and 4.4.8 of the AML/
CTF Rules in relation to simplified verification requirements for companies and trusts). In addition, there 
is a broad discretion about how and in what circumstances those obligations need to be discharged (e.g. 
Paragraph 8.1.3 of the AML/CTF Rules “some	 requirements...	 may	 be	 complied	 with	 by	 a	 reporting	 entity	
putting	in	place	appropriate	risk-based	systems	and	controls”). There are also safe harbour provisions setting 
out what amounts to “simplified” CDD procedures for both “low” or “medium” risk customers. Rule 4.1.3 lists 
customer type, service provided, delivery channel, and foreign jurisdiction as mandatory areas to consider 
when identifying ML/TF risk. Nonetheless, the discretion left with reporting entities (whether to determine 
customer risk levels and thus access the “safe harbour” provisions, or the extent of the measures that they 
put in place, which could, in practice, be simplified compared to the full requirements of the FATF standard), 
is not premised on any requirement that it be based on low risk only or be consistent with the country’s 
assessment of the ML/TF risks. In fact, reporting entities are not required anywhere in the Rules to consider 
the risks already identified by the jurisdiction. 
a2.10. Criterion	1.9	– AUSTRAC applies a risk-based approach to the supervision of financial groups, in 
particular those core principles institutions and those operating within a DBG or providing services as a 
remittance network provider. While bullion dealers and casinos are supervised by AUSTRAC, other DNFBPs, 
(most of which are identified as high risk in the NTA) are not subject to AML/CTF obligations, and therefore not 
monitored by competent authorities or self-regulatory bodies. AUSTRAC supervises entities subject to AML/
CTF obligations on a risk sensitive basis which includes assessment for those classified as high risk of their 
policies, practices, systems and controls in place to address their ML/TF risks. Thus, a large number of FIs and 
DNFBPs are supervised on a lesser basis or not at all in relation to their obligations under Recommendation 1.
10 See NTA.
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a2.11. Criterion	 1.10	 – Reporting entities (except financial advisers and planners) are required under 
sections 84-86 and 165 of the AML/CTF Act and Parts 8.1 and 9.1 of the AML/CTF Rules to produce a written 
program to identify, mitigate, and manage their ML/TF risks. This includes having regard to the nature, size 
and complexity of its business and the type of ML/TF risk that it might reasonably face. There is an implicit 
requirement to provide risk information to the authorities, because a copy of the program must be provided 
to AUSTRAC to help rectify any situation of non-compliance. Financial advisers and planners need only have 
a program that details customer identification procedures and do not need to otherwise assess ML/TF risks. 
However, many DNFBPs identified in the NTA as presenting a high threat are not reporting entities and thus 
not subject to this obligation (e.g. accountants, lawyers, trust and company service providers, dealers in 
precious metals and stones, and real estate agents).11  
a2.12. Criterion	 1.11	 –	 The programs mentioned above must be approved by the Boards or senior 
management of reporting entities (Parts 8.4 and 9.4 of the AML/CTF Rules) and require ongoing monitoring 
and updating in response to changes in ML/TF risks (Paragraphs 8.1.5, 8.4, 9.1.5, and 9.4 of the AML/CTF 
Rules). The programs must also contain a section on implementing enhanced CDD when the reporting entity 
identifies situations of high risk, or forms a suspicion of ML/TF, or when it is dealing with a prescribed foreign 
country (Paragraphs 15.8 and 15.9 of the AML/CTF Rules). However, as above, these requirements only apply 
in a limited way for financial advisers and planners and not at all for those DNFBPs identified in the NTA as 
presenting a high threat.
a2.13. Criterion	1.12	– While simplified measures are allowed only if lower risks have been identified and 
in the absence of any suspicion of ML or TF (as suspicion requires that enhanced measures be applied - see 
Paragraph 15.9(2) of the AML/CTF Rules), as elaborated above, not all of the requirements of criteria 1.9 to 
1.11 have been met. 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a2.14. Australia uses many processes to identify and assesses it ML/TF risks that generally result in a 
reasonable portrayal of those risks. Australia’s NTA was a good first attempt to identify and assess ML risks, 
but suffers from limitations that likely mean that most main but not all ML risks were identified, nor properly 
assessed. Efforts to evolve thinking on the ML risks since the NTA have helped address some limitations and 
the authorities recognise that remaining gaps need to be addressed. The scope of assessments, including the 
next NTA, and information used needs to be broadened to assess other potential major risks such as customer 
types and incoming laundered proceeds. Engaging the private sector for input could also strengthen future 
assessments. The NRA used a more up to date methodology and does identify and assess the TF risks and 
is current. The AML IDC uses the NTA and NRA to set annual risk-based priorities that guide the work and 
resource allocation of its member agencies on AML/CTF matters. Australia’s risk-based approach to AML/
CTF regulation grants regulated entities exemptions and provides for some simplified measures that are not 
based solely on a proven low risk of ML or TF, or the need to be consistent with the NTA or NRA. In addition, a 
key moderate shortcoming is that many high risk entities and services identified in the NTA are not regulated 
under Australia’s AML/CTF regime. Those reporting entities that are regulated must have programs that 
include a risk assessment and that mitigate the risks that they identify – but they are not required to mitigate 
other risks, nor carry out enhanced measures for high risks, identified in the NTA or NRA. AUSTRAC primarily 
supervises entities it classifies as high risk to see that they are meeting obligations to identify, assess, and 
mitigate ML/TF risks. Recommendation	1	is	rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	2	-	National	Cooperation	and	Coordination
a2.15. Australia was rated largely compliant with the previous Recommendation 31. The assessment 
identified the scope to improve the level of cooperation and coordination between AUSTRAC, APRA and ASIC, 
11  Some may provide designated services akin to being a financial institution under the FATF Recommendations, 
and have AML/CTF Act obligations for that particular service, but they will not have such obligations for the list of 
activities applicable to them as DNFBPs under the FATF Recommendations.  
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and also to enhance co-ordination at the policy level, possibly through the establishment of a formal national 
co-ordination mechanism. Recommendation 2 is now more specific about the need for countries to have 
national AML/CTF policies that encompass identified risks and for coordination to be more formalised. 
a2.16. Criterion	2.1	– The nearest thing that Australia has to a national set of policies and strategies for 
combating ML/TF informed by the risks identified is the annual work plan of the AML IDC, which combines 
the views and priorities of its member agencies. While it references the NTA, but not yet the NRA, in a few 
places, most issues in the plan are driven by considerations not related directly to combating ML or TF; those 
that are, focus mainly on preventive measures only. Plans and strategies of a range of agencies and task forces 
both support the AML IDC work plan and inform its development, and some of these are more directly related 
to combating the ML/TF risks identified in the NTA and NRA. In addition, other government initiatives, such 
as those that target certain aspects of mainly organised crime also deal with AML. The NOCRP is part of 
the national framework for combating organised crime. The first NOCRP details strategies for national and 
multi-jurisdictional approaches to key risks within the organised crime environment – and while it identifies 
ML as a key enabler of organised crime, it does not really articulate a policy or strategy for combating it. TF 
risks are addressed both as part of AML/CTF policy and national security and counter-terrorism strategy as 
appropriate. 
a2.17. Criterion	 2.2	 – The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) is responsible for national AML/CTF 
policy. 
a2.18. Criterion	2.3	– Australia has mechanisms in place to co-ordinate domestically on AML/CTF policies 
and activities: 
 On policy matters, the AGD chairs the AML IDC, which meets three times each year to share 
information and inform the strategic direction and priority setting of federal agencies working on 
domestic AML/CTF initiatives. Other agencies represented include AUSTRAC, the AFP, the ACC, DFAT, 
the ACBPS, the Treasury, the ATO and the CDPP. In addition, Australia uses other inter-departmental 
fora to coordinate policy on matters relevant to combating ML/TF (e.g. the Heads of Operational 
Commonwealth Law Enforcement Agencies (HOCOLEA) – meets twice a year and serves as the 
primary forum for 14 federal agencies to discuss law-enforcement policy issues). CTF policy is also 
coordinated through broader counter-terrorism coordinating bodies, led by the Australia-New 
Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee.
 Operational activities are coordinated using a mixture of standing committees and task forces with 
representation from federal and State and Territory agencies as necessary. A key committee is the 
ACC Board. The Board determines, among other things, national criminal intelligence priorities 
and special operations and investigations. A particular feature is the use of task forces targeting 
specific areas of concern where laundering activity is involved, such as the remittance sector (Eligo 
National Task Force), criminal gangs (Task Force Attero), serious and organised investment fraud 
(Taskforce Galilee), and asset confiscation (federal Criminal Assets Confiscation Task Force). There 
is also the multi-agency TFIU. Criminal intelligence is also coordinated via the ACC National Criminal 
Intelligence Fusion Capability, with input also from AUSTRAC. 
  In addition, AUSTRAC hosts an annual forum with key agencies to shape its annual FIU Intelligence 
Strategy. More generally, to facilitate operational cooperation, AUSTRAC provides online access to 
its transaction reports database to all its partner agencies and posts liaison officers in some. In 
addition, Joint Management Groups (JMGs) operate in each State and Territory to help coordinate 
operational interaction with federal agencies. Since the last evaluation, both APRA, the prudential 
regulator, and ASIC, the market integrity and consumer protection regulator, have been added as 
designated agencies with whom AUSTRAC can share information, thus creating a mechanism for 
operational coordination on supervisory matters. 
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a2.19. Criterion	2.4	– DFAT chairs and services a number of counter-proliferation coordination groups, 
both at the senior policy level and the working level.12 These groups bring together all relevant government 
agencies, including the intelligence community, to share information and coordinate responses to current 
proliferation issues, including proliferation financing. Meetings are scheduled monthly but can be convened 
at short notice if needed for operational or policy purposes.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a2.20. While Australia does not have a formalised AML/CTF policy that draws on risks identified in the NTA 
and NRA, it does have an agency that is responsible for national AML/CTF matters. Australia also has many 
standing committees and task forces in place to coordinate domestically on AML/CTF policies and activities 
within the federal government (on policy matters), and between the federal and State/Territory levels of 
Government (on operational matters). Moreover, the NTA and NRA risks get included in some other mainly 
criminal justice policy initiatives (e.g. the NOCRP). It is worth noting that the coordination efforts encompass 
State and Territory agencies, which is salient as Australia is a federation. Australia also has coordination 
mechanisms to combat PF. Recommendation	2	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Recommendation	33	-	Statistics
a2.21. Australia was rated largely compliant with the previous Recommendation 32. The assessment 
identified that there was a lack of State or Territory statistics on prosecutions and convictions for ML, no 
clear statistics on ML/TF investigations at the Commonwealth level, nor adequate statistics on ML/TF 
investigations at the State or Territory level. While the language of Recommendation 33 has not changed, this 
Recommendation has taken on more relevance in the context of assessing effectiveness.13  
a2.22. Criterion	33.1	– The authorities maintain that the effectiveness and efficiency of Australia’s AML/
CTF systems are supported by statistics gathered by the FIU, regulators, police and prosecution services, and 
the ACA (within the AGD). AML/CTF related statistics are maintained comprehensively in some areas (e.g. for 
AUSTRAC operations), and other data are available or can be produced upon request for some agencies in the 
AML/CTF system. However, overall, Australia does not maintain a sufficiently comprehensive set of statistics 
to enable a full appraisal of its AML/CTF systems. In particular, national level information about prosecutions, 
convictions, and confiscations is not easily collated. Primary attention is paid to counts of various outputs. 
Other than for AUSTRAC, few maintained statistics focus on the efficiency of the AML/CTF systems. The 
authorities are also challenged to provide breakdowns of  the data that they do hold. Coverage for specific 
types of statistics is as follows:
 STRs received and disseminated: AUSTRAC maintains a wide range of statistics about SMRs, many 
of which they publish in the AUSTRAC annual report. 
 ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions: Australia does not maintain comprehensive 
national statistics on all these matters. The assessors were provided statistics on ML investigations 
by only some States and none at the federal level. Statistics for ML prosecutions and convictions 
were obtained at the federal, State and Territory level, but the authorities do not maintain national 
12 The key Counter-Proliferation Coordination Group comprises: DFAT (Chair), Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Department of Defence, AGD, the ACBPS, the Australian Intelligence Community agencies, and other 
agencies co-opted as necessary.
13 For the assessment of Australia only, the use of the words “comprehensive” and “includes” in R.33 are collectively 
interpreted as requiring countries to have, as a minimum, statistics (not just data) covering all of the areas listed and 
which are accurate, national, covering at least three annual time periods, that present some value as well as volume 
data, and that are also in disaggregated form to show such things as reporting entity types, predicate crime type, 
country of origin, and type of ML activity as appropriate. “Maintain” and “keep”, are interpreted as indicating that the 
statistics are readily available. FATF is still considering its approach to R.33 in light of its latest Methodology.
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aggregated statistics. Those provided used different bases and time periods, preventing accurate 
aggregation. The assessors had to compile the data provided or obtained into national level data. 
Moreover, it was not possible to obtain disaggregated prosecution and conviction data by reference 
to the associated predicate crime, and reliable national sentencing data for ML convictions does not 
exist. 
 TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions: Comprehensive national statistics on TF 
prosecutions and convictions, but not on investigations, are available.
 Property frozen, seized, and confiscated: Australia is challenged to compile nationally aggregated 
statistics on these matters, due mainly to the different ways in which federal and State/Territory 
agencies maintain their own statistics – and not all States or Territories were able to provide data. 
The statistics produced allowed for disaggregation back to underlying predicate crimes in only 
some limited areas. Tax crime related confiscation data is available. Comprehensive statistics on 
illicit drug seizures are available at the national level.
 MLA or other international requests for cooperation made and received: Australia maintains some 
comprehensive statistics on AML/CTF related MLA, but is unable to track the timeliness of response 
and the nature of underlying predicate crime. Only AUSTRAC maintains statistics on AML/CTF 
related international cooperation requests. 
 Other statistics: AUSTRAC maintains a broad range of statistics related to its regulatory and 
supervisory role (including on enrolment of reporting entities and registration of remittance 
dealers, its compliance assessment activities, and enforcement action). However, it was challenged 
to provide comprehensive and consistent statistics on the nature, structure, and size of the financial 
and DNFBP sectors, and many data sets are challenging to use to assess the efficiency or effectiveness 
of the regulatory/supervisory system as they are compiled differently. 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a2.23. While Australia produces many statistics on AML/CTF matters for various parts of its system, it is 
often challenged to produce statistics at the national level. The statistics most readily available came from 
AUSTRAC and the AGD (in relation to MLA requests and extradition requests), and on TF prosecutions and 
convictions, all of which relate to centralised national AML/CTF functions. However, a concern is that some 
statistics crucial to tracking the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the system related to ML investigations, 
prosecutions, convictions, and property confiscated are not maintained nationally, reflective of the wide 
range of agencies involved at the federal and State/Territory levels. Recommendation	33	is	rated largely	
compliant.
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3. LEGAL	SYSTEM	AND	OPERATIONAL	ISSUES
Recommendation	3	–	Money	laundering	criminalisation
a3.1. Australia was rated largely compliant for Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2 (ML offence). 
The main shortcomings that were noted at the time related to lack of effectiveness, and the less than compliant 
(implementation of the) criminalisation of ML at the State and Territory level. ML is criminalised at the federal 
and the State/Territory level. This section focuses primarily on the federal level.
a3.2. Criteria	3.1	and	3.11	– ML is criminalised under Division 400 of the federal Criminal Code Act 1995 
(the Criminal Code, or CC). Vienna Article 3(1) (b) and (c) and Palermo Article 6(1) have been implemented 
(section 400.2 CC covers receipt, possession, concealment, disposal, import, export and engaging in banking 
transactions, which also covers transfer, conversion , disguising, and acquisition). Participation, association 
or conspiracy, aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring, incitement and conspiracy are all covered 
under part 2.4 of the CC (attempt, complicity and common purpose, joint commission, commission by proxy, 
incitement and conspiracy). Knowledge is required (beliefs, recklessness or negligence), although section 
400.9 CC separately criminalises ”dealing in property reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime”. 
a3.3. Criteria	3.2	and	3.3	– The CC applies a threshold approach, with predicate offences for ML comprising 
all indictable offences—i.e. those offences whose penalty is a minimum of 12 months imprisonment (section 
400.1 CC and section 4G Crimes Act 1914). An extensive overview was provided by the authorities, a sufficient 
range of offences within each of the categories of offences are criminalised under Australian criminal law, 
either at the Commonwealth level, or at the State level/Territory. Federal predicate offences are predicates 
for the federal ML offence, and State/Territory predicate offices are predicates for State/Territory and federal 
ML offences. 
a3.4. Criterion	3.4	– The definitions of ‘proceeds of crime’ and ‘property’ in section 400.1 CC extend to 
any money or other property that is wholly or partially derived or realised, directly or indirectly, by any 
person from the commission of an offence that may be dealt with as an indictable offence. Property is defined 
as real or personal property of every description, whether situated in Australia or elsewhere and whether 
tangible or intangible, and including an interest in any such real or personal property. This includes financial 
instruments, cards and other such items regardless of whether they have intrinsic value. 
a3.5. Criterion	3.5	– Section 400.13 CC explicitly provides that that the prosecution does not need to 
establish that a particular offence has been committed, or that a particular person committed an offence 
in relation to the money or property, in order for those assets to be considered proceeds of crime. The 
prosecution must, however, prove beyond reasonable doubt that the proceeds are either the proceeds of a 
crime, or are intended to become, or are at risk of becoming, an instrument of crime. 
a3.6. Criterion	3.6	–	The definitions of “proceeds of crime” and “instruments of crime” both cover crimes 
against laws of a foreign country. 
a3.7. Criterion	3.7	– Sections 400.1 and 400.2 CC formally apply to persons that commit the predicate 
offence. However, case law has limited the ability to charge both for the predicate offence and for self-
laundering where the criminality of the ML offence is completely encompassed by the criminality of the 
predicate offence (e.g. the decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Nahlous	v	R (2010) 
201 ACrimR 150; Thorn	 v	R (2010) 198 ACrimR 135; Schembri	 v	R (2010) 28 ATR 159). This has led to 
the issuing of a litigation instruction (number 10 of May 2013) that restricts the use of the self-laundering 
provisions in line with case law.
a3.8. Criterion	3.8	–	 Intent and knowledge (belief, recklessness, negligence) must normally be proven 
(sections 5.2 and 5.3 CC) but can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Under section 400.9 CC 
(reasonably suspected proceeds), a range of possible examples of such circumstances is given which will 
satisfy the offence provision. Section 400.9 carries a lower penalty. All other sections require knowledge and 
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intent to be proven. Absolute liability applies to the value of the property laundered, but mistake of fact as to 
the value of the property can be a defence to the particular offence charged (but not the lesser offence).
a3.9. Criterion	3.9	– CC Division 400 provides for different charges for different monetary thresholds 
(amounts involved), with the maximum penalties also differing depending on the level of fault (intention, 
knowledge, recklessness, negligence and reasonable suspected proceeds). This allows for proportionate 
sanctioning. Sanctions for natural persons range from 25 years imprisonment and/or AUD 255 000 
(intentionally laundering AUD 1 million or more), to a fine of AUD 1 700 (negligence, laundering less than 
AUD 1 000). These sanctions are dissuasive.
a3.10. Criterion	3.10	– Part 2.5 CC sets out the general principles, physical and fault elements of corporate 
criminal responsibility. Section 12.1 provides that the Criminal Code applies to bodies corporate in the 
same way as it does to natural persons (the term corporate body means legal person), and section 4B of the 
Crimes Act enables a fine to be imposed for offences that only specify imprisonment as a penalty. Section 12.3 
indicates that to prove intention, knowledge or recklessness, the fault element must be attributed to a body 
corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. This 
could be done by proving that the body corporate’s board of directors, or high managerial agent, intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or 
permitted the commission of the offence; proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate 
that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or proving that the 
body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant 
provision.
a3.11. Sentencing is based on a formula from imprisonment to financial penalty, all based on sections 
4AA(1), 4B(2), and 4B(3) of the Crimes Act. This means that the maximum penalties for legal persons under 
Division 400 of the CC range from a fine of AUD 1 275 000 (intentionally laundering AUD 1 million or more) 
to AUD 8 500 (negligent laundering less than AUD 1 000).
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.12. Recommendation	3	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	4	-	Confiscation	and	provisional	measures
a3.13. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated compliant for Recommendation 3 (confiscation and 
provisional measures). Most confiscation action is brought under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), 
although each State and Territory has its own complementary system. This section focuses primarily on the 
federal level. 
a3.14. In addition to what is required by Recommendation 4, authorities can also issue non-conviction based 
forfeiture orders which are decided upon a civil standard and directed at persons, property, or equivalent 
value (sections 47, 49 and 116 POCA). Property-based civil forfeiture orders apply to any suspected indictable 
offence, foreign offence, or offence of “Commonwealth concern”, while those directed at a person or equivalent 
value can be applied for a suspected “serious offence” (defined as an indictable offence punishable by 3 or 
more years’ imprisonment plus other conditions). Finally, unexplained wealth orders (section 179A-T POCA) 
could be issues that would require a person to pay an amount equal to a portion of the person’s total wealth 
if the person cannot satisfy the court that the money is not derived from certain offences.
a3.15. Criterion	4.1	– The POCA has broad provisions to confiscate (referred to as “forfeiture” in POCA) 
proceeds of crime. Part 2-2 (section 48) covers conviction-based forfeiture orders that apply to all indictable 
offences (i.e. those with 1 year imprisonment or more), which includes ML, TF, and predicate offences. 
Corresponding value is also covered through Part 2-4 POCA (section 116), where a pecuniary penalty order 
(fine) can be issued for the value of the benefits from the unlawful activity. POCA (section 329) defines 
proceeds and instruments of crime. Property is proceeds of an offence, located anywhere, if it is wholly 
or partially, directly or indirectly derived or realised from the commission of an offence. Property is an 
instrument of an offence if the property, located anywhere, is used or intended to be used in, or in connection 
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with, the commission of an offence. Property remains proceeds or instrumentality of crime even after transfer 
or exchange, except when the property is acquired by a bona fide third person or is inherited (section 330). 
a3.16. Criterion	4.2	– Provisional measures are covered under Parts 2-1A (freezing orders, which apply 
to financial accounts) and 2-1 POCA (restraining orders, which apply to property) and can be executed on 
the basis of a reasonable suspicion or conviction. Property can be restrained when a person is charged with 
an indictable offence (section 17), suspected of committing a serious offence (section 18), or when property 
is suspected to be the proceeds of an indictable offence (section 19). In addition to the regular investigative 
measures that are used to investigate offences and that can lead to the application of provisional measures 
and confiscation (see Recommendation 31), Chapter 3 POCA provides for examination orders, production 
orders (also for financial institutions relating to accounts and transactions, also over particular periods, and 
search and seizure of tainted property or evidential material). Section 36 of POCA enables the court to set 
aside a disposition or dealing with property, which contravenes a restraining order when that disposition or 
dealing was either not for sufficient consideration or was not in favour of a person acting in good faith.
a3.17. Criterion	4.3	– Rights of bona fide third parties are protected through sections 29 and 29A POCA, 
which enable a person whose property is the subject of a restraining order to have his or her property 
excluded from that order. Sections 69, 72, 73, 77, 81, 94, 94A, 99, 107, and 179L of POCA are also relevant.
a3.18. Criterion	4.4	– Chapter 4 POCA contains the procedural provisions relating to the management of 
property, the provision of legal assistance and how confiscated property can be used. The Australian Financial 
Security Authority (AFSA) is responsible for securing, managing and realising restrained property. Part 4-1 
sets out the powers and duties of AFSA which include how it may deal with controlled property. All confiscated 
money, and the funds derived from the sale of confiscated assets, is placed into the Confiscated Assets Account 
which is managed by AFSA. Money and assets that are forfeited can only be used for purposes specified in 
POCA (shared with other jurisdictions in case of joint investigations, the States or Territories). Funds can also 
be used for local crime prevention, law enforcement, drug treatment and diversionary measures.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.19. Recommendation	4	is	rated	compliant.
Operational	and	Law	Enforcement
Recommendation	29	-	Financial	intelligence	units
a3.20. Australia was rated compliant for Recommendation 26 (FIU). Since Australia’s last mutual evaluation, 
the FATF Standards on FIUs have been significantly strengthened by imposing new requirements which 
focus, among other issues, on the FIU’s strategic and operational analysis functions, and the FIU’s powers to 
disseminate information upon request and request additional information from reporting entities.
a3.21. Australia’s FIU is AUSTRAC established in 1989 under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 
(FTR Act) and from 2006 by the AML/CTF Act. AUSTRAC’s role as an FIU is discussed under R29. Other 
functions that AUSTRAC exercises (such as supervision) are discussed elsewhere. The key piece of legislation 
for AUSTRAC is the AML/CTF Act. However, the FTR Act remains in force as long as its provisions do not 
contradict the provisions of the AML/CTF Act.
a3.22. Criterion	29.1	– The AML/CTF Act confirms the establishment and functions of AUSTRAC AUSTRAC’s 
functions are: “to retain, compile, analyse and disseminate eligible collected information” (sections 209, 210, 
and 212). “Eligible collected information” comprises all types of reports that reporting entities are required 
to file with AUSTRAC, as well as other information that AUSTRAC obtains from government bodies and 
reporting entities upon request.
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a3.23. Criterion	29.2	 –	AUSTRAC is the central agency for the receipt of disclosures filed by reporting 
entities under both AML/CTF Act and FTR Act. These disclosures include reports of suspicious matters 
(SMRs), reports of threshold transactions, reports of , IFTIs, compliance reports, reports about physical 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments (see subsections 41(2), 43(2), 45(2), 47(2), 53(8)) and 55(5)), as 
well as reports obliged under the FTR Act-significant cash transactions by cash dealers, reports of significant 
cash transactions by solicitors, and reports of suspect transactions (SUSTRs) (see sections 3, 7, 15A, and 16).
a3.24. Criterion	29.3	– Section 49(1) of the AML/CTF Act enables AUSTRAC to collect further information 
from any reporting entity or even any other persons (legal or natural) once an SMR has been filed by a 
reporting entity. This goes beyond the standard, which only requires that FIUs can obtain and use additional 
information from any reporting entities. Other databases are not integrated into AUSTRACs analytical tool 
(except for the electoral role). AUSTRAC can gather information from the AFP, ACBPS, ACC, Immigration 
and public company information database (including the public ASIC database database), other commercial 
services (including World Check) and State/Territory Police where AUSTRAC staff are posted. 
a3.25. Criterion	29.4	– AUSTRAC’s Operations Division is responsible for both operational and strategic 
analysis. Concerning operational analysis, AUSTRAC employs automated analysis systems to categorise reports 
of suspicious matters based on a series of rules which are defined and continually reviewed by AUSTRAC in 
collaboration with its partner agencies. These rules enable AUSTRAC’s automated system to identify those 
reports which relate to specific key risks, for potential further analysis by AUSTRAC (intelligence reports). 
Intelligence reports are shared with other agencies, spontaneously or upon request. Partner agencies 
also have direct access to all information in the AUSTRAC database (all types of reported transactions and 
intelligence reports) and can undertake their own searches or analysis. Concerning strategic analysis, the 
Operations Support Branch has a dedicated strategic analysis section which includes a typologies team. The 
typologies team uses data mining technology to develop ML/TF typologies, sanitised case studies, ML/TF 
indicators, and reporting summaries. Strategic intelligence reports can be used by AUSTRAC business units 
and by partner agencies for any purpose. The strategic analysis team also produced the NTA and NRA.
a3.26. Criterion	29.5	– Section 212 (1) of the AML/CTF Act provides the functions of the AUSTRAC CEO 
which includes disseminating “eligible collected information” (i.e. information received by AUSTRAC). 
As partner agencies have on-line full access to AUSTRACs database (’SMRs and analysis) and also use the 
AUSTRAC analysis tool, dissemination of information is technically not as important as it would be in other 
countries (sections 125 - 133C AML/CTF Act). Access to the database and disseminations are based on the 
Australian Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF, see below). The Egmont Secure Web system is used 
for international disseminations. The AUSTRAC database tracks all access by each user
a3.27. Criterion	29.6	 – AUSTRAC protects its information as follows: section 121 of the AML/CTF Act 
prohibits the disclosure of AUSTRAC information except in cases specified in the legislation. Additionally, the 
aforementioned PSPF sets detailed requirements for governance, staff members’ protective security roles and 
responsibilities, risk management elements including security vetting, and information asset classification 
and control, including for AUSTRAC. AUSTRAC has also internal policies for employees who have an obligation 
to manage and protect the records they create and/or receive in the course of business. Employees are 
required to ensure that records are retained, classified, and filed according to the provisions of the AUSTRAC 
Information Management Policy (IMP). The IMP outlines procedures for handling and storage of AUSTRAC 
information, whilst the AUSTRAC Information Security Policy outlines procedures for securing information, 
security classification and protective markings, dissemination limiting markers, handling, access and control. 
All AUSTRAC employees are subject to a security vetting process undertaken by the Australian Government 
Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA). AUSTRAC’s personnel security policy determines that AUSTRAC must also 
identify designated security assessment positions within the agency that require access to official information 
and assets. Information security is maintained within AUSTRAC’s risk management framework. There are 
designated IT units that have responsibility to develop, implement, and maintain the security of all AUSTRAC 
services, in cooperation with AUSTRAC’s security advisor. Physical access to AUSTRAC building facilities is 
also limited to appropriately cleared staff.
a3.28. Criterion	29.7	–	AUSTRAC is established as a statutory authority within the Attorney-General ‘s 
Department’s Portfolio. The powers and functions of AUSTRAC are set out in detail in Part 16 of the AML/
CTF Act. The legal and institutional framework does not grant full operational independence and autonomy, 
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to allow for accountability to Parliament. The AML/CTF Act provides a reserve capacity for the Minister 
to issue written policy principles and directions to the AUSTRAC CEO, which  the CEO has to comply with 
(section 213 AML/CTF Act). These written policy principles can relate to any issue but not to a specific case 
(section 228(2) AML/CTF Act) and must be tabled in Parliament (sections 213(2) and 228(5) AML/CTF 
Act). AUSTRAC can make arrangements for information exchange with domestic competent authorities and 
foreign counterparts. AUSTRAC is an independent body and has its own distinct structure and core functions. 
AUSTRAC has its own operational resources, including financial budget and staff, allocated through the 
normal governmental processes. Once allocated, there are no specific provisions that would require further 
approvals from government or partner agencies to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its 
functions. There is a general consultation requirement; however, any failure to consult in relation to the 
performance of a function does not affect the decision taken. 
a3.29. Criterion	29.8	– AUSTRAC is a founding and active member of the Egmont Group, and served as 
Chair of the Egmont Committee in 2008-2009.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.30. The power of the minister to provide written policy principles or instructions to AUSTRAC is a 
limitation to the operational independence and autonomy of the FIU and a technical shortcoming. Because 
the assessors are of the view that the instruction powers cannot be used in practice because of likely public 
disapproval, it is a shortcoming that should not have an effect on the overall compliance. Australia is also to be 
commended for providing AUSTRAC with the legal tools to be able to obtain and use additional information 
from any other natural or legal person, which goes beyond the FATF requirement to obtain information from 
reporting entities. Recommendation	29	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	 30	 –	 Responsibilities	 of	 law	 enforcement	 and	 investigative	
authorities	
a3.31. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated largely compliant for old Recommendation 27 (law 
enforcement authorities). The deficiency related to effectiveness, which is not assessed in this section under 
the 2013 Methodology. The new Recommendation 30 contains much more detailed requirements. 
a3.32. Criterion	30.1	– The AFP is the primary law enforcement agency for the investigation of federal 
offences, including ML associated predicate offences, and TF. The Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (AFP 
Act) establishes the AFP which is the federal police force (section 8 AFP Act), chiefly responsible for federal 
crimes, and its functions also include the investigation of State/Territory offences that have a federal aspect 
(section 4AA AFP Act). A State offence may be identified as having a federal aspect where it potentially falls 
within federal legislative powers because of the elements of the State offence or the circumstances in which it 
was committed, or because the investigation of that State offence is incidental to an investigation of a federal 
or Territory offence. 
a3.33. The AFP had three permanent Money Laundering Short Term Teams. First established in January 
2012, these teams focused solely on ML investigations. One team was merged into a general crime squad 
before the on-site, one team was merged with a joint task force on alternative remittance (Eligo National Task 
Force), and the third team is still in place (7 staff in Melbourne). State and Territory police forces also have 
responsibility for investigating ML offences set out in State legislation.
a3.34. The AFP also has a dedicated TFIU to focus on TF investigations, intelligence, education and liaison. 
The TFIU is a multi-agency unit and includes representatives from a number of Commonwealth and State 
Government agencies. 
a3.35. In addition, The Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (the ACC Act) establishes the ACC, mainly a 
law enforcement intelligence agency. The functions of the ACC include the investigation, when authorised 
by the ACC Board, of matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity (section 7A ACC Act). The ACC 
uses its coercive powers in collaboration with its partner agencies: it does not conduct investigations into 
criminal activity on its own since its role is primarily to be the national criminal intelligence hub and not 
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a supra-national police force. The ACC Board (which includes the heads of federal, State and Territory law 
enforcement agencies) approves Special Investigations and Special Operations in which the ACC may use 
coercive examination powers (set out in Division 1A and 2 of Part II of the ACC Act). The ACC’s far-reaching 
coercive powers means it has broader investigative powers than those available to the police forces and it 
operates in effect as a standing Royal Commission. ML is relevant to ACC investigations, such as the current 
Targeting Criminal Wealth Special Investigation. 
a3.36. Criterion	30.2	–	AFP and State and Territory Police investigators are authorised to undertake both 
predicate and ML investigators in tandem or individually depending on the nature and desired outcomes of 
the particular investigation. However, this is not the case for Queensland where there is a legal requirement 
for the DPP to request the Queensland Attorney General to authorise a ML prosecution.
a3.37. Criterion	30.3	– The bodies described above have the authority to identify, trace, and initiate the 
freezing and seizing of property. In addition, the AFP-led CACT conducts investigations and litigation arising 
from the POCA (POCA) and is responsible for the majority of POCA work. The CACT has the ability to identify 
and pursue criminal assets and also works in partnership with relevant Commonwealth, State, Territory and 
international law enforcement agencies to identify, investigate and litigate appropriate asset confiscation 
matters at the federal level.
a3.38. Criterion	 30.4	 –	Australia recognises tax and social security fraud as an ML predicate offence. 
Regarding tax, the ATO has the primary responsibility for investigating tax evasion and tax fraud and 
conducts both (civil) audits and (criminal) investigations of taxation-related matters. The ATO undertakes 
investigations either of its own accord, or with partner law enforcement agencies, or in multi-agency task 
force operations (for example Project Wickenby). The ATO investigators have recourse to a number of Acts 
which impose criminal sanctions (Tax Administration Act 1953, Crimes (Taxation Offences) Act 1980 and the 
CC). Where a tax-related matter intersects with an associated non-tax related offence (e.g. drug-trafficking), 
the investigation would be considered ‘serious and/or complex’ and the ATO will liaise with the AFP and CDPP 
to coordinate the various aspects of such an investigation. However, the ATO investigators do not conduct 
‘stand-alone’ (i.e. without a predicate tax offence) ML investigations as these are the responsibility of the AFP 
and ATO’s scope is somewhat limited. The ATO investigators are required to be qualified in accordance with 
“Australian Government Investigation Standards” and are able to prepare complex briefs of evidence for use 
in criminal court matters. Department of Human Services investigators have powers and procedures similar 
to the ATO, in order to focus on social security fraud. 
a3.39. Criterion	30.5	–	In July 2014, the AFP launched the Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre, responsible 
for operational fraud and anti-corruption efforts at the federal level. At the State level (but not at the federal 
level), independent anti-corruption bodies exist in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, Victoria, 
Tasmania and South Australia. Like Royal Commissions, these bodies have extensive investigate and coercive 
powers. Cases may be referred to the (C)DPP.
States and Territories: 
a3.40. Australia also provided extensive information for Recommendation 30 for the state level. In general, 
states follow the same model as the federal government, with one unified police force and a centralised DPP 
body.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.41. Besides the limitation in Queensland where the Attorney-General needs to authorise a ML prosecution, 
the responsibilities of law enforcement are sufficient.  Recommendation	30	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Recommendation	31	-	Powers	of	law	enforcement	and	investigative	authorities
a3.42. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated compliant for old Recommendation 28. In February 2010, 
existing relevant provisions in the Crimes Act were replaced with new regimes based on national model 
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legislation. The new Recommendation 31 contains much more detailed requirements in the area of law 
enforcement and investigative powers.
a3.43. Criterion	 31.1	 – Australian authorities have authority to obtain information from financial and 
other institutions and seize and obtain evidence in law enforcement investigations of ML, TF, and predicate 
offences. State and Territory authorities have similar authority as that provided to the federal authorities 
under POCA and the Crimes Act. General information gathering powers pursuant to warrants in the Crimes 
Act can be utilised, as well as the specific information gathering power set out in section 49 of the AML/CTF 
Act. ACC also has the power to obtain documents (section 29 ACC Act 2002). POCA (section 213) requires 
financial institutions to provide any information or document relating to accounts and certain transaction 
information For any other information held by financial institutions and for information held by anyone else 
(including DNFBPs), POCA section 202 allows a magistrate to issue a production order, requiring a person to 
produce one or more property-tracking documents to an authorised officer, or make one or more property-
tracking documents available for inspection. POCA (section 225) also authorises a magistrate to issue a 
warrant to search premises (for evidence gathering). Similar general powers are available to investigate 
predicate offences (section 3E(1) Crimes Act). Ordinary and frisk search powers are available to officers 
(sections 228 POCA and 3E(2) and 3E(6)(b) Crimes Act). Tainted property and evidence can be seized 
(sections 228(1)(d) POCA) and 3E(6) and 3E(7) of the Crimes Act). The ACC may apply for a warrant to 
enable the search of premises and seizure of evidence (section 22 ACC Act). The ATO can use sections 263 and 
264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 to search premises and require people to provide information in 
tax related cases. The AFP and other law enforcement agencies can obtain witness statements in any matter 
when a witness is prepared to provide a statement. There is no legal basis necessary, as this is not a coercive 
power. A witness statement is not admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings (except in some limited 
situations where a witness has died or is not able to give evidence), but witnesses can be subpoenaed to go 
to court to give evidence. The ACC has the power to compel witnesses to give evidence on themselves and 
others under investigation. 
a3.44. Criterion	31.2	– The Crimes Act (Part IAC and 15KA and 15KB) authorises undercover operations 
and obtaining of evidence. The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, Parts 2-5, authorises 
the AFP, ACC, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, and State law enforcement agencies 
to intercept communications for investigations of a “serious offence”. This includes ML, terrorism, and TF, 
serious cartel offences, cybercrime offences, offences involving organised crime, murder, kidnapping, serious 
drug offences, and certain other offences punishable by at least seven years imprisonment. The Surveillance 
Devices Act 2004 authorises Commonwealth and State and Territory law enforcement agencies to access 
computer systems for a “relevant offence”, i.e. offences punishable by three years imprisonment and certain 
other offences. The Crimes Act allows for controlled delivery operations (sections IAB, 15HA, and 15GE) 
involving a serious Commonwealth offence, which includes ML, terrorism and TF, and a number of other 
offences punishable by three years imprisonment. It is not clear whether this covers all predicate offences, 
unless the investigation also includes a ML offence.
a3.45. Criterion	31.3	– While there are mechanisms in place to identify in a timely manner which natural 
or legal persons own or control a specific account, there is no (general) mechanism in place to identify in a 
timely manner whether specific natural or legal persons own or control accounts. 
a3.46. Criterion	31.4	– The competent authorities investigating ML, TF, and associated predicate offences 
are able to ask for all information collected and held by AUSTRAC. Subsection 126(1) of the AML/CTF Act 
allows the AUSTRAC CEO to designate officials or a class of officials to access this information. Forty-one 
authorities or agencies, including national security agencies and federal, State and Territory Police and Crime 
Commissions, are currently so designated.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.47. Law enforcement and investigative authorities generally have all the powers that they need to 
investigate ML/TF. However, there is no mechanism in place to identify in a timely manner whether natural or 
legal persons own or control accounts (such as a register of accounts, or asking all account holding financial 
institutions at the same time if they have certain account holders). Recommendation	31	is	rated	largely	
compliant. 
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Recommendation	32	–	Cash	Couriers
a3.48. In the 2005 evaluation Australia was rated partially compliant on Special Recommendation IX. The 
main deficiencies identified were that (i) there was no system for declaration or disclosure of bearer negotiable 
instruments (BNIs) and, therefore, (ii) no sanctions for false declaration or disclosure relating to BNIs and 
(iii) no ability to stop or restrain BNIs in relation to a false declaration or disclosure. Recommendation 32 
contains new requirements that were not assessed under the 2004 Methodology, but which are assessed 
under criteria 32.2 and 32.10 of the 2013 Methodology.
a3.49. Criteria	32.1,	32.2	and	32.3	– Australia implements a combination of declaration (for cash) and 
disclosure (for BNI) systems for incoming and outgoing cross-border transportation of currency and BNIs. 
For cash (whether Australian or foreign), the AML/CTF Act requires a declaration for all physical cross-border 
movements above the threshold of AUD 10 000, whether by travellers or through mail and cargo. For BNIs, 
the traveller must, if required to do so by a police officer or a customs officer: (i) disclose whether or not the 
person has with him or her any BNIs; and (ii) disclose the amount payable under each BNI that the person has 
with him or her; and (iii) produce to the officer each BNI that the person has with him or her. The definition 
of the BNI is given in section 17 of the AML/CTF Act, in line with the FATF definition. The Outgoing Passenger 
Card contains a question for outgoing currency and BNI, and directs travellers to the related CBM-PC or CBM-
BNI form. The Incoming Passenger Card contains the same questions; however, it does not inform passengers 
about the need to obtain CBM-PC of CBM-BNI (neither of which is easily available online) (sections 53, 55 and 
59 AML/CTF Act).
a3.50. Criterion	32.4	– Sections 199 and 200 of the AML/CTF Act authorise police and customs officers to 
require a person to declare or disclose currency and BNIs, search the person, and seize the currency or BNI. In 
case of a false/failure to declare/disclose, regular law enforcement powers will be used (see Recommendation 
31).
a3.51. Criterion	32.5	– If a person fails to make a declaration of currency (under sections 53 or 55), there are 
two types of sanctions available: civil or criminal. Under the civil penalty (section 186), the person is subject to 
a fine of (i) AUD 850 if the total amount of the physical currency involved in the alleged contravention is AUD 
20 000 or more, or (ii) AUD 340 otherwise. Under the criminal penalty, the person is liable to imprisonment 
of 2 years or a fine of AUD 85 000, or both for failure to make a report. Sections 136 and 137 also provide 
for imprisonment of 10 years or a fine of AUD 1.7 million for (i) giving false or misleading information, or 
(ii) producing a false or misleading document to competent authorities, including the customs, the police and 
AUSTRAC. These provisions apply to information and documents in relation to cross-border movement of 
currency or BNIs. Overall, the sanctions envisaged under civil responsibility appear to be proportionate, but 
not dissuasive (a fine of AUD 850 is more than 20 times smaller than the amount of undeclared currency if it 
is more than AUD 20 000, for example). On the other hand, the sanctions under criminal responsibility appear 
to be dissuasive, but not proportionate as they are rather high.
a3.52. Criterion	32.6	– Declarations of physical currency have to be made either to AUSTRAC or a police or 
customs officer. That officer must forward the report to AUSTRAC within 5 business days (section 56 AML/
CTF Act). Therefore, the FIU receives all declarations of physical currency transportation. BNI-disclosures 
are made available to AUSTRAC within 5 days (section 60 AML/CTF Act). Detected BNI-declaration failures 
require follow-up by AFP officers. AUSTRAC has access to AFP and ACBPS databases.
a3.53. Criterion	32.7	– Domestic cooperation in relation to the cross-border transportation of currency 
and BNIs is based on a number of MOUs concluded between the ACBPS, Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection (DIBP) and AUSTRAC. In addition to that, AUSTRAC provides access to its information both 
to ACBPS and DIBP. The ACBPS also co-ordinates its efforts in monitoring cross-border activity with AFP and 
ACC, and also through liaison officers. ACBPS investigations that contain proceeds of crime elements and/or 
indications of ML are referred to the CACT within the AFP as a matter of course. ACBPS officers undertake 
customs as well as immigration checks at all ports of entry into Australia. Also, the Border Management 
Group (including with AUSTRAC) was established. It coordinates border security activities, including cash 
smuggling issues, across government agencies and is led by the ACBPS.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 139
LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
A3
a3.54. Criterion	32.8	– Subsections 199(5) and 199(10) of the AML/CTF Act allow competent authorities 
(the customs and the police) to seize physical currency (no specific time limit) where there is suspicion that 
it may afford evidence of a false declaration (under section 53). This provision is somewhat broader than 
the requirement under 32.8(b), as a mere suspicion of false declaration is sufficient to seize the currency. 
Subsections 200(12) and 200(13) provide for the seizure of BNIs where a person has made a false disclosure. 
In case of a suspicion of ML/TF, sections 199(3) - 199(5) allow customs to examine the traveller and his 
belongings, and seize currency. Section 200 has similar provisions for BNIs, and section 201 allows for an 
arrest warrant based on suspicion of ML/TF.
a3.55. Criterion	32.9	 – AUSTRAC is able to exchange information that it has access to with its foreign 
counterparts with whom it has an MOU or an exchange instrument. 
a3.56. Criterion	32.10	– For information security in relation to AUSTRAC: see Recommendation 29. These 
general government provisions equally apply to the ACBPS. 
a3.57. Criterion	32.11 – See criterion 3.9, Recommendation 4 and criterion 5.6.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a3.58. The lack of dissuasive and proportionate sanctions is a shortcoming, considering the overall 
risk profile of Australia. The attractiveness of the use of cash smuggling (caused by the tracking of every 
international wire transfer) and the abundance of typologies related to smuggled cash are risk factors taken 
into account in this conclusion. Recommendation	32	is	rated	largely	compliant.
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4. TERRORIST	FINANCING	AND	FINANCING	OF	
PROLIFERATION
Recommendation	5	-	Terrorist	financing	offence
a4.1. Australia was rated largely compliant for Special Recommendation II (criminalisation of terrorist 
financing). The main shortcoming at the time was that the collection of funds for a terrorist organisation and 
the collection or provision of funds for an individual terrorist, were not covered. 
a4.2. Criteria	5.1,	5.2,	and	5.5	– Australia has criminalised TF, mainly on the basis of the TF Convention. 
Terrorist acts are defined in the CC under section 100.1, and section 103.1 criminalises the financing of 
these acts. Section 102.6 criminalises the financing of a criminal organisation, and section 103.2 targets the 
financing of a terrorist. 
a4.3. Section 103.1 CC criminalises the collection or provision of funds (without specifying that this could 
be directly or indirectly) if the person is reckless as to whether the funds will be used to facilitate or engage in 
a terrorist act. Under section 100.1, an act has to meet three conditions to be considered a “terrorist act”: 1) it 
falls into a category of behaviours such as causing serious harm to a person or property, endangering another 
person’s life, creating a serious risk to public health or safety, interfering or disrupting an electronic system; 
2) there is the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and 3) there is the intention of 
coercing or intimidating the federal, State, Territory or foreign government or intimidating the public. 
a4.4. In relation to the first condition, Australia did demonstrate how each of the acts in the Convention 
annex is criminalised in Australia. However, the acts must also meet the two additional intent elements to 
come within the Australian definition of terrorist act, whereas Article 2(1)(a) of the Convention requires 
that these should be considered as terrorist acts as described in the CT Conventions, and some of these 
Conventions do not allow terrorist intent to be a condition for a conduct to be considered terrorism (e.g. the 
theft of nuclear material should be considered terrorism no matter what the actual intent of the suspect is). 
The Australian definition of terrorist act does not cover all acts in Article 2(1)(b) of the CTF Convention (“any 
other act, intended to cause death or serious bodily injury…”) either, since the second condition above is not 
foreseen in Article 2(1)(b), and the third condition does not cover intimidating/influencing an international 
organisation as foreseen in Article 2(1)(b). Furthermore, subsection 100.1(3) clarifies that acts in relation to 
lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action are not terrorist acts unless they are intended to cause 
serious harm etc. to a person or create a risk to the health or the safety of the public, although this is more of 
an issue of effectiveness.
a4.5. Section 103.2 criminalises making funds intentionally available to, or collecting funds for (both 
directly and indirectly) another person while being reckless as to whether the other person will use the 
funds to facilitate or engage in an act. However, the collection or provision of funds to an individual terrorist 
to be used for any other purpose is not covered. In addition, Australia has criminalised getting funds to, from, 
or for a terrorist organisation in section 102.6 CC. “Terrorist organisation” can be specifically designated 
by regulation or more generally be one that engages in, prepares, or assists in fostering terrorist acts. 
Section 102.6 covers intentional support / receipt, whether directly or indirectly, and either knowledge 
or recklessness that the organisation is a terrorist organisation. For all three provisions (103.1, 103.2 and 
102.6) intention, knowledge and recklessness are covered in section 5. 2-4 CC. Recklessness requires the 
prosecution to establish that a person is aware of a substantial risk that the funds would be used, and that 
having regard to the circumstances known at the time to the person, taking the risk was unjustifiable. Section 
5.4 CC also provides that proof of knowledge or intention satisfy the recklessness element (although proof of 
knowledge itself caries a higher penalty than recklessness). 
a4.6. Criterion	5.3	– All funds are covered under section 100.1 CC (the broad definition covers property 
and assets of any kind, tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, as well as legal 
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documents and instruments in any form, titles and financial or monetary instruments). The source (legitimate 
or illegitimate) is irrelevant. 
a4.7. Criterion	5.4	– Section 103 CC specifically indicates that offences are committed even if an act does 
not occur, or the funds will not be used in a specific act, or if the funds will be used for more than one act. 
a4.8. Criterion	 5.6	 – The maximum penalty for natural persons under 103.1 and 103.2 CC is life 
imprisonment, and under 102.6 it is 25 years (when the persons knows it is a terrorist organisation) or 
15 years (when the person is reckless as to whether the organisation is a terrorist organisation).
a4.9. Criterion	5.7	– See also criterion 3.10 for the basics on corporate criminal liability. Sentencing is 
based on a formula from imprisonment to financial penalty, all based on 4B(2), (2A) and (3) Crimes Act. 
This means that the maximum penalties for legal persons under 103 CC is AUD 1.7 million (knowledge 
and recklessness), under 102.6 it is AUD 1 275 000 (knowledge) or AUD 765 000 (recklessness). Fines are 
calculated in penalty units; section 4AA defines a penalty unit to be AUD 170.  
a4.10. Criterion	5.8	– 2.4 CC extends criminal responsibility to attempt, aiding and abetting, incitement, and 
conspiracy to commit an offence, and to participation as an accomplice (through aid, abet, counsel, procure 
the commission of, section 11.2 CC) and organisation and directing (through joint commission, commission 
by proxy, incitement or conspiracy, sections 11.2A and 11.5).
a4.11. Criterion	5.9	– All TF offences meet the threshold for predicate offences. See Recommendation 3.
a4.12. Criterion	5.10	– TF offences apply regardless of geographic location (CC 15.4, 102.9, and 103.3).
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a4.13. Australia’s TF criminalisation largely follows the TF Convention; the financing of terrorist acts and 
terrorist organisations for any purpose is covered, as is the financing of individuals while being reckless as 
to whether the other person will use the funds to facilitate or engage in a terrorist act. However there are 
shortcomings: the Australian definition of terrorist act is somewhat narrower than the definition in Articles 
2(1)(a) and (b) of the TF Convention, and the provision or collection of funds to be used by an individual 
terrorist for any purpose is not covered. Recommendation	5	is	rated	largely	compliant. 
Recommendation	6	-	Targeted	financial	sanctions	related	to	terrorism	and	terrorist	
financing
a4.14. Australia was rated largely complaint for Special Recommendation III (freezing of terrorist assets). 
The main shortcoming was that Australian law did not explicitly cover funds of terrorists and those who 
finance terrorism or terrorist organisations outside of specific terrorist acts.
a4.15. Criterion	6.1:	Sub-Criterion 6.1a – DFAT is responsible for proposing entities to the 1267/1989 and 
1988 Committees for designation, based on the Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO) of 12 December 
2013 (relations and communications with the UN). Sub-Criterion 6.1b – DFAT (coordination), AFP, AGD, ASIO 
and other intelligence agencies are responsible for identifying targets, each on the basis of the AAO, or their 
organic law. Sub-Criterion 6.1c – The legal framework allows an evidentiary standard of reasonable grounds 
in deciding whether or not to make a proposal for designation is applied, and there is no legal requirement 
that designations would be conditional upon the existence of criminal proceedings. Sub-Criterion 6.1d – The 
authorities indicate that the procedures and standard forms for listing are used (and required by the UN in 
the case of UNSCR 1989), also as a basis for domestic awareness outreach. Sub-Criterion 6.1e is not applicable 
as no names have been unilaterally proposed by Australia to date.
a4.16. Criterion	6.2:	Sub-Criteria 6.2a and 6.2d – Section 15(1) and (2) of the Charter	of	the	United	Nations	
Act 1945 (CotUNA) identify the Minister for Foreign Affairs as the competent authority to be responsible for 
designating entities that meet the requirements of the CotUNA. In addition, Section 20 of the Charter	of	the	
United	Nations	(Dealing	with	Assets)	Regulations	2008 (DAR) links the designation of a person to the relevant 
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criteria of UNSCR 1373. These sections also provide that any determination and listing must meet the standard 
of “reasonable grounds”. No listing is linked to or conditional upon a criminal procedure. Sub-Criterion 6.2b 
– Same authorities and legal basis as criterion 6.1a; DFAT’s  Counter-Terrorism Branch and the Sanctions 
Section coordinate the review of (de)listing proposals and 3-yearly review, and advise on legal issues. Sub-
Criterion 6.2c – The list of persons and entities designated by Australia under UNSCR 1373 includes listings 
done at the request of foreign governments. The process of considering a request commences the day it is 
received (through DFAT’s Counter-Terrorism Branch). Sub-Criterion 6.2e is not applicable as no such request 
has yet been made. 
a4.17. Criterion	 6.3:	 Sub-Criterion 6.3a	 – Relevant government agencies have the legal authority and 
procedures to collect, solicit and share information to identify persons and entities that meet the criteria for 
designation (Privacy Act 1988, Australian Privacy Principles, Schedule 1, principle 3.1, AAO 6.1a and 6.1b, and 
section 35 of the CotUNA). Sub-Criterion 6.3b – The authorities indicate that designations are made ex parte, 
there is no legal or judicial requirement to hear or inform the potential designee. 
a4.18. Criterion	 6.4	 – The Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 (Sanctions	 –	 The	 Taliban)	 Regulations	 2013 
(Taliban Regulations) and the Charter	of	the	United	Nations	(Sanctions	Al-Qaida)	Regulations	2008	(Al-Qaida 
Regulations) contain provisions that prohibit dealing with or making available assets of designated persons 
and entities (regulations 9 and 10, or 10 and 11). Designated persons and entities are defined in article 3 as 
any person or entity listed by the UN under UNSCRs1267/1988/1989 and the designations are therefore 
automatically incorporated into Australian law. In the case of listings under UNSCR 1373, a listing takes effect 
as soon as the person or entity is listed in the Gazette (section 15(6) CotUNA), which takes place as soon as 
practicable after the Minister’s decision, usually the following business day.
a4.19. Criterion	6.5:	Sub-Criterion 6.5a – The requirement to freeze is contained as a prohibition to deal 
with designated persons or entities in regulation 11 (Al-Qaida Regulations, UNSCRs 1267/1989), regulation 
10 (UNSCR 1988, Taliban Regulations) and section 20 CotUNA (UNSCR 1373). Freezing is ex parte and without 
delay as soon as the legal obligation exists. The prohibition to transfer, conversion, disposition or movement 
is covered through the prohibition to deal with assets (dealing is a broad term used in other laws as well). 
Sub-Criterion 6.5b – To cover this criterion, Australia uses the exact language used in each of the relevant 
UNSCRs. Each UNSCR uses slightly different language to cover the same concepts, language that is slightly 
different from the general language used in Recommendation 6. The definition of controlled asset (regulation 
4 of the Al-Qaida and regulation 3 of the Taliban Regulations for UNSCRs 1267/1988/1989) covers an asset 
of a designated person or entity; and funds derived from an asset owned or controlled (which includes whole 
and joint ownership), directly or indirectly, by a designated person or entity; or a person acting on behalf of 
or at the direction of a designated person or entity. 
a4.20. The definition of freezeable asset (section 14 CotUNA for UNSCR 1373) covers assets owned and 
controlled (whole and joint ownership) (control includes acting on behalf and at the direction of others) by 
a listed entity, and assets derived or generated from those assets, either directly or indirectly. The definition 
of asset in CotUNA (Section 2) applies to all sanction regimes. The prohibition requirements are contained in 
regulation 10 (Al-Qaida Regulations, UNSCRs 1267/1989), regulation 9 (UNSCR 1988, Taliban Regulations) 
and section 21 CotUNA (UNSCR 1373). DFAT maintains a Consolidated List of designated persons and entities 
subject to UNSCRs and Australian autonomous sanctions (www.dfat.gov.au/sanctions), with a possibility to 
receive notices if an amended list is issued. DFAT also provides software to assist those that may be holding 
assets to identify listed assets/entities. Additional guidance is available on the DFAT website. Also, the AFP is 
designated to assist to guide those that may be holding assets (regulation 41 of the DAR). Regulation 42 of the 
DAR requires anyone with an opinion about a targeted asset to inform the AFP. AFP, together with the ABA, 
has developed a referral form for possible matches. Bona fide rights are protected under section 25 CotUNA.
a4.21. Criterion	6.6	– Under regulation 16 CotUNA, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the authority to 
revoke designations that no longer meet the designation requirements (in relation to autonomous sanctions 
under UNSCR 1373). Under article 15A CotUNA, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has to review all autonomous 
listings every three years, before they automatically cease to have effect. DFAT informs listed persons and 
entities of the availability of the UN Ombudsperson (Al-Qaida) or Focal Point (Taliban). One false positive was 
so far discovered, which was resolved using the procedure highlighted above.
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a4.22. Criterion	6.7	– The Minister for Foreign Affairs is able to authorise access to frozen funds or other 
assets in accordance with UNSCR 1452. See for UNSCR 1267/1989 regulation 12 of the Al-Qaida Regulations, 
for UNSCR 1988 regulation 11 of the Taliban Regulation and for UNSCR 1373 section 22 of CotUNA and 
regulations 30 and 31 of the DAR.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a4.23. Recommendation	6	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	7	–	Targeted	financial	sanctions	related	to	proliferation
a4.24. This is a new requirement that was not part of the previous assessment. Australia has implemented 
one system for targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and TF (Recommendation 6), although 
specific regulations differ because they target different UNSCRs.
a4.25. Criterion	 7.1	 – Pursuant to its authority under subsection 2B (1) of the CotUNA, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs has issued and periodically updated two regulations dealing with the requirements in 
Recommendation 7: The Charter	of	 the	United	Nations	(Sanctions—Democratic	People’s	Republic	of	Korea)	
Regulations 2008 (“the DPRK Regulations”) and the Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 (Sanctions	 —	 Iran)	
Regulations 2008 (“the Iran Regulations”). These regulations contain provisions that prohibit dealing with 
assets of designated persons and entities. Designated persons and entities are defined in regulation 4 of both 
regulations as any entity listed by the UN under article 8(d) of UNSCR 1718 for DPRK) and in the Annex to 
UNSCR 1737 or designated by the UNSC pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737 (for Iran). Therefore, as the 
UN periodically updates its designations, targeted financial sanctions automatically apply to these persons 
and entities in Australia.
a4.26. Criterion	7.2	– The requirements to freeze are contained in regulation 13 for DPRK Regulations 
and article 16 for the Iran Regulations. These articles prohibit using or dealing with the asset; allowing the 
asset to be used or dealt with; or facilitating the use of or the dealing with the asset of the designated person 
or entity. Freezing is without delay as soon as the legal obligation exists. Other parts of the obligations are 
similar to those described under criterion 6.5a. Sub-Criterion 7.2b – To cover this criterion, Australia uses 
the exact language used in each of the relevant UNSCRs. Each UNSCR uses slightly different language to cover 
the same concepts, language that is slightly different from the general language used in Recommendation 
7. The definition of controlled asset (regulation 4 of the Iran and DPRK Regulations) covers an asset owned 
or controlled by a designated person or entity (whole and jointly), or a person or entity acting on behalf of 
or at the direction of a designated person or entity. The Iran Regulation covers in addition assets owned or 
controlled by an entity owned or controlled by a designated person or entity. “Asset” is defined in the CotUNA 
(section 2), applicable to the Iran and DPRK Regulations. The prohibition requirements are contained in 
regulations 12 and 14 for DPRK and 15 and 17 for Iran. The first article in each Regulation deals with the 
prohibition, the second with the licencing.
a4.27. Criterion	7.3	– Section 30 of CotUNA provides that the head of a designated federal entity (either 
DFAT, the Department of Defence, the ACBPS or AUSTRAC) may for the purpose of determining whether a UN 
sanction enforcement law is being complied with, require by written notice, the production of information 
or documents. Section 32 provides that failure to comply with such a notice is an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for 12 months. See also Recommendations 26 and 27. 
a4.28. Criterion	7.4	– On its public website, DFAT informs listed entities that they can submit de-listing 
requests either through the focal point process outlined in UNSC resolution 1730 or through their State of 
residence or nationality. A link to the Focal Point website is included. A procedure to permit access to assets 
for humanitarian reasons is established in regulation 14 for DPRK and 17 for Iran. Regulation 5 of the DAR 
brings these in line with conditions and procedures set out in UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.
a4.29. Criterion	7.5	– For the Iran sanction regime, this is covered (regulation 5(5), DAR  as required also 
in OP14 of UNSCR1737). For the DPRK regime, this is covered through the general freezing provisions which 
Australia indicates permit the freezing of interests or other earnings due on an account through addition to 
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these accounts, in line with UNSCR 1718. Sub-Criterion 7.5b – Regulation 17, and specifically 17(8) of the Iran 
and DPRK Regulations cover these requirements.
Weighting	and	Conclusion	
a4.30. Recommendation	7	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	8	–	Non-profit	organisations
a4.31. Australia was rated partially compliant for Special Recommendation VIII (non-profit organisations). 
The main shortcomings that were noted at the time related to the lack of follow-up to NPO sector reviews, and 
the lack of effective implementation of a system to address TF-related NPO risks. 
a4.32. Criterion	8.1	– Several reviews of the adequacies of NPO laws have been undertaken, but none of 
these relate to TF abuse risks. No comprehensive reviews were undertaken in order to identify the features 
and types of NPOs that are particularly at risk of being misused for TF or other forms of terror support. 
In addition, the regulator of the Australian NPO sector (ACNC) has some information on those NPOs that 
voluntarily register for tax purposes but none of this relates to TF. The term “terrorism” did not feature on 
the ACNC’s public website until during the on-site (when a link to an AGD brochure was added). The TF 
NRA that was provided notes that current conflicts, such as in Syria, may raise the number of NPOs that are 
misused. However, none of this is a domestic review of the NPO sector; it does not provide the authorities 
with the capacity to obtain timely information on the NPOs’ activities, size, and other relevant features, as 
a basis to identify the features and types of NPOs that may at risk for TF. There is no evidence that NPO TF 
vulnerabilities are periodically assessed.
a4.33. Criterion	8.2	–	The government has only provided outreach to NPOs in relation to TF in the form 
of a brochure (non-binding guidance) in 2009, which was not available on the website of the ACNC until the 
on-site. It explains that there is a risk for NPOs to be misused and lists some of the measures that could be 
taken, but then focuses on Recommendation 6 issues. The ACNC has not issued any information in relation to 
terrorism or TF. A fact sheet in relation to Syria was developed, but it focuses on targeted financial sanctions 
breaches by citizens and is therefore not relevant for Recommendation 8.
a4.34. Criterion	 8.3	 – Although the main objectives of the Australian	 Charities	 and	 Not-for-Profits	
Commission Act 2012 (ACNC Act) are to promote minimum governance standards for NPOs, these standards 
only apply to those NPOs that voluntarily register for tax purposes (approximately 40 000 of the estimated 
140 000 known NPOs that have taken legal personality and 20 000 without legal personality have done so, 
for tax purposes). The ACNC Act does not relate to terrorism, except in relation to external conduct standards 
of designated terrorist organisations (which is related to the general prohibitions in Recommendation 6).
a4.35. Criterion	8.4:	Sub-Criterion	8.4a	– Firstly, it is not known whether the provisions in the ACNC Act 
(and therefore all the requirements in Criteria 8.4(a)-(f)) apply to (i) a significant portion of the financial 
resources under the control of the sector or (ii) a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. 
It is also not known to what extent they cover the set of charities that should be targeted under this 
Recommendation (charities that may be at risk for TF may not be the ones that register to seek tax benefits). 
The ACNC allows certain NPOs to register voluntarily for tax reasons, and in this case they must register 
certain information and keep certain records. The aim of the information that is recorded is to promote public 
confidence in the sector (not related to counter terrorism purposes). The voluntary registration information 
includes the charity’s responsible persons (which include directors, trustees, administrators, receivers) but 
not information on the purpose and objectives of the stated activities. Although these shortcomings negatively 
affect most criteria for Recommendation 8, these are not repeated throughout this section to allow for a 
more succinct presentation of the analysis. Sub-Criterion 8.4b – Medium and large charities that voluntarily 
register must file annual financial reports and annual information statements; small charities must provide 
annual information statements. Basic religious charities are excluded from the requirement to provide non-
financial information even if registered. However, they must still provide non-financial information in annual 
information statements. Sub-Criterion 8.4c: see sub-criterion 8.4b. Sub-Criterion 8.4d  – There is no licencing 
or registration requirement. Registration is voluntary and for tax purposes, and is only for charities and not 
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for other NPOs. Sub-Criterion 8.4e – see sub-criterion 8.4b. Sub-Criterion 8.4f – Record keeping requirements 
(e.g. sections 55-5(1) and (2)), which includes financial records that explain transactions and financial 
position and performance) apply only to those that voluntarily register. 
a4.36. Criterion	8.5	– The ACNC has law enforcement powers for those charities that voluntarily register 
for tax purposes. 
a4.37. Criterion	8.6	– The domestic cooperation and coordination agreements that ACNC has concluded 
only cover its work on the charities that voluntarily register for tax purposes. Although ACNC has access to 
information of NPOs, this only covers those charities that voluntarily register for tax purposes. Although there 
are information-sharing mechanisms in place, these do not focus on TF. In addition, the information sharing 
only relates to information that is available on those charities that voluntarily register for tax purposes.
a4.38. Criterion	8.7	– Australia uses the general procedures and mechanisms for international cooperation 
to handle requests relating to NPOs, and does not identify specific points of contact or procedures for requests 
involving NPOs. The assessment of Recommendations 37-40 has not identified any substantial problems 
which would affect cooperation regarding NPOs (if there would be a domestic recipient for such requests)
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a4.39. According to the NRA, charities and NPOs are a key channel used to raise funds for TF in or from 
Australia. However, the lack of a comprehensive sectorial risk assessment (as required by Recommendation 
8), the lack of subsequent outreach in relation terrorist financing to the sector, and the lack of adequate 
preventive requirements or a supervisory framework that covers all relevant NPOs are all shortcomings. 
Recommendation	8	is	rated	non-compliant.
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5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Preamble 
a5.1. Scope	of	financial	institutions	–	The chart below sets out the types of entities and persons who 
carry out the financial activities listed in the Glossary to the Methodology, as well as the licensing authority. 
Australia advised that debit and credit card schemes (see item 5 below) are licensed by ASIC and supervised 
for ML/TF purposes by AUSTRAC; however, representatives of such institutions met during the visit to 
Australia informed the team that they are not regulated or supervised by Australian authorities. AUSTRAC is 
the supervisory authority for AML/CTF.
Table	A5.1.		Types	of	entities	and	persons	who	carry	out	financial	activities
Activities and operations according 
to the FATF definition of financial 
institutions
Financial institutions authorised to conduct these 
activities and operations 
Licensing 
authority
1. Acceptance of deposits and 
other repayable funds from the 
public
Banks 1 (or authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs)):
20 Australian-owned Banks
8 Foreign Subsidiary Banks
40 Branches of Foreign Banks
APRA
9 Building Societies (ADIs) APRA
85 Credit Unions (ADIs) APRA
4 Other ADIs APRA
2. Lending Banks (or ADIs) see item 1 above APRA
9 Building Societies (ADIs) APRA
85 Credit Unions (ADIs) APRA
2 Specialist credit card institutions (ADIs) APRA
Finance companies
[Total of 5 856 Australian Credit Licensees and 28 201 
authorised credit representatives, including ADIs, of 
which 4 102 licensee provide consumer leases]
ASIC
3. Financial leasing Lease finance companies ASIC
4. Money or value transfer services 6 287 Money remittance companies, including hawala
ADIs
AUSTRAC
5. Issuing and managing means 
of payment (e.g. credit and 
debit cards, cheques, traveller's 
cheques, money orders and 
bankers' drafts, electronic 
money)
ADIs, including specialist credit card institutions APRA
Debit and credit card schemes (e.g. Visa, Mastercard, 
Bankcard)
Electronic payment systems providers (e.g. BPAY, 
Paypal)
641 Ancillary non-cash payment facility providers e.g. 
phone companies (paying for meter parking or vending 
machine purchases by SMS), providers of prepaid 
phone card, providers of gift vouchers etc.
ASIC
1. The size of the activity (assets) is as follows: banks - AUD 3214.1 billion; Building Societies - AUD 23.2 billion; 
Credit Unions - AUD 41.0 billion; Other ADIs and Specialised Credit Card institutions - AUD 7.7 billion; life insurance 
- AUD 273.9 billion
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Table	A5.1.		Types	of	entities	and	persons	who	carry	out	financial	activities	(continued)
Activities and operations according 
to the FATF definition of financial 
institutions
Financial institutions authorised to conduct these 
activities and operations
Licensing 
authority
6. Financial guarantees and 
commitments
Banks APRA
7. Trading in:
money market instruments 
(cheques, bills, certificates of 
deposit, derivatives etc.);
foreign exchange;
exchange, interest rate and 
index instruments;
transferable securities;
commodity futures trading
ADIs
Investment banks/firms (securities/derivatives dealers/
market makers)
Money market firms (foreign exchange derivatives 
dealers/market makers) - 26 investment banks, 250 
hedge fund investment managers/ responsible entities, 
43 retail (over-the-counter) OTC derivative providers
1 079 AFSL holders are authorised to provide financial 
product advice or deal in foreign exchange contracts. 
These licensees have 7 853 authorised representatives. 
ASIC
8. Participation in securities issues 
and the provision of financial 
services related to such issues
18 financial markets
6 clearing and settlement facilities
136 market participants 
800 securities dealers
ASIC
9. Individual and collective portfolio 
management
12 Friendly societies APRA
28 Life insurers APRA
Superannuation funds and trustees: 
53 Pooled superannuation trusts
2 979 Small APRA funds
62 Single-members ADFs
APRA
528 701 Self-managed superannuation funds
200 superannuation fund trustees
ATO
4 789 Investment advisors (3,394 AFSL holders licensed 
to provide personal advice and 1,395 AFSL holders 
licensed to provide general advice)
ASIC
Funds managers ASIC
784 Managed investment schemes (trustees) 
4 152 registered managed investment schemes, 494 
responsible entities for MIS (as of July 2013), 614 
foreign financial service providers, 718 custodial service 
providers, 26 investment banks, 250 hedge fund 
managers, and 43 retail OTC derivative providers
ASIC
10. Safekeeping and administration 
of cash or liquid securities on 
behalf of other persons
Licensed financial service providers including:
718 custodial service providers
483 Managed investment operators (responsible 
entities)
ASIC
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Table	A5.1.		Types	of	entities	and	persons	who	carry	out	financial	activities	(continued)
Activities and operations according 
to the FATF definition of financial 
institutions
Financial institutions authorised to conduct these 
activities and operations
Licensing 
authority
11. Otherwise investing, 
administering or managing funds 
or money on behalf of other 
persons
Licensed financial service providers– see item 10 above ASIC
12. Underwriting and placement 
of life insurance and other 
investment related insurance
28 Life insurers 
207 Reinsurers
APRA
Life insurance brokers/ life insurance agents (see 9 for 
list of investment and general financial advisors)
Financial advisors (if holder of an AFS licence)
ASIC
13. Money and currency changing Bureaux de change / currency exchange providers – 
108 bureaux de change enrolled with AUSTRAC
ADIs and other businesses performing bureaux de 
change functions
None
Information as of 31 December 2013. 
a5.2. Exemptions	from	the	AML/CTF	Act	granted	by	AUSTRAC	under	section	248	of	the	AML/CTF	
Act	–	Section 248 of the AML/CTF Act authorises AUSTRAC to exempt a specified person from one or more 
provisions of the AML/CTF Act, or to amend the applicable provisions of the AML/CTF Act in relation to a 
specified person. Pursuant to its internal policy, AUSTRAC considers a number of factors while deciding on 
granting an exemption or not, including the ‘the level of any potential or existing money laundering and/or 
terrorism financing risk’. AUSTRAC advised that a number of exemption requests were declined, including 
because of the ML/TF risk such an exemption would incur. All exemptions granted are publically available on 
AUSTRAC’s website. However, a sample of exemption decisions reviewed shows that AUSTRAC has granted 
full exemptions from their AML/CTF obligations to applicants and unconditional exemptions. Australia 
advised that unconditional exemptions have not been granted since 2010. Exemptions were also granted to 
businesses operating in the area of private banking, prepaid cards or investment funds. The first two sectors 
have been identified as a high ML threat in the NTA, while investment funds were rated as presenting medium 
threat. Moreover, a director from an exempted private bank has been banned by ASIC from the financial service 
industry for dishonest conduct, including for hiding where investment money would ultimately be placed. 
APRA also took enforceable undertakings against this company. Neither the exemptions nor AUSTRAC’s 
policy on exemptions provide for a regular review and the potential revocation of the exemptions granted. 
a5.3. Nature	of	some	requirements	applicable	 to	reporting	entities – The AML/CTF Act and Rules 
contain obligations and prohibitions applicable on reporting entities - financial institutions or other persons, 
including some DNFPBs - when providing designated services. It should be noted that some of the FATF 
requirements are translated into the Act as prohibitions accompanied by sanctions (e.g. section 32 prohibits 
the commencement of the provision of designated service if the reporting entity has not carried out the 
applicable customer identification procedure; and section 81 prohibits reporting entities from providing 
designated services if it has not adopted an AML/CTF program or does not maintain such a program). 
The Rules are issued pursuant to section 229 of the AML/CTF Act and specify the obligations of the Act, in 
particular with respect to customer identification. The Rules, however, do not impose direct obligation on 
reporting entities to identify their customer, but require that their AML/CTF programme includes procedures 
to identify and verify the identity of their customers. Consequently, there is no explicit requirement on 
reporting entities to apply CDD as specified in the Standard – what they do in each case is determined by their 
own procedure for how they meet the requirements. Pursuant to the provisions under Part 7 of the AML/CTF 
Act (section 80 et seq.) reporting entities are required to adopt, maintain and apply an AML/CTF programme 
that complies with the AML/CTF Rules. AUSTRAC supervises reporting entities’ respect of this obligation 
and applies sanctions as necessary, see also Recommendations 26 and 35. As a result, from a technical point 
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of view, the evaluation team is satisfied with the original structure of the AML/CTF obligations for reporting 
entities opted for by Australia.
a5.4. Enforceability	of	the	2014	AML/CTF	Rules.	Amendments to the 2007 Rules were adopted in May 
2014 and entered into force on 1 June 2014. The 2014 amendments introduced and amended a few, though 
essential, obligations, most importantly with respect to beneficial ownership, ongoing due diligence and 
politically exposed persons. In addition to the adoption of the Rules, the Policy (Additional Customer Due 
Diligence Requirements) Principles 2014 was issued by the Minister of Justice on 15 May 2014. Provision 213 
of the AML/CTF Act allows the Minister to give written policy with which AUSTRAC must comply. According 
to the policy, for 18 months after the entry into force of the Rules (1 January 2016), a civil penalty or an 
injunction, the issuing of a remedial direction, or the imposition of a requirement to undertake an external 
compliance audit, may be applied only if the reporting entity ‘has failed to take reasonable steps to comply 
with the relevant provision’. The policy specifies the matters to consider in determining whether a reporting 
entity has failed to take reasonable measures or not; they include the adoption of a transition plan and require 
that the Rules be applied as soon as practical in case of high ML/TF risk, and as soon as reasonable to existing 
customers. Notions such as ‘as soon as practical’ or ‘as soon as reasonable’ are not specified. Transition plans 
are to be established by 1 November 2014; they should include the necessary action and timeframes to ensure 
full compliance with the 2014 Rules from 1 January 2016. AUSTRAC advised that the policy reflects how 
AUSTRAC would have implemented and enforced the Rules in the absence of a formal policy issued by the 
Minister of Justice. The assessment team took the 2014 Rules into account for the purpose of the TC ratings.
Recommendation	9	–	Financial	institution	secrecy	laws	
a5.5. Australia was rated compliant in its 3rd round Mutual Evaluation Report. Since the adoption of the 
3rd round assessment, the AML/CTF Act was adopted in 2006. 
a5.6. Criterion	9.1	– The AML/CTF Act imposes on reporting entities a number of reporting obligations 
(Parts 3 and 4), in particular a suspicious matter report (SMR). The Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act) exempts 
from the non-disclosure prohibition where the disclosure is required or authorised by or under an Australian 
law or a court/tribunal order. As a result, the Privacy Act does not hinder the implementation of the AML/
CTF Act. 
a5.7. No obstacle that would inhibit the implementation of the FATF Recommendations was identified in 
the regime for correspondent banking, wire transfers, and reliance on third parties.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.8. Recommendation	9	is	rated compliant. 
Customer	due	diligence	and	record-keeping
Recommendation	10	–	Customer	due	diligence
a5.9. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 5. Deficiencies had 
been identified under most aspects of the Recommendation, as well as in the scope of the financial institutions 
covered. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress was made through the adoption of the AML/CTF Act in 
2006 and the AML/CTF Rules in 2007. The AML/CTF Rules were amended in 2014.  
a5.10. Criterion	10.1	– Sections 139 and 140 of the AML/CTF Act prohibit the provision and the reception 
of a “designated service”, including opening and operating an account as defined under section 6 of the AML/
CTF Act, using a false customer name or customer anonymity. The penalty is  two years imprisonment and/
or 120 penalty units. 
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a5.11. Criterion	10.2	– Section 32 of the AML/CTF Act requires that the applicable customer identification 
procedures (hereinafter ACIPs) be applied prior to the provision of a designated service, including operating 
an account or carrying out an occasional transaction, including wire transfers. Section 39 of the AML/CTF Act 
provides for general exemptions to the identification requirements. These exemptions can be found in the 
AML/CTF Rules and apply to: 
 Partial or full transfer of business from one reporting entity to another (Chapter 28). This situation 
is not in contradiction with the requirement of Recommendation 10.
 The identification of signatories of financial institutions with whom the RE has a correspondent 
banking relationship (Chapter 35).
 The sale of shares up to AUD 500 for charitable purposes (Chapter 38). This case is not in 
contradiction with the requirement of Recommendation 10. See also Recommendation 8.
 Premium funding loans for a general insurance policy (Chapter 39). This case does not seem to be 
in contradiction with the requirement of Recommendation 10. 
 Superannuation funds, when the total amount of interest to be cashed out does not exceed AUD 1 000, 
or when the total amount of interest to be cashed out does not exceed AUD 5 000 (Chapter 41). 
These cases do not seem to be in contradiction with the requirement of Recommendation 10. 
a5.12. Section 38 of the AML/CTF Act provides that the ACIP is deemed to be carried out if the customer 
has already been subject to ACIP consistent with the AML/CTF Act and Rules by another reporting entity. See 
Recommendation 17 below.
a5.13. With respect to occasional transaction above the USD/EUR 15 000 threshold and structuring: section 
6 of the AML/CTF Act sets the scope of the Act and therefore of the application of the CDD obligation. Among 
them, the issuance of stored value cards is covered by the AML/CTF Act if the value stored on the card is 
more than AUD 1 000 (if whole or part of the monetary value stored on the card may be withdrawn in cash) 
or AUD 5 000 (if the monetary value stored cannot be withdrawn in cash) and the increase of the value of a 
card with the same threshold. The latter case (reloadable cards) is not an occasional transaction and should 
therefore require that CDD be applied regardless of any threshold, which is not the case under the current 
Australian legislation. Stored value cards are identified in Australia’s NTA as presenting potentially high ML 
threats. Australia advised that a risk-based approach is applied to these means of payment and that, pursuant 
to items 21-24 in Table 1 in subsection 6(2) of the AML/CTF Act, the thresholds can be adjusted by regulation 
if necessary. 
a5.14. Section 6 of the AML/CTF Act is completed by Paragraphs 14.2 to 3 of the AML/CTF Rules which 
sets thresholds for the application of the provisions of Part 4.2 of the AML/CTF Rules (i.e. customer 
identification). Pursuant to these provisions, cheques drawn on a customer for less than AUD 5 000 or AUD 
1 000 for cheques funded by cash; transactions below AUD 1 000 relating to traveller’s cheques (i.e. issuing, 
cashing or redeeming); and currency exchange below AUD 1 000 are exempted from customer identification. 
These transactions do not exceed the USD/EUR 15 000 threshold set by the standard; however this raises 
an issue in the absence of a requirement to perform CDD for occasional transactions below the threshold 
that appear to be linked (i.e. structuring). Australia advised that reporting entities are required to detect 
structuring, as section 142 of the Act makes it an offence to structure transactions to avoid the reporting 
threshold (AUD 10 000). This argument is only relevant in the scope of the reporting obligation of section 43 
(and its exemptions in section 44). 
a5.15. Occasional transactions using wire transfers: there is no threshold for the identification and 
verification of the identity of the originator of wire transfers, regardless of the nature of the transfer. See 
Recommendation 16, below. 
a5.16. In case of suspicion of ML/TF, reporting entities are required under Paragraph 15.9 of the AML/
CTF Rules to apply enhanced due diligence. Paragraph 15.10 specifies that measures taken in the context of 
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enhanced CDD must be ‘appropriate to [the] circumstances’. The measures listed include the clarification or 
update of KYC information already collected on the customer, etc. 
a5.17. There is no explicit obligation for reporting entities to conduct CDD when they have doubts about the 
veracity or adequacy of the previously obtained customer identification data. However, Australia advised that 
pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 15.10 of the AML/CTF Rules, reporting entities are required to apply 
enhanced CDD (see criterion 10.17 below) when a suspicion has arisen, including in situations where there 
are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. 
a5.18. Criterion	10.3	– As mentioned in the preamble to the section, there are no direct requirements to 
identify and verify the identity of the customer in the Act or in the Rules. Reporting entities are required 
to have AML/CTF programmes that include procedures to identify/verify the identity of the customer and 
enable them ‘to be reasonably satisfied’ that the customer is who/what he claims to be. Chapter 4 of the 
AML/CTF Rules requires reporting entities1 to identify their customer and verify the information received. 
For each type of customer (i.e. natural persons, legal persons, trusts, etc.) the identification and verification 
requirements are specified. When the customer is a natural person, including a sole trader (Part 4.2 of 
the AML/CTF Rules): his/her name, date of birth and address must at a minimum be collected. The name 
must be verified as well as either the date of birth or the address. Verification is made through ‘reliable and 
independent documentation’ or electronic data or a combination of documents and electronic data. Parts 
4.9 and 4.10 of the AML/CTF Rules specify the verification requirement, either from documentation or from 
electronic data.
a5.19. Similarly, Parts 4.3 to 4.8 provide for customer identification, and verification of the identification 
information when the customer is a company, a trust, a partnership, an association, a registered co-operative 
or a government body. 
a5.20. Reliable and independent documentation is defined by the Rules as including but not limited to 
photographic and non-photographic identification documents, such as birth/citizenship certificates issued 
by a State/Territory/Commonwealth or foreign government, and secondary identification documents. 
Secondary identification documents – which can only be used to supplement primary documents to help 
establish identity, rather than prove identity – may include notices issued by utilities providers or schools; 
assessors are of the view that these documents cannot per se be seen as reliable documentation. Australia 
advised that in practice, reporting entities rely on multiple primary and secondary identification documents 
to verify the identity of their customers.
a5.21. Criterion	10.4	– Section 89 of the AML/CTF Act specifies that Part B of financial institutions’ AML/
CTF programmes must apply to agents purporting to act on behalf of a customer. Part 4.11 of the AML/CTF 
Rules contains different obligations considering the nature of the customer. Where the customer is a natural 
person, reporting entities are required under Paragraph 4.11.2 to identify the agent and collect evidence of 
their authorisation to act on behalf of the customer. There is no obligation to verify the identity of the agent 
of a customer, as Paragraphs 4.11.3 and 4 leave it to the reporting entities to determine whether and to what 
extent the identity of the agent must be verified. Where the customer is a ‘non-natural’ person, the name 
of the agent, his/her position or role with the customer, a copy of his/her signature and evidence of the 
authorisation to act on behalf of the customer must be verified (Paragraph 4.11.13).
a5.22. Criterion	10.5	– The beneficial owner is defined (Paragraph 1.2.1 of the Rules) as an individual who 
ultimately owns or controls (directly or indirectly) the customer. It is specified that control includes control 
1 The AML/CTF Act requires reporting entities to establish an AML/CTF programme, which is divided into two parts 
– Part A and Part B.  The primary purpose of Part A of the standard AML/CTF programme is to identify, mitigate and 
manage ML/TF risks that a reporting entity faces and includes AML/CTF risk awareness training for employees, 
employee due diligence programme, oversight by boards and senior management, and procedures for independent 
review of programme. The primary purpose of Part B is to set out the reporting entity’s ACIPs including beneficial 
ownership, ongoing CDD and enhanced due diligence. The AML/CTF Rules – including Chapter 4 – lays out items 
that the reporting entity are required to include in their AML/CTF programme.
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as a result of, or by means of, trusts, agreements, etc. and includes exercising control through the capacity 
to determine decisions about financial and operating policies. Owns means ownership (either directly or 
indirectly) of 25% or more of a person. 
a5.23. Pursuant to Part 4.12 of the AML/CTF Rules, reporting entities are required to collect information 
on the name, and either date of birth or address of each beneficial owner, and to take reasonable measures 
to verify it before the provision of a designated service, or as soon as practicable after the service has been 
provided. Pursuant to Paragraph 4.12.2 of the AML/CTF Rules, the obligation may be modified when the 
customer is a natural person, as the reporting entity may assume that the customer and the beneficial owner 
are one and the same person, unless there are reasonable grounds to consider otherwise. The obligation does 
not need to apply when the customer is a company or trust subject to simplified verification (i.e. Australian 
public listed companies and their majority owned subsidiaries, as well as companies licensed and subject to the 
regulatory oversight of a Commonwealth, State or Territory statutory regulator), an Australian Government 
Entity or a foreign listed public company subject to disclosure requirements concerning beneficial ownership 
comparable to those applicable in Australia. When the information is to be verified, verification must use 
reliable and independent documentation and/or electronic data (see above). The definition and obligations 
are largely in line with the FATF Recommendation; however, the exception concerning natural persons, trusts 
that are registered and subject to regulatory oversight, and companies that are licensed and supervised, is 
not authorised by the Standard, as it is not completely clear who this applies to and the level and type of 
supervision that is applied. Australia advised that the decisions with regard to trusts that are registered and 
subject to regulatory oversight and to companies that are licensed and regulated were made considering the 
existing high-level regulatory oversight and that both categories of legal entities are low risk.
a5.24. Criterion	10.6	– Paragraph 8.1.5 of the AML/CTF Rules only provides that an AML/CTF programme 
‘enable’ the reporting entity to understand the nature and purpose of the business relationship with its 
customer types (i.e. natural or legal persons), including, as appropriate, the collection of information relevant 
to that understanding. The use of ‘enable’ does not require a reporting entity to understand the nature and 
purpose of the business relationship. However, the  AML/CTF Rules were accompanied by an Explanatory 
Statement issued by the AUSTRAC CEO. Explanatory Statements are admissible as evidence under the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 as to the intention of the Rules. Item 2 of the Explanatory Statement that accompanied 
the AML/CTF Rules states that the amended text of Paragraph 8.1.5 requires reporting entities to understand 
the nature and purpose of their business relationships with their customers. Moreover, the reference to 
‘customer types’ used in this provision seems to deal with customers in general and does not contain the 
specific obligation to understand the nature and purpose of the relationship with every single customer. On 
the contrary, Australia advised that ‘customer types’ is used in Paragraph 8.1.5 to make it clear to reporting 
entities that all customers are included in this requirement.
a5.25. Criterion	10.7	 – Section 36 of the AML/CTF Act requires financial institutions to monitor their 
customers with a view to identifying, mitigating and managing ML/TF risks. Chapter 15 of the AML/CTF 
Rules further details the ongoing due diligence obligation. The transaction monitoring programme is risk-
based and must allow a reporting entity to identify suspicious transactions and have regard to complex, 
unusual large transactions and patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. 
Little information or guidance is given on how to implement the obligation; for example, there is no express 
reference to the KYC information and customers’ profile. Paragraph 15.3 of the AML/CTF Rules requires 
reporting entities to undertake reasonable measures to keep, update and review the documents, data or 
information collected under the ACIP (particularly in relation to high risk customers) and relating to the 
beneficial owner. The wording ‘reasonable measures’ is weaker than that of the criterion, which requires that 
CDD documents, data or information be kept up-to-date and relevant. 
a5.26. Criterion	10.8	– Paragraph 8.1.5(2) of the AML/CTF Rules requires reporting entities to understand 
the control structure of non-individual customers. There is no explicit requirement to understand the nature 
of their business and their ownership structure.
a5.27. Criterion	10.9	– The AML/CTF Rules specifies for each category of legal persons what information is 
to be collected and/or verified (see below). There is also a general provision, providing in each case that the 
financial institution should be reasonably satisfied that the legal person exists. The specified information for 
categories of legal persons and arrangements are as follows: 
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 Companies: The AML/CTF Rules, Part 4.3, specify the information that financial institutions are 
required to collect, including: the full name of the company, its addresses of registration and 
principal place of business, its registration number (either the Australian Company Number or 
Australian Registered Body Number), the nature of the company and the names of the directors. 
Only the name, legal form and registration number must be verified. Reporting entities determine 
on the basis of risk if other information should be verified.
 Trusts: Part 4.4 of the AML/CTF Rules requires financial institutions to collect information on the 
name of the trust, its type, country of establishment and information on the trustees, beneficiaries 
and, under specific circumstances, the settlor. Verification only applies to the name of the trust and 
its beneficiaries and is done using a trust deed, certified copy or certified extract of the trust deed. 
Reporting entities determine on the basis of risk if other information should be verified.
 Partnership: Part 4.5 of the AML/CTF Rules requires financial institutions to collect information on 
the name of the partnership, country of establishment, identity and address of each partner. Only 
the name of the partnership and information about one partner must be verified. Reporting entities 
determine on the basis of risk if other information should be verified. Verification is done using the 
partnership agreement, or a certified copy or extract of the partnership agreement.
 Associations: Part 4.6 of the AML/CTF Rules requires financial institutions to collect information 
on the name of the association, its address or that of its chairman, secretary or treasurer, name 
of the chairman, secretary and treasurer and unique identification number. Only the name and 
identification number are to be verified. In case of unincorporated associations, information on the 
name and address of the association, on the name of the chairman, secretary and treasurer and on 
the identity of the members must be collected. Only information on the name of the association 
and information on the members is to be verified. Reporting entities determine on the basis of risk 
if other information should be verified. Verification is done using the constitution or rules of the 
association, or a certified copy or extract. 
 Registered co-operatives: Part 4.7 of the AML/CTF Rules requires financial institutions to collect 
information on the name of the co-operative, its full address, unique identification number and the 
name of the chairman, secretary and treasurer. Only information on the name of the co-operative 
and unique identification number must be verified. Reporting entities determine on the basis of risk 
if other information should be verified. Verification is done through any register maintained by the 
cooperative, or a certified copy or extract. 
 Government bodies: Part 4.8 of the AML/CTF Rules requires financial institutions to collect and 
verify information on the name, principal place of operations and whether the government body 
is an entity or an emanation of the Commonwealth, a State, Territory or a foreign country or is 
established under the legislation of the Commonwealth, a State, Territory or a foreign country. 
a5.28. The identification of companies seems to be overall in line with the criterion. For customers that are 
legal persons, not all required elements must be verified, in particular the powers to bind the legal person 
and, for companies, the names of senior management (i.e. apart from the directors and those who appear 
on the legal person’s statutes). The obligation to verify the information gathered does not cover the entire 
information that is required to be collected by the AML/CTF Rules and is therefore not in compliance with the 
Standard. However, the AML/CTF programmes must include risk-based systems and controls to determine if 
the information collected other than that for which the verification is mandatory should be verified. 
a5.29. Criterion	10.10	– Part 4.12 of the AML/CTF Rules provide for the identification and verification 
of the identity of the beneficial owner, see criterion 10.5, above. Paragraph 4.12.9 of the AML/CTF Rules 
provides for the measures to be undertaken if the reporting entity has not been able to determine who the 
beneficial owner is. In this case, the reporting entity must identify and take reasonable measures to verify 
the identity of any individual exercising more than 25% of the voting rights or holding a position of senior 
managing official. This is in line with the Standard, though there is no gradation between the two measures 
of Paragraph 4.12.9. 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 155
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A5
a5.30. Criterion	10.11	– Part 4.4 of the AML/CTF Rules deals with the identification of trusts. As already 
described under criterion 10.9 above, the identification of the trust as a customer requires the identification 
of the trustees (pursuant to the rules applicable to the nature of the trustee) and beneficiaries. Information 
on the name and address of each trustee is required to be collected, as well as either information on the full 
name of each beneficiary or collection information on the class of beneficiaries. Amendments introduced in 
May 2014 now also require reporting entities to identify and verify the name of the settlor, unless the settlor’s 
contribution to the trust is less than AUD 10 000 at the time of its creation, or if the settlor is deceased, or if 
trust is subject to the simplified trustee verification procedure. Verification on the identity of the trustees and 
beneficiaries is not required by the Rules. Paragraph 4.4.11 leaves it to the reporting entities to determine 
whether and to what extent the identity of the agent must be verified. Paragraph 4.12.9 of the AML/CTF Rules 
requires reporting entities unable to determine who the beneficial owner of a trust is, to identify and take 
reasonable measures to verify the identity of any individual who holds the power to appoint or remove the 
trustees of the trust. 
a5.31. Criterion	10.12	–	Pursuant to item 39 of Table 1 under section 6 of the AML/CTF Act, the person(s) 
to whom a payment is made under a life insurance policy is considered as being the customer of the paying 
financial institution. CDD measures of Chapter 4 of the AML/CTF Rules described above apply to the customer 
at the time of the payment. No obligation applies in relation to the identity of the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy as soon as the beneficiary is identified or designated. 
a5.32. Criterion	10.13	– The beneficiary of a life insurance policy is considered as being the customer of 
the paying reporting entity, which is required to apply enhanced due diligence to the customer in certain 
circumstances, see criterion 10.17 below. 
a5.33. Criteria	 10.14	 and	10.15	 – Section 32 of the AML/CTF Act prohibits the provision of financial 
services if the financial institution has not carried out the ACIP. This prohibition does not apply to existing 
customers (section 28), in case of ‘low risk designated services’ (section 30) and in the circumstances of 
Chapter 46 of the AML/CTF Act dealing with the acquisition or disposition of a security or a derivative or 
a foreign exchange contract (section 33). The AML/CTF Rules do not list any low-risk designated service 
and no designated services have been listed as ‘low-risk’ since the enactment of the AML/CTF Act in 2006. 
Concerning the special circumstances of Chapter 46, a list of eight conditions is provided, including the 
impossibility for the customer to transfer the amount of the contract and the prohibition for the financial 
institution to accept cash. It is specified among the conditions of Chapter 46 that it is practically impossible 
to conduct the ACIP before the transaction, which must be performed rapidly due to the market conditions, 
and that the financial institution put ‘in place appropriate risk-based systems and controls to determine 
whether and in what circumstances to provide the designated service to a customer before the applicable 
customer identification procedure is carried out, including in relation to the number, types and/or amount of 
transactions’. The financial institution is required to carry out the ACIP within five business days (section 34 
of the AML/CTF Act and Chapter 46 of the AML/CTF Rules); otherwise, it must not continue to provide any 
transaction or service or to perform another transaction or service.
a5.34. Criterion	10.16	– Division 2 of Part 2 of the AML/CTF Act explicitly applies to existing customers. 
Obligations with respect to existing customers apply when a suspicion arises (section 29); the obligations are 
set forth in Part 6.3 of the AML/CTF Rules: financial institutions are required within 14 days after the suspicion 
arose to take at least one of the following actions: (i) perform ACIP; (ii) collect any KYC information; or (iii) 
verify certain KYC information. As a result, the financial institution should be satisfied that the customer is 
the person he or she claims to be. This mechanism does not seem to take account of the risk presented by the 
customer and its objective focuses on the identity of the customer (i.e. it does not cover beneficial owner or 
the functioning of the account). Moreover, it does not seem to be fully consistent as the trigger event would 
most likely be a transaction (that raises suspicion), while the objective and measures to take rather deal with 
the identification of the customer. Though this is not explicit in section 36 of the AML/CTF Act and in Chapter 
15 of the AML/CTF Rules, Australia advised that the requirement to monitor customers and the obligation to 
apply enhanced due diligence also applies to existing customers.
a5.35. Criterion	10.17	 – Paragraph 15.8 et seq. of the AML/CTF Rules provides for the enhanced CDD 
programme and measures to implement in this context. Such a programme must be implemented when the 
reporting entity determines that the ML/TF risk is high; when the customer is a foreign PEP; when a suspicion 
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has arisen; or, when the customer is located in a prescribed foreign country (i.e. Iran). The enhanced CDD 
measures to be taken must be appropriate to the circumstances. Examples of a range of measures are listed 
in Paragraph 15.10; some of the measures included in the range seem to address normal due diligence (e.g. 
clarification and update KYC information, including its activity or business, identification of the beneficial 
owner, etc.). Other measures, such as identification of the sources of funds and wealth, and seeking senior 
management approval, are more suited to enhanced due diligence. 
a5.36. Criterion	 10.18	 – Paragraph 4.3.8 allows financial institutions to apply simplified verification 
procedures when the customer is a domestic listed company, a majority owned subsidiary of a domestic 
listed public company or a company licensed and subject to the regulatory oversight of a Commonwealth, 
State or Territory statutory regulator. The verification measures are considered to be satisfied provided that 
the reporting entity at least obtains a search of the relevant domestic stock exchange, of the relevant ASIC 
database or of the license or other records of the relevant regulator or a public document issued by the 
relevant company. The application of simplified measures to companies that are licensed and supervised is 
not justified nor authorised under the FATF Standards. Pursuant to Paragraph 4.4.8, simplified verification 
procedures may apply to trusts that are managed investment schemes registered by ASIC, managed 
investment schemes that are not registered by ASIC under specific conditions, trusts registered and subject 
to the regulatory oversight of a Commonwealth statutory regulator, or a government superannuation fund 
established by legislation. Australia has not established that these cases have been identified through risk 
analysis.
a5.37. In Chapter 4 there are a number of provisions allowing financial institutions to apply CDD on the 
basis of risk. In most cases, it relates to measures other than those that are mandatory according to the Rules, 
e.g. collection of additional KYC information or verification of information other than in cases required by the 
Rules. In a few instances, the drafting of the provisions may lead to a complete exemption from CDD measures, 
in particular the verification obligation but also the obligation to collect information (see for example 
Paragraph 4.4.11 concerning the verification of the name of any or each trustee or beneficiary or class of 
beneficiaries or any other KYC information collected; Paragraph 4.11.3 on the verification of the identity of 
the agents of a customer, etc.) as the Rules leave it to the financial institutions ‘to determine whether [and in 
what manner] to collect and/or verify’ information.
a5.38. Criterion	10.19	– Where a financial institution is unable to comply with the relevant CDD measures, 
there is no requirement to not open the account/terminate the business relationship, or consider filing an 
SMR. If a reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that a customer is not the person who he/she/
it claims to be, including because the reporting entity is not able to comply with the CDD measures, the 
reporting entity must file an SMR pursuant to subsections 41(1)(d) and (e)  of the AML/CTF Act.
a5.39. Criterion	10.20	 –	There is no provision permitting financial institutions to not pursue the CDD 
process where there is a risk of tipping off, or requiring them to file an SMR in those cases (apart from the 
regular SMR obligation).
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.40. Several deficiencies have been identified under Recommendation 10 including: 
 exemptions provided by the AML/CTF Act and Rules diminish the application of CDD in every 
situation envisaged by the standard (e.g. signatories of financial institutions in domestic 
correspondent banking relationships, reloadable stored value cards operating at a threshold, 
occasional transactions below a threshold which appear linked); 
  shortcomings regarding verification requirements in relation to agents;  
 exemptions and simplified due diligence do not appear based on proven low risk; 
  shortcomings in relation to identification requirements and verification (powers to bind the legal 
entity and its senior managers) across all legal persons and legal arrangements including ownership 
structure; 
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 no requirement to identify the beneficiary of a life insurance policy until payout; limitations in 
enhanced customer due diligence which may be satisfied by updating identification which is 
considered normal due diligence; and 
 no requirements relating to not proceeding or terminating the business relationship when CDD is 
unable to complied with or to stop performing CDD if there is a risk of tipping off. 
a5.41. Recommendation	10	is	rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	11	–	Record-keeping
a5.42. In the 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant for Recommendation10. The main 
deficiencies were that the FTR Act did not cover transaction record-keeping for all types of financial 
institutions, and there were no specific requirements for account files and business correspondence to be 
retained. Record-keeping requirements were substantially amended respectively in 2006 and 2007 by the 
AML/CTF Act (Part 10) and AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. AUSTRAC has published guidance 
note 08/04 on record-keeping requirements to assist reporting entities to comply with their record-keeping 
obligations.
a5.43. Criterion	11.1	– Sections 106 to 110 of the AML/CTF Act applies to transaction records, and these 
requirements are comprehensive. Section 106 identifies designated services where a transaction record 
must be made and retained. If a reporting entity makes a record of information relating to the provision of 
a designated service, that reporting entity must also keep records for seven years in relation to transaction 
records, or a copy of transaction records for seven years following the closing of the customer relationship 
(section 107). A document or a copy of the document provided by a customer relating to the provision of a 
designated service must also be retained for seven years after the provision of the document (section 108). 
These are supplemented by broad requirements to keep transaction records in corporate legislation. Under 
section 286 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), all companies, registered schemes and other 
disclosing entities (whether or not they are financial institutions) must keep for seven years financial records 
that correctly record and explain their transactions and financial position and performance and would enable 
true and fair financial statements to be prepared and audited. 
a5.44. Criterion	11.2	–	Reporting entities must make and keep records of the ACIP, which must include the 
information obtained in the course of carrying out the procedure (sections 112 – 113 of the AML/CTF Act). 
These records seem to cover all CCD information collected and must be kept for seven years following the 
conclusion of the customer relationship. The following must also be kept for seven years: electronic funds 
transfer instructions, an AML/CTF programme made under Part 7 of the AML/CTF Act, and due diligence 
assessments of correspondent banking relationships (sections 115 – 117).
a5.45. Pursuant to a designating provision in section 107 of the AML/CTF Act, the AML/CTF Rules (Chapter 
29) exempt certain documents in particular customer-specific documents, such as account statements and 
documents routinely prepared by the reporting entity, correspondence, and records of customer enquiries 
from the record-keeping requirements. These exemptions mean that not all account files and business 
correspondence, and results of any analysis undertaken, needs to be kept. 
a5.46. Criterion	11.3	– There is no clear obligation in the AML/CTF Act that transaction records should 
be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions. AUSTRAC guidance note 08/04 (section 
7.3) indicates that AUSTRAC considers it preferable that transaction records be sufficient to permit the 
reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved, if any) so 
as to provide, if necessary, evidence for the potential prosecution of criminal activity. However, this is not a 
legally enforceable requirement. There are additional recordkeeping obligations laid out in the Corporations Act (section 988E) and the National Consumer Credit Act 2009 (section 92), that require – among other 
things – that financial records must be kept in sufficient detail to show particular details related to all money 
received or paid by the licensee. This may be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions 
into/out of some financial institutions, but there are gaps in the scope of financial institutions covered by these 
provisions and it is unclear whether this would capture all types of transactions. In the case of international 
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wire transfers and for transactions reported to AUSTRAC (either SMR or TTR), more detailed information 
may be available as it is required in the context of the reporting obligations.
a5.47. Criterion	11.4	– There is no requirement upon financial institutions to ensure that all CDD information 
and transaction records are available swiftly to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority. 
There are provisions relating to AUSTRAC’s monitoring and enforcement authorities (Parts 13-15 of the 
AML/CTF Act), including the power to give a written notice requiring the person to provide information 
or produce documents or copies of documents in the manner and within the time specified in the notice. 
AUSTRAC guidance note 08/04 (section 7.9) does indicate that, pursuant to AUSTRAC’s monitoring powers 
under Part 13 of the Act, records should be stored in a retrievable and auditable manner. However, the actions 
available under the monitoring and enforcement powers of AUSTRAC do match the swift availability of the 
records and are limited to AUSTRAC. The guidance note is not enforceable. There are additional provisions 
in section 49 of the AML/CTF Act for the heads of selected government authorities to request information 
directly from reporting entities; this authority is limited to information related to reports (SMRs, IFTIs or 
TTRs) filed by reporting entities.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.48. Reporting entities are required to keep records of the transactions with their customers and of their 
identification information for seven years. However, certain customer-specific documents are exempt from 
record-keeping requirements. There is also no requirement that the records kept be sufficient to permit the 
reconstruction of the transactions although Australia’s reporting framework provides a complementary 
backstop. Finally reporting entities are not legally required to ensure that the records are available to all 
competent authorities. Recommendation	11	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Additional	Measures	for	specific	customers	and	activities
Recommendation	12	–	Politically	exposed	persons
a5.49. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 6 as PEPs were not 
dealt with under the AML/CTF regime in place at that time. In subsequent follow-up reports, some progress 
was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, as 
amended in 2014. 
a5.50. Scope – Part 1.2 of the AML/CTF Rules provides the definition of PEP which is broadly in line with that 
of the FATF. However, it seems that the status of the PEP ceases with the position or function, as the definition 
refers to an individual who holds a prominent public position or function. Important political party officials 
are not explicitly covered by the Rules. Australia advised that they are covered by other categories, such as 
senior government officials or senior politicians. This may be true in Australia, but may not be adequate to 
cover important political party officials in foreign countries. Immediate family members are covered while 
the standard refers more broadly to ‘family members’. The notion of ‘close associates’ requires beneficial 
ownership of a legal person or arrangement. Australia advised that the definition of PEPs is inclusive.
a5.51. Criterion	12.1	– Part 4.13 of the AML/CTF Rules deals with PEPs. Pursuant to Paragraph 4.13.1, 
reporting entities are required to determine whether a customer or the beneficial owner is a PEP. This 
determination should occur before the provision of a designated service to the customer or as soon as 
practicable after the provision of a designated service. Paragraph 4.13.3 provides for the measures to be taken 
in case of foreign PEPs. If the PEP is the beneficial owner of the customer, the ACIP applicable to the customer 
should apply to the PEP. In all cases, the reporting entity should (i) obtain senior management approval 
before establishing or continuing the business relationship; (ii) take reasonable measures to establish the 
PEP’s source of wealth and source of funds; and, (iii) comply with the obligations in Chapter 15 on ‘Ongoing 
customer due diligence’. 
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a5.52. Criterion	 12.2	 – In addition to the common measures applicable to all PEPs, measures specific 
to domestic PEPs and PEPs of international organisations are set out in Paragraph 4.13.2 of the AML/CTF 
Rules. If the PEP is the beneficial owner of the customer, the ACIP applicable to the customer should apply to 
the PEP. If the PEP is considered as presenting high ML/TF risk, then the reporting entity should (i) obtain 
senior management approval before establishing or continuing the business relationship; (ii) take reasonable 
measures to establish the PEP’s source of wealth and source of funds; and, (iii) comply with the obligations in 
Chapter 15 on ‘Ongoing customer due diligence’. 
a5.53. Criterion	12.3	– The obligations described above apply to PEPs. The definition of which includes 
‘immediate family members’ and ‘close associates of PEPs’. 
a5.54. Criterion	12.4	–	As described under criterion 10.12, CDD measures only apply to the beneficiary of 
a life insurance policy at the time of the payout. There is no further obligation in case of higher risk situation.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.55. The AML/CTF Rules Amendment set comprehensive obligations for PEPs.. The notions of close 
associate, which requires beneficial ownership of a legal person or arrangement, and of family members, 
which only apply to the spouse, parents and children, are too restrictive. Important officials of political parties 
are not covered and there is no specific requirement for life insurance. Recommendation	12	is	rated	largely	
compliant.
Recommendation	13	–	Correspondent	banking
a5.56. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 7 as correspondent 
banking relationships were not regulated under the AML/CTF regime in place at that time. In subsequent 
follow-up reports, some progress was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/
CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.57. Criterion	13.1	– Pursuant to sections 97 to 99 of the AML/CTF Act and Part 3.1 of the AML/CTF 
Rules, financial institutions are required, in relation to the provision of correspondent banking services, to:
 Conduct a preliminary assessment (section 97(1) of the AML/CTF Act) of the risk the financial 
institution may reasonably face that the correspondent banking relationship might involve or 
facilitate ML/TF. This assessment is to be carried out before the establishment of the correspondent 
banking relationship and is to be carried out on a regular basis. No further indication is provided on 
how such an assessment should be conducted, using what information, etc. Based on the outcomes 
of the preliminary assessment, financial institutions may be required under section 97(2) of the 
AML/CTF Act to conduct a ‘due diligence assessment’. Pursuant to Paragraph 3.1.2 of the AML/CTF 
Rules, undertaking a ‘due diligence assessment’ is not compulsory; a reporting entity determines 
whether it is warranted based upon the preliminary assessment. This assessment of the ML/TF risk 
presented by the correspondent financial institutions covers among other things the existence and 
the quality of the AML/CTF regulation in the country of the correspondent institution; the adequacy 
of the AML/CTF internal control and compliance of the correspondent institution; information on the 
ownership, control and management, the reputation of the correspondent institution; information 
on whether the correspondent institution has been subject to ML/TF related investigations or 
prosecution, etc. This assessment must be conducted prior to the establishment of the correspondent 
banking relationship and must be updated on a regular basis. There is however no reference to the 
ML/TF supervision conducted in the country of the correspondent institution;
 Obtain prior approval from a senior officer of the financial institution;
 Document the respective responsibilities. There is no specification of the AML/CTF responsibilities, 
which therefore are deemed to be covered (section 99(2) of the AML/CTF Act).
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a5.58. However, as noted above, Part 3.1 of the AML/CTF Rules specifies that ‘due diligence assessment’ is 
implemented on the basis of risk, which is not permitted under the standard.
a5.59. Criterion	13.2	– There is no requirement with respect to payable-through accounts. However, in 
July 2007 AUSTRAC issued a guidance note to assist financial institutions in implementing their obligations 
in relation to correspondent banking relationships, which provides an example of a payable-through account.
a5.60. Criterion	 13.3	 – Section 95 of the AML/CTF Act prohibits financial institutions from entering 
into a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank, or with another financial institution that has 
a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank. It is unclear whether the prohibition extends to 
entering into a correspondent banking relationship with a financial institution that does not currently have a 
correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank, but would theoretically be permitted to engage in such 
a relationship in the future. Financial institutions are also required to terminate such business relationships 
within 20 days after becoming aware that the correspondent institution is a shell bank or within the period 
of time determined by AUSTRAC.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.61. The information reporting entities are required to gather and verify in the context of a correspondent 
banking relationship is insufficient as information on the AML/CTF regulation applicable to the correspondent 
bank; the adequacy of its internal controls; information on the ownership, etc. is gathered in the due diligence 
assessment, which a financial institution can conduct or not based upon the risk. There are no specific 
obligations for payable through accounts. Recommendation	13	is	rated	non-compliant.
Recommendation	14	–	Money	or	value	transfer	services
a5.62. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant on Special Recommendation VI as a 
number of deficiencies had been identified, in particular with respect to the licensing/registration of MVTS 
and limitations of the FTR Act. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress was made through the adoption 
respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.63. Criterion	14.1	– Part 6 of the AML/CTF Act relates to the Remittance Sector Register. Section 74 
provides that a person must not provide a registrable remittance network service or a designated remittance 
service unless they are registered as a remittance network provider, a remittance affiliate of a registered 
remittance network provider, or an independent remittance dealer. Sanctions are two-year’s imprisonment 
or 500 penalty units, or both. Pursuant to section 75, AUSTRAC is required to maintain the Remittance Sector 
Register. The Register indicates the name of the person; the category in which s/he is registered (remittance 
network provider, or an affiliate of a registered remittance network providers, or independent remittance 
dealer); as necessary, the name of the network to which the affiliate is affiliated; any conditions to which 
the registration of the person is subject; the date of effect of the registration; and the registrable details 
in relation to the person. AUSTRAC’s decision to register a person is made according to section 75C after 
having considered whether the person would involve a significant ML/TF or people smuggling risk that 
would potentially arise, should registration be granted. Registration is valid for three years; after that period, 
it must be renewed. AUSTRAC has large powers in the registration process. For example, further conditions 
to the registration can be imposed; further information can be requested; registration can be cancelled or 
suspended, in particular in case of significant ML/TF or people smuggling risk, etc. Pursuant to section 75M, 
any change that could materially affect the person’s registration must be notified by the registered person. 
Civil penalties apply in case of failure to notify substantial change on a registered person. 
a5.64. Criterion	 14.2	 – Australia advised that a series of measures has been implemented since the 
commencement of the AML/CTF Act in 2006 in order to identify unregistered MVTS. These measures include 
advertisements using radio and press in several languages, awareness raising and training sessions and 
material, the reliance on large money transfer networks to identify unlicensed remitters, etc. As mentioned 
above there are sanctions applicable to those persons: two years imprisonment and/or 500 penalty units. 
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a5.65. Criterion	14.3	– MVTS providers are subject to the monitoring of AUSTRAC for AML/CTF compliance. 
Australia advised that within AUSTRAC a team is dedicated to MVTS. This team is in charge of maintaining 
the Remittance Sector Register; dealing with the registration requests; and monitoring MVTS’ AML/CTF 
compliance. 
a5.66. Criterion	14.4	– As described above under criterion 14.1, agents (or affiliates in Australia’s AML/
CTF Act) are required under section 74 to register with AUSTRAC.
a5.67. Criterion	14.5	– Pursuant to section 84(5A) of the AML/CTF Act, a registered remittance network 
provider is required to make a standard AML/CTF programme available to its affiliates. This however does not 
prevent a remittance affiliate from adopting an individual specific AML/CTF program. Paragraph 54.2 of the 
AML/CTF Rules specifies that a remittance network provider assumes the TTR and IFTI reporting obligations 
of its agents. However, this does not entail that a remittance network provider monitors all activities of 
its agents. Australian authorities believe that there is an implicit requirement for a registered remittance 
network provider to monitor the compliance of its affiliates with the AML/CTF programme as part of the 
ongoing customer due diligence and transaction monitoring of the registered remittance network provider 
conducted on the affiliate, as the AML/CTF Act notes that the affiliates are the customer of the registered 
remittance network provider. However, the assessors believe that this was not sufficient in requiring the 
registered remittance network provider to monitor compliance of its affiliates with the AML/CTF programme 
and would recommend that this be made an explicit requirement.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.68.  MVTS are registered and supervised by AUSTRAC, which has taken a number of initiatives to ensure 
that all providers are registered. Agents of an MVTS provider can be included the provider’s AML/CTF 
programme, but this is not an obligation. Their compliance with the AML/CTF programmes is not monitored 
by the MVTS provider. Recommendation	14	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Recommendation	15	–	New	technologies	
a5.69. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 8 in the absence of an 
AML/CTF regime applicable to new technologies. In subsequent follow-up reports, some progress was made 
through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended 
in 2014. 
a5.70. Criterion	15.1	– Australia has identified and assessed in its 2011 NTA the ML risks associated with 
‘electronic payment systems and new payment methods’ which cover ATMs, credit/debit cards and stored 
value cards, online payment systems, online remittance and digital currencies. It seems to the assessors that 
among these items, not all can be considered as new technologies. Moreover, the NTA does not cover new 
business practices nor is it up to date. See also Recommendation 1. However, AUSTRAC also has conducted 
research on virtual currencies/Bitcoin and issued a policy.
a5.71. Reporting entities are required under section 81 of the AML/CTF Rules to adopt and maintain an 
AML/CTF programme whose objective, consistently with section 84(2), is to identify; mitigate and manage 
ML/TF risk. The AML/CTF Rules further specify under Parts 8.1 and 9.1 the factors to be considered for the 
identification of ML/TF risk, in particular the types of services provided and the methods by which services 
are delivered. The same provisions also state that the AML/CTF programme must enable reporting entities to 
assess the ML/TF risk posed by all new designated services prior to introducing them to the market; all new 
methods of designated service delivery prior to adopting them; and all new or developing technologies used 
for the provision of a designated service prior to adopting them.
a5.72. Criterion	15.2	– As described above, reporting entities are required to assess new services, methods 
of delivery and technologies prior to their adoption or use. However, other than the general obligation to 
assess the ML/TF risk (section 80 et seq. of the AML/CTF Act and Paragraphs 8.1.5 and 9.1.5 of the AML/CTF 
Rules), there is no specific explicit requirement for reporting entities to take appropriate measures to manage 
and mitigate the identified risks in the area of new technologies.
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Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.73. Australia demonstrated it had assessed ML/TF risks associated with some new products and 
technologies. Reporting entities are required to identify, mitigate and manage their ML/TF risks, but there is 
no specific obligation for new technologies. Recommendation	15	is	rated	largely	compliant. 
Recommendation	16	–	Wire	transfers
a5.74. Australia was rated non-compliant for Special Recommendation VII (wire transfers). There was 
no system to implement the requirements, only a reporting obligation for international wire transfers (a 
requirement which was deemed not-relevant in the context of and for the assessment of the compliance 
with SRVII, which required, as the current standard still does, that certain information flow to other financial 
institutions dealing with each wire). Since 2009, Australia has implemented measures intended to solve the 
shortcomings related to SR.VII. These have not been re-assessed as part of follow-up, but were extensively 
discussed with the authorities as part of this assessment and seem to address the earlier deficiencies. The 
requirements for Recommendation 16 have been extensively updated compared to SR.VII.
a5.75. For	all	 criteria	 – Australia meets the requirements regarding the originator information (name, 
account number or unique transaction reference, address or identity/customer number or date and place of 
birth). Australia also meets the requirement that originator information is retained with a transfer. However, 
the legislation does not yet require the new elements of Recommendation 16: verification of the accuracy 
of the information, beneficiary information, intermediary financial institutions, record keeping (for the 
information that is not required). There is no threshold in Australia, thus criterion 16.3 does not apply. The 
current legal framework applies to MVTS but only covers the requirements related to SR.VII. However, in 
practice, Australia already requires MVTS to report information on originator and beneficiary MVTS transfers 
when filing an SMR (not in law, but through the relevant report forms). With respect to the freezing obligations, 
Australia does not ensure that freezing action is undertaken in the context of Recommendation 16. 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.76. Australia has the elements in place to comply with the originator information requirements contained 
in the old SR.VII; however, the intermediary, beneficiary, verification, MSB and targeted financial sanctions 
elements have not yet been updated in line with the new Recommendation 16. Recommendation	16	 is	
rated	partially	compliant.
Reliance,	Controls	and	Financial	Groups
Recommendation	17	–	Reliance	on	third	parties
a5.77. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 9 in the absence of 
most of the requirements necessary to mitigate the risk posed by reliance on third parties. In subsequent 
follow-up reports, some progress was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/
CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.78. Section 38 of the AML/CTF Act sets out the conditions in which a reporting entity may rely on the 
CDD measures performed by a third party. The third party must be a reporting entity and have performed 
CDD consistent with the AML/CTF Act and Rules. Section 38(d) further provides that other conditions set 
out in the AML/CTF Rules must be satisfied. Chapter 7 of the AML/CTF Rules sets conditions in relation 
to financial advisers (i.e. holder of an AFSL) and for reporting entities that belong to the same designated 
group. Australia advised that only financial advisers and designated groups have expressed interest in the 
mechanism of section 38. Therefore, in other situations, the sole provisions of section 38 of the AML/CTF Act 
apply. In practice, reporting entities can only rely on a reporting entity located in Australia. The Explanatory 
Note of the Declaration, made on 16 March 2009 by the CEO of AUSTRAC, widens the range of third parties 
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on whom a reporting entity can rely to those that are a subsidiary of an Australian company located in a 
foreign country and that have customer identification procedures comparable to those prescribed under the 
AML/CTF regime in Australia. The objective of the declaration is to cover subsidiaries of Australian financial 
institutions located abroad, in particular in New Zealand.
a5.79. Criterion	17.1	–	Section 38 introduces the presumption that the ACIP has been conducted by the 
reporting entity that relies on the third party. It is not explicitly stated that the reporting entity relying on a 
third party remains ultimately responsible for CDD measures. When the reporting entity relying on a third 
party is a financial adviser or reporting entity belonging to the same DBG as the third party, Chapter 7 of the 
AML/CTF Rules requires that the reporting entity relying on a third party has obtained a copy of the record 
made by the third party, or has access to it and has determined that it is appropriate to rely on the ACIP carried 
out by the third party having regard to the ML/TF risk. There is no obligation in relation to the regulation and 
supervision of the third party located abroad or on the existence of measures in line with Recommendations 
10 and 11 for the third parties located abroad and regulated by foreign laws.
a5.80. Criterion	17.2	– As mentioned above, it is possible for Australian REs to rely on third parties located 
in Australia or abroad, in particular in New Zealand. Australia has not demonstrated that the ML/TF risk 
presented by New Zealand financial institutions was considered when the declaration expanding the scope 
of third parties to New Zealand financial institutions was issued. More generally, the Declaration of 16 March 
2009 makes it the responsibility of the reporting entity “to ascertain that under its risk-based procedure that 
the relevant ACIP has been carried out under an AML/CTF regime, which is comparable to the Australian 
AML/CTF Act”. 
a5.81. Criterion	17.3	– Part 7.3 of the AML/CTF Rules sets out similar conditions for relying on a third 
party within the same DBG to those described above. As demonstrated above, reliance on third parties is 
limited to those located in Australia and on the subsidiaries of Australian reporting entities located abroad.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.82. There are several deficiencies in Australia’s regulation of third party reliance. It is not explicitly 
stated that the reporting entity relying on a third party remains ultimately responsible for CDD measures. 
There is no obligation in relation to the regulation and supervision of the third party located abroad, or on 
the existence of measures in line with Recommendations 10 and 11 for the third parties located abroad and 
regulated by foreign laws. The geographic risk regarding New Zealand or any other country has not been 
taken into account when considering expanding the scope of third parties to financial institutions from this 
country was issued. Recommendation	17	is	rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	18	–	Internal	controls	and	foreign	branches	and	subsidiaries
a5.83. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendations 15 and 22 in the 
absence of an obligation for financial institutions to have AML/CTF internal controls, policies and procedures 
and to ensure that their foreign branches and subsidiaries apply AML/CTF measures consistent with the 
Australian requirements. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress was made through the adoption 
respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AMLM/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.84. Criterion	18.1	– Section 81 of the AML/CTF Act requires financial institutions to adopt, maintain 
and apply an AML/CTF programme. A standard programme applies to a particular financial institution; 
joint programmes apply to each financial institution that belongs to a particular DBG. Such programmes, 
either standard or joint, are divided into two parts. Part A is general; Part B relates to customer identification 
(sections 84(1)(b) and 85(1)(b)). Pursuant to sections 84.2 and 85.2, the objective of Part A is for the financial 
institution or entities of the DBG to identify, mitigate, and manage the ML/TF risk it may face. Chapters 8 and 
9 of the AML/CTF Rules provide details as to what Part A and the joint AML/CTF programmes must contain. 
 Compliance management arrangements, including the appointment of a compliance officer at the 
management level - Parts 8.4 and 8.5 and 9.4 and 9.5, require that Part A and the joint AML/CTF 
programme must be approved by the board and senior management of the financial institution or 
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group and that an AML/CTF compliance officer must be designated at the management level. There 
is no other compliance mechanism and the role and functions of the compliance officer are not 
further detailed. 
 Screening procedures when hiring employees – Parts 8.3 and 9.3 provide that Part A of an AML/CTF 
programme (either standard or joint) must include ‘an employee due diligence programme’, which 
‘put in place appropriate risk-based systems and controls for the reporting entity to determine 
whether to, and in what manner to, screen any prospective employee who, if employed, may be 
in a position to facilitate the commission of a money laundering or financing of terrorism offence’. 
Screening of potential employees is based on risk and therefore may not be performed. It is limited 
to ML/TF aspects. However, it should be noted that a new screening may be conducted in case of 
transfer or promotion of an employee. 
 Ongoing employee training programme – Parts 8.2 and 9.2 provide that Part A of an AML/
CTF programme (either standard or joint) must include an ‘AML/CTF risk awareness training 
programme’ which must be designed so that the reporting entity gives its employees appropriate 
training at appropriate intervals, having regard to the ML/TF risk it may reasonably face. The 
objective is to ‘enable employees to understand’ the AML/CTF obligations set out by the Act or the 
Rules and applicable to a particular financial institutions, the type of ML/TF risk that the financial 
institution may face, and the processes and procedures established in the AML/CTF programme. 
The wording ‘enable to understand’ is weaker than requiring that the employee understands AML/
CTF obligations.
  Independent audit function - Parts 8.6 and 9.6 provide that Part A of an AML/CTF programme 
(either standard or joint) must be subject to a regular independent review by an internal or external 
party. The objective is to assess the effectiveness of the Part A programme, its compliance to the 
AML/CTF Rules, and effective implementation. The result of the review is to be submitted to the 
board and senior management. The function is limited to the audit of Part A programmes. There are 
no indications as to the frequency of the “regular” review, or how to guarantee the independence of 
an internal audit, etc.
a5.85. Criterion	 18.2	 – As mentioned above, section 85 of the AML/CTF Act deals with the AML/CTF 
programme applicable in DBGs. DBGs are groups of two or more members that have decided to be member of 
the group. Part A of a programme is to identify, mitigate and manage ML/TF risk that each financial institutions 
of the DGB may face. The description and conclusions of criterion 18.1 above also apply.
 Sharing information – Part A of a joint programme is not required to contain policies and procedures 
on the sharing of information. It should be noted that the Act allows any member of a DBG to 
discharge certain obligations on behalf of other members. Section 123(7) of the AML/CTF Act is 
an exception to the tipping-off prohibition as it allows a member of a DBG with a joint AML/CTF 
programme to disclose information about one of its customer to another reporting entity within 
that DBG, in order to inform the other reporting entity about the risks involved in dealing with the 
customer.
 Group-level compliance, audit and/or AML/CTF functions – Section 207(3) of the AML/CTF Act 
allows a member of a DBG to disclose to the other members that an information notice pursuant to 
section 202 of the Act has been given. There are no further obligations for DBGs.
 Confidentiality and use of information exchanged – As mentioned above, members of a DBG may 
under certain circumstances disclose information in relation to a SMR to other members of the 
group. The financial institution to which information has been disclosed is prohibited to disclose it, 
unless the disclosure is made to another member of the DBG for the purpose of informing about the 
ML/TF risk. There are no further obligations in relation to confidentiality and use of information 
exchanged. 
a5.86. Criterion	 18.3	 – Section 6(6) of the AML/CTF Act extends the application of the Act to foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of Australian financial institutions. Part 8.8 and 9.8 deal with permanent 
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establishments in foreign countries (i.e. foreign branches). Paragraph 8.8.3 sets out without any further 
detail that where a foreign branch is regulated by AML/CTF laws comparable to Australia, only minimal 
additional systems and controls need to be considered by the financial institution. Paragraph 8.8.4 provides 
that Parts 8.1 to 8.3 (i.e. general provision on Part A programme, risk awareness training and employee due 
diligence programme) do not apply to foreign branches. Chapter 9 of the Rules contains similar provisions 
for DBGs. Except for section 6(6) of the Act, there are no provisions applicable to subsidiaries located abroad. 
There is no obligation for financial institutions with respect to the adequacy of the AML/CTF regime of host 
countries; and no obligation to apply the higher standard or Australia regime to the extent possible. There is 
no obligation to apply measures to manage ML/TF risks and to inform AUSTRAC when the host country does 
not permit the proper implementation of AML/CTF measures consistent with Australia’s AML/CTF regime.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.87. There are numerous deficiencies with respect to reporting entities’ internal controls: there is no 
obligation beyond the nomination at management level of a compliance officer, the audit function is limited 
and there is no indication of the frequency of the audit or guarantee of its independence. This also applies at 
the group level. There are a number of deficiencies concerning branches and subsidiaries located abroad, in 
particular the obligation to apply the higher standard. Recommendation	18	is	rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	19	–	Higher-risk	countries
a5.88. In the 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant for Recommendation 21. The deficiencies 
noted that while AUSTRAC has the authority under section 38(1)(e) of the FTR Act to indicate other countries 
as higher risk, it had made limited use of this provision. Also, there was no specific requirement for financial 
institutions to pay special attention to transactions involving countries that do not adequately apply the FATF 
Recommendations in accordance with Recommendation 21. Since 2005 specific regulatory measures have 
been implemented to target higher-risk countries.
a5.89. Criterion	19.1	– Chapter 15 (On-going Due Diligence) of the AML/CTF Rules requires reporting 
entities to apply their enhanced CDD programme when they determine the situation to be of higher risk, a 
ML/TF suspicion has arisen, or when entering, or proposing to enter, into a transaction with a party who is 
a natural or legal person in a prescribed foreign country. See the analysis in criterion 10.17 regarding what 
reporting entities must do as part of their enhanced due diligence programmes. Iran has been designated 
as a prescribed foreign country pursuant to the AML/CTF Regulations (as updated in 2012)—see also 
criterion 19.2 below. On the other hand, the DPRK has not been designated as a prescribed foreign country 
via the AML/CTF Regulations. While Australia imposes an autonomous sanctions regime in relation to DPRK, 
reporting entities are not legally required to apply enhanced due diligence measures to all customers from 
this country, although Australia notes that reporting entities do so in practice. However, this is not sufficient 
to meet the Standard.  
a5.90. Criterion	19.2	– Australia is able to apply counter-measures when called upon to do so by the FATF, 
or independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Part 9 of the AML/CTF Act allows regulations under the Act 
to impose countermeasures which regulate or prohibit transactions with legal and natural persons physically 
present in prescribed foreign countries (which includes situations when the FATF calls upon countries to 
do so or independently of any FATF call). Regulations made under Part 9 are subject to a two-year sunset 
effect. The AML/CTF Regulations were amended, with effect from 1 March 2012, to make Iran a prescribed 
foreign country and prohibit transactions of AUD 20 000 or more unless prior authorisation has been 
granted by DFAT. Reporting entities must also apply enhanced due diligence on customers and transactions 
involving Iran, including payments sent or received through third-party countries. AUSTRAC guidance note 
12/02 states that AUSTRAC expects all Iran-related transactions be treated as high-risk for the purposes of 
transaction monitoring.
a5.91. Criterion	19.3	– AUSTRAC Information Circulars (AICs) advise reporting parties of concerns about 
weaknesses in the AML/CTF systems of other countries. The AICs advise or update reporting entities of 
significant AML/CTF matters such as modified regulatory obligations, federal government listing of terrorist 
organisations, and UNSC or autonomous Australian sanctions. The circulars also publish the FATF Public 
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Statements and Improving Global AML/CTF Compliance documents and state that reporting entities should 
take into account FATF statements when considering whether transactions should be reported to AUSTRAC 
as suspicious.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.92. While reporting entities are required to apply enhanced due diligence (and counter-measures) to 
their relationships and transactions with Iran, they are not required to do so for DPRK, despite the FATF’s call 
to do so. While reporting entities must apply enhanced due diligence when they themselves determine there 
to be higher-risk, this does not equate to a requirement pursuant to criterion 19.1. And, among the measures 
for enhanced due diligence listed in the Rules, some address normal due diligence rather than enhanced due 
diligence. Recommendation	19	is	rated	partially	compliant.	
Reporting	of	Suspicious	Transactions
Recommendation	20	–	Reporting	of	suspicious	transaction
a5.93. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated largely compliant for both Recommendation 13 and Special 
Recommendation IV. Overall, the regime for reporting suspicious transactions within the FTR Act 1988 was 
comprehensive except that there was a limitation on the scope of “cash dealers” and a concern that the scope 
of the TF offence could slightly limit the reporting obligation. Provisions of the FTR Act were amended and 
updated in the AML/CTF Act(section 41). 
a5.94. Criterion	 20.1	 – Subsection 41(1) defines a series of “suspicious matter reporting obligation” 
triggers that then must be reported to AUSTRAC pursuant to subsection 41(2). Civil penalties apply for non-
reporting: up to 100 000 penalty units (AUD 17 million) for a body corporate, and up to 20 000 penalty units 
(AUD 3.4 million) for an individual. 
 For ML-related SMRs: these must be reported within 3 business days after the day of forming 
the suspicion on reasonable grounds that the provision or prospective provision of the service 
is preparatory to or may be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of ML, a tax offence, or 
any other offence. “Money Laundering” means any offence against Division 400 of the CC, or any 
corresponding State, Territory, or foreign offence. 
 For TF-related SMRs: these must be reported within 24 hours after forming the suspicion on 
reasonable grounds that the provision or prospective provision of the service may be preparatory 
to or may be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of financing of terrorism. “Financing of 
terrorism” includes: any offence against section 102.6 or Division 103 of the CC; an offence against 
section 20 or 21 of the CotUNA; or any corresponding State, Territory, or foreign offence. See	the	
analysis	of	Recommendation	5	–	 limitations	 in	the	scope	of	 the	TF	offence	may	somewhat	 limit	 the	
reporting requirement.
a5.95. Criterion	 20.2	 – Section 41 includes references to a “prospective” provision of a service when 
suspicion can be formed (and then must be reported), which incorporates the concept of attempted 
transactions. The reporting obligations apply regardless of the amount of the transaction involved.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.96. There are some limitations in the scope of the TF offences given that the reporting requirement is 
directly tied to the criminalisation in the CC. However, the assessors believe that the limitation is sufficiently 
minor as to not have a material impact on the reporting requirement. Recommendation	 20	 is	 rated	
compliant. 
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Recommendation	21	–	Tipping-off	and	confidentiality
a5.97. Criterion	21.1	– Section 235 of the AML/CTF Act protects a person or an officer, employee or agent 
of this person from any action, suit or proceeding (whether criminal or civil) in relation to any acts made in 
good faith in carrying out compliance with any requirement in the AML/CTF Act, Regulations, or Rules. 
a5.98. Criterion	21.2	– Section 123(1) indicates that if a SMR obligation arises or has arisen for a reporting 
entity in relation to a person, and the reporting entity has filed an SMR, the reporting entity must not disclose 
to someone other than the AUSTRAC CEO or a member of the staff of AUSTRAC that information has been 
communicated to the AUSTRAC CEO. 
a5.99. Section 123(2) further provides that if a reporting entity has formed an applicable suspicion (but 
has not yet filed an SMR), the reporting entity must not disclose to anyone other than the AUSTRAC CEO or 
an AUSTRAC staff member about the suspicion or about any other information from which the person to 
whom the information is disclosed could reasonably be expected to infer that the suspicion had been formed. 
However, subsection 123(4) specifies a number of cases where section 123(2) does not apply, including when 
the reporting entity is: a legal practitioner; a partnership or company that carries on the business of using 
legal practitioners to supply professional legal services; a qualified accountant, or a partnership or company 
that carries on a business of using qualified accountants to supply professional accountancy services; and 
the information relates to the affairs of a customer of the reporting entity; and the disclosure is made for the 
purposes of dissuading the customer from engaging in conduct that could constitute an evasion of a taxation 
law or evasion of a law of a State or Territory that deals with taxation; or an offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth, State, or Territory. It is unclear to what extent these exemptions weaken the confidentiality 
requirements before an SMR is filed. The Australian authorities should clarify in what circumstances this 
could apply to reporting parties that may be lawyers or accountants but also carry out “financial activities” 
as defined by FATF. 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.100. Recommendation	21	is	rated	compliant.
Designated	non-financial	businesses	and	professions
Preamble: Scope of DNFBPs
a5.101. The AML/CTF Act applies to those who provide a service designated in section 6, tables 6.1, 6.2 
and 6.3. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 deal with bullion dealers and gambling services, including casinos. Chapter 52 
of the AML/CTF Rules exempt persons licensed to operate no more than 15 gaming machines from most 
of the AML/CTF obligations, in particular CDD, internal control and record keeping obligations. These two 
categories are the only two DNFBPs explicitly targeted by the AML/CTF Act. Other DNFBPs (i.e. real estate 
agents, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals and accountants, and TCSPs) 
are only covered when they provide one of the designated services – i.e. essentially acting in the capacity 
of a financial institution under the FATF Recommendations. None of the services designated relates to real 
estate agents, dealers in precious stones or TCSPs activities. The AML/CTF Act applies to lawyers, notaries 
and other independent legal professionals when they provide a designated service. Australia specified that 
lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals may provide the designated services listed under 
Table 6, Items 6, 7 and 54 that relate to money lending and services provided as holder of an AFS licence. 
These three items are financial activities and dealt with in section 5 of this annex. They are not specific to 
lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals and Recommendation 22. Solicitors are referred 
to in the FTR Act and require that they report cash transactions exceeding AUD 10 000 (see below). 
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Recommendation	22	–	DNFBPs:	Customer	due	diligence
a5.102. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 12 as deficiencies 
had been identified under most Recommendations referred to in Recommendation 12, in particular 
Recommendations 5 and 10, and in the scope of the DNFBPs covered. In subsequent follow-up reports, 
progress was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF 
Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.103. Criterion	22.1 is not met. Pursuant to Chapter 10 of the AML/CTF Rules, gambling services are 
required to identify their customer when they carry out transactions above AUD 10 000 (approximately 
USD 9 000 / EUR 6 000) which exceeds the USD/EUR 3 000 threshold for this criterion. Bullion dealers 
are also obliged to perform CDD measures for transactions of AUD 5 000 or more, which is in line with the 
standard. When applicable, CDD obligations for casinos and bullion dealers are similar to those applicable by 
financial institutions and described in Recommendation 10.
a5.104. Criteria	22.2	to	22.5	–	See Recommendations 11, 12, 15 and 17.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.105. Only casinos and bullion dealers are subject to AML/CTF obligations. The AML/CTF Act also provides 
exemptions for casinos and lawyers, though these two sectors have been identified as high ML threat in 
the NTA. The identification threshold for casinos exceeds that set forth in the Recommendation. See also 
conclusions under Recommendations 11, 12, 15 and 17. As a result, Recommendation	22	 is	rated	non-
compliant.	
Recommendation	23	–	DNFBPs:	Other	measures
a5.106. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated non-compliant on Recommendation 16 as deficiencies 
had been identified under most Recommendations referred to in Recommendation 16, in particular 
Recommendations 13, 15 and 21, and in the scope of the DNFBPs covered. In subsequent follow-up reports, 
progress was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF 
Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a5.107. Criteria 23.1 to 23.4 - See Recommendations 20, 18, 19 and 21.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a5.108. Given that most DNFPBs are not subject to AML/CTF requirements on suspicious transaction 
reporting, instituting internal controls and complying with higher risk countries requirements, and the 
deficiencies identified under Recommendations 18 and 19 for DNFBPs that are subject to the requirements, 
Recommendation	23	is	rated	non-compliant.
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Recommendation	26	–	Regulation	and	supervision	of	financial	institutions
a6.1. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant on Recommendation 23 because of the 
low number of AML/CTF inspections, lack of tools, and quality of the supervision. In subsequent follow-up 
reports, progress was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and 
AML/CTF Rules, lastly amended in 2014. 
a6.2. Criterion	26.1	–	Pursuant to sections 212 and 229 of the AML/CTF Act, AUSTRAC is in charge of 
the “promotion of compliance this Act, regulations and AML/CTF Rules” and is empowered to “make rules 
prescribing matters required or permitted by the AML/CTF Act to be prescribed by AML/CTF Rules”. Pursuant 
to section 212(1)(f) of the Act, AUSTRAC has other functions as conferred on the CEO of AUSTRAC under this 
Act, including monitoring compliance with the AML/CTF Act, Rules and Regulations as mentioned under 
section 190 of the Act. 
a6.3. Criterion	26.2	–	
a6.4. Core Principles financial institutions: 
 Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) (i.e. banks, building societies, credit unions, certain 
participants in credit card schemes, and providers of certain purchased payment facilities) are 
required to be licensed to carry on banking business (section 8 of the Banking Act 1959). Section 
9 provides for the licensing process. In particular, APRA is responsible for granting licenses, as 
necessary imposing further conditions, and revoking licenses
 Financial intermediaries (i.e. investment banks) that are not operating as an ADI are required to 
obtain an AFSL before conducting financial services business. AFSLs are issued by ASIC. 
 Holders of an Australian Credit License (ACL) are licensed by ASIC. A national licensing scheme is 
applied for people who want to engage in credit activities in relation to consumers under the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 and must hold an ACL or be an authorised representative of a 
licensee.
 APRA registers superannuation funds of trustees regulated by APRA. Their trustees (other than 
trustees of self-managed superannuation funds which are regulated by the ATO) are licensed and 
registered by APRA; they may be required to hold an AFSL granted by ASIC depending on the nature 
of the operation carried out.
  Insurance: general insurers are required to be authorised under section 12 of the Insurance Act 1973 
(Insurance Act) and life insurers are required to be registered under section 21 of the Life Insurance 
Act 1995 (Life Insurance Act). In both cases, the authorisation and registration are granted by 
APRA and are in the nature of a license, as APRA assesses the applications received and can impose 
additional conditions prior to authorisation or registration.
a6.5. Other financial institutions: 
 Remittance sector: Part 6 of the AML/CTF Act sets out the framework for the enrolment (registration) 
of money remitters. As is the case for the Core Principles financial institutions, registration is not 
automatic. Additional conditions can be decided by the AUSTRAC CEO and a prior assessment as to 
whether the registration would involve a significant ML/TF or people smuggling risk is conducted, 
including the fact key personnel have been charged or convicted for offences and risks deriving from 
beneficial ownership arrangements. 
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 Currency exchange houses, (bureaux de change) where physical currency is settled immediately, 
must enrol (register) with AUSTRAC. 
a6.6. The establishment or the operation of shell banks is not expressly prohibited, but the licensing 
process seems to preclude it. Section 9 of the Banking Act requires institutions to be licensed by APRA in 
order to conduct a banking business. APRA’s Guidelines on Authorisation of ADIs set out a number of criteria, 
including on the head office, management and supervision, that applicants must fulfil, that seems to make it 
clear that a shell bank will not be authorised as an ADI. 
a6.7. Criterion	26.3	– 
 Financial institutions regulated by APRA – Section 19 of the Banking Act prohibits ‘disqualified 
persons’ from acting for an ADI. Section 20 defines disqualified persons to include persons who 
have been convicted of an offence under the Banking Act, Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 
2001, Corporations Act, or of an offence of any law, where the offence relates to dishonest conduct 
or to conduct relating to a company carrying out business in the financial sector. ML/TF offences 
are not expressly mentioned but Australia advised that they would fall within the scope of offences 
relating to dishonest conduct or to conduct relating to a company in the financial sector. The 
Banking Act does not include fitness and propriety as conditions for the licensing. ADIs must have a 
fit and proper policy and are primarily responsible for the quality of their senior management (i.e. 
directors, senior managers and auditors). However, a licence may be revoked for lack of fitness and 
propriety. 
 The Insurance Act, Life Insurance Act and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 contain 
similar provisions.
 The fit and proper requirement for ADIs, general insurers and life insurance companies is further 
detailed in the Prudential Standard CPS 520. In particular, it is specified that financial institutions 
must have a written policy on fit and proper requirements and are responsible for its implementation. 
Such a policy applies to directors, senior management and auditors; they are required to be skilled, 
experienced, competent, diligent and honest. The fit and proper policy applies to applicants to 
certain functions, but also on an annual basis for each responsible person position and in case of 
suspicion. 
 The Financial	 Sector	 (Shareholdings)	Act	1998 imposes approval requirements where more than 
15% of the voting shares in an ADI are to be held by an individual or a group. Shareholders are 
not subject to fit and proper obligations; however, the ADI Authorisation Guidelines issued by 
APRA state that ‘all substantial shareholders are required to demonstrate to APRA that they are 
‘fit and proper’ in the sense of being well-established and financially sound entities of standing and 
substance’.
 AFSL holders – except if licensed by the APRA, applicants to an AFSL are required to meet minimum 
obligations set out in the Corporations Act. ASIC must grant a licence if a business shows it can 
meet basic standards such as training, compliance, insurance and dispute resolution. There is no 
fit and proper obligation. A number of Licensing Regulatory Guides are available on the website 
of ASIC. One of them elaborates on the basic obligations, including the role and function of senior 
management, the obligation to provide services in an efficient, honest and fair way, employee 
screening and training. It should however be noted that regulatory guides are not law and do not 
constitute legal advice; they only provide guidance. 
 There are no fit and proper requirements regarding ACL holders. ACL holders are required to 
lodge annual compliance certificates which may be verified by ASIC. However, there are no direct 
obligations regarding fitness and propriety.
 Remittance providers: Pursuant to section 75C of the AML/CTF Act, the ML/TF risks are to be 
considered by AUSTRAC while deciding to register a remittance provider. Chapter 57 of the AML/
CTF Rules specify the other matters that are to be regarded for the registration process; they deal 
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with the offences for which the applicant has been charged or convicted, the legal and beneficial 
ownership and control of the applicant, etc. 
 There are no fit and proper requirements regarding currency exchange businesses (‘bureaux de 
change’).
a6.8. Criterion	26.4	– AUSTRAC supervises all reporting entities under the AML/CTF Act, including Core 
Principles financial institutions, money remitters and ‘bureaux de change’ (or currency exchange businesses). 
All providers of designated services are under a legal obligation to enrol with AUSTRAC for supervision. 
AUSTRAC focuses on AML/CTF supervision of reporting entities at a corporate group level.
a6.9. AUSTRAC supervises all reporting entities under the AML/CTF Act, including Core Principles 
financial institutions, money remitters and currency exchange businesses (‘bureaux de change’). AUSTRAC 
focuses its efforts on the supervision on groups entities which provide services and products identified as 
having a higher exposure and vulnerability to ML/TF. 
a6.10. Criterion	26.5	– AUSTRAC applies to a certain extent a risk-based approach in its supervision of 
reporting entities at a corporate group level for efficiency reasons. Selection for assessment, frequency 
and intensity of on-site and off-site supervision of corporate groups (reporting entity groups - REGs) and 
individual reporting entities is determined on the basis of ML/TF risks identified in the NTA, exposure to 
ML/TF risk because of the size of the group, and the volume and value of transaction reports lodged with 
AUSTRAC, and specific interest by AUSTRACs internal risk committee or partner agencies. Through previous 
direct compliance engagements with REGs and/or individual reporting entities, AUSTRAC has information 
regarding internal controls and procedures associated within the REG and/or those individual reporting 
entities. Inherent ML/TF risks are only taken into account to a certain extent; as far as reported transactions 
may indicate, while size of the REG can be just be one of several factors in determining risk among other 
factors (for example activities of entities within the REG, geographical risk, product risk, client risk, etc.). 
Only after selection of individual reporting entities for assessment does AUSTRAC seek to collect further 
information to get a more complete risk profile of that reporting entity, mainly based on its information 
lodged through reporting requirements. Regarding ML/TF risks present in Australia, reference is made to 
industries and channels mentioned in the NTA. However, the NTA gives guidance on the current inherent ML/
TF risks in Australia (see Recommendation 1) to a limited extent. 
a6.11. Criterion	26.6	– AUSTRAC does not fully assess or re-assess the REG’s risk profile, as insight in 
compliance risks are yet to be further developed. AUSTRAC advised that the ML/TF risk profiles of the high 
risk groups are reviewed through yearly cycles, and low risk groups in three yearly cycles. These reviews 
include regular follow up actions by AUSTRAC monitoring the remediation given by the group. To a limited 
extent reviews of risk profiles of groups and reporting entities outside these high risk groups are undertaken. 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a6.12. Licensing or registration requirements and fit and proper obligations are in place regarding the 
financial sector. AUSTRAC applies to a certain extent a risk-based approach in its supervision of reporting 
entities at a corporate group level. ML/TF risks are not adequately identified by AUSTRAC, as risks are 
primarily identified by activity in a sector determined to be high risk by the NTA and mainly through analysis 
of transaction reporting. Risk profiles of the high risk groups are reviewed through yearly cycles; those of low 
risk groups in three yearly cycles. These reviews include regular follow up actions by AUSTRAC monitoring 
the remediation given by the group, but the depth of follow-up varies. To a limited extent reviews of risk 
profiles of REGs and reporting entities outside these high risk groups are undertaken. Recommendation	26	
is	rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	27	–	Powers	of	supervisors
a6.13. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant on Recommendation 29 due in particular 
to the limited powers of AUSTRAC and low level of implementation. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress 
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were made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, 
lastly amended in 2014. 
a6.14. Criterion	27.1	–	
 Supervision	- Sections 147, 148 and 150 of the AML/CTF Act list the powers of AUSTRAC’s authorised 
officers, which include the power to enter premises and to search, examine, and inspect documents, 
etc. in order to monitor compliance with the AML/CTF Act and Rules. However, all of these powers 
are conditional upon either the consent of the reporting entity to enter the premises or a monitoring 
warrant. Moreover, the Act permits a reporting entity to revoke the access of AUSTRAC’s authorised 
officers to its premises. Pursuant to section 161, AUSTRAC may require reporting entities to appoint 
an external auditor. The AUSTRAC CEO must specify what matters are to be covered by the audit and 
must be given a copy of the audit report.  
 Ensuring compliance – Section 190 of the AML/CTF Act provides for the situations where violations 
to the AML/CTF obligations of financial institutions are identified. The following paragraph lists 
some of the measures (‘remedial directions’) that AUSTRAC can take in the case of a reporting 
entity breaching the AML/CTF obligations. Ensuring compliance with the AML/CTF Act is also one 
the functions of AUSTRAC’s CEO pursuant to section 212 of the Act. Section 212(2) also specifies 
that AUSTRAC’s CEO must consider while performing his functions a number of factors, such as 
the integrity of the financial system; crime reduction; competition; economic efficiency; the FATF 
Recommendations and any relevant Convention or Resolution; etc. 
a6.15. Criterion	27.2	– Pursuant to sections 147 and 148 of the AML/CTF Act, AUSTRAC’s officers have the 
authority to conduct inspections (i.e. to enter the premises of a financial institution and search and examine 
necessary documents). However, inspections can only take place with the consent of the occupier of the 
premises or if a magistrate has issued a warrant (section 159). Moreover section 152 allows the financial 
institution to refuse to consent to the entry in the premises of the financial institution. 
a6.16. Criterion	27.3	– Section 150 of the AML/CTF Act provides AUSTRAC’s officers with the authority 
to ask questions and seek production of documents. As mentioned above, this power may be completed 
only with the consent of the occupier of the premises or if a magistrate issues a warrant. Section 167 of 
the AML/CTF Act authorises authorised officers to ask by a written notice to be provided with information, 
documents or copies of a document under the forms set in the notice. In both cases, omissions are sanctioned 
by imprisonment of 6 months and/or 30 penalty units. 
a6.17. Criterion	27.4	– There is a range of sanctions available for sanctioning violation of the AML/CTF 
obligations. Civil and criminal penalties can be imposed by a court. Remedial directions and enforceable 
undertakings are administrative actions that AUSTRAC can impose. See Recommendation 35. Sanctions do 
not include the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend the reporting entity’s licence. AUSTRAC can, pursuant 
to section 75G of the AML/CTF Act, cancel a remitter’s registration in case of significant risk of ML/TF, suspend 
or impose conditions on the registration. Regarding financial institutions licensed by APRA, AUSTRAC can 
refer breaches to APRA which maintains the power to withdraw the licence.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a6.18. AUSTRAC has powers to supervise and ensure compliance with AML/CTF requirements to the extent 
that these are conditional upon the consent of the reporting entity. Entering the premises and the search, 
examination and inspection of reporting entities’ documents can be limited by the reporting entity, although 
where required warrant powers exist. Moreover the Act permits a reporting entity to at any time revoke the 
access of AUSTRACs authorised officers to its premises. A warrant is then necessary for AUSTRAC to execute 
its powers. Therefore, Recommendation	27	is	rated	partially	compliant.
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Recommendation	28	–	Regulation	and	supervision	of	DNFBPs
a6.19. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant on Recommendation 24 as most 
DNFBPs lack effective AML/CTF regulation and supervision. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress was 
made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, lastly 
amended in 2014. 
a6.20. Criterion	 28.1	 – Casinos, gambling and gaming houses are required to be licensed by State or 
Territory casino control authorities. Under each State or Territory legislation, the licensing authority considers 
the applicant’s suitability. However, the State and Territory licencing authorities do not have express AML/
CTF responsibilities to qualify as competent authorities. In addition, not all legislation requires the licensing 
authority to consider the associates of the applicants (see for example the Gaming Control Act of the Northern 
Territory). Post-licensing, casinos are subject to the AML/CTF legislation and supervised by AUSTRAC. 
a6.21. Criteria	28.2	to	28.4	– With the exception of bullion dealers supervised by AUSTRAC, other DNFBPs 
are not subject to AML/CTF obligations, and therefore are not monitored by competent authorities or self-
regulated bodies. The entry standards and fit and proper requirements differ across the various DNFBP 
sectors, and are absent in some instance (e.g. bullion dealers, TCSPs).
a6.22. Criterion	28.5	– Only casinos and bullion dealers are supervised by AUSTRAC to which it applies the 
same approach as that applied to the supervision of other reporting entities. See Recommendation 26.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a6.23. Only casinos, gaming outlets, and bullion dealers are supervised for AML/CTF compliance. 
Considering the fundamental deficiencies in the scope of AML/CTF coverage and supervision of DNFPBs as 
covered under IO.3, Recommendation	28	is	rated	non-compliant.
Recommendation	34	–	Guidance	and	feedback	
a6.24. Australia was rated PC with the previous Recommendation 25. The assessment identified that most 
of the guidance was heavily focussed on SUSTRs, but inadequate in regard to general detailed CDD guidance. 
Guidance also did not cover most DNFBPs. On feedback, the assessment indicated that while there was some 
general and specific feedback on STRs, AUSTRAC could provide more sanitised examples of actual ML cases 
and/or information on that decision or result of an SUSTR. The language of the Recommendation has not 
changed. However, since the last assessment Australia has adopted a new AML/CTF Act and issued new 
AML/CTF Rules, archived most of the guidance issued under the previous legislation, and issued some new 
guidance. 
a6.25. Criterion	 34.1	 – AUSTRAC issues a wide range of guidance covering most aspects of AML/CTF 
obligations of reporting entities from its website. Feedback is mainly general but does now include a range of 
sanitised cases. The guidance does not apply to most DNFBPs as they are not reporting entities.
 Almost all guidance is issued by AUSTRAC – mostly on its website, pursuant to a general obligation 
of the AUSTRAC CEO to “advise and assist reporting entities in relation to their obligations”. The 
material issued includes policies, guidance notes, information circulars, legal interpretations, 
newsletters, guides, information booklets and brochures, risk assessments, annual typology and 
case studies reports, and typology briefs. In addition, AUSTRAC provides guidance and feedback 
during consultations with industry as well as via an E-Learning application and a help desk for 
reporting entities. The issued material addresses a range of issues, with much of it focusing on 
sending signals to industry about how AUSTRAC will exercise its regulatory functions, particularly 
for non-compliance. The key document is AUSTRAC’s “Compliance Guide” (available at: www.
austrac.gov.au/austrac-compliance-guide.html) which comprehensively explains the obligations of 
reporting entities. 
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 A concern is that the regulatory framework gives reporting entities substantive discretion for 
applying the AML/CTF requirements and allows simplified measures for all medium and low risk 
situations, yet there is only limited guidance for identifying high risk customers or situations. 
 Feedback provided to reporting entities is mainly general, published, since 2007, in AUSTRAC’s 
annual typologies and case studies report (which contains sanitised examples of actual cases drawn 
from SMRs). AUSTRAC also highlights positive examples of suspicious reporting, as well as general 
areas of deficiency (e.g. late reporting, insufficient detail in certain fields) at industry meetings and 
forums. AUSTRAC does provide specific feedback on SMRs to some reporting entities as part of their 
compliance assessments and ongoing regulatory engagement. AUSTRAC also provides detailed 
feedback on regulated entities compliance with requirements as part of its supervisory role (see 
IO3). 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a6.26. AUSTRAC issues a wide range of guidance covering most aspects of AML/CTF obligations of reporting 
entities. The material issued includes a comprehensive “Compliance Guide”. Feedback has improved since the 
introduction of the AML/CTF Act in 2006 and includes a range of sanitised cases. A concern is the limited 
guidance available for identifying high risk customers or situations. In addition, none of the guidance applies 
to most DNFBPs. Recommendation	34	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Recommendation	35	–	Sanctions
a6.27. In its 3rd assessment, Australia was rated partially compliant on Recommendation 17 due in particular 
to the limited powers of AUSTRAC and low level of implementation. In subsequent follow-up reports, progress 
was made through the adoption respectively in 2006 and 2007 of the AML/CTF Act and AML/CTF Rules, 
lastly amended in 2014. 
a6.28. Criterion	35.1	– Sanctions for Recommendation 6: Violations of terrorist and TF related targeted 
financial sanctions (i.e. UNSCRs 1267/1989, 1989 and 1373) are sanctioned by a maximum of 10 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine the greater of either AUD 425 000 (approx. USD 391 000 / EUR 283 000) or three 
times the value of the transaction when committed by a natural person,  and a fine the greater of either AUD 
1.7 million (approx. USD 1.5 million / EUR 1.1 million) or three times the value of the transaction when 
committed by a legal person. 
a6.29. Sanctions for Recommendation 8 to 23: The AML/CTF Act provides for a number of civil penalties 
and criminal offences when obligations are violated. Moreover, AUSTRAC has some powers to directly impose 
actions in case of violation of the AML/CTF obligations. In addition, it may apply to a court for a civil penalty 
order in case of violation of the obligation to apply customer’s identification procedures (section 31), to verify 
the identity of the customer (section 35), to conduct on-going due diligence (section 36), to report suspicious 
matters (section 41), etc. Pursuant to section 175(4) of the AML/CTF Act the maximum civil penalty that 
can be imposed is 100 000 penalty units for a corporation and 20 000 penalty units for natural persons, or 
AUD 17 million and 3.4 million respectively (or approximately USD 15.5 million – EUR 11 million and USD 3 
million – EUR 2.3 million). AUSTRAC can also apply to the court for an injunction restraining a person from 
doing something or requiring a person to do something (section 192). With respect to money remitters, 
AUSTRAC can, in addition to the measures above, suspend or cancel the registration (sections 75G and H of 
the AML/CTF Act).
a6.30. Criminal sanctions are also imposed by a court. They are available for a limited number of offences for 
failure to implement obligations related to R.8 to 23, and are listed in Part 12 of the AML/CTF Act: providing 
false or misleading information or documents; falsifying documents for use in an ACIP; providing or receiving 
a designated service using a false name or customer anonymity; structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting 
obligation; failing to register; failing to respond to questions; and failing to respond to notices. The first three 
offences are the most severe as they are punishable by 10 years imprisonment and/or 10 000 penalty units. In 
addition to these penalties and offences provided in the Act, AUSTRAC may give remedial directions (section 
192). They are written directions through which AUSTRAC requires a reporting entity to take specified action 
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towards ensuring that the reporting entity does not breach its AML/CTF obligations. Remedial directions are 
enforced by a court and are published on the website of AUSTRAC. Criminal sanctions are also available for 
tipping-off, punishable for two years or 120 penalty units or both.
a6.31. Australia also relies on the powers of the AUSTRAC CEO to give remedial directions (section 191) 
and to accept enforceable undertakings (section 197 et seq.). A remedial direction is a “written direction 
requiring the reporting entity to take specified action directed towards ensuring that the reporting entity 
does not contravene the civil penalty provision, or is unlikely to contravene the civil penalty provision, in 
the future”. An enforceable undertaking is a “written undertaking given by a person that the person will, in 
order to comply with this Act, the regulations or the AML/CTF Rules, take specified action or refrain from 
taking specified action”. With respect to remitters, AUSTRAC can refuse, cancel or suspend a registration in 
case of significant risk of ML/TF. AUSTRAC does not have the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend the 
reporting entity’s license. For reporting entities licensed by APRA, AUSTRAC can refer breaches to APRA, 
which maintains the power to withdraw a license. However, APRA does not have the direct ability to put 
conditions on or revoke a license, or to remove managers and directors for breaches of the AML/CTF Act and 
Rules. APRA may only revoke a license for breaches of the Banking Act (section 9A), its regulations, or the 
Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001.
a6.32. There are a range of sanctions available for AML/CTF breaches; the maximum fines seem to be high 
enough to apply sanctions that are proportionate to the violation and dissuasive. See also criterion 27.4.
a6.33. Criterion	35.2	– Sanctions for the violation of AML/CTF obligations apply to the offender, be it a 
natural or a body corporate. Part 2.5 of the CC provides for the criminal liability of bodies corporate. The 
offence must be “committed by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate acting within the actual 
or apparent scope of his or her employment, or within his or her actual or apparent authority” and the 
intentional element “must be attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised 
or permitted the commission of the offence”. Section 231 of the AML/CTF Act explicitly states that Part 2.5 
of the CC applies to the offences against the AML/CTF Act. Sections 232 and 233 relate to the civil liability of 
corporations and of persons other than corporations.
a6.34.  It is not specified in the AML/CTF Act or in the Rules that, in addition to the sanctions applicable 
to the natural person who violates an AML/CTF obligation of the Act or of the Rules, directors and senior 
management of financial institutions or DNFBPs are also liable for the violation committed and therefore may 
be sanctioned (except in the cases where the violation is committed by a director or senior manager).
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a6.35.  Given the scope issues on DNFBPs, the AML/CTF requirements in Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23 
do not apply to DNFBPs. The range of sanctions for AML/CTF breaches is limited, particularly what can be 
directly applied by AUSTRAC, but the maximum fines are sufficiently high to be viewed as proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions. Sanctions do not apply to all the DNFBPs that are regulated by competent authorities, 
and do not extend to directors and senior management if it is the reporting entity that breach the AML/CTF 
Act or the Rules. Recommendation	35	is	rated	partially	compliant.
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7. LEGAL	PERSONS	AND	ARRANGEMENTS
Recommendation	24	–	Transparency	and	beneficial	ownership	of	legal	persons	
a7.1. Australia received a largely compliant rating in 2005 for Recommendation 33 in the 
2004 Methodology (the predecessor to Recommendation 24). The only deficiency noted in the 
2005 assessment was that administrative measures supporting corporate on-going maintenance did not 
provide adequate access to beneficial ownership information in a timely manner for the majority of legal 
persons. Recommendation 33 was not part of the follow-up process for Australia given the strength of this 
rating. The new Recommendation 24 is much more detailed than the previous standard.
a7.2. Criterion	 24.1	 – The principal forms of legal persons in Australia are proprietary companies, 
public non-listed companies, public listed companies, incorporated limited partnerships, and incorporated 
associations. All companies (proprietary and public companies) must register with ASIC. ASIC maintains 
a record of the incorporation, as well as type of incorporation, of each company on its publicly accessible 
“Companies and Organisations Register”, which is updated and maintained on an on-going basis. The process 
for the creation of these legal persons and for the obtaining and recording of basic ownership information 
about them is clear. There is no clear process for the obtaining or recording of beneficial ownership information 
(as that term is defined by FATF). However, pursuant to the provisions in Part 6C.2 of the Corporations Act, 
beneficial ownership tracing notices can be issued with respect to a person’s interest in the shares of a public 
company (listed company or listed investment scheme). Other legal persons, such as incorporated limited 
partnerships, incorporated associations, are incorporated by the States and Territories. There is no beneficial 
ownership tracing notice mechanism available for State/Territory entities. The processes for the creation 
and the public availability (all registers are publically available) of information relating to these types of legal 
persons, including on beneficial ownership, therefore vary throughout the country. 
a7.3. Australia reports that in 2012-13 there were approximately 2 million registrations with ASIC, 
including 1 990 551 proprietary companies; 21 690 public companies; and 3 324 foreign companies. 
a7.4. Criterion	24.2	– Australia has assessed the threat of ML through corporate vehicles and other legal 
persons in its (sanitised) NTA and, in the context of organised crime, in the sanitised version of the ACC’s 
biennial OCTA (Organised Crime in Australia). The NTA made a distinction between corporate entities that 
can be used to conceal ownership and public companies where shares can be purchased using proceeds of 
crime. The first scenario was given a high threat rating; the second a medium threat rating. The sanitised 
version of the NRA is silent about legal persons. 
a7.5. Criterion	24.3	–	The Corporations Act (section 117) requires the provision of specific information 
on company information when an application for registration is made, including the address of the registered 
office, share structure of the company, name and address of directors (who cannot be legal persons) and 
whether a registered company will have an ultimate holding company in Australia or overseas. Other required 
information is registered as well. ASIC maintains a Companies and Organisations Register (on which the 
information is publicly available). According to section 112 of the Corporations Act, proprietary and public 
companies are registered under the Act. The registration process for the other types of legal persons, including 
incorporated limited partnerships and incorporated associations, and the basic information required in this 
context vary throughout the country. Australia advised that according to State and Territory legislation, the 
name of the entity, its legal form and status, its address, the basic regulating powers and officeholders and 
members are registered and that this information is publically available.
a7.6. Criterion	24.4	– Under section 168 of the Corporations Act companies must set up and maintain a 
shareholders (“members”) register which contains each member’s name and address, and date of entry of 
the member’s name in the register. If the company has more than 50 members there must be an up-to-date 
index of names that is easily accessible. Where the company has share capital, that register must also contain 
information including the date, number and share class allotted to each member. It must also contain the 
amount paid for each share. The register must also show the names and details of former shareholders and 
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the date they stopped being a member. This information is required to be held at the company’s corporate 
registered office (section 172).
a7.7. Criterion	 24.5	 – A number of provisions of the Corporations Act require that changes in the 
information submitted to ASIC be notified within a specified timeframe (usually within 28 days of the change). 
Failure to notify such changes is punished by an AUD 10 700 fine and/or one year of imprisonment. ASIC also 
has the power to require a company to respond to a return of particulars (section 348A of the Corporations 
Act), which may be issued at any time. Failure to respond to such notice is also liable of an AUD 10 700 fine. 
Every year, on the anniversary date of their registration, legal persons registered with ASIC are subject to 
an Annual Review Process for the purposes of updating their information registered in the public register. 
The register of members kept at the registered office of the company must also be kept up to date. However, 
Australia has not indicated any mechanism to ensure that information on the registers of members kept by 
companies is accurate, as no diligence to verify the information recorded is required (however, it is an offence 
under section 1308(2) of the Corporations Act to provide false or misleading information to ASIC; moreover, 
shareholders may take legal action under section 175 to correct the register). 
a7.8. Criteria	24.6	and	24.7	– While the Corporations Act requires companies to obtain and hold accurate 
and up-to-date information on the direct owner of the shares of a company there is no requirement in the Act 
for companies or ASIC to obtain and hold up-to-date additional information to determine the ultimate natural 
person who is the beneficial owner beyond the immediate shareholder. Nor are companies required to take 
reasonable measures to obtain and hold this information. As a result, beneficial ownership information 
is only recorded if the legal owner of the share certificate happens to be the beneficial owner. For public 
companies (listed company or listed investment scheme) Australia also relies on the provisions of Part 
6C.2 of the Corporations Act, according to which ASIC or a company can require any person to disclose the 
name and address of another person, who has a relevant interest in any of the shares or interests of a public 
company, or the name and address of each person who has given the person instructions about acquisition, 
exercise or any other matter relating to the shares. The information disclosed must be recorded in a register 
kept by the company. This mechanism also provides information on the beneficial owner if the person having 
an interest or having given instructions happens to be the beneficial owner. It is also not clear how beneficial 
ownership information could be obtained on foreign companies, which may register with ASIC but which 
must only maintain a local agent (who can be a natural or legal person). Pursuant to the introduction of 
the 2014 AML/CTF Rules, reporting entities are now required to identify the beneficial owner and take 
reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner (see Recommendation 10.5). For all the 
information above, Australia has not indicated any mechanism to ensure that the information collected is 
accurate, as no diligence to verify the information recorded is required.
a7.9. Criterion	 24.8	 – Australia partly addresses this issue (through criterion 24.8(a)) by requiring 
proprietary companies to have at least one director ordinarily resident in Australia. Public companies 
must have at least three directors, and at least two of them must ordinarily reside in Australia. Proprietary 
companies must notify ASIC about the details of the top 20 members for each class of shares, including 
whether the shares are not held beneficially. Companies other than proprietary companies must have a 
company secretary. ASIC can request and/or compel information that is available from the resident directors 
and secretaries, but only in relation to the information that this person(s) holds or has knowledge about. 
Foreign registered companies must have at least one local agent ordinarily resident in Australia, who may be 
liable for breaches of the Corporations Act.
a7.10. Criterion	24.9	– The Corporations Act requires that the directors of deregistered companies (or 
companies which otherwise cease to exist) maintain the books and records of the company (“books” is defined 
in the Act to include virtually all company records including the members’ (shareholders’) register, etc.) for 
a period of three years from the time a company is de-registered. Section 286 of the Act requires financial 
records to be held for at least five years. Subsection 542(2) of the Corporations Act also requires liquidators 
to keep books and records for five years. There is no specific provision applicable to ASIC in this context. 
a7.11. Criterion	24.10	– ASIC has sweeping statutory authority to require disclosure of all information held 
by corporations established under the Corporations Act by virtue of Part 3 of the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act). ASIC also has the power to issue tracing notices under Part 6C.2 of 
the ASIC Act (see also criterion 24.6 above). These powers include powers to require production, inspection, 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 179
LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
A7
disclosure, attendance, compelling assistance, and other wide powers (including warrants). The AFP and 
State/Territory Law enforcement authorities in Australia also have wide powers to secure ownership, control 
and other information from companies incorporated under the Corporations Act.  
a7.12. Criterion	24.11	– Corporations established under the Corporations Act are prohibited from issuing 
bearer shares (section 254F). There is no prohibition on corporations issuing bearer share warrants. While 
rarely seen, there are no mechanisms, statutory or otherwise, to mitigate the risk of ML and/or TF posed by 
these instruments.
a7.13. Criterion	 24.12	 – Nominee shareholders and nominee directors are permitted under the 
Corporations Act. Australia applies the following mechanisms aiming to ensure that such nominees are not 
abused: 
 With respect to nominee shareholders, a shareholder may hold shares for the benefit of another 
person (including a legal person) either as trustee or nominee or otherwise on behalf of, or on 
account of, another person. In those cases, under section 1072H of the Corporations Act the 
shareholder of such shares must advise the company that he/she/it is holding those shares “non-
beneficially” and the company must indicate in the share register that those shares are not held 
beneficially (section 169(5A)). Failure to comply with this requirement is an offence under the 
Act (section 1311(1)) attracting penalties. ASIC’s power to trace beneficial owners of shares for 
publicly listed entities (Part 6C.2 of the Corporations Act) means that, where applicable, nominee 
shareholders are required to disclose the identity of the nominator. The information disclosed 
must be kept in the company’s register. This mechanism does not apply to the vast majority of legal 
entities – only to public companies.  
 With respect to nominee directors, the Corporations Act refers to these as “alternate directors” 
(section 201K). A company must notify ASIC within 28 days if a person is appointed as an alternate 
director. The following details are required when appointing an alternate director: full name and 
any former names; date and place of birth; residential address; date of appointment; the name 
of the director for whom the individual is an alternate; and the expiry date (if applicable). If the 
appointment is open-ended, they must provide the date of appointment only and the terms of 
appointment. These must include details such as the timeframe of the appointment, capacity to sign 
instruments and attend meetings.
a7.14. Criterion	 24.13	 – ASIC has a range of administrative, civil and criminal remedies under the 
Corporations Act. The failure to comply with some statutory requirements constitutes an offence punishable 
by monetary penalties or terms of imprisonment. For example:
 Failure to maintain a member’s register - maximum penalty of AUD 1 170 or imprisonment for three 
months or both for an individual and AUD 8 500 for a company. 
 Failure to notify ASIC about a change to a member register or a change to the company’s share 
structure - maximum monetary penalty of AUD 10 200 for an individual and AUD 51 000 for a 
company. 
 Failure to notify ASIC about the appointment/cessation of a director or a change in a director’s 
address - maximum monetary penalty of AUD 10 200 or imprisonment for one year or both, and 
AUD 51 000 for a company. 
 Failure of a person to comply with a tracing notice under Part 6C.2 - maximum monetary penalty of 
AUD 4 250 or six months imprisonment or both for an individual and AUD 21 250 for a company. 
 The Court may disqualify persons from managing corporations in certain circumstances, including 
repeated contraventions of the Corporations Act. 
a7.15. Criterion	 24.14	 – Australia is able to provide international co-operation through a range of 
mechanisms (see Recommendations 37-40 below), including any and all information relating to directors and 
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shareholders. In addition ASIC has a number of MOUs with both countries and international organisations, 
and it is also a signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding. These arrangements 
are published on ASIC’s public website. Public information on legal persons from the ASIC website is also 
available to foreign competent authorities, and the site is structured to assist with other regulators who are 
not party to an MOU to request information from ASIC.  
a7.16. Criterion	24.15	– There is no information that Australia monitors the quality of assistance it receives 
from other countries in response to requests for basic and beneficial ownership information or requests 
for assistance in locating beneficial owners residing abroad. However, Australia advised that its competent 
authorities regularly provide feedback to the authorities from which they have received assistance, see also 
Recommendation 40.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a7.17. There are some measures in place to prevent the misuse of legal persons for ML and TF purposes. 
The registration processes and the necessary supporting information implemented either by the federal, 
the States or the Territories are diverse. There are a number of deficiencies with respect to the beneficial 
ownership of legal persons and Australia relies exclusively on ASIC to trace beneficial ownership of shares, 
which only deals with public listed companies – no such mechanism exists for private companies, or legal 
persons established under State/Territory legislation. There are some measures to improve the transparency 
of legal persons which can have nominee shareholders and alternate directors. Recommendation	24	 is	
rated	partially	compliant.
Recommendation	25	–	Transparency	and	beneficial	ownership	of	legal	arrangements
a7.18. Australia received a partially compliant rating for Recommendation 34 (the predecessor to 
Recommendation 25) in the 2005 assessment, Australia has not reported any progress in relation to correcting 
the deficiencies noted in relation to Recommendation 34. The assessment noted that “overall the mechanisms 
to obtain and have access in a timely manner to beneficial ownership and control of legal arrangements, and 
in particular the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries of express trusts, are insufficient.” 
a7.19. Criterion	25.1	– There is no requirement in Australian law (federal, state or territorial law) that 
requires trustees of express trusts to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on the 
identity of settlors, trustees, protectors (if any) and beneficiaries of trusts, including any natural person who 
exercises ultimate effective control over a trust. While trusts that receive income are required to file a tax 
return with the ATO, and in doing so state who the trust beneficiaries are, the requirement to state those 
beneficiaries extends only to the direct beneficiary under a trust and not to other beneficiaries (for instance 
the shareholders of corporate trust beneficiaries).
a7.20. Criterion	25.2	– There is no legal requirement for information on trustees, beneficiaries, settlors 
and others such as protectors (if any) to be held up-to-date and accurate. 
a7.21. Criterion	25.3	– There is no explicit obligation on trustees to disclose their status when entering into 
a business relationship or conducting an occasional transaction with a financial institution entity or a DNFBP 
(it is an offence to omit to provide information when entering into a business relationship with a reporting 
entity where omission of that information would mean that what information is given is misleading under 
section 139 of the AML/CTF Act). There are however obligations on reporting entities providing designated 
services. These obligations are described in detail under criteria 10.9 and 11, above.
a7.22. Criterion	25.4	– There are no prohibitions in law on trustees providing trust-related information to 
competent authorities. 
a7.23. Criterion	25.5	– Competent authorities including law enforcement (AFP and ACC), tax authorities, 
and AUSTRAC have powers to obtain information relating to trustees, beneficiaries, trustee residence and 
assets managed under a trust.  
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Australia - 2015 © FATF and APG 2015 181
LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
A7
a7.24. Criterion	 25.6	 – There is no framework at a State/Territory level governing the exchange of 
information in relation to trusts. Domestic and international exchanges could be accomplished only within 
the framework of a criminal investigation, and the use of MLA requests. At the federal level information 
may be exchanged domestically when agency secrecy requirements allow and MOUs exist between relevant 
agencies, which hold information relevant to trusts (the ATO and ACNC) and through double tax agreements 
and international information exchange agreements with foreign counterparts. 
a7.25. Criterion	25.7	–	Trust law is contained in State legislation. NSW is the largest state in Australia. 
Under the NSW Trustee Act 1925, penalties for trustees who fail to perform their duties are not proportionate 
and dissuasive. The only penalties available in NSW are removal of the trustee (which is not a sanction) 
or a civil claim for equitable restitution/compensation (also not a sanction) by an affected beneficiary. The 
Trustee Act 1925 does not provide for fines or other civil or administrative measures to address breaches of 
obligations imposed upon trustees. Trustees who commit fraud on beneficiaries may be liable under criminal 
law but not for beaches of the law applicable to them as trustees – only under general criminal law. However, 
trustees are also legally liable for any failure to perform the duties relevant to meeting the obligations of the 
trust, as trusts are not separate legal entities. Measures applicable to trustees include the restoration of loss, 
the account of profit or the liability for legal costs. Injunctive relief is also available against trustees.
a7.26. Criterion	 25.8	 – There are proportionate and dissuasive sanctions available (criminal, civil or 
administrative) to enforce the requirement to grant competent authorities access in a timely manner to 
information where held regarding trusts. Section 49 of the AML/CTF Act permits a number of agencies to 
issue notices subject to civil penalties (sections 49(2) and (3)); failure to comply with the ATO’s information 
gathering powers under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 may result in administrative penalties being 
applied; and the ACC Act and POCA contain criminal penalties where the relevant agencies are not allowed 
access.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a7.27. There is no obligation for trustees to hold and maintain information on trusts or to keep this information 
up-to-date and accurate. In the absence of such obligations, the transparency of legal arrangements cannot be 
guaranteed. As	a	result,	Recommendation	25	is	rated	non-compliant.
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8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Recommendation	36	–	International	instruments	
a8.1. Australia received a largely compliant rating for Recommendation 35 (the predecessor to 
Recommendation 36) in the 2005 MER. One deficiency was noted, namely that Australia has not fully 
implemented the TF Convention because of insufficient measures to identify beneficial owners of accounts 
and transactions. Recommendation 35 was not addressed in mutual evaluation follow-up reports given the 
strength of the rating for the recommendation. 
a8.2. Criterion	36.1	– Australia ratified the following instruments (with dates):
Table	A8.1.		Instruments	ratified	by	Australia	
Title Date Comments
Vienna Convention 16 November 1992 no reservations
Terrorist Financing Convention 26 September 2002 no reservations
Palermo Convention 27 May 2004 no reservations
Merida Convention 7 December 2005 no reservations
a8.3. Criterion	36.2	–	Deficiencies in the TF offence (i.e. the scope of terrorist acts in the TF Convention 
covered) affect the implementation of the TF convention (see Recommendation 5).  
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a8.4. Australia has ratified all the relevant Conventions. In terms of implementation, Australia has 
implemented most of the relevant articles; however, deficiencies in the TF offence affect the implementation 
of the TF Convention. Recommendation	36	is	rated	largely	compliant.
Recommendation	37	-	Mutual	legal	assistance
a8.5. Australia received a compliant rating for Recommendation 36 and a largely compliant rating for 
Special Recommendation V (both of which are the predecessors to the combined new Recommendation 
37) in the 2005 MER. Neither of the previous recommendations were the subject to follow-up reporting 
by Australia on the basis of the ratings. The requirements in (new) Recommendation 37 are much more 
detailed.
a8.6. Criterion	37.1	– The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (MACMA) (amended in 2012 
to streamline procedures) provides a basis for legal assistance to foreign jurisdictions. Section 11 provides 
the federal Attorney-General with general power to receive requests from foreign countries. Section 9 
provides that assistance may be provided to a foreign country subject to conditions determined by the 
Attorney-General. MLA treaties are not required in Australia to render assistance. However, Australia has 
concluded up to 29 MLA treaties (which may be necessary in order for Australia to request assistance from 
other jurisdictions). Under the MACMA, Australia may provide assistance as follows:
 Non-coercive powers: no applicable offence threshold applies – it must simply be a ‘criminal matter’. 
Australia can prioritise requests relating to foreign ‘serious offences’ attracting a maximum penalty 
of imprisonment for at least 12 months, death, or a fine exceeding 300 penalty units. 
 Coercive measures: MACMA section 13(1A) and following sections provide for such measures 
as taking of evidence for criminal proceedings, provision of material, applying for search and/or 
surveillance warrants, authorisation for proceeds of criminal restraints, etc. 
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a8.7. Australia can also make MLA requests to obtain documents and other evidence (e.g. witness 
testimony) from foreign countries in a form admissible in Australian courts under the Foreign Evidence Act 
1994. 
a8.8. Criterion	 37.2	 – The Australian Central Authority (ACA) within the AGD is Australia’s central 
authority for MLA. The AGD maintains a website that contains fact sheets and other information for countries 
wishing to make MLA requests to Australia. The ACA also maintains a case management system which records 
the details of each MLA request. Case officers are responsible for updating the database, and can utilise a 
function which sets up a timeline of ‘next actions’ for the case officer to complete certain actions to process 
the request. The database is accessible by case officers only.
a8.9. Criterion	37.3	– MACMA section 8(1), (1A) outlines mandatory grounds and section 8(1B) outlines 
discretionary grounds for the Attorney-General to refuse foreign assistance requests. None of the grounds 
stipulated in those sections are unreasonable or unduly restricted. They relate, for instance, to requests 
for assistance where offences are of a political nature or where the death penalty or torture might apply. 
In addition, section 13 states that there must be a “proceeding” in the foreign country before the Minister 
can issue an authorisation to take evidence. That term is defined in section 3(1) to include an inquisitorial 
proceeding before an investigative Magistrate or a grand jury but does not include a criminal investigation. 
Section 15 allows the use of search and seizure powers based on a request for use in both proceedings and 
investigations.
a8.10. Discretionary provisions provide that a request may be refused if the provision of the assistance may 
result in the death penalty being imposed on a person; and after taking into consideration the interests of 
international criminal co-operation in the circumstance of the case, the request should not be granted (section 
8(1B)). Section 9 of MACMA allows the Attorney-General to render the assistance and impose conditions on 
the requesting country. 
a8.11. Criterion	37.4	– Assistance is not refused on the sole ground that the offence involves fiscal matters, 
as this is not a ground for refusal under section 8 of the MACMA. Nor is assistance refused on the grounds of 
laws that impose secrecy or confidentiality requirements on financial institutions or DNFBPs.
a8.12. Criterion	37.5	– Section 43C of the MACMA provides that a person must not intentionally disclose 
the existence or nature of an MLA request received by Australia, except insofar as is necessary for the 
performance of his or her duties (in executing the request), or with the approval of the Attorney-General. 
An offence against this section carries a penalty of imprisonment for 2 years. A confidentiality clause is also 
included in the majority of bilateral treaties Australia has concluded on MLA. Further, officers of the ACA who 
are involved in handling MLA request are subject to section 79 of the Crimes Act , which deals with official 
secrets. Breaches of this section are an offence under Australian law. Officers also hold security clearances 
and operate under the ‘need to know’ principle when sharing information within Government. 
a8.13. Criterion	37.6	– Under section 8(2) of the MACMA a request by a foreign country for assistance may 
be refused if, in the opinion of the Attorney General, the request relates to the investigation, prosecution or 
punishment of a person in respect of an act or omission that, if it had occurred in Australia, would not have 
constituted an offence against Australian law at the time at which the request was received. Dual criminality 
is, therefore, a discretionary ground of refusal in relation to requests for all assistance (whether the request 
involves coercive measures or otherwise). If Australia does provide assistance when the offence for which 
assistance is required is not an offence in Australia, section 9 of the MACMA allows the Attorney-General to 
impose conditions on the requesting state. Hence, Australia does have a mechanism to provide MLA if dual 
criminality is a presumptive requirement.
a8.14. Criterion	37.7	– Australia assesses the alleged conduct of the person to determine whether that 
conduct, had it taken place in Australia, would constitute an offence under Australian law at the time that 
the request was received. The dual criminality test does not require that the foreign offence and the notional 
Australian offence be comprised of the same elements. Australia does not place a focus on the categorisation 
of the offence but on the alleged underlying conduct involved. Moreover, if an equivalent and qualifying 
Australian offence could be established based on any part or parts of the total foreign conduct, then dual 
criminality may be established.
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a8.15. Criterion	37.8	– Australia has a range of powers and investigative techniques available in the 
international context for MLA request. Those powers under MACMA include:
 The production, search and seizure of information, documents or evidence (including financial 
records) from financial institutions or other natural or legal persons: Sections 12-13 allow Australia 
to seek and provide a document or other article. Sections 14-15 allow Australia to seek and provide 
material obtained by search and seizure subject to the provisions of the MACMA. 
 Witness statements: Voluntary witness statements can be obtained at any time including the early 
investigative stage without the need for a formal MLA request, since this is not a coercive power. 
Under section 13, a witness who is not a suspect can be compelled to give evidence or produce 
documents before a court, including via video-link to the foreign court, if foreign proceedings are 
on foot. Sections 26-27 facilitate the travel of a person in custody to voluntarily give evidence in a 
foreign proceeding. 
 Service of documents: While many of Australia’s bilateral treaties specifically refer to the service of 
documents as a type of assistance that may be provided, Australia will consider a request for service 
of documents from any country. 
 A broad range of other powers and investigative techniques: Surveillance devices (Part IIIBA, section 
15C), stored communications warrants (Part IIIA, section 15B), telecommunications data (Part IIIB, 
section 15D), and forensic procedures (Part IVA, section 28). 
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a8.16. Recommendation	37	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	38	–	Mutual	legal	assistance:	freezing	and	confiscation
a8.17. Australia received a C rating for Recommendation 38 (numbered the same in the 2013 assessment 
Methodology) in the 2005 assessment. 
a8.18. Criterion	38.1 – Australia can identify, freeze, seize or confiscate the proceeds or an instrument of a 
foreign serious offence on request by another country. A foreign serious offence is defined as an offence against 
a law of a foreign country, the maximum penalty for which is death, imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 
months or a fine exceeding 300 penalty units (being AUD 51 000). Sections 34 –35M of the MACMA set out 
requirements for receiving and dealing with requests made by foreign countries. These provisions provide 
for the enforcement of foreign orders, including: forfeiture orders (which include laundered property and 
proceeds), pecuniary penalty orders (which designate a value rather than a property), restraining orders, 
production orders, monitoring orders, and search warrants to identify and seize property. Action can also 
be taken against the instruments of offences (used in or intended for use in) if the action is conviction based.
a8.19. Criterion	38.2	– Section 34(2) of the MACMA provides for the registration and enforcement of non-
conviction based foreign forfeiture orders and foreign pecuniary penalty orders. This provision enables the 
forfeiture of property that is, or is alleged to be, the proceeds or an instrument of a serious foreign offence, or 
the benefit derived from a serious foreign offence, regardless of whether the person alleged to have committed 
the offence has been convicted of that offence, or whether charges have been laid against that person. Section 
34(3)(b) of the MACMA enables a non-conviction based foreign restraining order to be enforced over property 
where the identity of the person who committed the serious foreign offence is not known.
a8.20. Criterion	38.3		– Seizure and confiscation actions are coordinated by the ACA, the central authority 
for extradition and MLA, in partnership with the CACT within the AFP. Casework officers liaise with 
government departments and law enforcement on MLA requests. 
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a8.21. The AFP also coordinates arrangements with other countries relating to seizure and confiscation 
action. Section 34B of the MACMA provides that property subject to a foreign forfeiture order may be 
disposed of, or otherwise dealt with, in accordance with any direction of the Attorney-General or of a person 
authorised by the Attorney-General in writing. Section 34D of the MACMA provides that a foreign pecuniary 
penalty order may be enforced as if it were a debt due to the federal government. Money paid to the federal 
government under a foreign pecuniary penalty order registered under section 34 of the MACMA is credited 
to the Confiscated Assets Account. Section 297 of the POCA sets out a number of mechanisms for managing, 
and when necessary, disposing of payments made into the Confiscated Assets Account. The way in which 
restrained property is dealt with is covered by Division 3, Part 4-1 of the POCA (section 35C of the MACMA). 
However, before disposing or destroying of property, the Official Trustee must consult with the foreign 
country that made the request relating to the property covered by the foreign restraining order (see section 
35C(2) of the MACMA and section 278 of the POCA). 
a8.22. Criterion	 38.4 – Legislation allows Australia to share confiscated proceeds of crime with any 
country in the absence of any specific treaty obligations. Under the POCA, the federal Minister for Justice 
can approve the sharing of confiscated assets with a foreign country if, in the Minister’s opinion, the foreign 
country has made a significant contribution to the recovery of those proceeds or to the investigation or 
prosecution of the unlawful activity. Australia has bilateral MLA treaties with 29 countries. These treaties 
generally include provisions relating to dealing with confiscated assets. Additionally, Australia has ratified a 
number of international conventions that have proceeds of crime and asset sharing provisions, including the 
Merida Convention. Any request for sharing proceeds of crime made under the Merida Convention, or by a 
country with which Australia has ratified a MLA treaty that has obligations with respect to proceeds of crime, 
will be considered by Australia in accordance with the terms of the treaty.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a8.23. Recommendation	38	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	39	–	Extradition
a8.24. Australia received a compliant rating for Recommendation 39 in the 2005 assessment. In 2012, 
Australia amended the Extradition Act 1988	(the	Extradition	Act)	in order to streamline and modernise the 
extradition process further. The reforms aim to reduce the length of the process, including the amount of time 
a person spends in custody, in new and ongoing extradition cases. In particular, the amendments:
 Enable a person to elect to waive the extradition process entirely, subject to appropriate safeguards
 Aim to reduce the time spent by persons in Australian custody, by streamlining the early stages of 
the extradition process, subject to safeguards
 Extend the availability of bail to the later stages of extradition proceedings, and
 Enable a person to be prosecuted in Australia where extradition has been refused ensuring that 
refusal to extradite does not mean that a person escapes justice.
a8.25. Criterion	39.1	– Extradition is governed by the Extradition Act. The Act applies when a country 
is designated as an “extradition country”. This designation generally occurs by way of domestic regulation. 
Australia has designated by regulation extradition countries individually, with countries which it has treaty 
and for countries without a treaty, for a group of Commonwealth countries under the London Scheme, and 
for all countries automatically that are also parties to the Vienna, Palermo, Merida, and CTF Conventions. 
Countries that have an extradition treaty with the UK, which was inherited by Australia, fall within the 
definition of “extradition country” without the need for designation by regulation. These provisions make ML 
and TF extraditable offences in Australia. Under the Extradition Act, generally a person can be surrendered for 
an “extradition offence’, which is an offence against the law of the other country (i.e. the requesting country) 
punishable by at least 12 months imprisonment. Dual criminality is also a requirement for extradition 
(section 19(2)). ML is criminalised in the Criminal Code and applies to all serious offences. While deficiencies 
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in relation to the TF offence have been identified, the underlying conduct of TF has been criminalised with a 
broad range of TF offences. Therefore, the deficiencies in the TF offence do not apply to Recommendation 39 
as the classification of the offence does not affect dual criminality requirements.
a8.26. The Extradition Unit within the ACA coordinates extradition requests. The Unit maintains a casework 
database allowing cases and ‘next-steps’ to be monitored. It also has processes and practices in place to execute 
matters in a timely fashion and to prioritise cases effectively. Extradition requests may also involve a number 
of other agencies including the CDPP, the AFP and other Commonwealth, State or Territory law enforcement, 
revenue or regulatory bodies. The ACA represents the foreign country in extradition proceedings in Australia. 
The CDPP only has a role in outgoing extradition cases if the matter is being prosecuted by the CDPP.
a8.27. There are no unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on extradition. Section 15B(3) allows the 
Attorney-General to refuse extradition if the person sought in Australia may be subject to torture or the death 
penalty. Section 7 of the Extradition Act also provides for “extradition objections” to be determined which 
relate to offences of a political character, prejudice on account of race, religion etc., offences solely under 
military law and not the ordinary criminal law, and cases of double jeopardy. 
a8.28. Criterion	39.2	– Australia does not refuse extradition on the basis of nationality. Section 45 of the 
Extradition Act contains provision for prosecution in lieu of extradition of any person (including Australian 
citizens). The Attorney-General can consent to a such a prosecution only after: 1) determining not to surrender 
the person to an extradition country; 2) being satisfied that the conduct occurring outside Australia would 
have constituted a “notional Australian offence” under the law of the federal government, State or Territory 
of Australia had it occurred there. 
a8.29. Criterion	39.3	– Under section 19 of the Extradition Act, the dual criminality requirement is assessed 
as part of a broader assessment of a person’s eligibility for surrender. Section 19(2)(c) sets out the test for 
when dual criminality is satisfied. Section 10 provides further detail on the interpretation of provisions 
relating to offences. Section 10(3) provides:
 Where the conduct or equivalent conduct consists of two or more acts or omissions, regard may be 
had to all or to only one or some of those acts or omissions, and
 Any difference between the denomination or categorisation of offences under the law of the country 
and the law of Australia, or the law in force in the part of Australia, as the case requires, shall be 
disregarded.
a8.30. Australia does not therefore assess the dual criminality requirement based on the categorisation or 
the terminology used to describe the relevant offences.
a8.31. Criterion	39.4	– There are a number of provisions in the Extradition Act for simplified processes. 
For instance: 
 Part II of the Act provides for simplified extradition procedures between Australia and New Zealand 
known as the ‘backing of warrants scheme’. The scheme is administered by the police forces in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 A person may waive their participation in the extradition process subject to certain safeguards. If a 
person elects to waive the extradition process, not all stages in the extradition process will need to 
be completed and consequently the time the person spends in custody in Australia can be reduced. A 
person can elect to waive the process once they have been arrested in Australia (either pursuant to 
a provisional arrest request or a full extradition request). A person may waive their participation in 
the extradition process for their return to the requesting country for offences which are ‘extradition 
offences’ and those which are not classed as such (i.e. those that are punishable by less than 12 
months’ imprisonment). If satisfied, the magistrate must commit the person to prison or on bail 
pending the Attorney-General’s determination whether the person should be surrendered to the 
requesting country. 
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a8.32. While extradition requests made and received by Australia are transmitted formally through the 
diplomatic channel, provisional arrest requests can be made and received directly from central authorities or 
through the Interpol channel. This assists in not delaying the delivery of such requests given the urgency and 
time sensitivities associated.
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a8.33. Australia has comprehensive measures for extradition. Recommendation	39	is	rated	compliant.
Recommendation	40	–	Other	forms	of	international	cooperation
a8.34. Australia received a compliant rating in 2005 for Recommendation 40. The requirements in new 
Recommendation 40 are considerably more detailed. 
a8.35. Criterion	40.1	– Australian competent authorities including AUSTRAC, AFP, ACC, APRA and ASIC can 
provide a range of information to their foreign counterpart authorities in relation to ML, predicate offences 
and TF. Information can be shared both simultaneously and upon request.
a8.36. Criterion	40.2	–	
1.	 The competent authorities have a lawful basis for providing cooperation. (AUSTRAC: AML/
CTF Act, section 132; AFP: the AFP Act), section 8(1) and AML/CTF Act section 132; ACC: 
the ACC Act , section 59AA, AML/CTF Act, section 132; APRA: the APRA Act ,sections 56(5)
(a)–(b); ASIC:  the ASIC Act, section 127(4); the NSW Police Force: section 6(2)(c) of the 
Police Act 1990 (NSW); the New South Wales Crime Commission (NSWCC): section 13 of 
the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW); the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission 
(QCCC): section 55 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001.)
2.	 Government agencies in Australia are not only authorised to use the most efficient means to 
cooperate within existing frameworks, they are required to do so.
3. All authorities use clear and secure gateways, mechanisms or channels. The AML/CTF 
Act allows AUSTRAC and designated law enforcement and national security agencies to 
communicate AUSTRAC information with foreign counterparts. AUSTRAC had 67 exchange 
instruments with counterpart foreign financial intelligence units (FIUs) effective in 2014. 
AUSTRAC uses Egmont’s secure web as the primary channel for international exchange. 
ASIC has a clear and secured gateway for foreign requests; a dedicated email address is 
available on the ASIC’s website. ASIC plans to improve the level of security of the information 
exchanged with foreign counterparts in 2015, through for example enhanced encryption. 
Section 127 of the ASIC Act provides that information received from foreign regulators, 
including their requests, is treated as confidential information. ASIC complies with the 
requirements of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF). APRA also communicates 
and exchanges information with foreign counterparts using encryption tools. State and 
Territory law enforcement agencies use the AFP Liaison Officer network. Where necessary, 
State and Territory police services enter into Memoranda of Understanding with the AFP. 
4. The competent authorities have processes for prioritising and executing requests: the 
ACC and ASIC have dedicated teams for coordinating and responding to foreign requests 
within a maximum of 28 days. The ACBPS also has a dedicated unit for the coordination 
and operational assistance to and from foreign counterparts. ASIC has a dedicated team, 
International Cooperation Requests (ICR), which coordinates international requests to and 
from ASIC. ICR has key performance indicators of 14 days to send out requests and 28 days 
to respond to international requests. These are subject to complexity of requests, resourcing 
and other operational issues. Priority is given to requests relating to enforcement matters. 
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Requests made pursuant to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) Multilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MMOU) and bilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) that require authorisation under the Mutual Assistance in Business 
Regulation Act 1992 (MABRA) are given highest priority. ICR has and maintains a database 
(OIRs), which has built in milestones for acknowledgement and request sent/response sent. 
There is also an ability to categorise an activity as urgent.
5. The competent authorities have clear processes for safeguarding the information received. 
The PSPF sets for all agencies detailed requirements for a number of matters, including 
information asset classification. Agencies are also required to have internal policies to 
manage and protect the records, as well as to ensure that records are retained, classified, and 
filed. They are also required to have Information Security Policies for securing information, 
security classification and protective markings, dissemination limiting markers, handling, 
access and control. The following legislative instruments prescribe details regarding the 
protection of information held by APRA and ASIC: section 56 of the APRA Act and section 
127 of the ASIC Act. Section 60A (Secrecy) of the AFP Act places specific constraints on the 
AFP in relation to the disclosure of prescribed information. 
a8.37. Criterion	 40.3	 – AUSTRAC has entered into a range of agreements to give effect to multilateral 
or bilateral arrangements; APRA and ASIC have entered into Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and 
Multilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MMoUs) with a wide range of foreign counterparts.1 Similarly, 
the AFP relies on a range of police-to-police and government-to-government MoUs2.
a8.38. Criterion	 40.4	 – AUSTRAC seeks feedback from foreign counterparts on assistance received in 
a timely manner. ASIC also sends feedback to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), of which it is a member, on the quantity and quality of information exchanged pursuant to the IOSCO 
Multilateral MoU. APRA participates in international surveys on information exchange and cooperation 
arrangements conducted through international standard setting bodies such as the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors.
a8.39. Criterion	40.5	– The relevant statutes and agreements that empower the sharing of information 
by competent authorities as identified in Criterion 40.2 above do not unduly restrict information exchange. 
Where the statutory provisions provide for an approval process, information sharing is generally limited only 
by the requirement to establish that the foreign request is relevant and proportionate. 
a8.40. Criterion	40.6	– The MOU which facilitates the exchange of information by competent authorities 
contains confidentiality provisions which safeguard against improper disclosure of information. Authorities 
also have the discretion to impose additional conditions to safeguard exchanged information. See, for example, 
section 56 of the APRA Act and section 127(1) of the ASIC Act. Internal policies of Australian agencies 
(federal, State and Territory) prioritise the protection of information received from international bodies. It is 
1 For a full list of these, please refer to www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/ArrangementsandMoUs.aspx and www.
asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/OIR+-+Memorandum+of+Understandings?openDocument. 
2 See:  
www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2005/June/singapore-and-australia-sign-cooperation-agreement.aspx
 www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2012/july/the-afp-and-fbi-unite-against-terrorism-and-transnational-
crime.aspx
 www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2011/november/AFP-and-Indonesian-National-Police-sign-new-
agreement-to-combat-transnational-crime.aspx
 www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2012/february/AFP-and-serbian-police-sign-new-agreement.aspx
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a standard operational principle of law enforcement bodies that the information received can only be used 
for the purposes for which it was provided.
a8.41. Criterion	40.7	– For AUSTRAC, international exchange information is classified with a protective 
marking applied to information covered by a specific secrecy provision of an Act, consistent with the PSPF. 
Part 11 of the AML/CTF Act provides the secrecy provisions in this case. Security containers and system 
controls provide physical and online protection to stored information. The PSPF protects information 
holdings, including international exchange information. The provisions allow competent authorities to refuse 
to disclose information where the requesting competent authority is unwilling or unable to agree with the 
conditions of disclosure.
a8.42. Criterion	40.8	– AUSTRAC conducts enquiries within Australia on behalf of foreign counterparts. In 
addition, sections 8 –10 and 18 of the MABRA empower competent authorities (i.e. ASIC and APRA) to provide 
assistance in response to a request from a foreign regulator. While APRA can only provide such assistance 
with Ministerial approval (section 8), ASIC senior staff can exercise the Minister’s power to authorise the 
obtaining of information or documents. 
a8.43. Criterion	40.9	– AUSTRAC has an adequate basis for international cooperation on issues related to 
ML, predicate offences and TF under section 132(1) of the AML/CTF Act. That section authorises AUSTRAC 
to provide information so long as the foreign government provides undertakings to protect confidentiality, 
controls the use of the information and ensures that the information should only be used for the purpose for 
which it is communicated.
a8.44. Criterion	40.10	– AUSTRAC provides feedback to foreign countries on a range of matters, including 
on behalf of other Australian domestic agencies receiving information from overseas as the result of a 
spontaneous disclosure or in response to a request. AUSTRAC has provided feedback on such matters as: 
the timeliness of the response by the overseas FIU; whether Australian agencies were already aware of the 
information; and if new information was relevant, how the information was used and whether spontaneous 
disclosures led to further requests for information. Feedback is requested routinely following each 
international exchange. 
a8.45. Criterion	 40.11	 – Section 132(1) of the AML/CTF Act authorises AUSTRAC to communicate 
AUSTRAC information, including information from reporting entities obtained by authorised officers under 
AUSTRAC’s information-gathering and enforcement powers. Company and business information from ASIC 
is also exchanged with foreign FIUs. Information obtained by AUSTRAC from a government body becomes 
AUSTRAC information and is subject to the same protections afforded under the AML/CTF Act.
a8.46. Criterion	40.12	– As noted earlier, AUSTRAC has statutory authority under the AML/CTF Act to 
cooperate with foreign counterparts, ASIC and APRA have authority to do so under the MABRA. APRA is also 
authorised to disclose information to foreign counterparts under section 56 of the APRA Act; ASIC can also 
release information it holds to assist foreign counterparts pursuant to section 127(4) of the ASIC Act.
a8.47. Criterion	40.13	– Financial supervisors are able to acquire information from financial institutions 
and share them with foreign counterparts under the authority of sections 8-10 and 18 of the MABRA. While 
APRA can only provide such assistance with ministerial approval (section 8), ASIC senior staff are able to 
exercise the Minister’s power to authorise the provision of information, documents or evidence. ASIC and 
APRA are also able to share the information available to them through their routine operations; section 
127(4) of the ASIC Act and sections 56(5)(a)–(b) of the APRA Act.
a8.48. Criterion	 40.14	 – APRA and ASIC are not restricted from sharing regulatory and prudential 
information that is not institution-specific. ASIC can share with foreign agencies the information it holds on 
financial institutions’ business activities, beneficial ownership, and fit and properness under the conditions 
set in section 127 of the ASIC Act. Disclosure of information on financial institutions’ activities by APRA is 
authorised under certain conditions by section 56 of the APRA Act. It is further provided in section 56(3) of 
the APRA Act that institution-specific information can be released where the information is disclosed for the 
purposes of a prudential regulation framework law. APRA and ASIC are also designated agencies under the 
AML/CTF Act, which gives them access to AUSTRAC information. 
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a8.49. Criterion	40.15	 – Financial supervisors can provide assistance to a foreign regulator under the 
MABRA; however, this requires Ministerial approval. See also criteria 40.2, 40.8, 40.13 and 40.18.
a8.50. Criterion	40.16	–	Information conveyed to Australian financial supervisors is protected by secrecy 
and confidentiality provisions in statutes and relevant MoU. See criteria 40.6 and 40.7 above.
a8.51. Criterion	 40.17	 – Law enforcement authorities are able to exchange domestically available 
information with foreign counterparts for intelligence or investigative purposes. Subsection 8(1)(bf) of the 
AFP Act includes, as an AFP function, the provision of police services and police support services for the 
purposes of assisting, or cooperating with, an Australian or foreign law enforcement, intelligence, security 
or government regulatory agency. “Police services” is defined as including services performed by way of the 
prevention of crime, including information exchange. “Police support services” includes any service related to 
the provision of services by an Australian or foreign regulatory, intelligence or security, or law enforcement 
agency. State and Territory police services and the AFP are able to exchange domestically available information 
with foreign counterparts through the AFP’s International Liaison Officer Network.
a8.52. Criterion	40.18	– The AFP can use its powers to conduct inquiries, including investigative techniques, 
and obtain information on behalf of foreign counterparts under sections 8(1)(bf) of the AFP Act. The ACC is 
permitted to conduct inquiries and obtain information on behalf of foreign counterparts, in the exercise of its 
general intelligence power under section 7A(a) of the ACC Act. State and Territory law enforcement bodies 
are able to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts under the authority of the MACMA. 
a8.53. Criterion	40.19	–	The AFP’s powers provide a basis for the AFP to form joint investigative teams and 
establish bilateral or multilateral agreements where required. The ACC is afforded similar powers to form 
joint investigative teams and bilateral/ multilateral arrangements to enable joint investigations under section 
17(2) of the ACC Act. ASIO is afforded similar powers in section 19(1)(c) of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth). State and Territory law enforcement bodies have been less likely to require the 
creation of such joint investigations. However, where the need arises, they have the authority to do so under 
the MACMA or under the broad authority they are given to perform their functions. See, for example, section 
6(2)(c) of the Police Act 1990 (NSW).
a8.54. Criterion	 40.20	 – The relevant statutory provisions identified in response to criterion 40.2 are 
not limited to direct disclosures of information and do not require that the information only be transmitted 
between counterparts. For example, subsection 8(1)(bf) of the AFP Act includes, as an AFP function, the 
provision of police services and police support services for the purposes of assisting, or cooperating with, an 
Australian or foreign law enforcement, intelligence, security, or government regulatory agency. The majority 
of information exchanges channelled through AUSTRAC each year is indirect in nature. AUSTRAC facilitates 
foreign exchanges with all its domestic partner agencies across the regulatory, law enforcement, revenue, 
intelligence and social justice spheres. Similar provisions for indirect cooperation are provided to APRA 
(section 56 of the APRA Act, and ASIC (section 127 of the ASIC Act).
Weighting	and	Conclusion
a8.55. ASIC and APRA may conduct enquiries for purposes of complying with a request from a foreign 
regulator. As an FIU, AUSTRAC can also provide all the information to foreign requests as required by 
Recommendation 40; as a regulator, AUSTRAC can share all relevant information that it holds or that it can 
obtain from reporting parties. Recommendation	40	is	rated	compliant.
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Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report
In this report:  a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML) / counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures 
in place in Australia as at the date of the on-site visit (30 July - 12 August 2014). The report analyses 
the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Australia’s 
AML/CTF system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened.
